Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan that it has not a claim to absolute perfection have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. Why, say they, should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established? This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically defective and that without material alterations the rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found who will not declare as his sentiment that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such a one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer in the next place that I should esteem it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices as of the good sense and wisdom of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and union must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city 82 are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue as those in which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worth the perusal of every friend to his country. 83 There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine 84 in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise in relation to any other point—no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of effecting an amendment and that of establishing, in the first instance, a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity will, in my opinion, constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of doubt that the observation is futile. It is this: that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States [which at present amount to nine], to call a convention for proposing amendments which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof. The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress shall call a convention. Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures in amendments which may affect local Interests can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived by it for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: To balance a large state or society [says he], whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments. 85 These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginar
y. A NATION without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts because I know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS [Hamilton]
* * *
The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.
The poet is Shakespeare, King Henry VIII, III, ii. [Ed.]
Aspasia, vide Plutarch's Life of Pericles.
Ibid.
Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
Ibid.
Worn by the popes.
Madame de Maintenon.
Duchess of Marlborough.
Madame de Pompadour.
The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.
The Duke of Marlborough.
Vide Principes des Negociations par l'Abbe de Mably.
Gabriel Bonnet de Mably (1709-85) was a French historian and writer on international law. [Ed.]
Divide and command.
This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be shown that the only rational precaution on which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which conatin no guard at all on this subject.
Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), French historian and political theorist, who wrote Esprit des Lois in 1748. [Ed.]
Spirit of Laws, Vol. I, Book IX, Chap. I.
Recherches philosophiques surles Americains.
L'Abbe Guillaume Thomas Francois Raynal (1713-96) was the author in 1770 of Reeherehes Philosophiques sar les Americains. The original idea of physical degeneration in America is attributed to the naturalist Comte de Buffon (1707-88). [Ed.]
Jacques Necker (1732-1804), Director-General of Finances in France 1776-81 and 1788-90. [Ed.]
I mean for the Union.
Charles Francois Xavier Milot (1726-85), a widely read French historian who often wrote about ancient history. [Ed.]
This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members of the federal head.
Pfeffel. Nouvel Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne, says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.
Thuanus was Jacques Auguste de Thou (1553-1617), a French historian. C. F. Pfeffel (1726-1807) was a German diplomat and historian. [Ed.]
Hugo du Grotius (1583-1645), the famous writer on international law and political theory, published his De Jure Belli ac Paeis in 1625. [Ed.]
Sir william Temple (1628-99), English diplomat and essayist, wrote Observations Upon the United Provinces in 1672. [Ed.]
This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech in introducing the last bill.
Encyclopedia, article Empire.
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States, but they do not contain one third of the people.
Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be less than a majority.
The Forth Earl of Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope (1694-1773), was, in addition to being a wit and letter-writer, a statesman who served as British ambassador at The Hague from 1728-1732. [Ed.]
The historical episode referred to is the coup d'etat by Gustavus IV of Sweden in 1722. [Ed.]
This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collections of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up. This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bills of rights, a clause to this effect: Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE ; which is a formal admission of authority of the legislature. New York has no bill of her rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however, that one or two States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect.
The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution (1913) now requires that Senators be elected directly by the people of the states. [Ed.]
The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments will, in its proper place, be fully detected.
Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
The New England States.
The state referred to is Maryland which refused to ratify the Articles until her demands were met that all states renounce to the Union their claims to western land. [ED.]
Connecticut and Rhode Island.
Declaration of Independence.
Burgh's Political Disquisitions.
1st Clause, 4th Section, of the 1st Article.
Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.
In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of impeachments.
See Cato, No. V.
Cato was George Clinton (1739-1812), Governor of New York and main opponent of the Constitution in that state. He authored seven letters under the name Cato in the New York Journal between September, 1787, and January, 1788. [Ed.]
Article 1, Section 3. Clause 1.
vide Federal Farmer.
Richard Henry Lee (1723-94) was the author of Letter of a Federal Farmer. [Ed.]
The poet is Alexander Pope (1688-1744) in his Essay on Man, written in 1733 and 1734. Hamilton has the second line wrong. It should read: whate'er is best administered, is best.
A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY, has asserted that the king of Great Britain owes his prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative in this respect is immemorial, and was only disputed contrary to all reason and precedent, as Blackstone, Vol. I, page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I; but by the statute the 13th of Charles Il, chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole supreme government and command of all the militia within his Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all fous and places of strength, EVER WAS AND Is the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.
vide Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. I, page 257.
Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned. And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other considerations and pursue them through all their consequences, we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion.
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