by G. A. Henty
Chapter 9: Victories.
In the meantime, negotiations had been going on with Siam, betweenwhich state and Burma there was the bitterest enmity. It had beenthought that Siam would have willingly grasped the opportunity torevenge itself for the many losses of territory that it hadsuffered at the hands of Burma. This there was no doubt that itwould have been glad to do, but our occupation of several points onthe coast of Tenasserim roused the fears of Siam, and inclined itto the belief that we might prove an even more dangerous neighbourthan Burma.
The court of Ava had, on its part, also sent urgent messages to theKing of Siam--when misfortunes had, to some extent, lowered itspride--calling upon him to make common cause with Burma, and tojoin it in repelling an enemy who would doubtless be as dangerousto him as to Burma.
Siam, however, determined to steer a middle course. An army wasassembled, in readiness for any contingency; but Siam believed aslittle as Burma, itself, that the British could possibly bevictorious over that power; and feared its vengeance, if she wereto ally herself with us while, upon the other hand, Siam had a longsea coast, and feared the injury our fleet might inflict upon it,were it to join Burma. The king, therefore, gave both powers anassurance of his friendship; and marched his army down to thefrontier of the province of Martaban, which bordered on the greatSalween river on the Tenasserim coast, and lay some two hundredmiles from Rangoon, across the gulf of Martaban.
The intentions of the king being so doubtful, the advance of theSiamese army in this direction could not be regarded withindifference by the British. The town of Martaban was the centre ofthe Burmese military power in Tenasserim, and the advance towardsit of the Siamese army would place it in direct communication withthat of Burma. On the 13th of October, therefore, a force,consisting of a wing of the 41st Regiment and the 3rd MadrasInfantry, sailed from Rangoon against the town. The expedition wasdelayed by light winds and, when it arrived at the mouth of theriver, found that every preparation had been made for an obstinatedefence. They learned, from a peasant, that strong works had beenerected on every eminence round the town; and that the road fromthe coast had been cut, and stockaded.
Approach by this route was impossible, for there were twenty milesof country to be traversed; and much of this was under water fromthe inundations. It was, therefore, determined to go up the river,although this was so shallow and full of shoals that the navigationwas extremely difficult. At last, after great labour--incurred bythe ships constantly getting ashore--they succeeded in making theirway up to Martaban, and anchored off the town.
A heavy cannonade was carried on, for some time, between the shipsand the enemy's works. Then the troops were embarked in boats,which rowed for the shore under a very heavy fire from the enemy.As soon as they landed, and advanced to attack the stockades, theBurmese lost heart and hastily retreated; while the inhabitantsreceived the troops as they entered with the warmest welcome--forthey were, for the most part, natives of Pegu, and stillentertained a deep hatred for the Burmese, because of the longoppression that they had suffered at their hands.
Throughout the rest of Tenasserim, however; and indeed, throughoutthe whole country traversed by the troops later on, the inhabitantsappeared to have entirely forgotten their ancient nationality, andthe conquest of their country by the Burmans; and to have becomecompletely absorbed by them. Throughout the whole time that weoccupied Martaban, the people gave no trouble whatever and, indeed,offered to raise a force for service with us, if we wished it.
At the end of October the rain ceased--to the intense delight ofthe troops--and the cold season set in. November was, however, anexceptionally deadly month--the occasional days of fine weatherdrawing up the exhalations from the swamps--and the number ofdeaths was greater than they had been at any previous time. Therewas, too, no prospect of a forward movement, at present. Theexpedition had come unprovided with boats or other means oftransport, making sure that an abundant supply would be obtained,in a country where the whole trade was carried on by the rivers.The promptness with which the native authorities had, on the firstappearance of the fleet, sent every boat away, had disappointedthis anticipation and, although the opening of some of the otherrivers had enabled the local fishermen to bring their boats toRangoon, where fish were eagerly purchased, the British troops werestill, up to the end of November, without the means of sending ahundred men up the river, save in the boats of the fleet.
The Indian authorities--believing that, when the Burmese foundthemselves impotent to turn us out of Rangoon, the court of Avawould be glad to negotiate--had not, until the autumn was drawingto a close, thought of making any preparations to supply the armywith water carriage. They now, however, began to bestir themselves.Five hundred boatmen were sent from Chittagong, bringing many boatsdown with them, and building others at Rangoon. Transports withdraft cattle sailed from Bengal, and a considerable reinforcementof troops was on its way to join, at the end of December--for allthe natives agreed that no movement could be made, by land, untilthe end of January.
In November, even Bandoola's army was obliged to make its approachby water. Early in that month it was learned that the Burmesegeneral had given orders for the advance, and preparations were atonce begun to meet what none doubted would be a very seriousattack. The reinforcements had not yet arrived, and the greatlydiminished force was far too small for the length of the line thathad to be defended. Redoubts were therefore thrown up, pagodas andother buildings were fortified; and two complete lines of worksconstructed, from the great pagoda to the city, one facing east andthe other west.
The post at Kemmendine was strengthened, and was supported by H. M.sloop Sophie, a company's cruiser, and a strong division ofgunboats. The retention of this post was of great importance, as itbarred the river approach to Rangoon, and prevented the enemysending down a huge fleet of war galleys and fire rafts to attackthe town, and set fire to the merchant shipping lying off it.
In the last week of November, smoke was seen to rise from manypoints in the forest. Many fugitives came in from their villages,and reported that Bandoola's army were all on their way down theriver; and by the end of the month some sixty thousand men, with alarge train of artillery and a body of cavalry, were assembledround our position. Of this force, thirty thousand were armed withmuskets. They had with them, too, a great number of jingals. Theselittle guns carried ball of from six to twelve ounces, and weremounted on a light carriage, which two men could wheel with ease.The cannon were carried to the scene of action on elephants. Thecavalry were seven hundred strong, drawn from the borders ofManipur.
The rest of the army were armed with swords and spears, and carriedimplements for stockading and entrenching. The force was accompanied bya number of astrologers; and by the Invulnerables--who had, doubtless,satisfactorily explained their failure to capture the pagoda.
A great semicircle of light smoke, rising from the trees, showedthat the position taken up by Bandoola extended from the riverabove Kemmendine to the neighbourhood of Rangoon. On the night ofthe 31st, the troops at the pagoda heard a loud and continuous stirin the forest. It gradually approached and, by morning, greatmasses of troops had gathered at the edge of the jungle, withinmusket shot of the post. The garrison there were drawn up inreadiness to repel a sudden rush but, just as the sun rose, a dinmade by thousands of men engaged in cutting down the trees began,and it was evident that the Burmese were going to adopt their usualplan of entrenching themselves behind stockades.
During the time that had elapsed between the repulse of theInvulnerables and the arrival of Bandoola's army, Stanley's workwas light, and the life dull and monotonous. An hour was spent,every morning, in examining the fugitives who had, by the retreatof the Burmese, been enabled to make their way back to the town;and of women who had escaped from the vigilance of the Burmesepolice, and had come in from the villages where they had been heldas hostages for their husbands. Once or twice a week, he went offwith the general to the hospital ship, to inquire into the state ofthe sick and to pay a visit to th
e long line of cots along the mainand lower deck. Almost every day he rode, in spite of the weather,to one or other of the regimental camps; and soon came to know mostof the officers of the force. His previous experience on the rivershad done much to acclimatise him, and his health continued good.
On the evening of the 30th he had, at the general's order, riddenup to the pagoda. It was considered likely that the attack would bedelivered there in the first place and, at three o'clock in themorning, when it became evident that a large body of men wereapproaching through the forest, he galloped back to Rangoon withthe news and, at five, rode out again with Sir A. Campbell.
Among the garrison there was much disappointment when the sound ofwood chopping announced that the Burmese did not intend to attack;but the general, who had been watching the edge of the junglethrough his glasses, lowered them and put them into their case withan expression of satisfaction.
"I don't want them to attack, Colonel," he said. "If they do, andwe beat them off, we are no nearer the end than before. That sortof thing might be carried on for months; as long, in fact, as thereremains a man to bring up. What we want is to inflict such a heavyblow upon them, that even the court at Ava may become convincedthat they cannot hope to drive us out of Rangoon; in which casethey may consent to negotiate, and we may bring the war to an end.
"Heaven knows that we have suffered enough loss, at present; and Idon't want to have to undertake such a difficult operation as anadvance against Ava. I am glad to see that they have begun toconstruct stockades. I do not intend to interfere until they havecompletely finished their work, and gained sufficient confidence tomake a general attack on us. Then we shall be able to give them aheavy lesson.
"Ah, there they are, at work!"
As he spoke, a roar of musketry and artillery broke out suddenlyfrom Kemmendine, and all eyes were turned in that direction. Thespot was two miles distant, but the forest shut out, alike, theview of the river and of the works held by us. The exact position,however, was indicated by the masts of the two war vessels, risingabove the trees.
Soon great wreaths of heavy white smoke rose above the forest, inand around Kemmendine, shutting out all view. The fire continuedwithout abatement, and it was evident that the attack was a hot anddetermined one. Confident as all felt that the little fort would beable to defend itself successfully, the great smoke clouds werewatched with some feeling of anxiety; for the garrison was, afterall, but a handful. In momentary intervals of the firing, the yellsand shouts of the natives could be distinctly heard and, once ortwice, after a heavy broadside from the ships of war, the cheers ofthe British sailors could be plainly recognized.
After two hours' fighting the din gradually ceased. The clouds ofsmoke rolled away, and the masts of the ships became visible, andthe garrison of the pagoda raised three hearty cheers, to tell thedefenders that their successful defence had been watched andwelcomed.
Presently some heavy columns of the enemy issued from the forest,on the other side of the river; and marched across the plain toDalla, which faced Rangoon. They moved with great regularity andorder, led by their chiefs on horseback, their gilded umbrellasglittering in the rays of the sun. On reaching the bank of theriver opposite Rangoon, they began entrenching themselves andthrowing up stockades and batteries; with the evident intention ofopening fire on the shipping. Soon afterwards large bodies of menissued from the forest facing the pagoda and, marching along aslight ridge, that extended from that point to the creek belowRangoon, took up their position there, and began entrenchingthemselves all along the line. Thus the British position was nowcompletely surrounded; there was, however, no doubt that the mainbody of the enemy was still facing the pagoda.
"We must see what they are doing," the general said. "This is tooimportant a point for us to allow them to erect a stronglyfortified position, close at hand."
Accordingly, Tollemache was sent down with an order to the 18thMadras Infantry--supported by a detachment of the 13th Regiment,under Major Sale--to advance against the enemy in the jungle. Themovements of this force were eagerly watched from the terrace ofthe pagoda. At a rapid pace they crossed the intervening ground,and a rattle of musketry broke out from the jungle as theyapproached. The British made no response; but charged, with acheer, and were soon lost to sight in the trees. Their regularvolleys could be heard, at short intervals, above the scatteredrattle of the Burmese musketeers; and their cheers frequently rose,loud and triumphant. In half an hour the red line emerged againfrom the jungle, having destroyed the stockades the Burmese haderected; captured several guns, a quantity of muskets, andentrenching tools thrown away by the Burmese; and killed a largenumber of the enemy.
During the day the enemy made repeated efforts to send fire raftsdown the river from above Kemmendine. These rafts were constructedof bamboos, upon which were placed great numbers of earthenwarepots, filled with petroleum. These rafts were skilfullyconstructed, and made in sections so that, when they driftedagainst an anchor chain, they would divide--those on each sideswinging round, so as to envelop the ship on both sides with fire.
The sailors from the sloops and gunboats rowed up to meet the raftsand, although a heavy fire was kept up by the enemy, from thejungles lining the banks, they succeeded in towing most of themsafely to shore; while the rest grounded on a projecting spit, offKemmendine.
So diligently did the Burmese work at all points throughout the daythat, by the afternoon, their whole line of circumvallation wascovered with earthworks; behind which they lay, entirely hiddenfrom sight.
"If they could fight as well as they dig, and build stockades," SirA. Campbell remarked, "they would be one of the most formidableenemies in the world. No European army ever accomplished the workof entrenching themselves so speedily as they have done. Theirarrangements have been admirable. Everything has been done withoutconfusion, and each body has taken up the position allotted to it;as is evident by the fact that there is no gap in their lines.
"As to Bandoola's tactics, I cannot say so much for them. In thefirst place, he has divided his force into two parts, separated bya river, and incapable of helping each other. In the next place,great as are his numbers, his lines are far too extended.
"Well, we will let them go on for a time; and then show them themistake that they have committed."
Major Sale's reports of the entrenchments were that they consistedof a long line of holes, each capable of containing two men. Theearth was dug out on one side so as to form a sort of cave. In thiswas a bed of straw or brushwood, on which one man could sleep,while the other watched. Each hole contained a sufficient supply ofrice, water, and even fuel for its inmates. One line of these holeshad been completed, and another was being dug a short distance inadvance.
The Burmese do not relieve their men in the trenches. Those whooccupy the line first made remain there. Fresh men dig and occupythe next line, and so the advance is continued, until close to thework to be attacked. The system has the great advantage that ashell falling into one of these holes only kills its two occupants;instead of destroying many, as it might do if it fell in acontinuous trench.
In the afternoon the general returned to Rangoon, leaving Stanleyat the pagoda, with orders to ride down should there be any changeof importance. In the evening a considerable force of Burmeseissued from the jungle, and prepared to entrench themselves nearthe northeast angle of the pagoda hill. Major Piper therefore tooktwo companies of the 38th and, descending the hill, drove theBurmese, in confusion, back to the jungle.
In the morning it was found that the enemy had entrenchedthemselves upon some high and open ground, within musket shot ofthe north gate of the pagoda. It was separated from the gate by alarge tank; but as their jingals and musketry were able, from thepoint they occupied, to sweep the plateau and the huts occupied bythe troops, a party of the 38th and the 28th Madras Infantry wentout, and drove them off. As soon, however, as our troops fell backthe Burmese reoccupied the position and, for the next few days, aconstant skirmishing went on at this point; while
an artillery firewas maintained, by the assailants and defenders, along the wholeline down to Rangoon, and the enemy's batteries at Dalla kept up anincessant fire on the shipping. Kemmendine was attacked time aftertime, and many attempts made to launch fire rafts down the river.
The work was very harassing for the troops. Night and day they wereexpecting an attack in force; and there was a general feeling ofdelight when, on the evening of the 4th, orders were issued for ageneral movement against the enemy.
The latter had, by this time, brought the greater portion of theirguns up from the jungle, and placed them in their entrenchments;and it was therefore in the power of the British to strike a heavyblow. A division of the flotilla of gunboats was ordered up thecreek by the town. These opened a heavy fire upon the enemy'sflank, thus attracting their attention to that point and, after thecannonade had continued for some little time, the two columns ofattack--the one eight hundred strong, under Major Sale; the otherfive hundred, under Major Walker of the Madras army--issued out.The latter was to attack the enemy facing the town, the former toforce his way through the centre of their position. He had with hima troop of horse, that had landed only the previous day.
Major Walker's force was the first to encounter the enemy. Theirresistance was, for a time, obstinate. Major Walker and severalother officers fell, in the attack on the first line ofentrenchments; but the soldiers carried it at the point of thebayonet and, as the enemy broke and retreated, followed them sohotly that the works in the rear fell into their hands with butslight opposition.
Major Sale's column now began its attack on the enemy's centre.Here the resistance was more feeble and, bursting through theenemy's lines, the British drove them before them in headlongflight. Then, turning, they swept along the line of entrenchments;carrying all before them until they effected a junction with theother column, which was advancing to meet them. They then drove theBurmese from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving theground behind them covered with dead and wounded.
Except at the point first attacked by Major Walker, the resistanceof the Burmese was very feeble, and the British loss inconsiderable;and a large number of guns, entrenching tools, and muskets fell intothe hands of the victors. The next day Bandoola rallied the troopsthat had been driven from the plain, and gathered the greatest partof his force in the forest round the pagoda, where they continued topush forward their works with unabated energy.
The British had a day of rest given them and, on the 7th, preparedto attack the enemy at this point. Four columns of attack wereformed, composed of detachments drawn from all the corps of thearmy. In the morning a heavy cannonade was opened upon the jungle;the artillery being assisted by several heavy guns which had, withgreat labour, been brought up by the sailors from the ships to thepagoda. The enemy returned it with a steady fire of lightartillery, jingals, and musketry.
While the firing was still going on, the four columns were alreadyin motion. One had entered the jungle on the enemy's left, andanother on the right. One of the central columns advanced from thefoot of the pagoda hill, while the 38th Regiment descended thestairs from the north gate and advanced, one wing on each side ofthe tank, against the enemy's entrenchments on the high ground. Asthe four columns approached the enemy, our artillery fire ceased.
The Burmese appeared, for a moment, bewildered at the sight oftheir foes advancing against them from so many directions, but theysoon opened a very heavy fire upon the assailants; and kept it upwith undiminished steadiness until our troops, advancing at thecharge, dashed into their entrenchments and drove them headlongbefore them into the thick forest behind--where pursuit, whichwould at any time have been difficult, was now impossible; thetroops, exhausted by their seven days' and nights' watching, beingwholly incapable of following their active and lightly-armedenemies.
There now remained but the force at Dalla to cope with and, in theevening, a force composed of the 89th and 43rd Madras Infantry,under Colonel Parlby, embarked in boats. The night was dark, andthe troops crossed unobserved. The alarm was not given until theBritish actually entered the entrenchments, and opened fire uponthe enemy; who were sitting, unsuspicious of danger, round theirfires. Scarcely any opposition was encountered, and the whole ofthe works, with the guns and the stores, were soon in our hands;while the enemy were flying towards the forest.
In the actions during these three days, the Burmese lost some 5000men, 240 pieces of artillery of every kind, and a great number ofmuskets and vast supplies of ammunition; while the British had but50 killed and 300 wounded. Great numbers of Bandoola's men neverrejoined the army, and the whole force was dispersed through thecountry.
Bandoola himself was retiring towards Donabew, with but a remnantof his army, when he met considerable reinforcements on their wayto join him. During his operations he had left a reserve corps atthe village of Kokein, four miles from the pagoda; and these hadbeen busily entrenching the position, which commanded the roadleading from Rangoon to Donabew. The ground was elevated and, onhis arrival there, Bandoola set his troops--now some 25,000 innumber--to aid in the work. In a marvellously short time theheights were completely stockaded with trunks of trees; and with abroad, deep ditch in front. Beyond this were lines of felled trees,their heads pointing outwards and each branch sharpened--forming avery formidable abattis--and, believing this to be impregnable,Bandoola awaited the attack of the British.
As soon as his army had been dispersed, great numbers of deserters,and of the inhabitants of the villages, poured into Rangoon. Withthe deserters were mingled a good many of the troops sent in byBandoola, himself, with instructions to fire the town. In order tolull the suspicions of the British, he caused a report to be spreadthat an imperial commissioner from the court of Ava would arrive,in the course of a few days, to treat for terms of peace.
The general, however, determined to attack Bandoola before thecommissioner could arrive; as it was evident that better termscould be obtained, after the total dispersion of the Burmese, thanif their famous general remained, with 25,000 men, in a formidableposition close at hand. He was uneasy at the presence of so large anumber of natives in the town, and the precautions that had beentaken against fire, some time before, were now redoubled. Were oneto break out, not only might the whole of the stores collected forthe advance of the army be destroyed but, if Bandoola had his forcegathered in readiness at the edge of the jungle, he might takeadvantage of the confusion that would be caused by the fire, andrush forward to the attack of the town.
Numbers of troops, and of sailors from the fleet, patrolled thestreets in every direction at night but, in spite of their efforts,a week after the retreat of Bandoola the dreaded cry of fire wasraised. At a dozen points, on the windward side of the town, fireshad been lighted by incendiaries and, as there was a brisk windblowing, the danger was extreme. The drums beat to arms along thewhole of the British lines. Orders had already been issued as towhat was to be done in such an emergency and, while a portion ofthe troops lined the trenches, the rest were marched at once to thetown, and formed up between it and the jungle, to repel any attackthat might be made there; leaving the troops quartered in the town,and the sailors of the fleet to battle with the flames.
For a time it seemed as if the whole place would be swept away but,by levelling lines of huts, and beating out the flames at thebarrier so formed, their progress was at length checked; but notuntil more than half the town had been destroyed. Fortunately thiswas the half farthest from the river and--with the exception of thecommissariat stores for the supply of the troops of the MadrasPresidency--the buildings containing the food, ammunition, andnecessaries for the army escaped unharmed.
What had happened once might, however, happen again, in spite ofall precautions. The general therefore determined to attackBandoola at once as, were his force once scattered, the motive forthese incendiary fires would cease to operate.
The difficulties were formidable. One or two light field piecescould, at the most, be taken with the column. They would have tomarch b
y a narrow and winding footpath, through a thick forest,exposed at any moment to a desperate attack by the enemy. Moreover,it would be necessary to leave a strong force for the defence ofRangoon, as Bandoola would be sure to learn, from his spies, of theintended movement and, having with him men intimately acquaintedwith every forest track, could make a rush down upon the townduring the absence of so many of its defenders.
The general felt it imperative, however, to attack without delayand, early on the morning of the 15th, he moved out with a force of1500 men against Kokein. They marched without molestation throughthe forest and, on reaching its confines, could see the trulyformidable nature of the works that they were to attack. The momentthey issued from the forest, a dropping fire was opened upon themby parties of the enemy, in flank and rear; and no time was lost inpreparing for the assault.
The 13th Light Infantry and the 18th Madras, with 60 cavalry, underBrigadier General Cotton, were ordered to move round the stockadeand assault it on the left rear; while the rest of the troops, some800 strong, with 100 cavalry under the general himself, were toattack in front. The enemy's works consisted of a centralentrenchment, connected with two large entrenched stockades on itsflank, but somewhat advanced in front of it.
As soon as the force under General Cotton had gained its positionin the rear of the enemy, a gun was fired, and the whole forcemoved forward to the assault.. The Burmans regarded the attack byso insignificant a force upon their works with such contempt thatthey did not, for some time, fire a shot; but continued chanting awar song, swaying themselves to its cadence, stamping and beatingtime with their hands on their breasts.
This delay proved fatal to them. When they opened fire, theirassailants were already close to the ditch and, leaping down intothis, were sheltered from the fire of the defenders. Scalingladders were speedily placed and the troops, running up them,leaped down into the entrenchment. Astounded at this sudden entryinto the works they had deemed impregnable, the Burmese hesitated;and the assailants, being joined by their comrades from behind,rushed impetuously upon the enemy.
The column in the rear had greater difficulty--for they had severalstrong stockades to carry before they reached the central work--andlost four officers and eight men killed, and forty-nine officersand men wounded, in the 13th Regiment alone. Fifteen minutes afterthe first shot was fired, the whole of the works were in ourpossession and the Burmese, who gathered in a confused mass, hadbeen decimated by our volleys. They were now in full flight, manybeing cut down by the cavalry before they reached the shelter ofthe woods. The British troops marched back to Rangoon; while theBurmese retreated to Donabew, leaving strong posts on the tworivers leading in that direction.
Their retirement left it free to the country people to return toRangoon, and very large numbers came in, including very many of thevillagers who had been forced to fight against us. All had alikesuffered from famine and hardship. Even the women had beencompelled to labour in the work of stockading, and the sufferingsof all had been terrible. The work of rebuilding the town began atonce, and the wooden huts sprang up with great rapidity; marketswere opened and, in a short time, supplies of fish, fruit, game,and vegetables poured in; sufficient not only for the nativepopulation, but to effect a most welcome change in the diet of thetroops.
As most of the natives were accustomed to the construction andmanagement of boats, the work of preparing the flotilla by whichthe troops were to proceed up the rivers went on rapidly; andnumbers of men were hired as servants and drivers for thecommissariat--with which the force was very insufficientlysupplied, as the natives of India of that class for the most partrefused, on account of their caste prejudices, to engage themselvesfor service across the sea. Reinforcements arrived; and Rangoon,which but six weeks before presented a miserable and desertedappearance was, towards the beginning of January, a cheerful andbustling town.
Preparations were being made in other quarters to assume theoffensive. Some 3000 men were driving the Burmese out of Assam; anda force 7000 strong was marching from Sylhet, to expel them fromCachar and capture Manipur; while 11,000 men were assembled atChittagong, and were advancing into Aracan with the intention ofdriving the Burmese from that province--and they meant, ifpossible, to cross the mountains and effect a junction with SirArchibald Campbell's force. The first part of the operations wereconducted with complete success, and Aracan wrested from Burma; butit was found impossible to perform the terrible journey acrossmountain and swamp, or to afford any aid to the main expedition.