by H M Hozier
While in Italy the whole population were clamorous for war; while Prussia, the author and originator of the whole disturbance, by her disregard of the rights of the prince in whose nominal cause she had taken up arms in 1864, was pointing out her increased battalions as purely a defensive police for the security of her territory; and while the war party in Austria, eager to wipe out on the Mincio the memory of Solferino, and proudly confident of the power of the military empire to sweep away with one hand the feverish soldiery of Victor Emanuel, while with the other it shattered the legions of Prussia, urged the Cabinet of Vienna not to yield an item: Russia and England, led and accompanied by France, entered upon the diplomatic theatre. These three great powers made a common attempt to avert the war by despatching, on the 28th May, almost identical notes to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the Germanic Confederation. In these notes it was proposed that the five great powers should join in a conference, at which the Germanic Confederation should also be represented, in order to settle by treaty the three main questions which menaced the peace of Europe. These questions were that of the Elbe duchies, of the tranquillity of Italy, and of the reform of the Federal Constitution of Germany.
The possibility of peace being maintained by these means was from the beginning extremely doubtful: even in the event of all the parties interested consenting to submit their causes to this European jury. Almost the utmost that could be expected from a conference would be that the points of dispute might be defined, and in this manner that the theatre of war might be limited.
On the 29th May, Prussia accepted the proposal for the conference. Italy followed this example; also the Germanic Confederation. Of what validity these acceptances were, may however be calculated from the fact that at the time of the acceptance the confederation informed its representative, Herr Von der Pfordten, that the project had already practically fallen to the ground. (Rüstow, Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschland und Italien).
Austria was only willing to join the conference on condition that no territorial alterations should be there discussed. This proviso was absolutely necessary for Austria. If territorial changes were to be discussed, few could doubt but that a proposal would be made for the cession of Venetia to Italy, and of the Elbe duchies to Prussia. If these cessions took place, Austria would lose as much without a blow, in her own diminution and the aggrandizement of her German rival, as could at that time have been anticipated from the most disastrous issue of the imminent war. It does not appear that it was any desire of war on the part of Austria which made her couple her expressions of readiness to join the conference with this condition, which appears on the contrary to have been advanced from a perhaps too honest desire to meet the wishes of the great powers.
To this communication of Austria the mediating powers replied that, in their opinion, the disputant governments should be allowed full freedom for the discussion, and if possible for the solution, of every relevant question at the conference.
Thus matters stood on the 1st June, the day appointed by the Federal Decree of the 24th May as that on which the German Powers were to make their declarations concerning their armaments.
The diet was assembled at Frankfort The Austrian representative rose, and declared that Austria could look back with a calm conscience on her steady endeavours to preserve an unity with Prussia in the question of the Elbe duchies. The Emperor Francis Joseph had conceded the uttermost title that the dignity of Austria and the rights of the Germanic Confederation would allow. Prussia had made unjust proposals, and had expressed the intention of prosecuting and carrying out these proposals by force. As Prussia had threatened, after the peace of Vienna, to compel the Federal troops to evacuate Holstein, so she had also threatened Austria concerning the question of the duchies with force, and had relied on the support of foreign opponents of the Imperial State.
At the time of the Convention of Gastein Prussia had renewed this attempt, because Austria would not consent to administer Schleswig-Holstein according to the policy of annexation. Threatened on two sides, Austria had been compelled to place herself in an attitude of defence. The preparations against Italy might rest unchallenged at Frankfort Austria would recall her troops that had been raised against Prussia, provided that the latter did not intend to make an attack on Austrian territory, or on any State allied to Austria, and would give security against the recurrence of the danger of war. This security would depend for Germany, as for Austria, on the fact that in Germany not force, but treaties and right ruled, and that Prussia also, although an European Power, should respect the peace and the decrees of the confederation, and further that the Schleswig-Holstein question should be settled, not for the interest of an individual claimant, but according to the rights of those provinces and Federal rule.
On the 24th August, 1865, Austria and Prussia had promised to communicate to the confederation the result of their negotiations in reference to Schleswig-Holstein. Austria now was fulfilling this promise. That she must now declare that all her endeavours to obtain a solution of the question of the duchies which would be agreeable to the confederation had been of no avail, and that now, in the first place, Austria yielded up everything further on this point to the decree of the confederation, and in the second place had already ordered her commissioner in Holstein to assemble the estates of that duchy in order to obtain an expression of the wishes of the people as to their future fate.
Austria thus attempted to undo what she had assisted in doing by the Treaty of Vienna and the convention of Gastein. But, in order to make restitution for her disregard of right in these two agreements, she was now obliged to break the Convention of Gastein, in handing over to the confederation, which she had declared incompetent in this international question, the decision of the future fate of the duchies. Her second step, by which she ordered her commissioner, Field Marshal Gablenz, to convene the Holstein Estates, was also, if not an actual breach of the convention, a virtual one, because by the convention, although the administration of the duchies was divided, the rights of the two sovereigns to the common supremacy were still as much extant as ever. (See chapter 1).
After the Austrian declaration, the representative of Prussia at the diet rose, and said that the mobilisation of the Prussian Army had only taken place in consequence of the Austrian armaments; only if these armaments were annulled, and if at the same time the other Germanic States which were allied with Austria restored amicable relations between themselves and Prussia, could Prussia herself disarm. On these conditions she would disarm immediately. Prussia had only taken defensive measures. If the Germanic Confederation was not in a position to give Prussia guarantees for the maintenance of peace, if the members of the confederation resisted those reforms of the Federal Constitution which were universally recognised as necessary, the Prussian Government must accept the conclusion that the confederation did not attain its object, and could not fulfil the most important of its aims, and that with regard to further Federal revolutions, Prussia would act on this conviction.
The Prussian representative further defended his government against the Austrian conception of the circumstances connected with the Schleswig-Holstein question, and advanced in support of his assertion the many declarations which Prussia had made with reference to this question.
The speeches of the two representatives of the great German Powers were the main events of the assembly of the diet of the Germanic Confederation at Frankfort on the 1st June, 1866. The reports of these speeches were immediately telegraphed to every town in Germany, and caused great excitement. Men foresaw that a war would result by the shock of which the political circumstances and peculiar constitution of the Fatherland would be shaken to their very foundations; but no one almost supposed the outbreak of war to be so near. It was believed that Austria was much superior as a military power, certainly at the outbreak of a war, to Prussia, but she was not yet ready, and it could not be supposed that she would urge matters on till her preparations were complete. Nor did sage men, who, wondering by
what fatuous madness Count Bismark was driving his government into a one-sided struggle, looked impartially upon the course of events, ever imagine that Prussian temerity would be wild enough to anticipate the necessity of defence through bearding a more than respected adversary by commencing the attack.
Count Bismark saw, however, in the steps that Austria had lately taken, in her summons to the Holstein Estates, and in the publication of her intentions with regard to the Elbe duchies, the final severance of the Cabinet of Vienna from his policy. No longer could Austria be persuaded to stand beside him in a common slight against, or oppression of, the body of the Germanic Confederation. Austria had resumed her position as the champion of the individuality of small States. The spoilers had ultimately quarrelled over the allotment of their prey. The Convention of Gastein was broken through and trampled upon.
Against the breach of this convention, Count Bismark sent a protest to Vienna; but, in anticipation of the answer he would receive to this protest, signed on the 4th June a despatch to the Prussian plenipotentiaries at foreign courts. This despatch accused Austria of giving provocation to war; and attributed to the Austrian Government the intention of recruiting its finances by forced contributions from Prussia, or by an honourable bankruptcy.
Count Bismark at the same time took a step more likely to be productive of important results than either protests or protocols The concentration of the Prussian army was resumed. The corps d’armée of the Guard was sent to Silesia, the eighth corps d’armée and one division of the seventh corps were forwarded by railway from the banks of the Rhine to the neighbourhood of Halle. In Berlin a reserve corps d’armée was formed of the four regiments of the Landwehr of the Guard, and of four other Landwehr regiments, while all available artillery and cavalry was drawn together, organised, and mobilised as quickly as possible.
******
How it came that Prussia was able to leave the frontier of the Rhine totally undefended during the campaign, when it was evident from the subsequent demand made by France that the government of the Tuileries had a jealous eye upon Rheinland, has remained one of the mysteries of the war. The explanation as far as yet can be discovered appears to be as follows:—In 1865 Count Bismark paid a visit to the Emperor of the French at Biarritz, and there hinted broadly that in case France would stand aloof, and allow Prussia to work her way in Germany, compensation might be given. for France’s tranquillity by the cession of the Rhine provinces.
The emperor, who expected, like everyone else, that the contest would be, if not favourable to Austria, certainly long and doubtful, anticipated that at a certain stage he would be able to step upon the theatre of war, and demand, from whichever side he espoused, the possession of the Rhine provinces of Prussia. He gave no distinct assurance to Count Bismark of neutrality, but the count left Biarritz with a tolerable certainty that France would not interfere, at least at the commencement of a war, and without giving any distinct promise to the emperor of territorial compensation. When the campaign terminated as abruptly as it did, the Emperor of the French wished to claim the price of his neutrality, but Prussia was then in a condition to enter on a campaign with France, whose armies were not armed with breech-loaders, and refused to entertain any ideas of territorial cession.
******
BOOK 2
CHAPTER 1: First Bloodless Conflict in Holstein
The good old rule sufficeth me,
The stern and simple plan—
Let those take who have the power,
And let those keep who can.
Notwithstanding the protests of Count Bismark, the Austrian Civil Commissioner of Holstein, General Von Gablenz, issued a decree on the 5th June, 1866, by which the estates of Holstein were summoned to meet on the 11th of that month at Itzehoe. It was, however, known at Berlin (on the same day as that on which the despatch to the plenipotentiaries of Prussia at foreign courts was signed) that Austria was about to bring forward a motion in the diet for Federal execution against Prussia. Accordingly, on the 6th June, Prussia published a more special protest against the assembly of the Holstein Estates, as well as a declaration that Prussia would consider such an encroachment on the Convention of Gastein as a direct breach of that agreement, and that in consequence not only was the convention a dead letter, but that the common occupation and administration of the duchies must be resumed as before that convention.
Orders were accordingly despatched from Berlin to General Manteuffel, the Prussian commissioner in Schleswig, that as soon as General Gablenz summoned the Holstein Estates to meet, he should enter Holstein with his Prussian troops in order to again resume the common administration of the two duchies. Orders were given to General Manteuffel to avoid any conflict with the Austrian troops; and to assure General Gablenz that the inruption of Prussian troops into the duchy over which he was appointed to represent the Austrian Emperor, was undertaken quite in a friendly spirit. General Manteuffel accordingly informed General Gablenz beforehand of his intention of invading Holstein, and issued this proclamation to the people of the duchy of Schleswig:—
Gottorp, June 7.
Inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig,—
Since my assumption of office here I have always acted towards you with frankness. Never have I had any reason to repent of that course, and I now address myself to you again with the same frankness. The rights of sovereignty which His Majesty my king and master has over the duchy of Holstein have been endangered by proceedings with which you are all acquainted. The most sacred interests of your country are placed in jeopardy, for never have the estates of either of the duchies been called together except in view of an assembly of the general representation of an undivided Schleswig-Holstein. I am charged by His Majesty the King with the protection of those menaced rights, and for that reason I have today ordered the entry of troops into Holstein, as I have announced to the Imperial Governor of the duchy of Holstein that this military measure has only a purely defensive character.
Inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig,—I have learnt to know and to esteem the spirit of order and legality with which you are animated, and I now give you a proof of this esteem. At this moment Schleswig is being almost denuded of troops. You will prove that the attitude which you have hitherto maintained has not been induced by fear, but by the loyalty of your character. But you, too, in your turn have learnt to know me, and you know that I am faithfully and heartily devoted to the interests of this country. You will with confidence accept my word. No doubt of the power or of the will of Prussia could find root in your minds. Let us have faith in each other.
The Governor of the duchy of Schleswig,
E. Manteuffel,
Lieutenant-General
Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the King of Prussia.
General Gablenz did not wait for the inruption at Kiel, where his headquarters had hitherto been, but suddenly left that town, and concentrated the whole of his forces, which consisted of the infantry brigade of Kalik and one regiment of dragoons, at Altona. The government of Holstein and the Prince of Augustenburg followed him quickly.
On the morning of the 8th June the Prussian troops crossed the Eider, without paying any attention to a protest launched against their proceedings by General Gablenz, and moved slowly southwards. General Manteuffel had under his command in Schleswig two brigades of infantry and one brigade of cavalry, and he crossed the frontier of Holstein with all his disposable force. Austria was naturally unwilling to resume the common administration of the two duchies as it had existed previous to the Convention of Gastein, and accordingly, by order of his government, General Gablenz concentrated his troops in the south-western comer of the duchy. General Manteuffel, who had marched into Holstein on the 8th June, on the 11th prevented the assembly of the Holstein Estates at Itzhoe by taking military possession of that town, closing the House of Assembly, and placing a guard over the door with fixed bayonets.
General Gablenz, assailed by far superior numbers, and unable to be of any more use in Holstei
n, on the night between the 11th and the 12th June withdrew his troops to Hamburg, and thence despatched them by railway through Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfort to the Austrian Army of the north in Bohemia. From this bloodless conflict in Holstein arose the first Prussian victory, gained by the knowledge of the great rule of war, which teaches that to reap success great numbers must be hurled upon the decisive point, and that in order that these superior numbers may be forthcoming, rapidity of concentration, organisation, and locomotion of troops are vitally required. This bloodless victory, and the consequent evacuation of Holstein by the Austrians, had an important effect on the subsequent incidents of the war.
The abandonment of Holstein added only five battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery of artillery to the Austrian army in the field; while the same event left the whole of the Prussian division of General Manteuffel—which consisted of twelve battalions of infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, and six batteries of artillery—free and at the disposition of the Prussians for the further prosecution of operations.
The assembly of the Holstein Estates, and the delivery of the opinion of the southern Elbe duchy with regard to its future fate, was prevented by the inroad of the Prussians. The Prince of Augustenburg departed from the province. The Prussian Government appointed Herr Von Scheel-Plessen as Supreme President of Schleswig-Holstein. Supreme President is the title of the highest civil administrator of a Prussian province. Scheel-Plessen entered upon the duties of his new office on the 11th June; while the non-consulted duchies looked on sulkily upon the Prussian assertions of right The duchies came under Prussian rule when Scheel-Plessen assumed his office. This was all very arbitrary, forcible, and dependent upon main strength, but the Prussian virtual annexation of Schleswig-Holstein had one good effect. It settled the question of the Elbe duchies; and, as far as the Seven Weeks’ War is concerned, neither reader nor author will be again troubled with the intricate problem of the true rights of succession to “Schleswig-Holstein sea-surrounded.”