by H M Hozier
In most of the villages and hamlets of Saxony, certainly in all those which lay on roads leading to the frontier, Prussian soldiers were billeted; cavalry and artillery horses filled the farmsteadings of the border farmers, and field guns and artillery carriages were parked on many a village green. But the Saxons had no complaints to make, and, as far as could be judged from appearances, seemed highly to approve the occupation of their county by the Prussian Army. The Saxon peasantry and the soldiers were on the most friendly terms, and a stranger who did not know the Prussian uniform, in passing through the villages, would have supposed that the troops were quartered among the people of their own country. As soon as the Prussian vanguards crossed the frontier, Prince Frederick Charles issued a most stringent order, in which he insisted upon the troops showing every respect for private property and for the comfort of the inhabitants. This order was strictly observed both by officers and men. The kind-hearted soldiers brought with them none of those horrors which too often follow in the train of an army which occupies a strange country.
On the contrary, had it not been for the swords and bayonets of patrols which glittered in the sun along every road, the scene was one of perfect peace. In some places the men were helping the peasantry to carry the hay harvest, in others they might be seen working in the cottage gardens, and nearly always were spending money in the village shops; the bare-legged country urchins got taken up for rides on the cavalry or artillery horses as they went to be watered, or were invited, half afraid, to peep into the muzzle of a rifled gun; only when, with the contempt bred by the familiarity, some too adventurous youngster tried to introduce a handful of cornflowers into the mouth of a piece of ordnance, was he warned off the precincts of the battery by the reluctant sentry. (It must be remembered that this was a war of Germans against Germans).
The Prussian military authorities took care to make the inconveniences of the existing state of affairs sit as lightly as possible on the inhabitants of the country in which the troops where quartered. Passenger traffic on the railways of Saxony was soon resumed, except where the broken bridge of Rieza caused a gap. Telegraphic messages were received at the bureaux, and were certainly and regularly delivered.
The successful occupation of the kingdom of Saxony gave the Prussian leader also great moral, material, and strategical advantages. His adversaries had seen the energy and vigour with which the Prussian blows were delivered. Two armies were established on hostile territory, which facilitated the supply of provisions to these large masses of troops. The theatre of war for the armies was also transferred to foreign soil. But the main advantages were gained in reference to the whole theatre of the war throughout Germany. The wide semicircle in which the Prussian Army had been spread along the Saxon and Bohemian frontiers, was much contracted by the advances of Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth. The communication between the individual armies was much facilitated by the possession of the Saxon railways, and an invasion of Bohemia was rendered possible, because the frontier passes of the mountains were secured; while in the case of its being necessary to act on the defensive, the Erz-Gebirge and the Lusatian hills afforded much superior military positions to any along the quite open frontier between Saxony and Prussia.
The invasion of Saxony brought immediately conditions of open war between Prussia and Austria. Saxony appealed to the diet at Frankfort, from which Prussia and several other States had since 14th June withdrawn their representatives. The remaining members of the diet decreed, on the 16th June, that Austria and Bavaria should give aid against Prussia; not only to Saxony, but also to Hanover and Hesse-Cassel. Austria declared herself ready to devote all her military forces to the support of the States which had been invaded by Prussian troops. This declaration was regarded by Prussia as an open and official announcement of a declaration of war. That Austria also intended it to be such was shown by the publication, on the 17th June, of this war manifesto of the emperor:—
To My Peoples.
While engaged in a work of peace, which was undertaken for the purpose of laying the foundation for a Constitution which should augment the unity and power of the empire, and at the same time secure to my several countries and peoples free internal development, my duties as a sovereign have obliged me to place my whole army under arms.
On the frontiers of my empire, in the south and in the north, stand the armies of two enemies who have allied with the intention of breaking the power of Austria as a great European State.
To neither of those enemies have I given cause for war. I call on an Omniscient God to bear witness that I have always considered it my first, my most sacred duty, to do all in my power to secure for my peoples the blessings of peace.
One of the hostile powers requires no excuse. Having a longing to deprive me of parts of my empire, a favourable opportunity is for him a sufficient cause for going to war.
Allied with the Prussian troops, which are now up in arms against us, a part of my faithful and valorous army two years ago went to the shores of the North Sea. I entered into an alliance with Prussia for the purpose of upholding rights secured by treaties, to protect an imperilled German race, to confine within the narrowest possible limits an unavoidable war, and by means of an intimate connexion of the two central European Powers—whose principal duty it is to maintain the peace of Europe—to obtain a lasting guarantee for the peace of my empire, of Germany, and of Europe.
Conquests I have never sought for. Unselfish in my alliance with Prussia, I did not, in the Vienna Treaty of Peace, seek to obtain any advantage for myself. Austria is not to blame for the series of unfortunate complications which could not have arisen had Prussia been equally disinterested and equally mindful of her Federal duties. Those complications were brought about for the furtherance of selfish purposes, and, consequently, could not be done away with by my government in a peaceful way. The state of affairs became more and more serious.
Even when it was notorious that the two hostile States were making preparations for war, and that there was an understanding which could only be based on an intention to make in common an attack on my empire, I, being mindful of my duties as a sovereign, remained in a state of profound peace, as I was willing to make all those concessions which were compatible with the welfare and honour of my peoples. But when I saw that further delay would not only render it difficult to ward off the intended blow, but also imperil the safety of the monarchy, I was obliged to resolve on making those heavy sacrifices which are inseparable from preparations for war.
The assurances given by my government of my love of peace, and the repeated declarations which were made of my readiness to disarm at the same time with Prussia, were replied to by propositions which could not be accepted without sacrificing the honour and safety of the monarchy. Prussia not only insisted on complete disarmament in the northern provinces of the empire, but also in those parts of it which touch on Italy, where a hostile army was standing, for whose love of peace no guarantee could either be given or offered.
The negotiations with Prussia in respect to the Elbe duchies clearly proved that a settlement of the question in a way compatible with the disunity of Austria, and with the rights and interests of Germany and the duchies, could not be brought about, as Prussia was violent and intent on conquest. The negotiations were therefore broken off, the whole affair was referred to the Bund, and at the same time the legal representatives of Holstein were convoked.
The danger of war induced the three powers—France, England, and Russia—to invite my government to participate in General Conferences, the object of which was to be (sein sollte) the maintenance of peace. My government, in accordance with my views, and, if possible, to secure the blessing of peace for my peoples, did not refuse to share in the conferences, but made their acceptance dependent on the confirmation of the supposition that the public law of Europe and the existing treaties were to form the basis of the attempt at mediation, and that the powers represented would not seek to uphold special interests which coul
d only be prejudicial to the balance of power in Europe and to the rights of Austria. The fact that the attempt to mediate failed because these natural suppositions were made is a proof that the conferences could not have led to the maintenance of peace.
The recent events clearly prove that Prussia substitutes open violence for right and justice.
The rights and the honour of Austria, the rights and the honour of the whole German nation, are no longer a barrier against the inordinate ambition of Prussia. Prussian troops have entered Holstein; the estates convoked by the Imperial Stadtholder have been violently dissolved; the government of Holstein, which the Treaty of Vienna gives to Austria and Prussia in common, has been claimed for Prussia alone; and the Austrian garrison has been obliged to give way to a force ten times as strong as itself.
When the German Bund, which saw in the measure no infraction of the Federal laws, accepted the Austrian proposition to ‘mobilise’ the Federal troops, Prussia, who prides herself on being the defender of the interests of Germany, resolved to complete the work she had begun. Violently severing the tie which unites the German races, Prussia announced her secession from the Bund, required from the German Governments the acceptance of a so-called project of Reform, which in reality is a division of Germany, and now she employs military force against those sovereigns who have faithfully discharged their Federal duties.
The most pernicious of wars, a war of Germans against Germans, has become inevitable, and I now summon before the tribunal of history, before the tribunal of an eternal and all-powerful God, those persons who have brought it about, and make them responsible for the misfortunes which may fall on individuals, families, districts, and countries.
I begin the war with confidence, arising from the knowledge that my cause is a just one, and with the consciousness of the power which is possessed by a great empire when the prince and the people have one and the same thought—that the rights of their country must be steadfastly upheld. My heart beats high at the sight of my gallant and well-appointed army—the bulwark against which the force of the enemies of Austria will be broken—and of my faithful peoples, who are full of loyal confidence and self devotion.
The pure fire of patriotic enthusiasm burns with equal strength and steadiness in all parts of my vast empire. Joyfully do the furlough men and reserves take their places in the ranks of the army; numerous volunteers present themselves; the whole of the able-bodied population of the countries which are most exposed are preparing to take the field, and everything that can possibly be done to assist the army and provide for its necessities is willingly done. All the inhabitants of my kingdoms and countries have one and the same feeling—the feeling that they belong to one and the same nation, that unity gives strength, and that a gross violation of justice has been committed.
It is doubly painful to me that the settlement of the questions relative to the internal constitution of the empire has not yet made so much progress that I, at this important moment, can assemble around my throne the representatives of all my peoples. Although I am now deprived of this support, my duty as a sovereign has become clearer, and my resolution stronger, that for all future time my empire shall have the benefit of it.
We shall not be alone in the struggle which is about to take place. The princes and peoples of Germany know that their liberty and independence are menaced by a power which listens but to the dictates of egotism, and is under the influence of an ungovernable craving after aggrandizement, and they also know that in Austria they have an upholder of the freedom, power, and integrity of the whole of the German Fatherland. We and our German brethren have taken up arms in defence of the most precious rights of nations. We have been forced so to do, and we neither can nor will disarm until the internal development of my empire and of the German States which are allied with it has been secured, and also their power and influence in Europe.
My hopes are not based on unity of purpose, on power alone, I confide in an almighty and just God, whom my house from its very foundations has faithfully served, a God who never forsakes those who righteously put their trust in Him. To Him I pray for assistance and success, and I call on my peoples to join me in that prayer.
Given in my residence and metropolis of Vienna, on this 17th of Tune, 1866.
Francis Joseph (M.P.).
On the same day the following general order was also issued to the Austrian Army of the North by Feldzeugmeister Benedek:—
Headquarters,
Olmütz Soldiers,—We are on the eve of grave and sanguinary events. As in 1859, you are collected in great numbers around our flag. Soldiers, we have now to repair in the eyes of the world the faults of that period; we have to punish an arrogant and faithless enemy. I have the full and entire conviction that you are aware of and are worthy of this mission. Have also confidence in me, and be assured that on my part I will exert my best efforts to bring this campaign to a speedy and glorious termination. We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the line and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed to privations and fatigues, and who have never yet made an important campaign; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their government.
In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on the field of battle. Veterans of the Mincio and of Palestro, I hope that with tried leaders you will not allow the slightest advantage to such an adversary. On the day of battle the infantry will adopt its lightest campaign accoutrement, and will leave behind their knapsacks and camping material, in order that they may be able to throw themselves with rapidity and promptitude upon the heavily-laden enemy. Each soldier will receive his flask filled with wine and water, and a ration of bread and meat easily to be carried. The officers will discontinue the use of their wide scarves, and all the useless insignia of their ranks, which but renders them too distinguishable in action.
Every man, without distinction of name or position, shall be promoted whenever he shall distinguish himself on the field of battle. The bands will place themselves in rear of the front of the respective positions, and will play heroic pieces for the warlike dance. The enemy has for some time vaunted the excellence of their firearms, but, soldiers, I do not think that will be of much avail to them. We will give them no time, but we will attack them with the bayonet and with crossed muskets. When, with God’s help, we shall have beaten and compelled to retreat our enemies, we will pursue them without intermission, and you shall then find repose upon the enemy’s soil, and those compensations which a glorious and victorious army has a right to demand.
BOOK 5
CHAPTER 1: Theatre of German War
Whoever casts a glance upon the map of Central Europe must at once observe the range of mountains which, starting from the Black Forest, passes through Germany from west to east, separates the basin of the Danube from the plain through which the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder glide to the German and Baltic seas, and terminates in the chain of the Carpathian Hills. This range about midway divides into two branches near the source of the Saale, which again join together near the east of the county of Glatz, and enclose in the so-formed quadrilateral the kingdom of Bohemia. On the north of these mountains lie the kingdoms of Saxony and Prussia; on the south the territories ruled by the Emperor of Austria. Bohemia, although a dependency of the Austrian empire, is geographically separated from the valley of the Danube, in which lie the majority of the provinces of the Kaiser, by the hills of the Bohemian Forest and the mountains of Moravia.
The advanced post of Austria towards the north, it stands as a strong bastion against an invasion of the empire from that direction, and is also a most valuable base of operations from which to hurl troops against the valleys of the Elbe or the Oder. It was this position of Bohemia which caused the destruction of Napoleon in 1813, when Prussia and Russia held the Elbe, and Austria f
rom Bohemia menaced his right flank. If he quitted his central position at Dresden to march on the Elbe, the Austrians issued from Bohemia, and cut off his communication with the Rhine; if he advanced against Bohemia, as soon as he passed the northern mountains of that province the allies debouched from the line of the Elbe, and separated him from France. It was a consequence of the natural configuration of Bohemia that, after having prevented the junction of his enemies by the victory of Dresden, the great Napoleon was surrounded at Leipsic.
In the midsummer of 1866, Bohemia was again about to play an important part in a European war. Austrian troops were collected there. Beyond the Erz-Gebirge, or Iron Mountains, and the Riesen-Gebirge, or Giant Hills, which form the Bohemian frontier on the north, lies in the first place the kingdom of Saxony, but beyond this again are the southern provinces of Prussia, from which two Prussian armies available for service in the field had now advanced. In the event of war, Saxony appeared likely to be the first battlefield, if the Austrian general should assume the offensive. But in a life-and-death struggle between the great German Powers it was impossible that the theatre of war could be restricted to one tiny kingdom; the area of operations on the contrary extended nearly throughout the district which spreads from the sea on the north to the Danube on the south, from the Rhine on the west to the Vistula on the east.