by H M Hozier
This procedure of Prince Charles of Bavaria was alone sufficient to condemn him as a general He held his army inactive, when, by a bold advance, not only could he have insured the safety of the Hanoverians, but could in all probability have captured the whole of his enemy’s troops at Gotha. Thus he would have saved nineteen thousand allies, have captured six thousand of his adversary’s men, have turned the scale of war by twenty-five thousand combatants, have preserved to his own cause a skilled and highly trained army, proud of high and ancient military reputation, which the faults of politicians had placed in a most precarious and unfortunate position.
On the 25th Prussian troops were closing in upon the devoted Hanoverians; but telegraphic orders were forwarded from Berlin to all their commanders not to engage in hostilities until ten o’clock on the morning of the 26th. Colonel von Döring was despatched to Langensalza by the Prussian Government, with full powers to treat with the King of Hanover; he proposed an alliance with Prussia, on the basis of the recognition of the Prussian project for reform of the Germanic Confederation, and of the disbandment by Hanover of its army. To these terms King George would not agree; deserted by his allies, to them he was still faithful, and still expected that the Bavarians must come to his aid. He refused to entertain any proposition for the capitulation of his array, and demanded a free and unimpeded passage into Bavaria.
In the meantime, while the king treated, the Bavarians remained inactive, and while the Hanoverian Army was fatigued by marching and countermarching within its lines, the troops of Prussia closed round it. On the 25th June the Prussian divisions of Goeben and Beyer reached Eisenach. The same day General Flies, who had been despatched by General Manteuffel with five battalions and two batteries, reached Gotha by means of the railway which runs through Magdeburg and Halle. On the same evening the Prussian troops at Gotha were reinforced by two battalions of the 20th regiment of Landwehr, and a depôt battalion from the garrison of Magdeburg. General Flies immediately assumed the command of the Prussian and Coburg troops at Gotha, and pushed his advanced guard that evening to Warza, halfway between Gotha and Langensalza.
Round this place the Hanoverian Army lay. The opportunity of forcing its way into Bavaria, while the two battalions of Coburg were alone at Gotha, had been lost By the morning of the 26th, forty-two thousand Prussians were placed on the south, west, and north, within a day’s march of its position, and all hopes of escape into Bavaria, or of aid from its southern allies, appeared to be vain.
On the 26th the armistice expired at ten o’clock in the morning, but the Prussian commander-in-chief did not immediately commence hostilities. His dispositions were not yet perfected. That day the Hanoverian army drew more closely together, either with the object of accepting battle, or, as some say, with the intention of moving by Tennstedt, and endeavouring to join the Bavarians by a circuitous route.
That evening the Hanoverians took up a position between the villages of Thämsbrück, Merxleben, and the town of Langensalza. None of these places were well suited for defence, and no artificial fortifications were thrown up on the southern side of the position, where General Flies lay. On the northern side a few insignificant earthworks and one battery were erected, to guard the rear and right flank of the army against the Prussian corps under General Manteuffel, which lay in the direction of Mühlhausen. The soldiers were weary with marching and privations, but eager to join battle with the Prussians, who of late years had spoken in a disparaging and patronising tone of the Hanoverian army, which, since the battle of Langensalza, has been exchanged for one of high respect and admiration.
There had been a false alarm in the Hanoverian lines of an advance by the enemy in the night between the 26th and 27th June; but an attack was not expected on the 27th. This day had been appointed by royal command to be observed as a solemn day of fast and humiliation throughout Prussia, and the Hanoverian leaders appear to have imagined that on this account the Prussian generals would not attack. In this they were deceived, for before evening there had been fought the bloody
BATTLE OF LANGENSALZA
The Prussian troops on the morning of the 27th occupied the following positions:—
The division of General Manteuffel was at Mühlhausen; that of General Beyer at Eisenach; that of General Goeben had one of its brigades, that of General Wrangel, pushed forwards towards the northwest of Langensalza, and the other brigade, that of General Kummer, at Gotha; while the corps of General Flies was concentrated on the south of Langensalza, at Warza. General Flies, who commanded five battalions of infantry of the Prussian line, one depôt battalion, two battalions of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and five battalions of Landwehr, with three squadrons, in all about twelve thousand men, (see list following), with twenty-two guns, advanced from Warza, and attacked the Hanoverian position on that forenoon.
General Flies has been censured by military critics for making this attack so early, while, as will be seen in the sequel, his colleagues were still too far distant to render him assistance during the action which he thus precipitated. He has not, however, failed to find defenders of the course he pursued. It has been urged that the object of his attack was to hold the Hanoverian Army on the Unstrut, and if this were his only object he was successful Hanoverian sources of information, however, hardly allude to the supposition that King George was about to move to Tennstedt; and, unless General Flies had strong reasons for believing that his adversary meditated the immediate execution of such a movement, he was hardly justified in exposing himself to an unnecessary chance of disaster.
It has also been said that General Manteuffel on the north was to fire two cannon as a signal to General Flies that he was ready to attack, and that the Hanoverians, having discovered this arrangement, gave the signal at an early hour from their own batteries. The Hanoverians, however, assert that their artillery only fired its first shot after General Flies’ infantry attack had been well developed.
The position occupied by the Hanoverian army on the morning of the 27th lay along the sloping side of the line of hills which rises from the left bank of the River Unstrut The right wing and centre rested on the villages of Thämsbrück and Merxleben; the left wing between the villages of Nägelstadt and Merxleben. The third brigade (Von Bülow) formed the right wing; the fourth brigade (Von Bothmer) the left; while in the centre was posted the first brigade (Von de Knesebeck), which at the beginning of the action was held in rear of the general line. The village of Merxleben, and the ground in front of it, was occupied by the second brigade (De Vaux), which had its outposts pushed as far as Henningsleben, along the road to Warza. The artillery and cavalry of the reserve were posted behind Merxleben, near the road to Sundhausen, where the scanty depôts of ammunition and stores were established. The front of the position was covered by the river, which with its steep banks impeded at first the Prussian attack, but afterwards was an obstacle to the offensive advance and counterattack of the Hanoverians.
At about nine o’clock on the morning of the 27th, the two Coburg battalions which formed the advanced guard of General Flies’ column reached Henningsleben, and attacked the Hanoverian outposts there. These withdrew to Langensalza, occasionally checking their pursuers by the fire of their skirmishers. One Hanoverian battalion remained for a short time in Langensalza, but then the whole Hanoverian troops, which had been pushed along the Gotha road, withdrew across the Unstrut to Merxleben, and the Prussians occupied Langensalza before ten o’clock.
General Flies then made his arrangements for an attack on the main Hanoverian position. His artillery was very inferior numerically to that of the enemy, so he relied chiefly on his infantry fire. He sent a small column to make a feint against Thämsbrück, while he advanced two regiments of infantry against Merxleben, and detached a column of Landwehr to his right, in order to outflank, if possible, and turn the Hanoverian left.
On the Hanoverian side the first gun was fired between ten and eleven, from a battery of rifled 6-pounders attached to the second brigade, and
posted on the left of Merxleben. The first brigade was immediately pushed forward to the support of the second brigade, and took up its position on the right of that village.
By a singular error, the Hanoverians failed to hold a wood and bathing-establishment close to the river, on the right bank, opposite Merxleben. Into these the Prussian regiments advancing against the village threw themselves. Sheltered by the cover, they opened a biting musketry fire against the Hanoverian gunners and troops near the village, which lasted till the end of the battle, caused great loss in the Hanoverian ranks, and made an issue from the village and a passage of the bridge most difficult and dangerous. The first gunshot of the Hanoverians was quickly followed by others, and in a few minutes the whole of the Prussian and the greater part of the Hanoverian pieces were engaged, when the roar of the guns, the explosions of bursting shells, and the rapid crackling of small arms, rose loud in the rough harmony of war.
The Prussian column on the right pressed forward against the Hanoverians’ left, seemed to be bearing against their line of retreat, and threatened to turn their flank. The Hanoverian leader seized the opportunity, and resolved to attack with vigour the widespread Prussian line.
The first brigade in the centre, with the third brigade on its right wing, advanced at mid-day from Merxleben. The fourth brigade on the left wing moved forward at the same time against the Prussian right, but here the banks of the river were steeper, and the time occupied in descending and ascending the banks, as well as in wading through the stream, prevented more of this brigade than one battalion of rifles from at first taking a share in the onset The rest of the Hanoverian troops, however, supported by their artillery, pressed steadily forward, and bore down upon the Prussians, who retreated. Many prisoners were taken, but not without severe loss to the assailants, who soon occupied the wood and bathing-establishment beside the river. The Prussians then drew off from every point, and a favourable opportunity occurred for a vigorous pursuit But the disadvantage of a river in front of a position now became apparent. The cavalry could not ford the stream, nor approach it closely, on account of the boggy nature of its banks, and had to depend upon the bridges at Thämsbrück, Merxleben, and Nägelstadt. The Duke of Cambridge’s regiment of dragoons issued from the latter village, and dashed forward quickly, but unsupported, against the Prussian line of retreat, and took several prisoners. As soon as the heavy cavalry of the reserve had threaded its way across the bridge of Merxleben, it also rushed upon the retreating Prussians. Two squares were broken by it, and many prisoners made, while Captain von Einein, with his squadron of cuirassiers, captured a Prussian battery. But the horsemen of Hanover suffered fearfully from the deadly rapidity of the needle-gun, and Von Einein fell in the midst of his captured cannon.
The cavalry pursued the Prussians as far as Henningsleben, but a further pursuit, or an advance of the infantry even so far, was impossible, on account of the fatigue of both men and horses, and the scarcity of provisions and ammunition.
About five o’clock the pursuit terminated, and the Hanoverians, masters of the field of battle, posted their outlying pickets on the south of Langensalza.
The total loss of the Hanoverians in killed and wounded was one thousand three hundred and ninety two. The Prussians lost nine hundred and twelve prisoners, and probably about the same number as their enemies in killed and wounded. It is said that the Hanoverian infantry engaged did not number more than ten thousand men, because the recruits were sent to the rear, and during the day one thousand men were employed in throwing up earthworks. The Hanoverian cavalry consisted of twenty-four squadrons, of which eighteen certainly took part in the pursuit, and must have mustered at least nineteen hundred sabres. The artillery in action on that side consisted of forty-two guns. The Prussian force, as has been shown before, numbered about twelve thousand combatants, with twenty-two guns. It is extremely questionable how far General Flies was justified under these circumstances in precipitating an action.
The Battle of Langensalza was of little avail to the gallant army which had won it The troops of Hanover were now too intricately involved in the meshes of Falckenstein’s strategy.
This general, on the 28th, closed in his divisions, and drew them tightly round the beleaguered Hanoverians, who, by the action of Langensalza, had repulsed but not cut through their assailants. The division of General Manteuffel and the brigade of General Wrangel were pushed into the Hanoverian rear, and took up positions at Alt-Gottern, Rothen-Heiligen, and Bollstedt. The division of General Beyer was advanced from Eisenach to Hayna. General Flies was at Warza, and the brigade of General Kummer at Gotha was held ready to move by railway to Weimar, in order to head King George, in case he should march to the eastward on the left bank of the Unstrut. Forty thousand hostile combatants were knitted round the unfortunate monarch and his starving but devoted troops.
POSITIONS ON THE MORNING OF THE 29TH
When these positions of the Prussians were reported to the king, he determined to avoid a holocaust of his soldiery. An action could hardly have been successful; it must have been desperate. The terms of capitulation which had been formerly proposed by Prussia, were agreed to on the evening of the 29th. Arms, carnages, and military stores were handed over to the Prussians: the Hanoverian soldiers were dismissed to their homes: the officers were allowed to retain their horses and their swords, on condition of not again serving against Prussia during the war. The king himself and the crown prince were allowed to depart whither they pleased, except within the boundaries of Hanover.
Political errors, and the supineness of Prince Charles of Bavaria, had at one stroke of the pen made a whole army captive, and blotted out from the roll of independent states one of the most renowned of continental principalities.
This disaster of the Hanoverian Army was due in a less degree to the uncertain action of its leaders than to the improvidence of its administrators, and the blindness of the political guardians of its country. Still there is no doubt that, on the days preceding the 25th June, the army of King George could easily have forced its way through the small knot of its enemies at Gotha, and have secured a safe retreat, provided only that it had been directed to march boldly forward. Its subsequent conduct at Langensalza compels us to believe that its organisation at this time must have been sufficiently advanced to allow it to take this course. For the reasons that it did not do so its military directors must be responsible.
Yet, whoever is to blame for the calamitous results of its expiring campaign, none can regard, without a feeling of sympathy and emotion, the last struggles of a proud and high-minded soldiery, who bore up ineffectually for days against privation, hardship, and superior numbers; who even hoped against hope; who rallied round their king in the hour of his misfortune, and strove to carry him, by the pressure of their bayonets, through the clustering bands of hostile combatants. Hanoverians may well look with a mournful satisfaction on Langensalza. British soldiers may justly feel a generous pride in the last campaign of an army which mingled its blood with that of their ancestors on the battlefields of Spain and Belgium, and not unworthily rank the name of the battle which closes the last page of Hanoverian history with Salamanca, Talavera, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo.
CHAPTER 2: Campaign on the Maine
When Prussia determined upon war, she resolved to throw herself with her main force upon Austria, since that power was the leader and backbone of the coalition against her. With the intention of crushing the Austrian army in Bohemia and Moravia, the whole of the regular corps d’armée of the Prussian service were directed upon those countries. Westphalia and the Rhenish provinces were denuded of their regular troops, which were marched to the Austrian frontier. To protect the western provinces of Prussia from the allies of Austria, to overrun Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and then to act against the allies of Austria in the south-west of Germany, was the task entrusted to General Vogel von Falckenstein. He was provided with an army hastily collected together from the Elbe duchies, and from the garrisons of th
e neighbouring fortresses.
With this army, General von Falckenstein had to be prepared to take the field against the Bavarians and the seventh corps of the late Germanic Confederation. Previous to engaging with these adversaries, he was forced to occupy Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and to pursue and disarm the Hanoverian troops. These preliminaries cost the Prussian general the loss of fourteen days of valuable time, and allowed the eighth Federal corps to assemble its heterogeneous constituents, and organise them round Frankfort. There can be no doubt but that if, on the 18th or 19th June, General Falckenstein had been able to concentrate his divisions near Wetzlar, and to have marched immediately upon Frankfort, he would have entirely prevented the collection of the troops of Baden, Würtemberg, and Hesse, and have annihilated in detail their separated divisions.
On the other hand, fortune favoured Falckenstein, inasmuch as that during this fortnight the main armies of his opponents remained inactive, and, with the exception of some petty demonstrations, began to develop no energy until quite the end of June, when he himself, after the capitulation of the Hanoverians, was free to turn his unrestricted attention to them, and had concentrated his whole army at Gotha and Eisenach.
The army thus assembled under General von Falckenstein consisted of three divisions. These were the division of Lieutenant-General von Goeben, which consisted of the 13th, 53rd, 15th and 55th regiments of Infantry, with the 8th regiment of Hussars, and 4th regiment of Cuirassiers. It mustered in all, at this time, about thirteen thousand men, with twenty-four guns, and was divided into two brigades, one commanded by General Kummer, the other by General Wrangel. One division was the division of General von Beyer, which had been formed from the garrisons of the Federal fortresses of Mayence, Rastadt, Luxemburg, and Frankfort-on-Maine, and consisted of the 19th, 20th, 30th, 32nd, 34th, 39th and 70th regiments of Infantry, with the 9th regiment of Hussars,—altogether twenty-one thousand five hundred men, with forty-two guns.