by H M Hozier
All was again activity and excitement in the Prussian Army; the whole of the troops who were at Brünn on the 14th, with the exception of one division, marched out on the morning of the 15th, and pushed forwards towards Thaya. The men, refreshed by their halt, equipped anew with supplies of the articles which had been worn out or lost during the late marches and actions, went forth in high spirits, for they thought that now they were certain to reach Vienna. They had no doubt of the result of a battle, if one should have to be fought on the way to the Austrian capital, and their fears that peace might be concluded had been allayed by the news of the failure of the negotiations; for it was known early on the 15th, that the armistice had not been agreed to, and the intelligence spread quickly from company to company, and from regiment to regiment.
General von Moltke retired to his quarters, and was closeted with his maps, making new plans for the further progress of the campaign, and for the occupation of Vienna. This skilful strategist, who had been the chief director of the movements by which the three Prussian armies, starting from different points, were collected at the necessary hour on the field of Königgrätz, never, except at that battle, appeared in the front of the armies. Some distance in the rear, sitting calmly at his desk, he traced on the map the course of his troops, and, by means of the field telegraph, flashed his orders to the different generals in more immediate command, with such skill and foresight that not a movement failed, and every combination was made at exactly the right moment.
A quick, light-blue eye, a high forehead, and a well-set figure, mark him an intellectual and energetic man, but though quick in action he is so prudent in discourse and so guarded in his speech, that from this quality and his wide knowledge of European languages he is known in the Prussian Army as the man who is silent in seven tongues. Careful and laborious, he worked out with his own hand, and himself calculated, almost every detail of the operations in which he took Europe by surprise from the lightning rapidity of his strokes and the tremendous consequences of his dispositions, before which the Austrian army withered away almost before it was gathered together, and which have won for him from his countrymen the title of the first strategist in Europe.
But though General von Moltke in so short a time deservedly obtained such a high reputation in Prussia, the soldiers and officers of the two armies thought almost as highly of the Princes who have carried out so ably the plans which were formed by the chief of the Royal Staff. Prince Frederick Charles, with all the dash and fire of a cavalry officer, can equally well lead his squadrons to pursue the broken enemy, and direct with patience his infantry and artillery in an attack against a firm and steady line; but his qualities as a general do not shine out more in the exciting duties of the battlefield than they do in the more tedious and laborious work which is necessary for the comfort of his soldiers in quarters or on the line of march. He has a singular power of making his troops care little for fatigue and hardship; on the line of march he is always with them, and often, from his knowledge of how to deal with his men, can, by a few happy words, dose up the straggling ranks of a weary battalion, and send the men forward cheering loudly. In the bivouac, often in person, he inspected the rations and heard the applications of the men for favours or indulgences, and few applied in vain to their commander-in-chief He had both the confidence and love of his troops, who regarded him as a skilful leader and a powerful friend.
The crown prince, by a series of victories in three successive days, established his title to be considered a general In the Second Army he was looked upon with the same affection and confidence as Prince Frederick Charles is in the First. By the men of Silesia he was particularly beloved; for he, as a colonel, commanded a regiment at Breslau, and became well known then to the whole province. Careless of trouble, ever anxious for the welfare of his troops, he visited, personally, billets and hospitals, and took the most kindly interest in every individual soldier. But in the hour of need he did not spare his troops, for his affection for them sprang from a sense of duty and from no mere desire of popularity. The march from Miletin to Königgrätz, and the attack on the Austrian right in that battle which crushed Marshal Benedek’s army and shook the Austrian dynasty, say more for his energy in action than could be written in any words.
With such leaders and so well led, with a better arm than their enemies, with every mechanical contrivance which modern science could suggest adapted to aid the operations of the army, it is little wonder that the stout-hearted and long-enduring Prussian soldiers proved victorious on every occasion on which they went into action.
The headquarters of the First Army were ordered to move forward on the 16th, to Pawlowitz, a small village twenty-five miles from Brünn. The advanced guard, on the 15th, moved upon Moschau; the whole of the army, except one division, which stayed another day here to guard the king’s headquarters, marched to the vicinity of Medritz, and the campaign already recommenced with energy.
M. Benedetti, unsuccessful in his attempt to procure an armistice through the mediation of France, left the Prussian headquarters on the afternoon of the 15th. He was accompanied by Count Colleredo, an Austrian officer, who had come in with a flag of truce, and a Prussian staff-officer went with him to take him through the outposts, for he went to Vienna.
The Prussians had now quite got their blood up; in the army it was regarded as an established fact that the conditions proposed by Austria for an armistice were intended only to gain time to move the army of Feldzeugmeister Benedek from Olmütz to the south, and their national feelings were wounded by the idea that the Austrians should imagine that they could be so easily duped. On the afternoon of the 15th, the patrols of the cavalry of the Prussian advanced guard pushed forward as far as the railway station of Göding, which lies on the line that leads from Olmütz to Lundenburg. When the leading horsemen came in sight of the railway they could distinguish two trains, one close behind the other, with engines puffing and snorting violently, as if drawing a heavy load, steaming slowly in the direction of Lundenburg.
There could be little doubt that in these trains were portions of the Austrian Army from Olmütz, which were on the way to Vienna.
To prevent any more troops from being taken south by this line, it was immediately resolved to break up the line. Some troopers dismounted, a few pickaxes, spades, and axes were found in the neighbouring cottages, and the men on foot quickly set to work, while the others held their horses. There was no Austrian cavalry to guard the line, no infantry picket in the station-house, and the demolition of the line by which alone General Benedek could hope to reunite his army to protect the capital of the empire began without any opposition.
Blows fell heavily on the rails and on the sleepers, the rails were wrenched out of their places, thrown upon one side, and in a few minutes the line was useless for railway traffic The work was hardly completed when another train came in sight, but before it came up to where the rails were taken away the engine-driver saw the Prussian cavalry, reversed his engine, and the train drew up short, and after a moment’s pause began to back slowly in the direction from which it came.
The great problem now for the Prussian staff was to discover how much of their northern army the Austrians had been able to move to Vienna, and how many troops were still in the camp before Olmütz. From the experience of this war many facts have been ascertained relative to the railway transport of troops which were now useful in assisting this calculation. When the Prussians were concentrating their army for the invasion of Saxony they found that it required 100 trains to move a corps d’armée of 30,000 combatants with all its train and baggage, and that it was rarely possible to despatch more than twelve trains a day—so that it required nearly ten days for the movement of a corps. The Austrians, during the concentration of their army, despatched fifteen trains a day; but at that time they are supposed to have moved with baggage and train complete.
On such a pressing occasion as the present, they probably might let the troops move with almost no baggage and
little train, and might have managed to despatch twenty trains per day, for they had most of the rolling stock which used to run upon the line between Vienna and Türnau by Josephstadt, and on this calculation 40,000 men could be moved in about six days. This calculation was subsequently found to be correct.
Another fact concerning railway transport dictated by common sense has been fully confirmed by the experience of the German war. Railways in an enemy’s country have been proved to be of no use for the transport of the troops of the invader during his advance; the army acting on the defensive always breaks them up, and they cannot be repaired quickly enough to allow of troops being moved by them. But for the carriage of provisions and stores they are invaluable. (This has been amply verified by the late campaign in France). The more quickly an advancing army can lay down the rails the more quickly can it move forward, and the more free are its motions, for the line of railway is the great artery which leading from the heart supplies the extremities of the army with means of life and action. In laying down the broken lines the band of workmen who accompany the Prussian army were singularly rapid and successful, but quick as they were they were not yet quick enough, for the army transport was conducted by road for some days, even after Prague was occupied, and no enemy on the line stopped the passage of convoys. A broken bridge, even though the breach was but only a few yards wide, caused a dead stoppage in the locomotion, and the time required to shift stores from a train on one side of the impediment to that on the other was very great.
An engineer who would find means of constructing rapidly field bridges which would bear the weight of a railway train, would cause an advance in the art of war. The road transport of the Prussian army was very well organised, but long distances, rapid marches, hilly roads, and accidents, were too much in some cases for even its powers. With each army corps there were five provision columns, in every column there were thirty-two waggons, each drawn by five horses, some spare horses being also supplied to the column to replace animals which may fall lame or get galled by the saddle or collar. These five columns were under the control of the intendantur, and were never used for any other purpose than the supply of food for the soldiers; the forage for the horses was carried in waggons hired in the country where the war was being carried on, which were also placed under the control of the commissariat.
Stores of clothing and arms were carried as much as possible by railway, and were brought to the army from the nearest practicable railway station by trains of waggons, which were also under the control of the intendant-general; but each battalion carried with it, besides a medicine cart, a waggon for spare ammunition, and an officers’ baggage waggon, a waggon which held materials for the repair of clothes and shoes, and which were thus always present with the troops, so that the old proverb that “a stitch in time saves nine” might be, as far as possible, acted upon.
For the transport of ammunition the commanding officer of artillery was entirely responsible; and it was conducted by means of trains of waggons, which were under his sole control There were nine ammunition trains with each corps d’armée. Each train consisted of thirty-three waggons, and was individually organised so as to carry ammunition for infantry, cavalry, 4-pounder, 6-pounder, and 12-pounder guns.
A long, hot march, over a road covered deep with dust, which rose in thick stifling clouds from under the horses’ feet, and deposited gritty particles in every pore of the skin, brought the headquarters of Prince Frederick Charles to Pawlowitz, which is about six miles south-west of the town of Auspitz, and about twelve north-east of the railway junction at Lundenburg. This day the army entered a country where the low, rounded hills were covered with vineyards, and from which, as a consequence, trees had almost disappeared. Down by the courses of the streams there were a few pollard willows dotted along the narrow belts of sward which fringed the banks, and some clumps of fir-trees could be made out, stuck like black patches against the blue sides of the Pollauer-Gebirge, which stands up high above the surrounding country; but everywhere else nothing could be seen except, on the lower ground nearer the water-courses, long stretches of unbroken corn-land, backed on either side by the undulating mounds rather than hills on which the vines twined round their poles, planted in straight lines with a monotonous regularity.
The aspect of the little town showed its proximity to the Hungarian frontier. The men, dressed in white trousers gathered tight in below the knees, and contained by a long black boot, with their black jackets trimmed with a bright edging and braided almost like a hussar’s pelisse, and with their low broad-brimmed black hat, round which a red riband was bound with the ends hanging down, looked rather like stage peasants, and had little resemblance to the heavy bloused vine-dressers that are seen on the banks of the Rhine. The women, with their short bright-coloured skirts, white bodices, and handkerchiefs for the head, kept up the theatrical appearance of the population. The houses were low and small, and not nearly so large as the stable which, without exception, was an adjunct to every cottage.
On the night of the 16th the First Army had its advanced guard at Lundenburg, and the Duke of Mecklenburg, who commanded it, threw some detachments across the Thaya by means of a pontoon bridge, for the Austrians had destroyed all the bridges which led across the river. General Manstein also threw a pontoon bridge near Wisternitz, and led the sixth division across at that point, and two other divisions crossed the stream a little higher up. The cavalry was at Feldsburg; and the eighth division was at Göding, on the line to Olmütz. The rest of the army was round Pawlowitz.
On the 15th July, the same day that Prince Frederick Charles pushed forward his troops from Brünn and with his advanced guard cut the railway from Olmütz to Vienna, near Lundenburg, and that the crown prince’s cavalry after the action of Tobitschau cut the same railway near Prerau, Herwarth, with the Army of the Elbe, occupied Znaym, and secured there the passage of the Thaya, the boundary between Moravia and the Crown lands of Austria.
On the 16th, Herwarth was to have pushed his left wing down the Thaya, to assist in cutting the railway. As its advanced guard approached the road from Nikolsburg to Vienna, it received intelligence that Prince Frederick Charles had already secured the railway, and that Manstein’s division of his army was moving along that road. Herwarth, on the receipt of this intelligence, drew his left back to the Znaym road, and pursued his way along it towards the Danube. At Jetzelsdorf the advanced guard of Herwarth’s centre, which had been pushed along this road, fell in with the Austrian cavalry of Wallis’s brigade. A slight skirmish took place between Wallis’s horsemen and the first Prussian light cavalry division, after which Wallis drew his troops off, and the Prussians occupied Hollabrun, thirty miles south of Vienna. Etzel’s division was at the same time directed in a south-westerly direction on Krems, where the Austrians, on its approach, blew up the bridge over the Danube.
On the 20th July, Herwarth’s outposts were pushed forward to Stockerau, within fifteen miles of Vienna. From the hills near Weikersdorf, the advanced guard first saw the Imperial city, which could be distinguished easily from afar off by the tall spire of the Cathedral of St. Stephen, and the tower of the Castle of Schönbrunn, glittering in the sloping rays of the evening sun. In the foreground, on the Marchfeld, lay the famous villages of Wagram, Aspern, and Eszling, in the midst of rich corn-land and fields of bright poppies, which from the distance looked like pieces of dazzling mosaic let into a golden pavement, fringed by the silver band of the Danube studded with emerald islets. Near the stream were the swelling undulations of the Bisamberg, and beyond the river were seen the purple highlands of Austria, with the heavy masses of the Wiener Wald, while the dark blue Carpathians bounded the prospect towards Hungary. Such a view was a fitting reward for Königgrätz. No Prussian Army, not even that of the Great Frederick, had ever gazed upon the same.
Late on the night of the 16th, it was ascertained that the Austrians had sent forty trains from Olmütz to the neighbourhood of Vienna before the railroad between those towns w
as broken up by the Prussian cavalry on the 15th. The last six trains were known to have been filled with Saxon troops. It was tolerably certain that all the trains contained infantry only, and that the proper complement of cavalry and artillery to accompany these foot soldiers had in all probability marched by road. This being the case, every train was estimated to have carried 1,000 men, so that the Austrian army round Vienna had been reinforced by 34,000 Austrian and 6,000 Saxon infantry, and very likely also by some cavalry and artillery.
Under these circumstances the headquarters of the First Army were on the morning of the 17th moved forward to the important railway junction of Lundenburg; the cavalry was retained for the morning at Feldsberg; the Army of the Elbe and some portions of the First Army were on the right flank, and the advanced guard was pushed forward a short distance on the road to Vienna. But at the same time the eighth division, which had been detached to the left bank of the March, marched by way of Göding, and occupied Holitsch. From that point this detachment was held able either to combine with the rest of the army in a movement upon Vienna, or to be pushed forward further into Hungary as an advanced portion of the First Army; for the previous night information was received by Prince Frederick Charles which showed that the Austrians had been moving troops from the country round Vienna towards Pesth, and it was possible that the regiments taken from Olmütz might have been also sent into Hungary by Preszburg, in order there to concentrate an army for future operations. If the Austrians had concentrated in Hungary, it is probable that Prince Frederick Charles would have been sent across the Carpathians to act against them there.