by Noam Chomsky
Quite apart from the possibility of massacre and atrocities, we might ask what is to become of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who were driven out of their “camps” by the invading Israeli forces—over 400,000, according to the calculation of Israeli correspondent Danny Rubinstein in early September.164 Israel at first blocked any reconstruction of the bombed and bulldozed camps, though in its mercy, it later permitted UNRWA to bring in tents and subsequently offered assistance in reconstructing permanent dwellings, after a policy shift to which we return. Few wage-earners remained, and the rather substantial economy created by the PLO had been destroyed along with the PLO network of social services, its workers either killed, imprisoned somewhere, or dispersed. There is no shelter, no employment, no protection, and nowhere to go.
Articles soon appeared in the U.S. press on the problems faced by the Israeli occupying army, compelled to spend the harsh winter in Lebanon. The New York Times expressed much concern about their grim fate. Under the subheading “All Those Jewish Mothers,” the following paragraph appears:
A Jerusalem man, a reservist himself and the father of a soldier, wondered how the army would react “to all those Jewish mothers worrying about their sons freezing in the hills.” He laughed, but then said it could represent a real problem.165
And all those Palestinian mothers, whose circumstances are perhaps marginally more severe, and who are not part of an invading army backed and supplied by the United States? From the coverage in the Times and elsewhere we must assume, again, that they must be made of sterner stuff, or perhaps they simply do not feel pain, as was alleged by some American sophisticates with regard to Vietnamese peasants, not long ago.
In Israel, Col. Dov Yirmiah, whose reports from Lebanon were discussed in chapter 5, section 5.3, wrote at the end of August that “The Israeli government has done nothing yet to ease the misery of the Palestinian refugees, the victims of the war, and their fate in the coming winter is cause for alarm… The Prime Minister, who is so sensitive to memories of our own people, should remember what it means for families to be divided by war, the torture of not knowing what happens to relatives.” His government is following a policy of “cruelty for its own sake,” refusing even to permit communication among divided families— that is, families with members imprisoned.166Nine months later, that still remained true—but it is perhaps unfair to accuse the Prime Minister of moral inconsistency, as Yirmiah does, since there is after all a difference between people and two-legged beasts.
Some urged that Israel undertake humanitarian efforts for “pragmatic” reasons. Moshe Kol, a former Minister from the Independent Liberal Party, observed that the refugees in the camps destroyed by the IDF “are living in sub-human conditions—in orchards, on the streets, in shattered buildings, corners and cellars.” He suggests that “This is not the time to explain to the world that these camps were PLO centers and therefore Israel had to destroy them. Israel would substantially improve its image abroad, which suffered a sharp deterioration following the massive bombing from the air and the sea, if it addressed itself to this humane task.”167 This message was apparently heeded. After the complex events of September, including the cooling of relations with the Phalange and the international reaction to the SabraShatila massacres, the policy of dispersing the refugees shifted and Israel began to provide cement for rebuilding the homes that had been destroyed and prefabricated houses—though “Israel’s publicised offer of prefabricated houses for all turned out to be not quite what people had expected,” the Economist correspondent observes: “some Israeli manufacturers did indeed put exhibition prefabs on display, but at prices that no refugee could afford,”168 another fact passed over silently here.
The situation of the Palestinians remained grim, if not hopeless, however. In Ain el-Hilweh, Trudy Rubin reports, “self-appointed leaders who claim influence with Israel but are suspected by many camp dwellers of being opportunists or worse” began to appear, while “any genuine leadership left here is afraid to speak out lest the Israelis suspect them of PLO affiliation and arrest them,” one “respected camp resident” added. A report in the British journal Middle East International provides more details. A “social and humanitarian committee” was set up in the ruins of the camp. Its founder, Dr. Fikry Faour, is suspected of having had connections with Lebanese intelligence and with Israel in the past. One of the first acts of the committee was to beat up an UNRWA official responsible for distributing land plots, a man “known to be efficient and incorruptible.” The presence of Israeli troops nearby “suggests protection for the aggressors, not the victim.” UNRWA had refused to deal with the committee, calling it “self-appointed.” Israel “wants an UNRWA that will not resist its policies—a tamed UNRWA.” “Attempts to impose the committee on the people of Ain Helweh have been backed up by threats and arrests—and worse. The Ansar concentration camp is used as a recruiting ground, with prisoners promised release in return for working with the committee.” Refugees concerned about arrest or about their current plight are sometimes offered help by the occupying army; “The price: cooperation with the committee.” The similarity to practices on the West Bank is striking. Dr. Faour is reported by committee members to have had a meeting with Mustafa Dudin, head of the Israel’s West Bank Village Leagues. Israel is reported to have offered arms to the committee “for defence against the Phalangist militia,” “a real embarrassment for the committee, which attaches as much importance to its relations with the Lebanese rightists as with the Israelis.” These reports are confirmed by others. Robert Fisk interviewed villagers in the south and reported their account of how Israeli soldiers force them to pay protection money to Haddad forces and of the effective use of the concentration camps: prisoners in Ansar, the villagers were told by the IDF, would be held there until the villagers paid the money. Such reports as these suggest that Israel is considering exploitation of communal strife and imposition of a network of collaborators as methods—of a classic sort—to enable it to maintain control after eventual partial withdrawal.
Urban middle-class Palestinians have also been subjected to threats, violence and terror by Phalangists, and though “the Israeli-Phalangist relationship continues to be quite close, even since the Beirut massacre,” it is unclear “how much leverage the Israelis will be willing to exert on Phalangists who want to harass Palestinians.” The Lebanese government appears to believe that Israel has some leverage. A week later it “asked the United States to intervene with Israel to halt a campaign of intimidation against Palestinians in southern Lebanon by Christian militiamen.” Prime Minister Wazzan, describing this appeal to U.S. mediator Philip Habib, stated: “We are exerting every effort to stop the campaign of intimidation against Palestinians and Lebanese in southern Lebanon.” The occasion for the appeal was the discovery of 15 bodies, most believed to be Palestinians, near Sidon. “The intimidation campaign was also said to have been directed against Shiite Moslems.” Nabib Berri, leader of the Amal Shiite militia that fought alongside the PLO, described incidents in which Shiites were driven from their homes or killed in areas where “Israeli-backed Lebanese Christian militiamen arrived…on the heels of the Israelis.” The Christian militia involved are alleged to be Haddadists and from the ultra-right Guardians of the Cedars. The State Department had no comment.169
As had long been predicted, by early 1983 Israel appeared to be laying the basis for domination of southern Lebanon, which may sooner or later become its “North Bank” if the U.S. continues to provide the wherewithal. It will hardly be a great surprise if sooner or later work begins on a canal linking the Litani river to the Israeli water system. Israeli officers began to distribute an elaborate questionnaire throughout southern Lebanon, Ha’aretz reports, citing a copy that reached the AP office in Beirut. This is to be the first census in the region since 1932; it requests detailed responses to questions about the male population between 13 and 65, pregnant women, children and grandchildren in every family, use of electricity and water, the name
s of the wealthy and village notables, etc. AP reports that “A Western diplomat who studied the questionnaire said it seemed designed to obtain intelligence information that the Israelis could use whether they stay in southern Lebanon or withdraw after transferring security duties to right-wing Lebanese militiamen with whom they are allied.” At the same time the Israeli government argued in Israel’s Supreme Court that it has the right to continue the war against the PLO, even after the fighting has ended, by destruction of the local economy. The issue arose when a Christian Lebanese brought to the Court a protest against the IDF’s destruction of a plastic factory he had purchased from Palestinians near Damour.170
Throughout the region, Israel began to arm militias that compete with one another and with Israel’s client Haddad. Israel may have realized something that a number of well-informed Lebanese had long observed. Haddad is a dubious client, since he has little standing even in any local region in Lebanon, and furthermore, as a Christian (Greek Orthodox), he is not the optimal choice as Israeli-imposed suzerain in the largely Shiite south. A more efficacious policy is to encourage communal strife, exploiting the crazy quilt of local loyalties and fiefdoms in Lebanon. This will serve the dual purpose of justifying an Israeli “peace-keeping” presence and placing barriers in the way of restoration of a central authority, now unwelcome after the problems that arose with Bashir Gemayel and later his brother Amin. And if Israel is some day compelled to withdraw, a network of antagonisms and dependencies may be in place that will permit its indirect domination of the area. Some of the militias are reported to have been encouraged to infiltrate the areas controlled by the United Nations force (UNIFIL), which Israel would prefer to see removed, since it impedes the expansion of its control. As noted above, after relations with the Phalange began to cool in early September, Israel switched its policy towards the Palestinians; instead of “driving them East,” it began to encourage a degree of reconstruction under the control of collaborators. Some observers regard this modification of policy under the changed circumstances as part of an effort to enhance communal conflict and block imposition of a central Lebanese authority over the future North Bank.
Nevertheless, Haddad has surely not been abandoned. In February 1983, he was encouraged to take over control of a 40km-wide section of southern Lebanon, backed by Israeli-supplied tanks, armored personnel carriers and cannons. The Lebanese Foreign Minister stated that Israel held the area by “force of arms.” Relations between Israel and the Maronites had now soured to the point that Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Phalange in the 1930s, pleaded with Lebanese Muslims to join in blocking Israel’s moves towards partition, moves also condemned by another Maronite elder statesman, Camille Chamoun. Meanwhile, the Economist reports, “the pro-Israeli faction in the Phalange militia,” led by Fady Frem (one of the architects of the Beirut massacre), expressed their support for Sharon in opposition to the Gemayel central government. A few weeks before, Shimon Peres, head of the Labor Alignment, expressed his view that Haddad should take over a 40km “security zone” inside Lebanon,171 yet another indication of the fundamental agreement on policy between Labor and Likud.
At the same time, Israel began to implement what it calls “normalization,” specifically, flooding south Lebanon with Israeli goods, including agricultural products that may undermine Lebanese agriculture and ultimately provide Israel with another cheap labor force. In September, the Israeli press reported that hundreds of agricultural workers would be brought in from Lebanon in the coming harvest season. By January, it reported that Israeli exports to Lebanon might amount to $1 billion a year, flowing to the Arab world through Lebanon; exports in December were reported by Israeli army spokesman Col. Aaron Gonen and by the Lebanese government to have reached $20 million. Lebanese authorities attempted to put a stop to these practices, but to no avail. The Minister of Economy, Commerce and Tourism, Ibrahim Halawi, commented that the “flow of illegal goods into Lebanon” will rob farmers of their livelihood and spread unemployment in the industrial sector, though it is impossible for the Lebanese government to take action against these illegal practices “with the Israelis still there.” The Minister of Health issued similar warnings, reporting also a ban on purchase of medical equipment from Israel or other acts that would amount to de facto recognition, again noting the impossibility of implementing policy because of the Israeli occupation. In March 1983, senior IDF officers warned the Tyre chamber of commerce that “its members must immediately stop threatening merchants trading with Israel.” According to economist Peter Franck of the American University of Beirut, Israel has effectively exploited its military power and the destruction caused by its attack to penetrate the economy of the south. Israel has even begun to establish counterparts to the West Bank “Village Leagues.” Villagers who refuse to join are threatened with imposition of outside militias, or given incentives, the promise of future economic assistance or of release of relatives held in the concentration camp at Ansar.172
These practices recapitulate what developed more slowly in the West Bank and Gaza. “Normalization” sounds fair enough, when one neglects the circumstances and implications given the balance of force. It will mean subjugation of at least southern Lebanon to Israeli domination, and in the context of a full peace treaty, would amount to ratification by Lebanon not only of these arrangements but also of the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories. Naturally, the government of Lebanon has resisted pressures for “normalization’’ and a “peace treaty,” though the reasons are much obscured in American commentary on the subject,173 only one of them being regularly noted, namely, that such “normalization” would lead to isolation of Lebanon within the Arab world, as long as Israel persists in its rejectionism.
7.2 The Chouf In the northern parts of the area occupied by the IDF, the Chouf region southeast of Beirut, communal conflicts began immediately after the IDF conquered the area and have continued since. This region had miraculously escaped the civil war, being recognized as the Druze homeland:
Although there are Maronites in the Chouf, the Phalange did not try to assert its political presence south of the Damascus highway during or after the civil war of the mid-1970s. All the communities in these hills—Druzes, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Shias—lived blessedly at peace with each other throughout that war.* It was only after the Israeli army occupied the Chouf last June [1982] that the Phalange, then led by Amin’s thrusting brother Bechir Gemayel, began to try to assert its presence in the Chouf and immediately met with vigorous armed resistance from the Druzes... For the Phalange these clashes are part of a much larger pattern of attempted domination. The Sunni Moslem and left-wing forces in Beirut and southern Lebanon have been disarmed and rendered impotent by the Israelis and by the Lebanese army. The Shia Moslems are split between Israeli- and Syrian-occupied areas. The Greek Orthodox have been cowed. Thus the Druzes are the only Lebanese obstacle between the powerful Phalange militia and its domination of Lebanon. The stakes are real and high.174
* While it is true that the Chouf region escaped the civil war, it did not completely escape violence. Charles Glass comments that after Druze leader Kamal Jumblait was assassinated in March 1977, the Druze “went on a rampage, killing hundreds of Christians, with the Syrian Army—much like the Turks 117 years earlier—standing idly by. Many Christians sought refuge in Beirut, their young men joining the Phalange and swearing revenge. Others remained, but the Shouf was quiet until the Israeli occupation.” “Victors and Vanquished: Baedecker to the Three Lebanons.”
The Phalange incited armed conflict and also carried out numerous atrocities, sometimes reported in the Israeli press.175 Shmuel Segev reports that although the Phalange were heavily armed by Israel and western countries, the Druze prevailed in the military conflicts that took place as the Phalangists followed the IDF into the Druze homeland. But “in contrast to the results of open battles—in incidents of kidnapping and murder the Christians [Phalange] held the upper hand—while in 90% of the incide
nts the Druze return Christian captives healthy and well, there have been 36 incidents in which the Christians did not return the Druze captives—or their bodies”; though, as we have seen, they sometimes returned parts of the bodies; see chapter 5, section 6.3. In the early stages of the war, Segev continues, Israel tried to cultivate Druze (the Arslan family) who had been traditional rivals of the Jumblatts and the current Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, the leftist “collaborator with the PLO and the Syrians.” But the belief among the Druze that “Israel is helping the Christians” has overcome the conflicts among the Druze, and they are now appealing to Syria to allow Syrian Druze to come to their assistance. Within Israel, there has been much agitation among the Druze (who are treated differently from other Israeli Arabs, and serve in the IDF), which “might drive the Druze of the State of Israel right into the arms of the most extreme Arab elements.” Earlier, Druze reservists in the IDF threatened to refuse their mobilization orders unless they were sent to serve in the Druze villages of the Chouf, and six Druze sergeants were arrested for attacking Phalangists. Israeli Druze complained that the IDF disarmed the Druze in Lebanon while arming the Phalangists. “We are part of the Israeli army,” a Druze leader in Israel said, “but we cannot just stand by and watch it arming the Phalangists who are murdering our kin.”176