by Noam Chomsky
Apart from the last condition, there is nothing here that would be unacceptable to Rabin and the Labor Party, and little that would trouble even the hawks. “The painful path of clarification” lies far in the distance.
Also interesting is the reason offered for support of Peace Now: “because attempts to rule over the Palestinians or to annex the land in which they live jeopardize Israel’s security and threaten Israel’s democratic, Jewish character.” Two points bear mention. First, the suffering of the Palestinians and their rights are not cited as a reason for supporting peace. Second, consider the phrase “Israel’s democratic, Jewish character.” What does it mean to speak of the “democratic character” of a state that has been determined, by its Supreme Court, to be “the sovereign State of the Jewish people,” including Jews in the diaspora, but not the state of its citizens? Recall that the “Jewish character” of the state is not merely symbolic. Discrimination against Arab citizens is far-reaching and deeply rooted in legal structure and administrative practice, including access to land, development funds, and virtually every aspect of social life. It is also regarded here as uncontroversial. Thus in an editorial comment in the New York Times that is critical of the settlement policies in the occupied territories, Jack Rosenthal writes sardonically that if the government subsidies were really motivated by “economic fulfillment,” as claimed, then they “would be limited to the new development towns in the Negev and Galilee, where there is no dispute as to who owns the land.”79 It is quite true that “there is no dispute.” The land is reserved for the use of Jewish citizens of Israel by laws and regulations that effectively exclude Arab citizens from over 90% of the country’s land within Israel proper (the pre-June 1967 borders). It is revealing that such arrangements are considered quite unremarkable, and consistent with democratic principle.
Further understanding of “Israel’s democratic, Jewish character” is provided by the clarification by Israel’s High Court of the 1985 legislation banning political parties that reject the conception of Israel as “the state of the Jewish People” in Israel or the diaspora, not the state of its citizens. This is part of the Basic Law; in effect, the Constitution. The crucial sentence of this part of the Basic Law reads: “A list of candidates shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if there exists, in its objects or actions, expressly or impliedly one of the following: (1) the rejection of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish People;….”80 In short, even implicit advocacy of the traditional conception of a democratic state as the state of its citizens suffices to bar political participation.
The meaning of this law was clarified in late 1989, when the High Court considered a challenge to the right of the Progressive List for Peace (a tiny Arab-Jewish party headed by Arab lawyer Mohammed Miari and Israeli Arabist Matti Peled, a retired IDF General) to participate in elections. The challenge was rejected, 3 to 2, on narrow technical grounds. The crucial issue was the plank in the PLP program calling for complete equality between Jewish and Arab citizens in an Israel that is “the state of all of its citizens, Jewish and Arab, in the same degree.” Two Justices, Dov Levin and Menachem Elon, argued that this commitment sufficed to bar the PLP. It should be disqualified, Justice Levin stated, because the party advocates “a state, as all democratic states, of the totality of its citizens, without any advantage to the Jewish people as such.” Legal commentator Allan Shapiro observes that Justice Elon, Deputy-President of the Court, “would also disqualify a party whose platform called, in Ahad Ha’am fashion, for a relationship between Israel and the Diaspora based on cultural, religious, and historical, but not legal ties.” In his view, then, a significant stream of traditional Zionism should be barred by law. Justice Elon took the firm position that “it is necessary to prevent a Jew or Arab who calls for equality of rights for Arabs from sitting in the Knesset or being elected to it,” the press reports.81
Two other Justices “appear to agree in principle” with these conclusions, Shapiro continues, raising only technical objections to the disqualification. One, Shlomo Levin, “votes against disqualification ‘with a heavy heart’ and great reservations, for lack of the required certainty of proof.” He stated that he would have voted for disqualification if he had been convinced that the call for equality of citizens reflected the party’s actual views. Thus the Court majority “has stated that there is a conflict between democracy and Zionism,” Shapiro observes, expressing his dismay that “such opinions have seen the light of day without, at the very least, producing a strident, if not anguished response in the press and in the academic community.”82
Justice Dov Levin noted that the PLP program calls for full equality between Jewish and Arab citizens; and, furthermore, the party intends “to act to realize equality in all aspects of life.” These commitments, he concludes, “completely deny that the State of Israel is the State of the Jewish people.” Members of the party have the right to express their opinions, but since these opinions “conflict with the Basic Law of the Knesset,” the party is barred from participation in the political system— or would be barred, according to the Court majority, if these transgressions had been fully proven.83
Neither the extreme discrimination against Arab citizens of Israel, nor the legal basis for it, has been regarded as problematic by mainstream opinion in the United States, including the left-liberal spectrum, even respected theorists of liberal democracy who know the situation in Israel well (Michael Walzer is an obvious example84). Few would find it surprising, for example, that the AFL-CIO, in its November 1989 National Convention, should pass a resolution praising Israel for continuing ‘to extend basic democratic rights to all its citizens,” despite the “sea of violence” in which it survives, including “the PLOinspired…Palestinian intifada and the violence it has inspired.”
The easy acceptance of the idea that what is important is the security of Israeli Jews alone, and that far-reaching legal and administrative discrimination against Arab citizens does not affect Israel’s status as a stellar democracy, is a standard feature of left-liberal commentary in the United States. This fact, once again, tells us a good deal about our own political and intellectual culture.
The differences between Labor and Likud should not be ignored. One is unlikely to hear Shimon Peres publicly referring to the Palestinians as “brutal, wild, alien invaders in the Land of Israel” (Prime Minister Shamir)85 and Labor’s Allon Plan is not identical with Likud’s concept of extending sovereignty over the territories. Peace Now positions differ from both. It is only beyond those limits, however, that one finds groups that have a clear and definite commitment to a settlement based on the principle that Palestinians and Jews are human beings with equal rights, and that act courageously in defense of this principle.
By late 1988, it was becoming impossible for the U.S. government and the media to suppress PLO peace initiatives, and Washington was becoming an object of international ridicule for its increasingly desperate efforts—to evade the obvious. In December, the U.S. decided that the wisest move would be to declare victory, accepting the PLO position in effect, while pretending that the PLO had at last capitulated. In return for this good behavior, the U.S. agreed to enter into a low-level dialogue with the PLO. The farce played perfectly.86
At the first session of the dialogue, the U.S. presented its position: first, there can be no international conference; second, the PLO must call off the “riots” in the occupied territories (the Intifada), “which we view as terrorist acts against Israel.” In short, the PLO should ensure that the former status quo be restored. The ban on an international conference follows from the fact that the world is out of step, so that participation of outside parties beyond the U.S. and its clients would lead to unacceptable pressure for a nonrejectionist political settlement.
A few weeks later, in February 1989, Rabin had a meeting with five Peace Now leaders in which he expressed his satisfaction with the U.S.PLO dialogue. He described it as a “successful operation,�
�� journalist Nahum Barnea reported, involving only “low-level discussions” that avoid any serious issue. The Americans are “now satisfied, and do not seek any [political] solution, and they will grant us a year, at least a year” to resolve the situation in our own way. This way is force. “The inhabitants of the territories are subject to harsh military and economic pressure,” Rabin explained: “In the end, they will be broken,” and they will accept Israel’s terms. The Peace Now representatives were not convinced that these tactics would work. No other objections are recorded.87
Endorsing the essentials of this view, a high-level U.S. official, preparing for visits to Washington by Shamir and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, urged Israel to put an end to its public objections to the dialogue, which “only add significance” to it, increasing its importance beyond the intended narrow bounds. The Bush Administration proposals in early March, offering “suggestions” to Israel and the PLO, underscored the point. Israel was urged to limit the repressive measures instituted to suppress the Intifada; and the PLO, to terminate the “violent demonstrations” and the distribution of “inflammatory leaflets.” The proposal, then, is that the PLO cooperate with Israel in establishing a somewhat harsher version of the former status quo.88
These measures worked like a charm. News coverage of the occupied territories declined further, thus granting Israel the opportunity to act as it chose, to see to it that “they will be broken.” Attention was focused on “the peace process,” not the repression that was intensifying with U.S. backing. Predictably the PLO allowed itself to be carried along, seduced by diplomatic maneuverings that are largely mythical, however appealing they may be to bureaucrats, instead of dedicating its efforts and resources to the needs of the people under siege, a fact that has led to much discontent, even outrage, among the victims, reports indicate.89
Notes—Chapter 8 The Palestinian Uprising
1. Chronology, Middle East Journal, Spring 1988; Attorney Avigdor Feldman,Hadashot, Jan. 1, 1988; The Other Front (Jerusalem), Oct. 3, 1989. See my article in Z Magazine, July 1988.
2. Yael Fishbein, “The Intifada Children’s ‘Punishment of Illiteracy’,” Davar, Sept. 15; Uzi Benzirnan, “Bingo In the Chicken Coop,” Ha’aretz, Sept. 15, 1989.
3. Editorial, NYT, Feb. 19, 1988. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 30; Jerusalem Post, Oct. 2; Moshe Negbi, Ha’aretz, Sept. 20, 1989. On the Givati case, see my Necessary Illusions (South End, 1989), 209f.
4. Joel Greenberg, JP, Nov. 8, 1989. Later, Col. Meir was brought to trial, with remarkable testimony on the responsibility for atrocities from the highest level.
5. Feldman, Tikkun, Sept./Oct. 1989.
6. Eitan Rabin, Ha’aretz, Sept. 1; AP, Sept. 5; Ha’aretz, June 14, 1989.
7. Yosef Cohen, Kol Ha’ir, Oct. 6, 1989. Segev, Ha’aretz, Sept. 30, 1988.
8. Nehemia Strassler, Ha’aretz, Oct. 2, 1987. See references in my Pirates and Emperors (Claremont, 1986; Black Rose, 1987), chapter 2, note 19. Boaz Evron, “Why should we prefer Labor?” Yediot Ahronot, July 7, 1989. Sharon in Gaza, Amnon Dankner, Hadashot, Apr. 11, 1989. In 1990, Sharon was a minister in the Shamir government. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Dec. 10, 1948, Article 13 (2): “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country.”
9. Yosef Cohen, Kol Ha’ir, Nov. 19, 1989.
10. Goga Kogan, “The invisible transfer,” Hotam, Sept. 15; Gabi Nitzan, “The transfer has begun and proceeds without a hitch,” Hadashot, Sept. 20; Ronit Matlon, “In a taxi to the bridge,” Ha’aretz, Nov. 11, 1989.
11. On the disruption of the collaborator network, see section 8.3.3;. Hiltermann,Nahon, Sept. 10, 1990. Hiltermann is a Dutch sociologist who works with the Palestinian human rights organization Al-Haq in Ramallah.
12 Ibid.
13. Enbal, Yediot Ahronot, Aug. 3, 1990. See now Yitzhak Zuckerman, Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (California, 1993).
14. Oren Cohen, “Let us cry,” Hadashot, Sept. 16, 1989.
15. Irving Kristol, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1973.
16. On Friedman’s interviews in the Israeli press as he left Israel to take on his new role as chief Times diplomatic correspondent, see pp. 487f. Shahak, Middle East International, May 26, 1990. Shahak’s regular commentary and translations from the Israeli press have long been an incomparable source of insights into political and cultural developments in Israel and the region.
17. Irit Rozenblum, Ha’aretz, July 30, 1989.
18. JP, Jan. 15,1988.
19. Yossi Beilin, Mehiro shel Ihud (Revivim, 1985), pp. 42-3.
20. Yosef Heller, Bama’avak Lamdina (Jerusalem, 1985), p. 140.
21. See pp. 61, 51.
22. Yosef Gorni, Hashe’ela Ha’aravit Vehaba’aya Hayehudit (Tel Aviv, 1985), 63, 56; Danny Rubinstein, Davar, June 27,1986.
23. Tsadok Yehezkeli, Yediot Ahronot, Feb. 21, 1988. Jerusalem radio broadcast, Aug. 9, 1979; cited in a secret State Department cable, Aug. 18, 1979; reproduced in Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den (42): U.S. Interventions in the Islamic Countries, Palestine (1), 16-7, the reconstruction of captured Embassy materials published in Iran by the Muslim Students following the Line of the Imam. Howe, NYT Book Review, May 16, 1982. See Christopher Hitchens, in J. of Palestine Studies, Winter 1987, on Peretz’s racist outpourings.
24. Ha’aretz, Mar. 11; Hadashot, Jan. 10. Gazit, Hamakel Vehagezer (Tel Aviv, 1985). See my Pirates and Emperors, p. 50, for long excerpts. Ha’aretz, Mar. 6; Reuters, NYT, Apr. 1, 1988; Hadashot, Jan. 6, 1988.
25. New York Times, Feb. 19, 1988.
26. Schiff, Ha’aretz, Dec. 13, 1987; Rubinstein, Davar, Nov. 18, 1984; Dalia Shehori, Al Hamishmar, Dec. 24, 1986; Ehrlich, Ha’aretz, Nov. 13, 1987; Elaine Fletcher, JP, July 2, 1987; Shohet, Ha’aretz Supplement, Sept. 25, 1985; see also Michael Berger, letter, JP, Sept. 26, 1983; Al Fajr, Oct. 7, 1983; Avigdor Feldman, Koteret Rashit, Aug. 24, 1983. Also a misleading report by David Shipler, NYT, Feb. 19, 1984.
27. AP, Feb. 28, 1988.
28. John Kifner, NYT, Mar. 23,1988.
29. Davar, Jan. 15, 1985.
30. Joseph Maliakan, New Statesman, Mar. 11; Amnon Kapeliouk, Le Monde diplomatique, March; Bezalel Amikam, Al-Hamishmar. Feb. 19, 1988.
31. Yitzhak Shamir, Hehazit (LEHI, the “Stern gang”), 1943; reprinted in AlHamishmar, Dec. 24, 1987; translated in Middle East Report (MERIP), May-June 1988.
32. Editorials, NYT, Feb. 19, 1988, Nov. 6, 1982; Time, Oct. 11, 1982.
33. Berlin, Personal Impressions (Viking. 1981), p. 50; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography (Delacorte, 1978), pp. 180-1.
34. Boston Globe, May 21, 1988; on the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, also NYT, same day. Charles Glass, discussing Israeli violence, estimates the death toll in two years of violent riots in South Korea at “under ten”; Spectator (London), Mar. 19, 1988.
35. See p. 36.
36. Margalit, New York Review, June 2,1988.
37. AP, Dec. 12, 1987; June 1,1988.
38. Gad Lior, Yediot Ahronot, Jan. 24; Shulamith Hareven, Yediot Ahronot, Mar. 25, 1988.
39. 1783; cited by Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building (Minnesota, 1980), p. 65.
40. For some examples, see my Pirates and Emperors and Necessary Illusions.
41. “The Man who Foresaw the Uprising.” Yediot Ahronot, Apr. 7; Hotam, Apr. 15. AP, Apr. 1,1988.
42. Davar, Nov. 21, 1980.
43. Sarny, Yediot Ahronot, July 3; Menahem Shizaf, Hadashot, July 7, 1987.
44. Donald Neff, “Struggle over Jerusalem,” American-Arab Affairs, Winter
1987-8; Middle East International, May 28.
45. Segev, Ha’aretz, Jan. 8, 1988. See Gabi Nitzan, Koteret Rashit, Dec.
30, 1987, for a particularly harrowing example. Translated by Israel Shahak.
46. My report of this incident, published in an Israeli political journal in which much of this article appeared, st
ruck the very knowledgeable Israeli writer Boaz Evron as “a bit shocking even by the ‘accepted norms’ in the occupied territories.” But he writes that his skepticism abated when he received an issue of a Kibbutz journal in which members described their personal experiences, some of which he recounts. A participant in the armed struggle against the British in the pre-state period, Evron observes that “we didn’t throw stones, but carried out ‘personal terror’ against them, killing and wounding them... We were confident that we were dealing with an enlightened cultured nation that would be bound by moral constraints and therefore permitted ourselves such actions.” Palestinians, he writes bitterly, can make no such assumption. We denounced the British as “Nazi-British,” he writes, but they were “a miracle of politeness and humanity in comparison to our behavior in crushing the Intifada,” and “the Jewish community never reached the level of determination and sacrifice of the Palestinians struggling for liberation against us.” Evron, “Silence is Trash,” Yediot Ahronot, Aug. 8, 1988.
47. Hareven, op cit.; Gilat, Hadashot, April 7.
48. See press release, Arab Studies Society, Sept. 13, 1987; The Other lsrael, Nov.-Dec. 1987.