Beyond the idiosyncrasies, Shepilov was faithfully following Khrushchev’s line not to give the Western powers any excuse to break up the conference and use Soviet actions as a pretext for an attack on Egypt. A few hours after meeting with Lloyd, Shepilov displayed the same earnest desire to find common ground with Dulles. “I do not intend to argue the correctness or incorrectness of Egypt’s action or those [of the] U.K. and France…. [The]important thing was to recognize that such situation exists.” The Soviet foreign minister praised Washington for sharing Moscow’s desire to decrease tension and find a peaceful settlement.73
Shepilov hinted that the Soviet Union had sources that suggested a rift between the American and Western European positions. Assuring Dulles that his goal in mentioning the disagreements among the Atlantic partners was “not to drive a wedge” between the United States and its allies, Shepilov added that “if this opinion is true, the U.S. and USSR together might find way out of this crisis.”74 The Soviet foreign minister said that he had heard that the United States was already distributing a draft proposal for internationalizing the Egyptian Suez Canal Company, which administered the canal. Rather than exclude that idea entirely, Shepilov, in the spirit of seeking accommodation, said that “it seemed to him very strict and might have a bad reception in certain areas of the world.” Although careful not to encourage Shepilov too much, Dulles said that he shared the Soviet view that the challenge was to find a settlement that reconciled the rights of Egypt as a sovereign country and the interests of countries that had a vital stake in freedom of navigation through the canal. But he refused to budge from the goal of international control of the canal. “[T]here can be no universal confidence in Egypt’s ability alone,” he told his Soviet counterpart, “to administer [the] Canal operation.”75
At a meeting later with the British and the French, Dulles assured them that the United States remained committed to using the conference to undermine Nasser.76 Dulles expected nothing from the formal sessions to come. London, Paris, and Washington had already decided what the conference would conclude. The task at hand was to lobby for a healthy majority among the twenty-two countries represented at the conference. Dulles was eager to ensure that not all of the developing world opposed the U.S.-British-French proposal. “[B]efore it is over,” he cabled Eisenhower, “there will be some smoke-filled rooms like Chicago and San Francisco.”77
The Soviets, however, did not follow the script. The day after the formal start of the conference Shepilov met privately with Dulles to float a compromise proposal. Instead of forcing Egypt to turn the operation of the canal over to an international board, Shepilov suggested the formula of “Egyptian operation with the participation of other countries.”78 The Soviet foreign minister understood that this was a vague proposal, but he wanted Dulles to consider alternatives to the U.S.-British-French position. The Soviet negotiator agreed with the Americans that Egypt had shown political immaturity in the past. Moscow wanted Washington to know that it expected Egypt to permit Israel to use the canal. Shepilov suggested that the language of the 1888 convention be tightened to ensure access to the canal for all states. The Soviet position, however, was that Egypt had to be excused its past mistakes and treated as a sovereign country that would adhere to these new treaty requirements.79
Dulles made special mention of the Soviet proposal in a highly secret cable to Eisenhower. But the secretary of state was not interested in working with the Soviets to achieve an acceptable compromise. He believed that accepting Shepilov’s proposal would help the Soviet cause with the Arabs and result in “some downgrading of the British and the French.” He told the president, “I doubt whether Soviet agreement is worth having at that price.”80 Knowing that Eisenhower was more interested in diplomacy at that moment than he, Dulles added, “I shall do everything possible short of disloyalty to the British and the French to get Soviet agreement.”
Eisenhower remained aloof from the proceedings in London. It appears he did not read the full description of what Shepilov actually proposed. This was unfortunate because the Soviet representative was substantially making the same case for modified international participation that Eisenhower himself was making to Dulles. On August 18 and 19 the president sent notes to Dulles to discourage him from signing on to a position that would be impossible for Nasser to swallow.81 “I see no objection to agreeing to a Board with supervisory rather than operating authority,” Eisenhower wrote.82 He added that he hoped “the results of the conference [would] not be wrecked on the rigidity of the positions of the two sides on this particular point.” Although he made no mention of the Soviet proposal, Eisenhower was saying that he liked the idea of establishing an international board to provide advice to Nasser, while leaving the management of the canal to the Egyptian company.
Eisenhower did not insist that these ideas be reflected in the U.S. position at the conference. Dulles persuaded him that Nasser might accept internationalization of the canal, and even if Nasser rejected this first effort at a diplomatic settlement, it was more important for the United States to stand by its Western allies.
With the American position frozen by Dulles, Shepilov curiously did not formally propose the compromise he had privately suggested to the secretary of state. A passivity had also fallen over the Kremlin. Although it was watching the proceedings carefully, Khrushchev was out of the city, and the Presidium did not feel the need to meet to discuss any new instructions for Shepilov.
Fortunately for Moscow, the Indian delegation decided on its own before the end of the conference to propose something that echoed Shepilov’s and Eisenhower’s ideas about international supervision without control. The proposal was a godsend to Moscow, though there is no evidence that it was behind the proposal. Here a third world country was making the points the Kremlin had intended to make. The canal would remain Egyptian and under Egyptian control.
The Indian proposal made no difference to the outcome of the conference, which had been preordained by the British, the French, and the Americans before any of the other delegates arrived. India lacked the clout of the Western allies to cause any major defections from the supporters of the internationalizing position. On August 23 the chairman of the conference, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, called for a vote on the five-power (Pakistan and Iran signed on with the three-power proposal once some cosmetic changes had been made) and Indian proposals. The five-power proposal received eighteen votes. The Soviet Union, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Indonesia joined India in voting for New Delhi’s proposal. Great Britain, France, and Dulles got what they wanted. Although the canal would still “belong” to Egypt, the Egyptian government would be expected to delegate to an international board the right to manage it, in return for which Cairo would receive a percentage of the revenues from the tolls. It was decided that a delegation headed by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies would present the conference’s proposal to Nasser in Cairo in early September.
KHRUSHCHEV WAS NOT satisfied with the outcome of the London Conference. Just home from his trip to the Donbass and another to Siberia, the Soviet leader had little energy of his own to devote to the Suez problem. But he was aware of the 18–4 vote in London and the fact that the majority intended to impose the internationalization of the canal on Nasser. It annoyed Khrushchev that the West was allowing its concerns over the efficient management of the canal, which the Soviets shared, to derail any possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement.
He decided to intervene personally. At a dinner reception at the Romanian Embassy, honoring the twelfth anniversary of the entry of the Soviet Army into Bucharest, he took the French and British ambassadors aside to lecture them on the errors of the majority view in London. He stressed that a consultative board was the solution to the problem of reconciling international concerns over the management of the canal with Egypt’s sovereign rights. He charged the British above all with pushing for an outcome at the conference that they knew in advance Nasser would reject. Alluding to intelligence
he was receiving that pointed to the possibility of an Anglo-French attack following Nasser’s rejection of these terms, Khrushchev warned the Western ambassadors. “The Arabs will not stand alone,” he vowed, if war broke out.83
The only credible military threat that Khrushchev felt he could make was to raise the possibility that the Soviet Union might send “volunteers” to defend Egypt. In 1950 a million Chinese “volunteers” had invaded Allied-occupied North Korea to rid the peninsula of Western influence. Khrushchev said to the foreign ambassadors that if he had a son of military age who could volunteer, “I would tell him to go ahead. ‘You have my approval.’” 84
Khrushchev had new instructions sent to London to toughen the rhetoric that Shepilov was to use at his closing press conference the next day. “Before your departure,” he cabled in a message also signed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Bulganin, “hit these imperialists on the snout!”85 The period of Soviet conciliation on Suez was over. The Western powers, including the United States, it appeared, had never intended to seek a peaceful settlement.
The next day, in a room filled to overflowing, Shepilov gave a tough speech in front of 175 journalists. He said that his view of Secretary Dulles had changed for the worse. The five-power plan, which he called the Dulles Plan, involved “a flagrant violation of Egypt’s sovereign rights” that flowed from “an unacceptable colonialist position.”86 The language was strong but did not come close to expressing Khrushchev’s irritation at how the conference had gone.
Khrushchev was still angry when Shepilov reached Moscow. “I had just reached my apartment and put down my valise,” Shepilov later recalled, “when I called [Khrushchev].” The Soviet chief told him: “Get over here.” When Shepilov reached the Kremlin and they were together, Khrushchev asked, “Now listen, why didn’t you follow the instruction that I sent you with Bulganin?” Shepilov replied: “We had already won the battle, and so why ruin relations with them [France, Great Britain, and the United States]?” His ire rising, Khrushchev said, “So now you want to direct foreign policy.”87
The hectoring of Shepilov continued at a formal meeting of the Presidium a little while later. One after another the members lambasted him for not having been tough enough at the closing press conference. “This voluntarism was wrong and dangerous,” stated Khrushchev.88 “Nothing is to be interpreted; once a directive is given, you should know how to act,” Presidium member Mikhail Pervukhin added. Georgi Malenkov even attacked Shepilov for having been too chummy with Dulles at one of their meetings.
This was displaced anger mixed with jealousy. Shepilov had made a good impression in the West and needed to be put in his place. But the main catalyst was the diplomatic defeat that Moscow had suffered at the London Conference. The West had ignored its wishes, and it had only the votes of three countries along with its own to show for its efforts.
The conference was not a fiasco for Moscow. It did represent the first time that the USSR was recognized as a player in the Middle East, and its participation did increase Soviet influence with the Egyptians. For the first time since the dispute had started, Nasser turned to Moscow for foreign policy advice. At the end of August the Egyptian leader called the Soviet ambassador in for a private chat. Knowing that the delegation led by Menzies was due to arrive in Cairo in less than two weeks, Nasser asked for “the opinion and advice of D. T. Shepilov in connection with further steps and tactics.” He added, “All Soviet advice would be received positively.”89
At a Presidium meeting two days later Khrushchev and his colleagues approved a list of policy recommendations for Egypt.90 Moscow shared Cairo’s conviction that despite Western threats, the London Conference proposals had to be rejected. To undermine the Western argument that Nasser had snatched the canal in the hopes of doing damage to other countries, the Soviets suggested instead that he announce the basic principles upon which the canal would be administered. They also suggested the principles. The first was that the Egyptian Suez Canal Company “not be assigned any kind of political function” the second, that it be “independent in its operational activity of any [governmental] economic organ” and the third, that it have a “juridical form subject to Egyptian law and operating on the basis of a special administration, in view of its unitary independent budget.” They added that Egypt should declare that the Suez Canal Company would guarantee free passage through the canal “on the basis of complete equality for the ships of all flags without any kind of discrimination.” In other words, as the price for gaining international acceptance of the nationalization, Egypt would have to accept Israel’s right to use the canal.91
Moscow continued to have concerns about the proper functioning of the canal under the Egyptians. It suggested that the Egyptian company commit itself to hiring foreign specialists: engineers, pilots, and other technical personnel. Egypt should also say that it endorsed the formation of an international consultative commission on the canal that would allow for international cooperation on technical assistance and on the use of tariffs and their collection before ships exited the canal. Although Moscow wanted the canal company to be separate from this international consultative commission, it suggested that Nasser think hard about how Egypt and the company would link themselves to the United Nations. Moscow thought that in addition to announcing its willingness to proceed along these lines, Egypt should organize a conference in Cairo of countries that used the canal “to discuss the draft of a new convention that would guarantee freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and also the question of the form of international cooperation.”92
While the delegation headed by Menzies was negotiating with Nasser, the Kremlin did not want the West to have any pretext for a military intervention. Since the middle of the month Moscow had been receiving reports of British and French efforts to undermine the operation of the canal. The British and French governments had asked their citizens working for the canal company as ship pilots to leave their jobs. According to Soviet estimates, of the 280 men who worked as pilots guiding ships through the canal, only 50 were Egyptian. The French, for example, offered their citizens who abandoned the canal thirty-six months’ severance pay as well as a pension adjusted to the time worked for the canal company. As a way of helping Cairo keep the canal open and thereby remove any Anglo-French arguments for war, the Kremlin decided on August 30 to send thirty experienced ships’ pilots to help fill the holes in the canal administration. It also suggested to Nasser that he formally ask for volunteers from the bloc countries of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, as well as from India, Greece, and Finland.93
As it tried to eliminate any pretexts for a Western attack, Moscow provided some military support to the Egyptians. In the first week of September, as Nasser was meeting with the Menzies delegation, the Soviets sent shiploads of weapons to the Egyptian Army. Meanwhile, by means of the KGB, Moscow provided military handbooks and training films and presumably some military advisers to show Egyptian officers how to use this material.94
AMERICAN ACTIONS at the London Conference had been disappointing to Khrushchev. By signing on to the declaration of eighteen, the United States effectively endorsed a diplomatic plan that was guaranteed to produce an Egyptian refusal. If Washington was not prepared to stop its allies, then the Kremlin needed to know how seriously to take the anger in Western Europe, especially the determination of Great Britain to harm Nasser.
Khrushchev had some reason to hope that Britain lacked the resolve to participate in any Western conspiracy against Nasser. Since 1951 two former members of the British establishment, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, had lived in Moscow. Until they fled their homeland in May 1951, Burgess and Maclean had operated as Soviet intelligence moles in, among other places, the Foreign Office. Now working under the aliases D. M. Elliot and Mr. Frazer, the two former spies served as high-level advisers to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on British politics and politicians. Khrushchev and the Presidium regularly received reports on the meetings that the two most fa
mous Britons in Moscow were having with old friends and British journalists who came to Moscow to see them.95
In mid-August Tom Driberg, the deputy leader of the British Labour Party and a journalist, had come to Moscow to see Burgess. Despite the rumblings in the British press that London might strike at Nasser, Driberg had told Burgess that Eden was too weak to attempt to impose his will on Egypt by force: “It was all bluff.”96 Reminding Burgess that “British journalists were usually a good barometer of official decision-making,” Driberg assured him that “Fleet Street does not expect a war in the Middle East now.” Khrushchev was so taken by this account of the meeting that he asked to see Driberg himself.97 The British political activist repeated the same story to the Soviet leader at their meeting on August 30.98 It seemed that despite the hue and cry following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, at least, Britain, would do nothing.
Events in September deepened the belief in Moscow that a Mideast crisis might be averted. As expected, Nasser refused to accept the proposals carried by the Menzies delegation. However, the day after it left Cairo Nasser called for a new international conference, assuring the world that Egypt was fully prepared to negotiate but not on the terms suggested by the eighteen-country bloc at the London Conference. Meanwhile Foster Dulles suggested a Suez users’ association, consisting of all the countries that used the canal, to negotiate with Egypt. France and Great Britain formally endorsed Dulles’s plan and called for a second conference in London to approve the suez users’ association. From Moscow’s perspective what happened next suggested that the British push for war was losing steam. Eden’s opponents in the House of Commons started a major public debate on the entire Suez policy, criticizing him for being too belligerent. On September 22 the prime minister surprised the world by calling for the UN Security Council to take up discussion of the Suez problem. The Soviets and the Egyptians had been advocating for this since July, and now, seemingly under political pressure, the British also recommended it. A date was set for talks to begin on October 5.
Khrushchev's Cold War Page 14