Khrushchev had some advice for the Cubans. Despite his disappointment at the recent collapse of the four-power summit in Paris, he still doubted that Eisenhower would invade Cuba unless provoked. His greater worry was that the Cubans might somehow trigger a U.S. counterstrike. “We don’t want war,” Khrushchev cautioned Raúl, “and you don’t need war.”59
When Raúl asked, “Do you think the U.S. can arrange intervention under the banner of Organization of American States, as it was in Korea under the banner of United Nations?,” Khrushchev responded, “It is not a real possibility now; it is an absolutely different situation [today].” Khrushchev, however, did not want the Cubans to believe that he was intending to limit Soviet military assistance to Cuba. “If it [is] useful for you,” he said, “we can give you more.”60
The meeting had its light moments. To demonstrate how committed the Cubans were to building a socialist society, Raúl spoke of himself toiling day and night. In response Khrushchev threw out a half-mocking taunt: “Don’t work all night. You will make stupid mistakes if you do.”61
Khrushchev thought the visit had achieved all that he had hoped it would. Cuba had become a very strong ally. A clerical change at the KGB signaled this new confidence. In August 1960 the code name for the Castro regime file was changed from YOUNGSTYE (Youngsters) to AVANPOST (Bridgehead).62
KHRUSHCHEV’S MEETING with Raúl Castro coincided with major developments in the Congo, which soon placed the Soviet relationship with Lumumba at the center of an international storm. Khrushchev did not attend the independence ceremony on June 30, but the events that followed had important consequences for the Soviet Union. In May, Lumumba’s party won the largest number of seats in the country’s first election. Congo became a parliamentary democracy with a prime minister, the head of government, and a president as the head of state. Lumumba became the country’s first prime minister, and Joseph Kasavubu, a fellow nationalist but not a member of Lumumba’s party, became president.
The deal struck between Belgium and the Congolese nationalists left a thousand white Belgian officers in charge of Congo’s twenty-five-thousand-man army, called the Force Publique, on the day of independence.63 Belgian nationals were also kept in posts in the new government’s civil service. This deal quickly unraveled. Within days of independence the Congolese Army collapsed. Black noncommissioned officers mutinied, declaring they were unwilling to serve under white officers. With the army paralyzed, disorder spread throughout the huge territory. Many of the hundred thousand Europeans living in the Congo at the time of independence fled out of fear. They included the civil servants, who had not had time to train Congolese replacements. The Belgian government reacted by sending troops on July 10 to protect the remaining foreign community.64 The independence accord stipulated that Belgium could not redeploy troops to Congo without the permission of the new sovereign government, yet Brussels sent troops anyway.
The next day the situation in the Congo became even more confused. With the support and encouragement of the Belgians, a Congolese soldier named Moise Tshombe declared the independence of the copper-producing province of Katanga. The province, the source of one-half of Congo’s exports, was by far the country’s richest region. A day earlier Tshombe had invited the Belgian government to send paratroopers to the provincial capital of Elisabethville. Eager to defend the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, a Belgian company that enjoyed a monopoly over copper production, Brussels also sent forces to Katanga.
With the Force Publique in disarray, Lumumba and Kasavubu jointly requested intervention by the United Nations on July 12. It was an unprecedented request by a sovereign state. The UN had never before been asked to send troops into a civil war. The two leaders explained that international intervention was required to prevent “acts of aggression” by Belgian troops against Congolese citizens. They asked that membership in the UN contingent be restricted to soldiers from neutral countries. Stressing the urgency of the situation, Lumumba and Kasavubu threatened to appeal to the countries associated with the nonaligned movement founded at the Bandung Conference in 1955, including India and China, if the UN did not act “without delay.”65
Kasavubu did not share Lumumba’s interest in close ties with Moscow. However, the next day he agreed to send a joint message to Moscow asking Khrushchev “to watch hourly over the development of the situation.” They added: “We may have to ask for the Soviet Union’s intervention should the Western camp not stop its aggression against the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo.” Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko distributed copies of the telegram to all members and candidate members of the Presidium.66
AS OF EARLY JULY, Khrushchev had no desire to involve the Soviet military in an intervention in Africa. The Congo presented a major logistical challenge to any intervention because it lacked a major port near its principal cities, meaning that all military assistance would have to be airlifted. Khrushchev preferred a political solution anyway. It served Soviet interests to let the UN restore order. Moscow’s favorite was already Congo’s prime minister, and the international community was coming to his rescue. On July 13 the Soviet delegate at the UN was instructed to support a Security Council resolution calling for the formation of a UN force for the Congo and the immediate withdrawal of Belgian forces from the country. The resolution passed that night, 8–0, with Washington and Moscow on the same side of the discussion. Both superpowers were asked to contribute weapons and food to the UN force.67 On July 15 Khrushchev sent word to Kasavubu and Lumumba that he regarded the UN intervention as a “useful thing.”68 In this telegram, which the Kremlin made public, Khrushchev also warned the Belgians and their allies: “If aggression were to continue in spite of this [UN] decision, the Soviet Government declares that the necessity would arise for more effective measures.”69
Advance elements of the UN force began arriving in Congo the same day as Khrushchev’s telegram. As soon as the Security Council passed the enabling resolution, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld moved quickly to organize a military force that initially numbered four to five thousand men, largely recruited from African countries.
Kasavubu’s and Lumumba’s appreciation was short-lived. They soon were disappointed to learn that this force would not deploy to the secessionist region of Katanga. Determined to avoid involving the UN in any civil wars, the Secretariat refused to be drawn into the conflict between the Congolese government and Tshombe’s forces in Katanga.
THE EISENHOWER administration knew that its interests in the Congo were different from those of the Soviet Union. On the day the Congo became independent, the CIA described its new government as having a “leftist tinge” and warned that it was vulnerable to Communist influence.70 The agency, which may have been receiving information from the Belgians, asserted that five of the ten members of the cabinet were “inclined toward communism.” It added: “Lumumba himself appears to be neutralist in attitude, with a Leftist and opportunistic bent.”71
As chaos spread throughout the country, the administration sensed it might be witnessing the creation of a second Cuba. The U.S. Embassy in Léopoldville baldly drew the parallel between Lumumba and Castro: “The most serious effort is centered in Leopoldville where they [the Soviets] are well on their way to completely capturing Lumumba and followers like they took Castro in Cuba. Believe pattern very similar but this one is easier in some ways; Congolese are totally disorganized, they are political children and only pitiful few have faintest idea where Lumumba is taking them.”72
Washington had an opportunity to get a better sense of whether Lumumba was another Castro when, on July 23, he flew to the United States at the invitation of the administration. The Congolese prime minister decided to leave his country in a desperate attempt to get the UN to help him fight Katangan separatism and to encourage the Americans to increase the pressure on their Belgian allies to leave the Congo. He planned to spend a few days at the UN before visiting Washington.
Lumumba made his case to the UN in New York. H
e visited with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and various ambassadors. He also made time to see Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vassily Kuznetsov.73
President Eisenhower did not make time to see Lumumba, but the Congolese leader was given half an hour on July 29 with Secretary of State Herter. Lumumba left a bad impression on the Americans. Herter’s deputy, C. Douglas Dillon, who attended the meeting, later recalled that Lumumba struck him as “a person who is gripped by this fervor that I can only describe as messianic…he was just not a rational being.”74 Lumumba’s request for U.S. assistance, which included a plane that he and Kasavubu could use to get around the Congo, fell on deaf ears. The administration wanted all support for the Congolese government to go through the UN lest it establish a precedent that the Soviets could use to outbid Washington.75
Lumumba next went to Ottawa, and the Canadian government was as unhelpful as the U.S. government. Frustrated by the lack of success, Lumumba went to see the Soviet ambassador in Canada, A. A. Aroutunian. A few days later, when he reached New York for more lobbying at the UN, Lumumba followed up the talk with Aroutunian with a second conversation with Kuznetsov.76 Afterward Lumumba flew to Western Europe to continue his search for allies in the fight against Brussels and Elisabethville.
The threat of Soviet intervention propelled the UN to take one of the steps that Lumumba had requested. On August 1 Moscow issued a public statement that “[i]n the event of the aggression against the Congo continuing…the Soviet government will not hesitate to take resolute measures to rebuff the aggressors who…are in fact acting with the encouragement of all the colonialist powers of NATO” and appointed a Soviet ambassador to the Congo. The next day Hammarskjöld declared that the UN force would enter Katanga Province on August 6. For some time the secretary-general had been telling the U.S. government that the UN had to go into Katanga to deny Moscow a pretext for military intervention.77 The Kremlin’s statement made the argument for him.
IN THE FIRST WEEK of August Khrushchev decided to abandon any hope that the UN could manage the situation and pursue instead a unilateral approach to the ever-worsening Congo situation. Lumumba’s comments to Soviet representatives on July 25, July 31, or August 1 may have been the catalyst. On August 5 Khrushchev sent a letter to Lumumba—and pointedly not to Kasavubu—that promised that “the Soviet Union is prepared to give and is already giving the Republic of Congo comprehensive support and assistance.”78 He added that Soviet military assistance might be necessary. “The difficulties of your struggle are clear and known to us. We know that the imperialists are mounting every possible intrigue against your young government. They do not have an aversion to use any means to achieve the success of their insidious aims. In their arsenal of subversive action is not only sabotage and economic diversion but the organization of plots and terrorist acts of every kind, which will require special vigilance on the part of the people and government of the Congo.” Khrushchev assured Lumumba that in an effort to strengthen his government, he would receive the “friendly and disinterested help of the Soviet government.” He also assured him that the Soviets sought a united Congo and viewed the Katangan separatists as part of a Western conspiracy.
The Soviet leader’s determination to do something bold in the Congo hardened a few days later, when he learned that Ghana wanted the Kremlin to intervene. On August 6, when UN forces did not enter Katanga as the secretary-general had promised, President Kwame Nkrumah asked the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Accra for assurances that in the event of the outbreak of general war in Central Africa, Ghana could count on secret tactical assistance from Moscow.79
AS MOSCOW was preparing its response to Nkrumah, Hammarskjöld reported to the UN Security Council that on the advice of Ralph Bunche, his personal representative in the Congo, he had decided to postpone the entry of UN troops into the secessionist province because of the likelihood the Katangans would attack them. He still wanted to send them in, but he wanted the consent of the secessionists and Belgium, which was increasingly acting as Katanga’s ally and protector.80 In response to the secretary-general’s initiative, the Soviets proposed a new Security Council resolution that drew a clear distinction between his and the Kremlin’s approach to the crisis. Whereas Hammarskjöld continued to look for a diplomatic way to restore order in Katanga without in any way tipping the balance toward either Tshombe or Lumumba, the Soviets wanted UN troops to enter the rebellious province and “put an end to acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Congo.”81 Moscow knew that it did not have the votes for this resolution. On August 9 it withdrew this resolution in favor of a compromise proposed by Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Tunisia, which demanded the “immediate” withdrawal of Belgian forces from Katanga and the deployment of UN forces to the province, while reaffirming that UN troops could not participate in the civil war between the Congolese government and Tshombe.82
With the United Nations unwilling to defend the unity of the Congo, the Kremlin stepped up its support for the central government in Léopoldville and its allies. On August 11 the Presidium approved a letter from Khrushchev assuring Ghana that it could count on receiving Soviet weapons if they were needed in the Congo conflict. More important, Ghana received a promise “to give the African people not only symbolic assistance but real help in this struggle.”83 The same day a Soviet Il-14 transport plane arrived in the Congo as a personal gift to Patrice Lumumba.84
Lumumba had meanwhile returned to Léopoldville from his extended trip to the United States and Europe. Although the UN’s August 9 resolution was disappointing, he was emboldened by Khrushchev’s letter to apply even more pressure on the UN to defend the principle of a united Congo. On August 14, a day after appealing for unity in a speech to the Congolese people, Lumumba issued a series of demands in a letter to Hammarskjöld, who was back in the Congo. The central government wanted Congolese troops, not the UN, to guard Congo’s airports, it wanted African and Congolese troops to be sent to Katanga and all non-African UN troops to be removed, and it wanted all weapons captured by the UN in Katanga be turned over to the government. Over the next twenty-four hours, although Lumumba and Hammarskjöld both were in Léopoldville, they communicated by letter. Five letters passed between them, and Lumumba’s became increasingly angry. At one point he charged that Hammarskjöld, a Swede, was not impartial because of the dynastic ties between the Swedish and Belgian royal families. The secretary-general’s response was to return to New York, and relations between the men were ruptured.85
At this point Lumumba formally requested Soviet military assistance. Although Lumumba claimed that Kasavubu had agreed to make this request to Moscow, the Congolese president later denied it and soon used the government’s turn to the East against his prime minister. Khrushchev had been expecting a request, and on August 20 the Kremlin agreed to send cargo planes to the Congo. Five days later the Soviets requested permission from the Greek government to overfly its territory and refuel in Athens. The Greeks, who told United States about the Soviet request, agreed so long as they could inspect the cargoes.86 On August 28 ten Il-14s took off from Moscow for Léopoldville, via Athens, with foodstuffs for the Congolese people.87 Soviet military assistance took a different route. Four days later five AN-12 cargo planes left Moscow for Conakry, Guinea, filled with weapons and ammunition for the Congolese.88
WITH KHRUSHCHEV’S direct involvement in the Congo conflict, fears that it had become a second Cuba bubbled over in Washington. Throughout July the U.S. government had continued to hope that the UN could stabilize the situation and prevent the Kremlin from increasing its influence. There had also been a debate over Lumumba’s politics. “Despite charges by the Belgians and his Congolese opponents that Lumumba is a communist,” concluded the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in late July, “we have nothing to substantiate this allegation.”89 The news in August that Soviet cargo planes were flying to Congo settled the debate about Lumumba.
The news also had an impact on a much broa
der discussion in the administration. Coming on the heels of the apparent Soviet gains in Cuba, the summer’s events in the Congo suggested that the third world was nearing a tipping point that required more energetic U.S. action if the entire region was not to be lost to communism. Eisenhower had told his foreign policy team on August 1 that the world was in “a kind of ferment” greater than he could remember “in recent times.” “The Communists,” he added, are trying to take control of this and have succeeded to the extent that students in many cases are now saying that the Communists are thinking of the common man while the United States is dedicated to supporting outmoded regimes.”90
On August 18, 1960, the administration began seriously preparing for the removal of the prime ministers of both the Congo and Cuba.91 At a morning meeting of the NSC the president said that Western troops might have to intervene in the Congo under the UN flag. “We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight.”92 Eisenhower was convinced that Lumumba was on the Soviet payroll, and the council discussed rumors that Belgian Communists or Soviet advisers were writing his cables and plotting strategy. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs requested that the White House consider overt and covert measures to keep a Congolese airfield and one port out of Soviet control, predicting that “the covert activities of just a few Communist infiltrating such essential facilities” could “threaten the Free World’s essential South Atlantic sea routes.”93 The Joint Chiefs presented no evidence for this, nor had they ever previously described the sub-Saharan region as a U.S. vital interest. But such was the emotional pitch that August in Washington. Formal planning for covert action to unseat Lumumba began after this meeting.
That afternoon the CIA updated the president on the progress of the anti-Castro planning. For months the administration had been watching developments in Cuba with dismay, reacting to them with more and more active planning but no action. Most recently, on July 21, the CIA had sent a message to the head of its station in Havana: “Possible removal top three leaders [Fidel, Raúl, and Che] is receiving serious consideration at HQS.”94 The next day the same officer was told, “Do not pursue…. Would like to drop matter.”95
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