by Barry Ernest
34. See HSCA, vol. 5, 554.
35. HSCA open hearings, September 11, 1978. See also HSCA, vol. 2, 94.
36. HSCA open hearings, December 29, 1978. See also HSCA, vol. 5, 556.
37. The testimony of McLain indicated he was the officer riding the motorcycle with the faulty microphone. He said he was unaware of any problems with his police radio on that day and may not have known about it even if there had been, and he admitted his microphone had become stuck in the open position on several earlier occasions. HSCA, vol. 5, 618-41.
38. Ibid., 583. See also HSCA open hearings, December 29, 1978.
39. Ibid., 592.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. See also 593.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 674. In its final report, the Committee would cite Barger as saying there was a small possibility that the recorded sound from the grassy knoll represented “random noise” or something other than that of a gunshot, thereby reducing the 95 percent figure to 76 percent. It would sum up the matter by saying, “The Committee found no evidence or indication of any other cause of noise as loud as a rifle shot coming from the grassy knoll at the time the impulse sequence was recorded on the dispatch tape, and therefore concluded that the cause was probably a gunshot fired at the motorcade.” See HSCA Report, 75.
45. Ibid. See also HSCA, vol. 5, 684.
46. Ibid. See also 694.
47. HSCA Report, 97.
48. Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources of the National Research Council, Report of the Committee on Ballistics Acoustics (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982).
49. Ibid.
50. HSCA open hearings, September 21, 1978. See also HSCA, vol. 3, 624-25.
Chapter 18
1. While I visited with him one day, Harold Weisberg told me the following story. In 1991, he had heard Oliver Stone was shooting a movie praising Garrison, and so he sent the producer a letter about his own knowledge of the district attorney’s investigation. It fell on deaf ears. Weisberg then obtained a copy of the movie’s script, despite extraordinary security precautions to keep it secret. (I asked him how he had been able to pull off such a feat, since Stone had had each copy numbered and kept under lock and key. Usually free with his information, Weisberg would this time only smile and say, “I had a good contact.”) What he read in those pages, he said, sickened him to the point where he decided to leak the contents of the script to a writer for the Washington Post. The result was the beginning of the media frenzy that surrounds the film even to this day.
2. People, December 30, 1991.
3. HSCA Report, 57.
4. Ibid. There would be no mention, however, of the lack of gun oil on the inside of the sack or the absence of creasing to the paper from it containing a heavy and angular object.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See CE 3131 (as shown in 26H809).
8. WR, 249.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 566.
11. HSCA Report, 54.
12. Ibid., 54-56.
13. Ibid., 51.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 57.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 58.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. 3H252.
23. Ibid., 240.
24. HSCA Report, 58.
25. 3H275. Mrs. Reid’s two-minute figure was based on the results of a timed test performed, stopwatch in hand, by David Belin, who had conducted her questioning. It is yet another example of the lengths to which Belin went to resolve timing questions—except when it came to Victoria Adams.
26. HSCA Report, 58.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 601.
29. HSCA, vol. 11, attachment E, 227.
30. Ibid., attachment H, 447.
31. HSCA 180-10095-10363.
32. HSCA Report, 59.
33. Ibid.
34. The Committee was aware of what Craig said he saw, though. Under the heading of “Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza,” details of Craig’s story as well as from others who saw suspicious activities are presented. See HSCA, vol. 12, 17-18.
35. HSCA Report, 59.
36. Ibid., 601.
37. Ibid., 60.
38. When Oswald’s personal effects were searched by Dallas Police after his arrest, authorities found a photograph showing the back of Walker’s home. By the time that picture was released by the FBI, a hole had been cut into the photograph, removing the license plate of a car that had been parked in Walker’s driveway (see CE 5, as shown in 16H7). Much of what was used to link Oswald to the Walker shooting ultimately came from the testimony of Marina Oswald.
39. HSCA Report, 60.
40. HSCA, vol. 7, 370.
41. HSCA Report, 60.
42. Ibid., 61.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 86. Then there were those who would say it was impossible for Holland to have seen gunfire because “modern” weapons do not emit smoke. Who’s to say that a gunman on the knoll was not using an older weapon like Oswald’s, which did emit smoke from the muzzle, as the Committee’s Firearms Panel proved (see HSCA, vol. 7, 373)? The Committee would continue, “A firearms expert engaged by the Committee explained that irrespective of the exact type of ammunition used, it would be possible for witnesses to have seen smoke if a gun had been fired from that arena. According to the expert, both ‘smokeless’ and smoke-producing ammunition may leave a trace of smoke that would be visible to the eye in sunlight. That is because even with smokeless ammunition, when the weapon was fired, nitrocellulose bases in the powder which are impregnated with nitroglycerin may give off smoke, albeit less smoke than black or smoke-producing ammunition. In addition, residue remaining in the weapon from previous firings, as well as cleaning solution which might have been used on the weapon, could cause even more smoke to be discharged in subsequent firings of the weapon.” (See HSCA, vol. 12, 24-25.)
45. WR, 219.
46. HSCA Report, 157.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 158.
50. HSCA, vol. 3, 461.
51. Ibid., vol. 9, 1120.
52. HSCA Report, 241.
53. Ibid., 242.
54. Ibid., 243-44.
55. Ibid., 244.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 255.
58. The Committee wrote in its Report, “Virtually all former Warren Commission members and staff contacted by the Committee said they regarded the CIA-Mafia plots . . . to be the most important information withheld from the Commission. They all agreed that an awareness of the plots would have led to significant new areas of investigation and would have altered the general approach of the investigation.” (Ibid., 258.)
59. Ibid., 238-39.
60. Ibid., 261.
61. The comment was made by administrative assistant Howard P. Willens in an August 8, 1964, memo to J. Lee Rankin regarding Willens’ thoughts on improving the wording in chapter 4 of the soon-to-be-published Warren Report. That chapter was titled, “The Assassin” and listed evidence linking Oswald with the crime. Willens’ complete statement read, “It could be set forth by the Commission in a frank statement that the Commission has no scientific evidence as opposed to eyewitness and circumstantial evidence that Oswald fired the rifle on November 22.” See, for example, HSCA, vol. 11, 447. During his stint with the Commission, Willens also served as liaison with the Department of Justice. The value Rankin attached to “circumstantial evidence” was shown in a closed-door meeting with Commission members in January 1964, when Rankin said, while discussing the rumor that Oswald was a paid FBI informant, “Now that is just circumstantial evidence, and it don’t prove anything about this, but it raises questions.” (See transcript, Executive Session Meeting, January 22, 1964, 11.)
Chapter 19
1. Alfred Goldberg, memorandum to J. Lee Rankin, April 28, 1
964, 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 2.
5. Ibid., 3.
6. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, December 16, 1963, 47.
7. Associated Press wire story as published in the Syracuse Herald-American, May 9, 1976. In Oswald and the CIA (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1995), 39, author John Newman details how the CIA had similar concerns about the FPCC, going so far as to think it “a Castro-financed effort to foment insurrection in America.”
8. There is no evidence Oswald ever visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The statement in the memo saying he did so undoubtedly refers to an FBI interview of Oswald on August 16, 1962, in Ft. Worth, not long after his return from Russia. During that interview, Oswald said he had written a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, but only to forward his wife’s current address. See CE 2758 (as shown in 26H143-44).
9. Document No. 92-226, LBJ Presidential Library. The copy I obtained was from the files of Harold Weisberg.
10. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum to Gordon Shanklin, November 22, 1963. FBI Document No. 62-109060-58.
11. Ibid., FBI Document No. 62-109060-59.
12. Ibid., FBI Document No. 62-109060-57.
13. FBI Document No. 105-569-94.
14. Cartha D. DeLoach, memorandum, November 25, 1963.
15. Ibid.
16. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum, November 26, 1963. FBI Document No. 62-109060-61.
17. Ibid.
18. HSCA, vol. 3, 644.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 643.
22. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, memorandum to Bill Moyers, November 25, 1963. Department of Justice Record No. 129-11, 2.
23. Ibid., 1.
24. Ibid., 2.
25. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum, November 26, 1963. FBI Document No. 62-109060-1490.
26. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, December 16, 1963, 12.
27. Ibid., 33.
28. Ibid., 55.
29. W. D. Griffith, memorandum to Mr. Conrad, November 28, 1964. Document No. 62-109060-2405, 2.
30. FBI Document No. 62-109060-4235.
31. Memo on Discussions with Mr. Allan W. Dulles on the Oswald Case, April 13, 1964. CIA Document 657-831.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. 5H121. This is in contrast to a redacted CIA memo written November 25, 1963 (but not released until 1992), which notes the CIA did in fact have “OI,” operational intelligence interest, in Oswald. The unknown author wrote that he or she was being moved into a new assignment and thus, “I would have left the country shortly after Oswald’s arrival [from Russia]. I do not know what action developed thereafter.”
36. CIA Document 579-250.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. CIA Document 695-302A, 2. The briefing material was well accepted. Helms, for instance, himself no stranger to such tactics, called it “a first-class job . . . not only as to format but also as to content” (see CIA Document 694-302).
40. CIA Document 695-302A, Summary Outline, 3.
41. CIA Document 871-388A.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. CIA Document 1035-960.
45. Ibid., 2.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Weisberg had a habit of writing himself explanatory notes that he would include in his files. Often lengthy, these personal notations included details on how he acquired certain documents and occasionally listed his feelings after having first read and thought about the material. Regarding this incident, Weisberg wrote that there were two obvious answers: one, the “Hunt” letter was real, which introduced questions of its own, or two, it was a “deliberate hoax designed to be used.” The latter was his choice. He also said he sent a written inquiry to the return address in Mexico that was on the envelope but had not received a reply.
49. Harold Weisberg, letter to Jim Lesar, February 12, 1977.
50. “It is impossible to determine positively whether the letter to Hunt is or is not in the handwriting of the same person as the other writings purporting to be Oswald’s,” those experts would say. See HSCA, volume 8, 246.
51. For a full discussion of this tomfoolery, see Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
Chapter 20
1. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, December 5, 1963, 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 2-3. One member, Senator Russell, actually went so far as to say he hoped the Commission would not be put into the position of having to hear the testimony of any witnesses. Another member, Senator Cooper, agreed, suggesting that witnesses simply be referred to the FBI to present their testimony and have it evaluated (ibid., 41).
5. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, December 16, 1963, 18.
6. Ibid., 43.
7. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, January 21, 1964, 61.
8. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, December 16, 1963, 25.
9. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, January 21, 1964, 13.
10. Ibid., 16-17.
11. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, January 22, 1964, 10.
12. Ibid., 1.
13. Ibid., 6.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 11.
16. Ibid., 12-13.
17. Ibid., 12.
18. Ibid., 13. Some researchers erroneously make mention of there being only twelve Executive Session meetings instead of thirteen. The mistake quite possibly originates from the fact that this particular meeting was not recorded like the others, perhaps because it was unscheduled and had been quickly called to order. Plus, an official transcription was not made until ten years later, based on this note on the cover page of that document: “Prepared by a Department of Defense stenotypist with the proper security clearance from reporter’s notes among the records of the Commission in the National Archives at the request of the General Services Administration in August 1974.”
19. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, January 27, 1964, 153.
20. Ibid., 162.
21. Ibid., 166.
22. Ibid., 171.
23. Ibid., 176.
24. See CE 2758 (as shown in 26H143-44).
25. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, January 27, 1964, 176.
26. Ibid., 193.
27. Ibid., 177.
28. Ibid., 212.
29. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, April 30, 1964, 5880.
30. Ibid., 5870.
31. Ibid., 5873.
32. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, June 4, 1964, 6653.
33. See, for example, Office Files of Staff, Francis Adams and Arlen Specter, box 1, entry 44.
34. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, June 4, 1964, 6656.
35. FBI Document No. 62-109060-4199EBF. On page 2 of this document, the FBI concluded “the copy of Oswald’s diary in possession of ‘Life’ magazine originated from the Office of the Dallas County Attorney.” The allegation that Ford was involved apparently originated from there as well.
36. HSCA, volume 11, 54.
37. Ibid., vol. 3, 576-77.
38. Ibid.
39. Cartha D. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1997), 149. Ford told the HSCA that he did meet with DeLoach, but those meetings were during the organizational stages of the Commission. Ford said he could find no written records indicating he had any meetings with DeLoach after December 19, 1963 (see HSCA, vol. 3, 577).
40. Robert Kennedy would say nothing during the interview, except for this sole question at the very end of the proceeding. It was printed only in the official and unedited transcript of Mrs. Kennedy’s testimony (released in June 1988, p. 6817).
Rankin: Yes. You have told us what you remember about the entire p
eriod as far as you can recall, have you?
Mrs. Kennedy: Yes.
Mr. Robert Kennedy: Can we go off the record just a minute?
The request by Kennedy to go off the record was not shown in the printed version of Mrs. Kennedy’s interview in the twenty-six volumes. The discussion in private may have concerned the condition of Mrs. Kennedy, since immediately after returning to the record, Warren ended the session.
41. Arlen Specter, memorandum to J. Lee Rankin, March 31, 1964.
42. 5H178-81.
43. Ibid., 180.
44. Unedited transcript of Mrs. Kennedy’s testimony, 6815.
45. WR, 50.
46. Ibid., 54.
47. Howard P. Willens memorandum to J. Lee Rankin, December 19, 1963, 1.
48. 5H180.
49. Unedited transcript of Mrs. Kennedy’s testimony, 6815.
50. A complete set of the twenty-six volumes, providing one can even be found, is currently valued at over two thousand dollars.
51. Transcript, Executive Session Meeting, September 18, 1964, 7654.
52. Ibid., 7655.
53. Ibid., 7657.
54. Leon Jaworski, Confession and Avoidance: A Memoir (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1979), 106.
55. Ebersole described that moment to the HSCA: “I believe by ten or ten thirty approximately a communication had been established with Dallas and it was learned that there had been a wound of exit in the lower neck that had been surgically repaired. I don’t know if this was premortem or postmortem but at that point the confusion as far as we were concerned stopped.” (See testimony of John H. Ebersole, M.D., March 11, 1978, HSCA Record Number 180-10075-10063, 4-5.)
56. Ebersole is further supported by the fact that tissue samples were taken during the autopsy from the president’s throat wound, an unusual procedure if doctors believed it to have been caused only by a tracheotomy.
57. Gil Delaney, Lancaster Intelligencer Journal, March 8, 1978.
58. Testimony of John H. Ebersole, M.D., March 11, 1978, HSCA Record Number 180-10075-10063, 3. During a recorded interview in 1992, Ebersole said he “saw a big wound” on the back of Kennedy’s head. He would also describe the bullet hole in Kennedy’s back as being at the level of “T4” (thoracic vertebra number four), a position even lower down the back than where Admiral Burkley placed it, at T3, in the president’s official death certificate. See James H. Fetzer, ed., Murder in Dealey Plaza (Chicago: Catfeet Press, 2000), 434.