The YARMOUTH/APPLELEAF incident in the middle of the rendezvous between the Battle Group and the BRILLIANT Group rejoining us could well have been the reason that another (?) surface contact was ‘found’ in amongst the group on this occasion. On any occasion, it can be a difficult business bringing such a large number of ships together, with no lights in the middle of the night, but when one frigate thinks it has found an enemy submarine in the middle of the whole event, the margin for disaster increases. It was all quite exciting for a while but order eventually emerged out of chaos.
The note on ‘Bandar Jissah syndrome’ stems from the unhappy incident Captain Barrow and I had had the previous November in Oman. The ship (GLAMORGAN) had been taken well inshore to anchor in Bandar Jissah for the day after exercises with the Omani Navy; the intention being to do a hot debrief of the exercise and entertain the Commanding Officers. Unhappily, when the ship weighed anchor at low tide, she lost large parts of both propellers on an uncharted coral pinnacle. Captain Barrow’s possible court martial still hung in the balance and was considered by me to be causing him to play things extra safe. I am glad to say I was wrong. Meanwhile considerable local amplification of the ROE was found necessary; while they made excellent sense no doubt at the ‘politico-military interface’ in Whitehall, they were ambiguous in the front line all too often.
26–9 April
Very little happened outside the routine of making best speed southwards in variable weather and trying to cram in the last minute preparations and exercises once the full Battle Group had formed up.
26 April
Making good time to southwest. Hoping to hear from SSNs of whereabouts of Arg surface groups soon. The matter of finding that one may be about to become a participant in a war rather than a spectator sharpens the attitudes quite a lot. I begin to see that exposure to the threat of having your head blown off can help to convince that war may not be the best solution. Also, and strangely perhaps, that since war doesn’t seem a good answer (ie seems irrational), nuclear deterrence is enhanced. Thus if you’re prepared to go to war, there’s no end to where your foolishness will stop.
27 April
Overnight we only made about six and a half kts over the ground in strong wind/swell on the nose. No night RASs [Replenishment At Sea] and little progress. Stood down ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] screen and Harriers. Long exchanges with CinC over the approach phase, submarines’ employment, TXA [Total Exclusion Area] ops after approach and political machinations. Proposed local ultimatum and no choice between full ROE clearance for air/sea anti-CVA [large aircraft carrier] ops or backdown. Politicians still reluctant to face up. No fuelling in filthy weather. Got in an ADEX [Air Defence Exercise] for the T42s – not very good performance but better than nowt.
28 April
Saw the Press transcript – after being warned by Fieldhouse to be “less jingoistic, more sober, peace-loving but quietly determined”. Fear I will have overdone and appeared practically craven. Ah well, I suspect the Press scene is one you can’t win, ever. Should have kept my mouth shut: but at least it can only confuse the Args. Weather went down so got the RAS(L)s done in the lull before the next storm. Final preps for run in are mostly complete now – just hope the politicos can pull back in time, otherwise a lot of people are going to stay out here. ‘Burglar’ (Arg Boeing 707 Recce aircraft) lifted over the radar horizon, and went away CPA (Closest Point of Approach) 250 miles odd. As the day goes on most of the plans for the first few days of the battle are set. They are necessarily very flexible but I’ve done my thinking about it and consequently feel easier in my mind. Of course, in the final hours/days, options reduce so decisions are a bit easier. Even the thought of death has to be faced up to as a not very likely outcome and taken for what it is – like unavoidable if it happens but do your best and maybe it won’t. Generally though, I feel much easier in my mind: our business end is about wrapped up for a few days – it will be a busy time and it is as well to stop worrying and ‘rest up’ to be ready.
29 April
Rather regretting I played safe and delayed by one day – the weather has been less difficult than I feared and we could have ‘celebrated’ my birthday in style. But the political scene hasn’t finally bogged down so maybe another 24 hours will settle it. I doubt it. But no progress by midnight.
30 April
A beautiful autumn day. Massive RAS(L), (S) and (A) [Ammunition] of entire force. New ROE came in at 1600. CinC rang to say ‘go’. So we’re off and it’s all to happen on 1st May. My chief worry remains their horrid little submarine. And I am turning my eye towards their aircraft at Goose Green where I suspect they are sheltering for fear of our strike on Port Stanley.
Today marked the arrival of our new ROE for entry into the Exclusion Zone. Much later than they ought to have been and requiring considerable local amplification/verification. My suggested changes were passed out to ships in the BG and back to MOD in case I had misinterpreted.
1 May
Fifty today and first day of the war. Vulcan went in as planned and did his fairly inadequate business as confirmed by SHAR strike on Port Stanley (three other SHARs to Goose Green). Many alarms and excursions about Arg mainland air strike but I think not somehow. Mirages bobbing about over the Falklands but not coming in strongly suggests Port Stanley CAP and Arg strike held in reserve until they can get a handle on us. Cat and mouse. Meanwhile NGS [Naval Gunfire Support, e.g. bombardment] and ASW inshore groups going in and Fleet telling me not to risk the NGS. I think I have to do so – firstly they’re nearly there, like half way! (by the time Fleet recommend no), secondly we need to loosen up the Args – it should make them keep a SM there in future if there’s not one there now – and thirdly, the Args will hate it. It may be risky but I believe we have to take some. Everyone (me included I guess) very jumpy, periscopes, torpedo HE [Hydrophone Effect], Exocet release, columns of smoke – but actually very little other than the strike of ours has come to anything yet.
2100 – and the day wore on in very good weather thank Heavens, I wouldn’t have cared to fly at these rates and notice in typical bad weather. So far we’ve been lucky. The NGS Group were bounced by four Mirages. The covering DLG [GLAMORGAN] was too close in [in the gun line I think] to cover properly and GLAMORGAN and ARROW received minor damage having completed first barrage. CAP splashed a Mirage in front of ALACRITY but others bombed and went away. Three Canberras went past BRILLIANT off the N coast; and disappeared low in our direction but never made it. INVINCIBLE CAP splashed one other, two went home, one badly, one lightly damaged. The Canberra attack tells me that:
a. They are out of AAR [Aircraft to Aircraft Refuelling].
b. They want to hit us.
c. They probably can’t.
So far so good – but I don’t really see how it can last. They clearly had very little idea where we were – the Canberras were groping a bit. GLAMORGAN and team then resumed NGS after a tiny bit of needle but only a straight suggestion which I think they’d have eventually made for themselves. BRILLIANT continuing with YARMOUTH overnight in their little area bashing the living daylights out of some wretched sardine. Come the morning, after a talk with David Hallifax [Chief of Staff to CinC Fleet], we intend going offshore to E for a quiet day leaving it to the Args to react.
2 May
By 0400 already apparent Args reacting; their CVA is hurrying through the SSN areas to strike us. BELGRANO going south-about at same time. However, all my chickens will be home to roost by 0800 and we can retire to maintain reasonable arms length until dawn. Not much of a ‘day off’ but indeed this could be decisive, one way or another. I fear that the SSNs have missed their chances. Of course they should get another go as the Args return to base.
By midday, with still no news and no strike, we all began to relax. CONX [CONQUEROR] at 1400 finally reporting that BELGRANO Group had turned back at O8OOZ having nearly reached the E edge of Burdwood Bank. Nothing from the S boats [SSNs] up North who should have intercepted the 25
de MAYO and her team. All in all, it seems the Args must have decided we weren’t the landing force after all and that the sally wasn’t worth the risk. Quite correct but in the process, I have had a free rehearsal of their plan, my response and greatly improved ROE because everyone got a fright when I released (against top orders) CONX to attack. I am no doubt in trouble, but provided I’m not relieved immediately, I expect it will be forgotten!
As a result of the saga though, a great deal has been learnt. Spent the rest of the day RAS-ing and recce-ing to W, NW and N but finding nothing. Future ops, just because of SSN and ROE, take a lot of pressure off me and, if the Vulcans can continue to come, off the Air Group so that we can get on with wearing out the Args. They have so much further to come that it may just work – not least since we have the initiative. Went back in pm to put in the Land recce teams. Quite a few Harrier recce missions run to the N and W out to 250 miles. These aircraft are absolutely invaluable, quiet, smart, fast, and fairly multi-role. They now need the best AAM [Air to Air Missile] we can find and a good standoff ship attack weapon.
I was not authorised to change ROE even for units under my command, much less for units not under my command, such as CONQUEROR. I did, however, put a signal on the submarine satellite broadcast in the early morning, ordering CONQUEROR to attack the BELGRANO Group; meanwhile my staff were negotiating via DSSS with the Fleet Staff at Northwood. The Flag Officer Submarines at Northwood, quite properly, removed my signal to CONQUEROR from the broadcast before she could receive it. It turned out many years later that they were in process of negotiating the same change in ROE in the MOD that night but forgot to tell me! What the Commanding Officer would have done about it had he received it, we shall never know. As it was, the signal was sent as much to emphasise my military concern at BELGRANO’s continued presence in the area – I needed to go back inshore overnight for 2nd/3rd for further recce insertions – as anything else. In fact, I believe the signal did not come to light during the process of obtaining the ROE to sink BELGRANO and was thus totally irrelevant – so much for diaries!
It is worth noting that the need to go forward to insert the land recce teams that evening (and most subsequent nights too), meant that BELGRANO remained a threat while she was within a night’s steaming of Port Stanley i.e. 12 hours at 25 kts = 300 miles odd.
3 May
The Junglies (Commando helicopters – SK4s) returned on deck at 0300 safely and we turned to the East again. YARMOUTH rejoined bringing FORT AUSTIN with her. GLAMORGAN, ALACRITY, ARROW were back from their (cancelled because of BELGRANO and future Black Buck [Vulcan attacks against Port Stanley] news) NGS of Port Stanley. We had been getting slight indications for some while that there might be surface trade up to the NW but by about 0330 it all seemed to fizzle out. Then a surface search SK finds a lit [navigation and deck lights on] contact, goes to look and gets shot at with tracer. So we send a HAG [Helicopter Attack Group]. First Lynx blows the SK’s contact away with two Sea Skuas [air to surface missiles]. Back-up Lynx sees another contact twenty miles further on, investigates, no lights, is fired on and replies with two more Sea Skuas. Target examined and found to be a hulk. HERMES transmitted on international distress frequency to tell the Args to look for their people – we couldn’t stay, it way too close to mainland for my taste, we’d have ended up facing the whole Arg Air Force like flies round a cow pat. Final event in saga. I send a carefully briefed SK to do a last surface search in the area and, in the middle, with the a/c off everybody’s radars, links and radios, bloody YARMOUTH (again) starts a panic by verifying that he heard a voice, saying ‘emergency, emergency, emergency’ on HF [High Frequency] reporting. In the ship the instant conclusion is that the SK has fallen out of the sky and some overreaction occurs. But the SK turned up at end of sortie having had no problems! Later assessment/debrief seems to establish that 2nd target was not engaging with GPMG. Pilot saw gun-flashes (recognised by his own previous experience with 4.5-inch guns) and attacked with Sea Skua. Reckon that this must have been an A69 corvette, perhaps escorting the tug. Spent the forenoon heading SE to stay in the weather clag and open range before the clearance comes in giving the enemy the weather gauge. Weather thickened during the day and a call for help from one of the recce parties ashore in Berkely Bay area could not be met. Two Harriers and two pilots are more valuable than four soldiers. Risks to both arguably the same. Nasty decision. Getting inured to them. That’s awful.
4 May
A dull forenoon with little happening until 1415 when an Exocet from an Etendard [Arg aircraft] blew my old ship SHEFFIELD away. As I write ten hours later she’s still burning out there and I’m hoping to entice the Args to have a look and chop them when they do. YARMOUTH had a plus and a minus. They say they had nine torpedoes fired at them yet without a decoy streamed, nothing hit anyone: had to send a very ratty signal. Hope he’s learning.
To correct the impression given here and elsewhere, YARMOUTH could be said to have been on a ‘steep learning curve’ at this time. They were, in fact, in my Flotilla, the CO (Commanding Officer) was not an experienced surface warfare man and they had only recently completed work up. By the end of Corporate they were one of the few ships to have survived unscathed and fully operational having done a thoroughly good job over an extended period – all this in a twenty-year-old ship.
5 May
After half a quiet night, a welcome sign that the Args are taking the bait, I’ve left them but this is a long cat and mouse ‘game’. The weather clamped right down before dawn – so no flying and we stood well back to watch the goat [SHEFFIELD]. Jez buoys (passive sonobuoys) and two helos not much hope but a ‘taxi‘ service to and fro to feed the idea we’re still working there may help to rivet Arg attention until we lay on a max push in daylight.
6 May
An INVINCIBLE helo, by getting his CCG [effectively, navigation] thirty miles out, managed to keep me and three Lynx up for two hours chasing a rock off Port Stanley. Morning, and while the weather is good enough for SKs, it’s too variably thick for SHARs. This sort of thing makes air planning near hopeless and crew fatigue a pressing problem. Junglies seem to have mislaid a couple of blokes. The rest of the day went no better. The Jez search around SHEFFIELD failed to produce trade as did the Dippers [active sonar ASW helos] behind. Two Harriers fell out of the sky for no apparent reason, chasing a helo report of a ‘contact tracking 250 degrees – fast’. This was patently a surface helo contact and probably spurious – not one for the CAP – all so bloody unnecessary. Then as it became clear that there was no aircraft contact about, people started seeing surface contacts and getting fire control radar locks and so on and so on. Very nervous lot here! And on through another very frustrating day. I’m getting very upset about the stalemate position I have been strapped in. I can only fiddle about in the TEZ [Total Exclusion Zone] which is topping up with fishermen and the whole thing is getting totally out of hand. I can’t hit anyone outside the TEZ, I can’t take risks, the Harriers can’t fly for the weather and if I’m not careful, I shall be picked apart. Feeling very hassled and suspicious of Cabinet. If we’re not allowed to take any risks and not allowed to go to war in any but the most limited area, if we have to live in an area into which the enemy can strike from safe havens, the strength we came with will be whittled away. I might as well leave the area. Made a long signal to CinC giving a list of the riskier possibilities for the next week or so but really pointing to the need for me to know whether Cabinet will actually decide to land on the day. If not, then it’s silly to get our people’s heads blown off now (though I can see why it may be thought a good idea). If they do intend to land, then there are several things we ought to do to test the water and attrit the Arg forces beforehand. To cap all, the SSNs have been stopped from doing anything nasty in the area of the main Arg surface force. It looks very much as though Hercules [Arg destroyer] is to be let go for the second time. It’s unbelievable, you just can’t expect to be given two bites, much less three, at the cherry. Th
e SSN force is becoming a laughing stock and joining the rest of us!
In this day’s log, it is quite obvious that the general nervousness was shared by the CTG. These moods come and go – and keeping the log did much to help me through them. It was by any standards a bad time for everyone, sailors hate fog, SHEFFIELD had been hit, we had lost two SHARs, the Arg carrier was still an unknown and my surface and air surveillance capability around the BG was anything but leak-proof.
7 May
Another near totally frustrating day in thick fog with ‘sucker holes’ [small, temporary gaps in fog]. Nearly lost two more Harriers when INVINCIBLE flew a CAP to cover radar/ESM contacts to NW – spurious in the event. We achieved pump-over [cargo transfer of fuel] from APPLELEAF to OLMEDA.
Sounded like a dull day but it was not without incident. During the early hours, the BG lay off to the east to await daylight and better flying weather. Replenishment (fuel and solids) continued unabated. At breakfast time, we thought we had a submarine contact in amongst us, which eventually proved spurious after some excitement over several different clues. Mid-forenoon, I decided to look for better weather so left YARMOUTH with RESOURCE, FORT AUSTIN, APPLELEAF and OLMEDA (last two still pumping fuel over), and headed west. SHEFFIELD was visited by helo, still burning, but upright and not settling in the water. After lunch, we detected a possible Arg shadowing a/c but visibility still precluded our flying SHARs to intercept. Early evening, there were indications of a possible air raid developing and nearly lost the two SHARs when we flew them. At about suppertime, BROADSWORD nearly collided with HERMES in the fog; certainly passed very close as we saw her wake (but not the ship) pass under our bows, still green and fresh and frothy. And at about 2200, as the YARMOUTH team rejoined, the surface plot managed to get confused causing yet another flurry in the Force Ops Room in HERMES.
One Hundred Days Page 51