Land Battles in 5th Century B.C. Greece: A History and Analysis of 173 Engagements (McFarland, 2009; paperback 2011)
A History and Analysis of 187 Engagements
FRED EUGENE RAY, JR.
Preface 1
Introduction 3
1. Sparta Ascendant
Overseas Battles and the Corinthian War (400-387 B.c.) 5
II. Trained in War
Battles Around the Mediterranean; Chalcidian, Boeotian and Spartan Wars (386-360 B.c.) 38
III. Finding a Master
Rise of Macedonia; Sacred, Persian and Sicilian Wars; Conquest of Greece (359-336 B.C.) 86
IV. Action and Glory
Battles in the Era ofAlexander the Great (335-324 B.c.) 138
V. Many Great Combats
Battles of the Successors (323-301 B.c.) 174
Conclusions 210
Appendices: Pitched Battles 400-301 B.C.
1: Combat Factors 213
2: Decisive Factors 217
3: Heavy Infantry Losses and Point/Cause of Formation Failure 221
Bibliography 227
Index 233
Longtime interest in ancient Greek military affairs led me a few years ago to write a book on land engagements in which I explored both probability and the available literature toward trying to determine what actually happened on all of the significant battlegrounds of classical Greece. For practical reasons, that work covered only the 5th century B.C., a limitation that let me incorporate the earliest reliable descriptions of Grecian pitched actions while keeping the time frame and associated volume of data to a manageable level. Needless to say, it was an exercise that only whetted my appetite for taking an even wider look at the topic. This current volume is my attempt to satisfy that hunger by delving into the next century using a similar approach. Once more, the aim is to try and separate myth from reality toward gaining a better grasp upon past ways of war that influence how we still look at mortal combat today.
The technique here uses information drawn from ancient accounts along with suitable analogs to produce descriptions of what most likely happened on the subject battlefields. Following multiple threads of evidence in their historical context, this involves correlating and reconciling every datum (some quite peripheral in nature) and applying logical projections where needed to fill gaps and resolve conflicts in the surviving records. Where major alternatives exist, I've tried to list them; nevertheless, a preferred version is presented whenever possible. This reflects my belief that multiple projections are no more likely to have the exact same probability than bags of salt to have precisely the same number of grains. There should always be a "most likely" scenario based on the evidence at hand. Of course, we must never forget that fresh information at a later date can profoundly alter judgments on what is truly more probable. As a result, anyone following this path has to be willing to stick his neck out on some close calls, yet equally ready to revise those interpretations in light of new data.
Attempting a book like this requires one to stand on the broad shoulders of many talented historians who have gone before, both ancient and modern. Vital classical sources for 4th century B.C. warfare include Xenophon, Diodorus of Sicily, Plutarch, Frontinus, Polyaenus and Arrian; the surviving works of these men along with those of a goodly number of lesser contributors have been my constant companions throughout the writing process. Nor have modern authors been any less helpful. Here, I can name Hans Delbruck, J.F.C. Fuller, W.K. Pritchett, Victor Davis Hanson, Nicholas Sekunda and Nick Sabin among the more influential. And there's another set of scholars that I'd like to acknowledge who've kindly traded ideas with me from around the world through the medium of cyberspace. These include Paul McDonnell-Staff, Michael Park, Paul Bardunias and Dan Powers - honorable gentlemen all that have tried to keep me from folly on a variety of subjects in recent years, with resulting failures being mine and not theirs. References to all of the foregoing sources appear parenthetically enclosed within the text (MLA format), as do any footnote comments.
The reconstructions that follow generally appear in chronological sequence; however, a few series of events fall into natural geographic groupings and are so collected to create some minor overlaps in time order. Where battles are mentioned during discussions of significantly earlier or later actions, I've attached their dates to allow easier referral to the principle descriptions (all dates in the text are B.C. unless otherwise noted). As always, transliteration of the Greek alphabet poses a problem and I've followed the course of using Latinized or English equivalents wherever these are likely to be more familiar to the modern reader. Similarly, where Greek or other foreign terms make their initial appearance, they are always in italics with an English translation. Units of measure (distance, area, weight) are uniformly expressed in the metric system as the primary reference. The maps and battle diagrams included here were drafted by Joan Huckaby, whose skills and patience have made something eminently presentable out of my crude originals.
Warfare in 4th century B.c. Greece has long held great fascination for the military enthusiast and general public alike. This is due to that period's intriguing mixture of famous battles and storied commanders. Capturing imaginations from ancient days to the present, these have inspired a host of histories, biographies and popular fictions that have turned them into the stuff of legend. As a result, even the most sober tactical analyses can be quite reverential regarding the key engagements of this time. Likewise, noted generals of the age like Xenophon and Iphicrates of Athens, Epaminondas of Thebes and the father-son team of Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedonia are frequently made out to have been veritable gods of war. We should recognize, however, that all this runs the risk of distorting the real contributions of these events and men to the fighting arts. So lofty are their reputations that everything that went before can seem simplistic or obsolete. But is this truly the case?
I've attempted to answer the foregoing question by reconstructing all of the 4th century's significant land engagements. Putting these into historical perspective allows at least a hazy glimpse into what actually took place on battlegrounds of the day. Of course, the spottily preserved and oft contradictory nature of our surviving records means that this is an undertaking unavoidably rich in conjecture. The results must therefore be treated with a sensible level of reserve. All the same, when carried out conscientiously and within reasonable bounds, this is an exercise that can reveal a great deal about otherwise unknowable probabilities regarding the true character of mortal combat in the subject era.
A major revelation along these lines concerns the introduction of tactical improvements. Col. Thomas Hammes (2004) has examined patterns common to modern warfare and noted that new forms of fighting never seem to arrive as fully developed instruments. Instead, he sees a more gradual process of evolution. This spans decades, with fresh approaches growing out of (and existing alongside) still vital methodologies of old. Data from the 4th century appear to strongly support this view. Progression of the Grecian military arts at that time was a cumulative affair, composed of many step-like advances rather than a few revolutionary leaps.
Other key findings concern the role played by the aforementioned iconic commanders. Greek warfare in the 5th century had been a tale of militiamen struggling to cope on battlefields where their equally amateur generals fought in the ranks just like any other soldier. Over the next 100 years, this would change dramatically. Professional troops of various stripes increased in importance and their leaders tended to become full-time warlords that dominated by devising different ways to wage their conflicts. Still, it's clear
that even the most lauded among these military innovators lifted and adapted their signature ideas at least in part from previous routines. Of course, we should never undervalue the creativity, industry and daring that this required. It took a quick intellect and hard work to appreciate and adopt or alter a novel technique, and also a good deal of courage to then apply it in the field, where the cost of being wrong would be measured in blood. Nonetheless, we still need to honor the historical roots that seem to nourish even the greatest of military geniuses. Gods of war these men may have been, yet if so, they were surely mortal gods - products not only of their own abilities and experience, but of those of their predecessors as well.
Finally, one of the more intriguing insights gained from reconstructing 4th century combats is that some celebrated campaign and battlefield successes attributed to the use of groundbreaking tactics were, in fact, very closely run affairs. Their outcomes could have gone either way and were often every bit as subject to the whims of choice and chance as to any tactical maneuver. Recognition of this reality fosters an enhanced appreciation for the phrase "fortunes of war."
Overseas Battles and the Corinthian War (400-387 B.C.)
"Although the Spartans during this [Corinthian] war had been rather evenly matched with their opponents, they nevertheless gained a much more eminent position from this so-called Peace of Antalcidas."
Xenophon (Hellenica 5.1.36)
The Grecian domain of classical times was a collection of some 1,000 city-states or poleis (polis singular) whose borders stretched around the Mediterranean basin, reaching east-west from Asia Minor to the shores of modern France and north-south from today's Ukraine to the coast of North Africa. At the center of this politically divided but culturally cohesive realm sat mainland Greece at the southeastern tip of Europe. It was from here that the Greeks had sailed and marched out to expand across the region and it was here where most of their more powerful states and most revered shrines still stood at the dawn of the 4th century B.C. But Greece at this time was a badly wounded land, one yet recovering from the longest and most devastating conflict in its history. The leading poleis of Sparta and Athens had spent most of the last third of the 5th century in a violent struggle for culture-wide dominance known as the Peloponnesian War. Waged all across the Grecian world, this grand fight had only ended with the exhaustion and surrender of Athens in 404. The legacy of the war was still very much in evidence as the new century opened, not only around its original epicenter on the European mainland, but on fresh battlegrounds overseas as well.
A Grecian War in Africa
One place where fallout from the great conflict between Sparta and Athens had significant impact was in the Peloponnesian Peninsula of southwestern Greece. This was the site of Lacedaemon (Laconia), home to the war's victors, the Spartans. Sparta had used its powerful army to intimidate the surrounding peoples into a series of bilateral treaties that created a military alliance that the ancients called "the Lacedaemonians and their friends," but is better known today as the Peloponnesian League. This arrangement was vital to Sparta in providing the manpower needed to remain a leading state. Spartan citizens were few in number even by the modest population standards of the day, the result of a strict social system that kept their nation under control of a very small body of elite warriors led by two general-kings. The spartiatoi or spartiates in this uppermost class spent their lives from childhood to old age in pursuit of military excel lence. Taking the field in crimson tunics and gleaming, bronze armor, they marched into combat at a slow, menacing pace to the sound of pipes, carrying all before them to win fame as the greatest foot soldiers of their age. Yet both numbers and auxiliary arms were valuable in war as well. And it was for these that the Peloponnesian League was crucial to Sparta, providing additional spearmen as well as ships and cavalry. The Spartans therefore put a priority on shoring up cracks in their regional dominance created during the long struggle with Athens. This included removing a long-standing local threat - the Messenians.
At the base of Spartan society were serfs called helots (helotoi). These tilled the land in support of the spartiate caste (which held no other occupation save that of warrior). Distinct from the state's working freemen (the perioikoi or perioeci), helots were little better than slaves. They not only had to yield much of the fruits of their labor to the spartiates, but were subject to legal murder should those social betters ever want to put them in their place. Known as Messenians, both the perioeci and helots had once been free inhabitants of Laconia. The Spartans had arrived to conquer them in the 8th century as part of a mass migration into the Peloponnese of "Doric" peoples (Dorians, after their legendary homeland of Doris in central Greece). Some Messenians fled westward to join kin in the neighboring region bearing their people's name, Messenia. This land was eventually absorbed by the Spartans as well, though its inhabitants escaped slavery to become perioeci.
In the 460s many helots took advantage of a devastating earthquake to escape Laconia and bring Messenia into revolt against Sparta. Unable to drive the rebels out by force of arms, the Spartans agreed to a truce sometime 461-455. Athens had then intervened to settle the insurgents on the north shore of the Corinthian Gulf at Naupactus and on the island of Cephallenia off the northwestern Greek coast. These new poleis had been staunch allies of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War and their very existence was a symbol of defiance to Spartan rule that might well inspire others, both subjects and vital League allies, to dream of similar independence; thus, the Spartans came down hard once Athens had been defeated. They evicted the Messenians from Naupactus and Cephallenia at spear-point and drove them out of Greece. Some of these outcasts landed at the Greek colony of Cyrene in North Africa, where a civil war was brewing that gave them an opportunity to fight for a new home.
Cyrene I(400B.C.)
Cyrene lay due south of Greece on a large promontory west of Egypt. This area was rich in farming and grazing land and its Greek colonists had come to hold both the coastal plain and adjacent interior, their polls being at the center of several satellite settlements and lending its name to the entire region of Cyrenaica. Originally led by kings, Cyrene adopted a republican form of government c. 440, but wealthy elites continued to hold sway over the state. A Cyrenean named Ariston had recently led an uprising to seize power on behalf of the lower classes. The new rulers put some 500 of the polls' leading citizens to death and drove many others into exile. It was into this tense situation that the Messenians sailed in the spring of 400, coming ashore just east of Cyrene at its port ofApollonia. Making common cause with the exiles, the Messenians took up arms against the city.
The Cyrenean civil dispute was settled on the battlefield as exile and polis armies fought it out in what must have been a major action with several thousand men on each side. Though professional soldiers (mercenaries and state-supported citizens known as epilektoi) had become increasingly common during the 5th century, Cyrene, like most Greek states at this time, still relied primarily upon amateur militia for the core force of heavy infantry in its army. These soldiers, known as hoplites (hoplitai, hoplites singular), were the premier fighting men of the Greek world.
CLASSICAL GREECE
The hoplite's name derived from the Greek word for arms (hopla, hoplon singular) and he carried a thrusting spear or dory (doru or enchos) in the right hand as his main weapon. This was generally about 2.0-2.5m long with steel head and bronze or steel butt spike (sauroter or styrax). The shaft of the dory was of ash or some other light, strong wood with a grip of leather wrapped around the balance point, which sat about one third up from the butt due to both the weight of the sauroter and forward tapering. A hoplite would rest the dory on his shoulder while marching and carried it upright when awaiting contact with the enemy that it might provide some small protection from falling missiles. Lined up in stacked rows for battle, hoplites would lower their spear for doratismos (spear fighting). Most of the time, this involved use of an overhand grip that allowed more powerful strikes
, though underhanded thrusting saw occasional use as well. In this way, the first two (less likely three) rows of spearmen could all reach the leading line of enemies standing opposite. The hoplite's most common secondary weapon was actually the back half of this same spear. Fitted with its sharp spike, the rear end of the dory could be jabbed down to either bury it and free the hand or finish off a fallen foe. However, spears often broke in front of the grip during a fight, leaving its owner with only the butt end. They could then reverse and use this stub as a shorter spear with the sauroter serving as its head. Should a hoplite lose this improvised pole-arm as well, he could grab for the sidearm hanging on his left hip. This was usually one of two types, either a double-edged, straight sword (xiphos) or a downward curving saber (machaira or kopis) with cutting edge confined to its underside. The former was better for slashing around the side of an opposing shield and the latter more effective for striking down over the shield's top (its dull backside preventing inadvertent damage to comrades ranked behind).
Defensive gear for hoplites included a bronze helmet. This kranos was often high-crested (making its wearer appear taller and more menacing) with a nose-guarded variety (called "Corinthian") having slender slits for the eyes being most popular. There was also torso armor (thorax, generally of stiffened linen or leather in this era) with shoulder pieces (epomides) and kilt-like strips of material at the bottom (pteruges) that warded the loins. Hoplites also wore snap-on bronze greaves (knemides) on their shins. But the most important and distinctive piece of the Greek spearman's protective equipment was his large shield or aspis (aspides plural). This was made of wood sheathed on the forward surface (at least around the rim) by a thin layer (less than 0.5mm thick) of bronze. Other elements of his arms and armor (panoplia or panoply) might be discarded to save weight or expense, but the spear and aspis were essential. The aspis was heavy (nearly 7kg), round and about lm across, covering from chin to knee with a concave shape that provided breathing space for the chest. This last prevented asphyxiation when a hoplite was crushed against the man ahead in file during concerted pushing attacks (othismos) that often characterized hoplite warfare (see Bardunias [2011, 63-651 for an excellent discussion of this process). Thickened, metal-reinforced rims on the shield enhanced its vital, domed shape and also helped prevent splitting from blows or pressure during combat. An aspis was held along the left forearm with a loop (porpax) at center that fit just below the elbow and a handgrip (antilabe) at the shield-edge. It thus covered the holder's left side while extending out to protect the right side of the man next in line.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 1