The Second Carthaginian War of Dionysius would end in anti-climactic fashion in 392. That's when Magon, having been heavily reinforced from Carthage, faced off against the Syra cusan and his full resources in central Sicily outside Agyrium. This was the capital of a powerful Siculi community that had not allied with Carthage. The tyrant was unwilling to risk a battle and Diodorus claimed (14.95.1-3) that his 20,000-man army was outnumbered by 4 to 1. However, the historian's figure for the force from Carthage is undoubtedly much inflated. Based on earlier expeditions, it's more apt that Magon held no more than a 50 percent advantage in overall numbers that was then reduced when the Agyrinaeans joined Dionysius. Another indication that the odds weren't so lopsided is that the Syracusans thought a favorable battlefield solution was quite feasible. When Dionysius chose to starve the enemy out of Sicily, his inpatient citizen levy went home. This took at least 5,000 hoplites out of the field; all the same, the tyrant persisted in his strategy with total success. Magon grew so short on food that he was willing to negotiate a peace treaty and leave without a fight. Dionysius actually got very good terms. These not only kept his current realm intact, but added to it most of the Siculi that had been Punic allies.
Laus and Elleporus Rivers (389B.c.)
Once more at peace with Carthage, Dionysius turned his attention from western Sicily to focus efforts on southern Italy. The Grecian poleis there had by this time formed an "Italian League" to defend against him. Accepting this challenge, he launched a campaign across the channel in 390, leading an army of 20,000 foot soldiers (likely 15,000 hoplites and 5,000 skirmishers) and 1,000 horsemen that he ferried over in 120 ships. The tyrant landed at Locris, which lay northeast of Rhegion on the eastern coast of the "toe" of Italy, and marched inland to ravage Rhegian territory. However, when he was unable to entice the Italian Greeks into a decisive battle, he sailed home that winter. Looking for a more effective way to damage his foes above the strait, he next made an alliance with that area's Lucanian tribesmen.
The Lucanians were a hill people that had formed a powerful federation of eleven tribes, each perhaps able to field an average 4,000-6,000 fighters. Part of the Oscan tribal grouping, Lucanian warriors were individually outfitted according to their personal wealth. At the upper end were men with spear and/or javelins that carried a large, center-grip shield (scutum) and wore a metal helmet, a harness for the chest (with one to three small metal plates or pectorales) and greaves (at least one on the left leg that was put forward in fighting stance). Poorer folk would sport only a portion of this panoply according to what they could afford. For every eight to ten men who fought on foot there was usually one high-born horseman equipped in the wealthier fashion and wielding javelins but sans shield. Inspired by their alliance with Dionysius, the Lucanians descended upon the territory of Thurii, a polls that sat at the front-instep of the Italian boot along the southeast shoreline. The Thurians called for help from the Italian League and, though they apparently set out at first by themselves, soon were part of a force of 14,000 infantry and about 1,000 cavalry (Diodorus 14.101)- this probably included troops from just the closest allies as it was less than half of Italiote potential. The infantry likely broke down into 10,000 hoplites and 4,000 light-armed.
Rather than fight their foes on open ground favorable to the Greek phalanx, the Lucanians fell back into their own rugged territory. In this way, they were able to contact and gather perhaps half to two-thirds of their federated manpower and create a huge counter-force some 30,000 strong. The Italiotes, meanwhile, had followed and wound their way through narrow pathways to come out on a plain near the mouth of the river Laus, a bowl-like expanse surrounded by high hills and cliffs. This was where the Lucanians had set up an ambush, and the tribesmen suddenly came down from forest cover on the enclosing heights to attack on all sides. Taken by surprise, the Greeks tried to form up and meet the charging barbarians, but any attempt to create a defensive square seems to have fallen victim to both the speed of the assault and the lack of organization of this ad hoc collection of militia spearmen from different cities who had never drilled together. The result was a slaughter as the tribesmen shattered any nascent cohesion the hoplites might have gained, cutting them down in place or as they ran away. Diodorus claimed that 10,000 Greeks lost their lives. This might be an exaggeration honoring the total hoplite force involved; still, the death toll among those defeated must have been huge and Diodorus' 67 percent tally is certainly within the realm of possibility. Around 1,000 of the survivors did manage to reach the sea, where they were taken captive by Dionysius' brother, Leptines, who was there with some warships to support the Lucanians. The Syracusan on his own initiative arranged a ransom to be paid for the prisoners and mediated a truce between the tribesmen and the Italiote cites. This was clearly very pro-Greek of him, but quite contrary to his brother's plans and got Leptines removed from command.
Though his sibling had managed to blunt the effect somewhat, Dionysius' pact with the Lucanians had still greatly weakened his foes in Italy. He now felt safe in personally taking the field against them. The Italian League mustered its full remaining strength (maybe only 70 percent of what it had been before Laus) with 25,000 footmen and 2,000 cavalry (Diodorus 14.103.6). These gathered at Croton, the League's largest city. Heloris, the exile who'd been turned back at Messana five years earlier, took command of the Italiote forces. Once organized, he led his army out with the intent of engaging Dionysius where he was laying siege to the coastal town of Caulonia east of Rhegion. Word of this march soon reached Dionysius. Withdrawing quickly from around the city, he hurried off to confront Heloris, taking him unaware just after dawn as his army was preparing to leave a campsite along the Elleporus River. The Syracusan force included 20,000 infantry (probably 15,000 hoplites and 5,000 skirmishers) and 3,000 horsemen (Diodorus 14.103.2) and these closed to catch the enemy commander separated slightly from his main body with a select vanguard lochos of 500 men. Forming a close-knit phalanx, the tyrant's spearmen swept forward like a wave, surrounding and wiping out the exile and his small band of elites almost to a man. Dionysius' array then advanced to take care of the rest of the League army. A runner from Heloris had by now reached its campsite and the various allied contingents were rushing up from the river one at a time and in some confusion.
The scrambling Italiotes met defeat in detail as each group came on the scene, never able to properly organize an effective composite formation against their well-ordered opposition. Thus, despite having essayed a heroic effort, they finally took to their heels. Some of the beaten men scattered through the countryside, but a main body of about 10,000 managed to stay together and dig in on high ground for a last stand. Rather than waste troops on a disadvantaged uphill assault, Dionysius surrounded this waterless position and waited for his thirsty foes to give in. This they did the very next day. In a surprise to all, Dionysius treated those captured with lenience in a savvy move that dismantled the Italian League's unity against him. He then set off for Rhegion. Isolated now, the Rhegians came to terms and the tyrant returned to Caulonia. That city surrendered as well and he leveled the place, relocating its population to Syracuse. The year therefore closed with Dionysius having established sway over a good portion of the southern Italian mainland.
The Corinthian War II
Nearly two years after having won grand victories at Nemea River and Coronea II, Sparta was struggling in its twin wars against the allied coalition on one hand and Persia on the other. The former from its base at Corinth had been able to control the isthmus leading out of the Peloponnese, curtailing broader operations and largely confining the Spartans to working close to their own local stronghold of Sicyon. What little action there was in 393 and into early 392 thus consisted of raids and skirmishes around Corinth, and these did little more than damage that polls' own property. Meanwhile, a Persian financed fleet under the Athenian Conon had been ravaging the Laconian coast. Worst yet, the latter even captured Sparta's most vulnerable homeland district, which sat
off the southern shore on the island of Cythera. With no military solution in sight on either front, the Spartans began in 392 to seek a three-way negotiated peace. The discussions did not bring an end to the war, however, since the terms being pushed by Sparta's representative Antalcidas appealed neither to the coalition (as it left the Spartans dominant over Greek affairs) nor the Persians (who wanted to regain Ionia). Still, Sparta was able to convince the Persians of a future threat from Athens, leading them to end support for the allied sea effort.
Long Walls of Corinth (392 B.c.)
The allies had helped secure Corinth by constructing a walled corridor that widened from a couple of kilometers separation near the city to pass up either side of its port of Lechaion to the north on the Corinthian Gulf. There was, however, turmoil within Corinth over whether it should continue on the allied side in light of all the damage it was taking on the coalition's behalf. Political upheaval in the city led to a change of government in the spring of 392 and the union of Corinth and Argos into a single, democratic state with the blessing of Athens and the Boeotians. All this trouble had exiled a number of Corinthians and disaffected others still in town. Some of the latter now conspired to let the garrison commander at Sicyon bring his troops inside the port corridor. The Spartan Praxitas moved at night to enter through an open gate, bringing with him his own mora (around 1,000 spearmen), troops from Sicyon (maybe including a two-thirds muster of 2,000 hoplites) and 150 heavy-armed Corinthian exiles along with a few Spartan-led horsemen and maybe 500-1,000 in light infantry. Mindful of a small Theban garrison at Lechaion, Praxitas set up his men in a battle line facing Corinth with the corridor walls on either flank.
Praxitas had to move south toward town where the corridor was narrower in order to cover the entire span with so few troops. And even so, his array was too thin for conventional phalanx action, perhaps a single rank a little less than 3km wide. The Spartan therefore used a field work to stiffen his front, starting with a shallow ditch. This would discomfit the enemy front-fighters by making them battle upward, disturbing their footwork and keeping the following rank a pace or so back where they were less able to apply effective othismos and might even be out of spear reach. Behind, he placed a short barrier of some sort incorporating dirt piled up from the trench. His spearmen could lean over it to fight while being protected below from spear strikes and any pushing of opposing files. This effectively limited potential engagement to just one rank on each side toward negating any enemy advantage in manpower. His skirmishers then spread out in back of the hoplites to give covering fire over their heads.
Neither reinforcements nor enemies arrived the first day, but on the second an allied force came up from the city. This consisted of spearmen from Argos (perhaps 3,000) and Corinth (likely 2,000) plus mercenary peltasts (maybe 800 or so) under Iphicrates of Athens. The allies found the Spartans in charge of the right side of their array, fixed against the western wall, with the exiles holding a short stretch from an anchor on the east wall and the Sicyonians standing across the rest of the front. Forming into line of battle, the Argives went after the men from Sicyon, the Corinthians advanced to oppose the Spartans and the peltasts charged the outcasts. The Sicyonians were soon defeated, running away as spearmen from Argos pushed a broad hole through the barrier without further opposition. The Argives chased their beaten foes all the way to the sea where they caught and killed quite a few. The Spartan cavalry commander, seeing this unfolding tragedy, had dismounted with some volunteers and attempted to aid the fugitives using discarded Sicyonian shields, but he and most of his handful of men were quickly overwhelmed and slain.
Elsewhere on the field, it was the exiles and Spartans that prevailed. Iphicrates and his peltasts had been impotent against the well-protected outcasts on the east wing, the hoplites' lower bodies covered by the field work and upper by helmets and shields proving impervious to javelins. Likewise, there was no hope for the lighter armed men to force their way through hand-to-hand as the Argives had done, since their opponents' heavy gear was much superior in shock fighting. The javelinmen therefore beat a retreat under fire from the exiles' own backing missilemen. As for the Spartans, they had simply proven better man-for-man, outdueling and intimidating their opponents until the Corinthians lost heart and retreated when the spearmen from Sparta threatened to mount their low barrier and bring the fight to them.
While the outcast hoplites and their light infantry advanced toward the city in the wake of Iphicrates' retreat, Praxitas did indeed lead his troops over their fronting wall and ditch. He then arrayed a phalanx maybe four shields deep and 250m across facing east toward where the Argives had broken through, setting his left wing next to the abandoned field work and having the light infantry screen the other flank. This let him move forward to attack the men from Argos on their unshielded right as they returned from besting the Sicyonians, straggling back unit by unit in ragged formation through the wide breach in the defensive barrier. In truth, this was a smaller scale replay of the Argives' defeat two years earlier at Nemea River. Many on the Argive right were killed, while those on the other side crowded into a mob along the eastern wall and fled toward town. However, they soon ran into the Corinthian exiles in that direction and turned back toward the Spartans once more.
What followed was a slaughter. Some Argives were shoved together and lanced down where they stood. Others were trampled and suffocated in a hysterical crowd of their own men. The Spartans speared a few from steps in the wall as they tried to go up, while most who reached the top to jump down met pursuit and death on the far side. In the words of Xenophon: "so many fell within a short time that men accustomed to see heaps of corn, wood, or stones, beheld then heaps of dead bodies" (Hellenica 4.4.12). Diodorus (14.86.4) cited 1,000 dead on the day for the losers, which likely was 25-30 percent of the Argives and 5-10 percent among the Corinthians. For the winners, Sicyonian losses would have been steep as well (perhaps 400 men or 20 percent), but casualties must have been minimal among the rest.
Praxitas followed up his success in the battle of the "Long Walls" by destroying the Theban garrison at Lechaion to take the port. He would later tear holes in the corridor barriers and lead an offensive to the east against Athenian ally Megara in which he captured and garrisoned two outposts near that city. All the same, despite having gained another crushing (albeit smaller) victory that broke the blockade across the isthmus, Sparta was still no nearer to ending the war.
Lechaion and Methymna (390 B.c.)
The next year saw Agesilaos invade the Argolid to ravage the countryside without meeting any real resistance. Meanwhile, Iphicrates' peltasts chased off a guard of Mantinean hoplites below Lechaion, which allowed for a rapid repair of the gaps that had been made in the long walls. This work soon went for naught, though, as the returning Agesilaos swung by Corinth and ripped the barriers down again. Elsewhere, Iphicrates' peltasts notched another success, ambushing hoplites from Sicyon on their own soil and so terrorizing them that they developed a phobia regarding the javelineers. But while the Athenian and his men were able to range down as far as Arcadia to the north of Sparta and do well against spearmen there as well, they had their own overwhelming fear of the Spartans themselves. They would run from the dreaded Laconian hoplites, and even then sometimes came to grief when the younger spearmen proved capable of catching them from behind (Xenophon Hellenica 4.4.16). It was in this light that a mora of Spartans was able to freely sortie out of Lechaion to range all about Corinth. (Note that there is uncertainty as to the timing of Iphicrates' actions, some of which might have taken place in late 392 prior to Agesilaos attacking Argos.)
With the war in Europe running at low key, there was new trouble for Sparta on the Asian front. Struthus had gone into the field there for the Great King with an army that included 5,000 mercenary hoplites (Diodorus 14.99.2). However, it was the Persian's horsemen that caused the greatest harm at this time. The Spartans had sent out Thibron to deal with Struthus and he had taken that opportunity to pill
age enemy territory and carry off a good deal of booty. Unfortunately, these expeditions were being carried out in a very casual and haphazard manner and Struthus' cavalry managed to catch the Spartan and some of his raiders lounging about on open ground just after breakfast. Sweeping down, the Persians killed Thibron and a number of those with him to put a sad damper on Sparta's counter-offensive in the region.
As the sporadic fighting around Corinth persisted into 390, it remained mercenaries like those led by Iphicrates that saw most of the action, with neither side seeking to involve large bodies of their citizen militias. The year did, however, see one modest but much ballyhooed engagement involving the heretofore all-conquering Spartan spearmen. This was sparked by, of all things, a religious festival back in Laconia. The people of the Spartan district of Amyclae set great store by a certain annual event that celebrated the god Apollo, and King Agesilaos elected to let his hoplites from there go home for the festivities. These men (some 400 in number) formed most of a single lochos, which was part of the mora currently on garrison duty at Lechaion. Leaving behind allied troops to hold post, the mora marched out with their cavalry to escort the Amyclaeans safely out of range of the enemy at Corinth. What was left of the Spartans (about 600 spearmen) saw their comrades off along with the horsemen and then headed back for Lechaion. This was all seen by the Athenians, who noted that the enemy regiment was not only temporarily undermanned, but also moving exposed along the coastal road with no mounted or light infantry support. Callias of Athens (who must have commanded at least 1,000 hoplites - an Athenian tribal levy or taxis [taxeis plural] roughly equivalent to a mora at Sparta) moved out with Iphicrates and his peltasts (maybe 800 strong) in the lead. Callias caught the Spartans just outside the port and set up his spearmen in phalanx at a fair distance to the south as the javelineers ran forward.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 6