Citium (386 B.C.)
Cyprus in the far eastern Mediterranean hosted some of the most distant outposts of Greece. These small kingdoms, many derived from settlements dating back to Mycenaean times, had come to share their island with other cities that were of Phoenician origin. Ruled first by Assyria and then Egypt, Cyprus came under nearly continuous Persian domination after 545; however, an attempt to change that subordinate status began in 411. This was when a Greek royal named Evagoras returned from exile in Cilicia to gain the crown of his native Cyprian Salamis.
An ardent advocate of Hellenic culture, Evagoras embraced a program of spreading its values throughout Cyprus in league with Athens. Critically, his policies also seem to have been visibly expansionist (Isocrates Evagoras 59) and raised frictions that c. 391 led to a state of war with Persia. Evagoras had built up a large military and Diodorus claimed (15.2.3-4, 3.4) that his army contained 6,000 of his own subjects (predominantly hoplites) plus an even larger number of men sent by his allies (perhaps 9,000 or more mainly Greek mercenaries). He had personal funds to hire troops directly as well, these likely including both Ionian and Carian spearmen. Evagoras might thus have collected some 20,000 fighters in all, representing maybe 16,000 heavy footmen supported by light infantry and cavalry.
Evagoras fared quite well early on in his campaigns against Persia according to both Diodorus and Isocrates (Evagoras 62). He was thus able to hold his own at home while capturing Tyre as well as other Phoenician cities. Indeed, his successes on the mainland proved sufficient to eventually bring the Cilician interior into revolt against the Great King. The Persians responded by gathering a large army in Cilicia in 386. The true nature of this force is clouded by an exaggerated estimate of its size by Diodorus (15.2.1); however, it might have consisted of around 30,000 line infantry (a tenth of Diodorus' claim for the entire armament) with strong supporting light elements. The heavier-armed backbone of the Persian host would probably have come from a garrison already on post in Cilicia (maybe 6,000 men at 60 percent nominal strength) plus three more baivaraba mustered from elsewhere in the empire (24,000 soldiers at 80 percent nominal). Likely on hand as well were some 3,000 horsemen (four hazaraba, each attached to a respective baivarabam of foot at 10 percent its manpower) and some local Cilicians armed with javelins. The latter might have counted about one skirmisher for each four line infantrymen to bring the entire army to around 40,000 combatants. Given significant seagoing requirements, the imperials also assembled an armada that could have had better than 300 triremes as well as numerous supply transports.
The Persians at first kept mostly to the mainland that they might guard vulnerable sites. Still, they landed an advance contingent at Citium, a Phoenician port lying just below and to the west of Evagoras' stronghold at Salamis in the eastern quarter of Cyprus. Diodorus' account then states that the Greek leader fell in with "a body of the land force near the sea" (16.4.2), which he was able to defeat. This isn't much to go on, but could well describe an action involving a single baivarabam (8,000 or so foot soldiers) along with a regiment of cavalry (800 riders) and some javelinmen. If so, the Persians were probably probing toward Salamis along the shores of modern Larnaca Bay, which spreads northeastward from the site of ancient Citium. The Greek force here is even more speculative. However, as little as half of his army would have let Evagoras match fronts by forming up his hoplites eight-deep against opposition filed at a similar depth. With the Persian right and Cypriot left holding posts tight against the coast, the spearmen of Evagoras (having arms better suited to the occasion) must have either outflanked or outfought the imperial inland wing. This would have let them roll around that end under cover from a screen of riders and light footmen. No doubt rapidly routing their foes, the Greeks probably chased them back down the strand toward the Persian base. Fatalities in this engagement could have run in the range of 1-3 percent for the victors and around 5-10 percent for the losers.
Evagoras was much encouraged by his success in this action, yet it would prove irrelevant when the Persians won a pivotal sea battle off Citium. Having reduced enemy naval assets in that fight, they now felt free to move most of their army onto Cyprus. Evagoras seems to have been reluctant to challenge so strong a force in the field and eventually found himself invested within Salamis. In the end, seeing no way forward after most of his allies had deserted (Isocrates [Panegyricus 141] made the no doubt hyperbolic but telling claim that he was down to only 3,000 light-armed troops at this point), Evagoras sought and came to terms in 380.
Pyrgi (384 B.c.)
On the other side of the Greek world from Cyprus, Syracuse's Dionysius had been spreading his influence into the Italian south and now reached around the Adriatic and even toward mainland Greece. The tyrant founded colonies in northern Italy and Illyria and allied in 385 with Illyrians at war with the adjacent tribal Molossians of Epirus. He supplied his new barbarian allies with 2,000 soldiers and 500 sets of heavy Greek fighting gear. The Illyrians, already being oriented toward shock action with spear and shield, gave the gifted panoplies to their best men and worked the tyrant's loaned troops into their combat array. But it seems that they now overplayed their hand. Seeking to promote Alcetas (who had been a resident exile at Dionysius' court) to the kingship of Molossia, they invaded Epirus and fought a great battle against its Greek tribesmen. Diodorus reported that 15,000 Molossians died in a sharp defeat (15.13.3). And while that claim is surely a gross amplification of their losses, the scope of the reverse was nonetheless vast enough to prompt the Spartans to intercede and intimidate the Illyrians into withdrawing.
Having failed on the northeastern front in Greece, Dionysius shifted his aim the next year. His new target was Pyrgi up the southwest Italian coast, which served as port for the Etruscan (Tyrrhenian) city of Agylle (Caere). Lying just north of Rome's harbor at Ostia, this was part of a realm known for its Carthaginian sympathies and (more importantly as a draw for the tyrant's interests) for having a temple filled with abundant riches. Keen to appropriate the reputed wealth, Dionysius gathered a seaborne strike-force for a lightening raid against the Etruscan site.
There is uncertainty about just how large a fleet sailed from Syracuse to attack Pyrgi. Diodorus (16.14.3) gave it 60 triremes while 100 ships have been cited elsewhere ("pseudo Aristotle," Caven 1990, 191), and Polyaenus (5.2.21) claimed that there were 100 triremes and horse transports combined. Diodorus would normally be the preferred authority on such an affair related to Sicily; however, his text here has survived only in abbreviated summary form. Therefore, while we've no call to doubt their accuracy, it's quite possible that his data aren't completely preserved. It seems best then to give some credence to the other sources. A reasonable proposal along these lines is that there indeed were 100 triremes, but that only 60 carried the primary infantry force. This leaves the other 40 to bring an auxiliary contingent of horsemen. The cavalry might have traveled on fast triremes, which could man a full three banks of oars and take a shipment of horses and riders instead of their maximum cargo (in line with Herodotus 6.15) of 40 or so foot soldiers. This called for substituting at a rate of one horse for five men (Rodgers 1937,15-16). Some 200 cavalrymen and their mounts as well as a few other passengers may then have come on those 40 vessels. This would allow for a landing party of around 2,000 hoplites, 500 foot skirmishers (mainly peltasts) and 200 horsemen. Alternatively, Caven (1990, 191) has suggested 4,000 foot soldiers and 300 riders based on a 5th century analog. But though consistent with Polyaenus, this gives no heed to Diodorus' number; moreover, such a fleet would have drastically increased travel time by using underpowered horse carriers. And had speed not been a priority then there would have been no need for such a large number of ships in the first place, since 4,000 infantrymen required less than 30 equally sluggish troop transports.
Beaching in the dark, Dionysius' men struck at daybreak, penetrating stout fortifications to overpower the small guard within. The locals gathered to take back their temple. Etruscans fought in the same
style as their Greek foes, using a phalanx of hoplites (Sekunda and Northwood 1995, 13) that featured bodies of light infantry (archers and men with throwing spears) and cavalry (Penrose 2005, 47-49) outboard in flank support. How large was the army that arrayed to counter the incursion at Pyrgi? In light of there being no more than very short notice for mustering, it was probably not much if any bigger than even the smallest raiding party discussed above. And whatever strength the Etruscans could field, they had collected in haste and are unlikely to have been in a confident mood. Thus, once engaged the Greeks must have used main force to awe and rapidly push through unsteady Etruscan ranks, setting off a panic that saw their foes drop shield and spear to either run or beg for mercy. Taking a good many prisoners on the spot (Diodorus 16.14.2), the Syracusans went on to waste the nearby countryside before heading home with their spoils.
Mantinean Plain (385 B.c.)
No sooner had the Peace of Antalcidas gone into effect than Sparta began throwing its weight around in the Peloponnese in violation of the pact's provisions for insuring the independence of all Greek poleis. This first took the shape of aggression against nearby Mantinea. A former ally, that city had failed to back the Spartans during the Corinthian War and would now face serious consequences.
The Spartans opened hostilities by ordering in 385 that Mantinea tear down its walls. When this was denied, the Spartan king Agesipolis called out his current allies, including the recently suborned Thebans. He marched into Mantinean territory, plundered the countryside and then closed upon the city to initiate a siege. Information about the opening stages of this investment is sparse; however, Plutarch indicated that the Mantineans sought to fend off the Spartans by sallying to fight a battle on the plain in front of their city (vol. I Pelopidas, 387). The scope of this engagement is speculative, but past operations suggest that Mantinea might have been able to field up to 2,500 hoplites, including reservists who likely took the field in this dire crisis. These line troops would have been backed by a modest number of light-armed skirmishers. As for the Spartans, there were probably at least 2,000 of their own spearmen present (two 500-man lochoi of spartiates and two more of perioeci) with possibly a matching force of allies. Perhaps half of the latter came from Thebes and the rest from Tegea (Mantinea's fierce Arcadian rival).
Had Agesipolis actually held the advantage in hoplite manpower proposed here, he no doubt would have aligned his heavy infantry eight shields deep across the entire breadth of his phalanx while placing whatever light forces he had on hand outboard off either side. It seems that the king and his spartiates took their usual station on the right and set the other Lacedaemonians on the far left. (This was much like the distribution of Spartan troops at Mantinea I some 33 years earlier, when perioeci had similarly stood on the left end of the array.) The allied hoplites would then have ranked across the middle of the formation, where we know that the Theban troops took position alongside the perioeci. This left the Tegeans to fill in next to the spartiates. These dispositions mandated that the Mantineans file only half as deep along the left wing of their own formation if they were to avoid an overlap. Critically, however, they could still deploy at a much more competitive depth of six along their right wing.
The slender array forced upon Mantinea would have put its phalanx at hazard of falling into dangerous disarray had it attempted to advance. It's therefore probable that the locals held steady close in front of their city walls. This sent the Spartan formation marching across the field at its traditional slow, flute-timed pace until coming into contact and initiating a lethal contest of dueling spears and pushing shields. As it turned out, this action played out along lines seen in many other hoplite battles to produce a mixed tactical result in which the Spartan king and his crack troops overcame the outmanned Mantinean left while the locals at the same time pushed back to partially disperse the left half of the Spartans' phalanx. And as the perioeci grudgingly gave ground, some of the troops from Thebes apparently broke ranks and fled. This put those few Thebans who still held station in great peril.
Among the men endangered in the Theban ranks were two later to rise to great fame: Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The former, in fact, went down with multiple wounds and would have died save for the courageous efforts of Epaminondas, who stood over his fallen comrade as he also took serious damage from both sword and spear. In one of history's more ironic turns, both of these deadly future foes of Sparta might have been slain had their position not been reinforced by the victorious Spartans crossing from the other side of the field. Beaten outright on their left and now finally undone on the right as well, the Mantineans withdrew, leaving behind maybe a tenth of their initial number dead or dying. Agesipolis, having probably lost no more than 5 percent of his own command, followed up this tactical success with a siege.
The city of Mantinea lay in a closed "polje" (Higgins 1996, 70-71), which is a low-lying area that does not effect its ultimate drainage on the surface; instead, its streams fall into sinkholes (ponors) and the flow channels underground to the sea (into the Gulf of Argos in this instance). There were five such sinkholes surrounding the site of ancient Mantinea and the Spartans set about plugging them. (They had used the same trick in 418 to precipitate the battle of Mantinea I.) As a result, when the rains came, flood waters rose and the river that flowed directly through town washed away the Mantinean defenses. So exposed, the city surrendered in 385 and the Spartans scattered its population into the same four villages that existed prior to the union that had created Mantinea in the mid-6th or early 5th century. These small communities were without the protection of walls and had to submit allied troops to Sparta upon demand.
Olynthus I (382 B.c.) and II (381 B.c.)
It was in context of the sort of aggression unleashed on Mantinea and anyone else that dared to oppose the Spartans that the cities of Acanthus and Apollonia sent envoys to Sparta in 383. Seeking to break free of Olynthus and its Chalcidian League in the far north, they begged for assistance. The Spartans saw a chance here to justify reaching into that region and set about collecting levies from their allies to send a large army to the Chalcidice. While this was being done, they decided to dispatch a small advance force to smooth the way, putting the general Eudamidas in charge.
Eudamidas undertook the Olynthian campaign in command of 2,000 hoplites (Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.24). It's likely that these included 1,100 spearmen in two perioecian lochoi (one of them the 600-strong Sciritae who usually scouted in front of a Spartan army when on the march) with the rest being freed helots. This forward contingent set up a base at Potidaea, which had deserted Olynthus, and proceeded to make small-scale war upon the enemy while lending garrison detachments to other cities wishing to rebel. Phoebidas in the meantime took charge of the main army and set out to join Eudamidas, who was his brother. He camped outside Thebes in route and there took a fateful step aimed at boosting the prestige of his polls. Acting on the spur of the moment, there was no way he could have known that he'd trigger a conflict that would alter the balance of power in Greece.
Leontiades, a Spartan client of long standing and leader of an oligarchic Theban faction, came to Phoebidas with others of his ilk and offered to bind his city to the Lacedaemonians in return for help in carrying out a coup. The Spartan and a party of his hoplites followed these traitors inside the gates of Thebes and took up position within the Cadmea, the city's fortified acropolis. Leontiades and his friends then went to the Theban senate and led a takeover of the government, replacing its former democratic format with a very narrow oligarchy (dunasteia) that fulfilled the conspirators' pledge by bringing Thebes into full sympathy with Sparta's interests. Phoebidas' action seems to have been in clear violation not only of the recent peace accord, but of Spartan law as well. However, though Phoebidas was removed from his command and fined, Agesilaus, who was probably a kinsman (Cartledge 1987, 373), defended what he had achieved. He did this by arguing that ends justified means, therefore making any sort of deed acceptable just as long as it ben
efited the state. The Spartans then compounded this flagrant moral transgression by proceeding to provide a trio of officers, a few of their own troops and some allied soldiers to help garrison the Cadmea in support of Thebes' new regime. At the same time, they sent out Agesilaus' brother Teleutias to replace the cashiered Phoebidas on the Olynthian campaign.
It appears that there had been some difficulty in gathering allied troops for an adventure so far from home. Thus, Phoebidas' original command must have started out somewhat shorthanded. But with the effective conquest of Thebes to trumpet, Teleutias had no trouble inspiring his allies to meet the expedition's declared manpower targets. Among these were 10,000 hoplites (Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.37), which would have included those sent out earlier. The spearmen in the reinforcement that now marched north probably counted 1,000 each from eight geographic areas that in 378 would formally make up the Peloponnesian League. Per Diodorus (15.31.2), those regions were Sparta, Arcadia, Ells, Achaia, Corinth/Megara, Sicyon/Phlius/Acte, Acarnania and Phocis/Locris (with Arcadia being split into two parts and the Chalcidice added to make up a ten-district format at that time). Of these, the Phliasians may have provided cash rather than troops as we know they did later (Xenophon Hellenica 5.3.10). If so, mercenaries might well have filled their slot in the battle order. As for the column's Spartans, they likely included at least a few full spartiates, with the rest mostly citizens of lesser privilege. Attaching these men to the perioeci already in the field produced a double allotment that consisted of two moral of citizen spearmen. Along with the earlier helot contingent and maybe 100 horsemen, this made for a very strong Lacedaemonian presence. Teleutias also brought a Theban levy of perhaps 2,000 hoplites and 200 riders. These troops represented yet another double draft, with Sparta's newest allies apparently being eager to give "even more than what was demanded of them" (Xenophon Hellenica 15.2.36).
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 8