The Athenians stepped unofficially into the fray at this point. It seems that two generals linked to the Theban resistance had moved troops into positions along the Attic border (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.9). These were to stand by, ready to quickly come up in support of the conspiracy if needed. Composed most likely of a couple of hundred hoplite volunteers and maybe 800 or so mercenary peltasts under Chabrias (Munn 1993, 137, 214-215), these men mobilized upon arrival of a body of rebel cavalry from Thebes and set out northward to join the fight. Meanwhile, the horsemen (perhaps 400-500 strong) turned west in order to oppose a contingent coming up from Plataea to address the uprising. Probably with Lysanoridas (the third Spartan commander from the Cadmea) in charge and numbering maybe 400-600 hoplites with a few light-armed attendants (likely 100-150 at 20 percent of the total force), the Plataeans would have been strung out a few abreast in marching order along the road to Thebes.
The Theban riders descended without warning on the men from Plataea, launching their javelins in a series of charge and retreat attacks as their slower, heavy-armed foes rallied into a fighting formation under inadequate cover from the few amateur missilemen in their ranks. By the time that the spearmen had achieved any sort of order, Thebes' riders had killed more than 20 of them (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.10) and must have wounded a good many more. This let the cavalry return at full speed to the city. The bloodied and badly shaken Plataeans, on the other hand, were in all likelihood expecting further mounted attacks and turned back. In contrast to this loss of reinforcements for the Cadmea's defenders, the rebel cause soon gained more troops from Athens and on an official basis this time. The volunteer generals that had led the initial Athenian support for Thebes must have reported back to the authorities at home that that all was going well. This motivated the Athenians to pile on. They elected to send out the general Demophon to aid the rebellion with 5,000 hoplites and 500 horsemen (Diodorus 15.26.2).
Between local men (3,000-4,000), other Boeotians rallying to Thebes' cause (maybe another 2,000-3,000) and the Athenians (5,200 or so), there were now 12,000 hoplites arrayed against the Cadmea (Diodorus 15.26.4). There were also 2,000 in cavalry among the rebels along with a possible 3,000 light missilemen (these representing around 25 percent of the total Boeotian complement plus Chabrias' mercenaries). The citadel's defenders were able to stave off several attempts on their position over the next couple of weeks, dealing out a fair share of casualties to the attackers. Still, seeing so vast and unfavorable a disparity in manpower as well as the determination of their foes and their own dwindling supplies, the garrison's troops lost heart. Including even the few Spartans present, these over-rode objections from their officers and voted to surrender the site. Negotiations then produced an agreement that would let the garrison keep its arms and leave Thebes unopposed.
The Spartans responded to the uprising by assigning their king Cleombrotus to muster an army and retake Thebes. Gathering allied levies, he was able to field a large force of perhaps 19,000 spearmen with around 4,000 light-armed supporters and marched out in early 378. Cleombrotus was able to avoid a blockade from Chabrias and his javelinmen (who were now on post at Eleutherae) by taking the direct route across Mount Cithaeron toward Plataea, moving up this path with a contingent of his own peltasts in the lead. At the top of the pass, the javelineers encountered a party of some 150 Thebans, former prisoners of the ousted oligarchic regime who had taken on the task of blocking this entry into their homeland. Perhaps a mixture of hoplites with a few foot skirmishers, this small force might well have been adequate with proper preparation to temporally seal the narrow pass against a modest assault. Sadly for the Thebans, they were not only facing long odds, but had been caught by surprise as well. Having recently watched the garrison depart with its tail between its legs, these men no doubt didn't expect to see an enemy offensive until spring opened the next traditional campaigning period. Instead, the peltasts at maybe 800 strong took them unaware, charging forward time and again to hurl their slender darts to lethal effect. Eventually, the attackers overwhelmed their outmanned foes' hastily deployed stance, wiping them out to nearly the last man and driving off those few who survived. With the pass now clear, Cleombrotus crested the mountain to descend into Plataea.
The Spartan king relocated from Plataea to Thespiae and then advanced on the village of Cynoscephalae, setting up camp there only a few kilometers from Thebes itself. He stayed at that site for just over two weeks, probably parlaying with the Thebans in hopes of finding a mutually amenable solution to the crisis. With the rebels remaining intractable and winter conditions dimming prospects for effective military operations, Cleombrotus fell back once more upon Thespiae. There, he proceeded to install a garrison under Sphodrias. He gave this Spartan general a third from each of the allied contingents (possibly 5,000 spearmen along with 1,000 skirmishers). He also ceded all that was left of his campaign funds to be used in the hiring of mercenaries. The king then marched back to the Peloponnese where he discharged what remained of his allies. Fearful of the vengeance of a now aroused Sparta, the Athenians scrambled to repudiate their pact with Thebes, placing on trial the generals that had first involved them with the uprising. However, this contrite attitude would soon evaporate in the wake of a major Spartan strategic gaffe.
Sphodrias came up with a plan to counter the Theban overthrow by means of an operation against the main Athenian harbor at Piraeus. Marching with a large army from Thespiae under cover of darkness, he made for Piraeus with the intention of capturing the recently walled but still ungated port that morning. What followed can only be described as a complete foul-up. Not only was the invasion force seen on the move and reported to Athens during the night, but sunrise found it still a good 20km from its target. Now fully on the alert, the Athenians deployed to protect both their city and its harbor, leaving Sphodrias little choice but to turn around and skulk back to Boeotia. The fallout from this fiasco saw the mood in Athens swing entirely around to produce a fresh alliance with Thebes and put the city on the path to war with Sparta. The Athenians had by that summer gone so far as to form what has been called the Second Athenian League as a rebirth of sorts of the old anti-Persian Delian League of the 5th century. Only this new organization was dedicated to opposing Spartan rather than barbarian ambitions. Swallowing all these reversals, the Spartans remained defiant and refused even to convict Sphodrias despite his clear intent to violate the Peace of Antalcidas. If Athens wanted to fight, then a fight it would get.
Thespiae (378 B.c.)
In early spring 378, both the Thebans and Athenians began building massive field works toward helping fend off the attacks they anticipated would surely come that summer from Sparta and its allies. For Athens, this took the form of a barrier wall across the gap between the southern side of Mount Parties and the northern end of the southeast-northwest trending Aigaleos ridge system that otherwise separated Attica from the Megarid and Isthmus of Corinth (and hence from the Peloponnese and Sparta). Called the "Dema Wall" (Munn 1993) after that opening's modern Greek name (To Dema or "The Link"), this barrier was crafted from local limestone and came complete with fighting platforms, sally ports, gates and watch towers. It was designed to accommodate a defensive corps some 5,000 strong, which was equal to about half the size of the Athenian army at this time. These troops were to consist predominantly of peltasts (and those mostly mercenaries), but with a strong component of hoplites as well as at least a few horsemen. Athens' current commanding general, Chabrias, was probably the inspiration behind the wall's design. He had been involved in the creation of barrier defenses when serving Persia in Egypt. He also likely had a hand in creating the defensive works that went up at this same time near Thebes. These were very different in composition and expanse from the Dema Wall, consisting of a 20km-long stockade system of ditches, earthen mounds and stakes that combined to enclose the most exposed expanse of the city's territory.
With these constructions in place, their defenders awaited the coming of the summer cam
paign season and its expected enemy offensive. And as anticipated, Sparta's King Agesilaos duly led out a powerful invasion force. It seems that sturdy old warrior had replaced Cleombrotus despite having reached his 60th year, an age normally marking retirement from even reserve military duty. But eager to put what they saw as their most successful general into the fray, both Spartans and allies alike had insisted that the older monarch take charge of this campaign. His host boasted 18,000 foot soldiers (Diodorus 15.32.1), probably including 4,000 Spartan and 10,000 allied hoplites. The Spartans maybe represented five morai at 80 percent establishment strength. (However, Diodorus, possibly confusing morai with lochoi, assigns just 500 men to each of these units, thus indicating only 2,500 Spartans.) In addition, there were some 2,800 allied light infantry, 1,200 mercenary peltasts and 1,500 horsemen.
Perhaps dissuaded by the Athenians' barrier wall, but more likely focused all along on striking at what he must have perceived as his primary objective, Agesilaos headed for Cithaeron and Boeotia beyond. He had sent the hired peltasts ahead to secure his target pass and his column made a rapid transit to set up camp at Thespiae. Agesilaos joined up here with the contingent already in place. This latter force might have numbered as many as 10,000 infantry per the complement that had embarked on the year-earlier Piraeus misadventure (Diodorus 15.29.6). A likely breakdown for these troops includes some 6,500 allied spearmen (5,000 Peloponnesian and 1,500 from Thespiae, Plataea and elsewhere in Boeotia). There also would have been around 1,500 allied skirmishers plus a modest cavalry force (maybe 500 riders, including a few refugee Theban aristocrats) and 2,000 or so professional peltasts. These last were Sphodrias' hires from the year before. Agesilaos marched this force across the Theban frontier near Cynoscephalae. Here, he came up against significant challenges from not only the recently erected stockade, but a reformed Boeotian League army as well.
During the winter, the Thebans had led a reorganization of the surrounding poleis that were free of Spartan control. This included restoration of the former seven-district federal government in which proportional representation of Thebes' large population gave it the power and responsibility of four districts (Hanson 1999, 28-29). There was, however, a major difference between the present union and Boeotian democracies of the past: broad, Athenian-style suffrage. By giving an equal vote to every male citizen in the region, the Thebans had uplifted men all across Boeotia, encouraging them to come forward as never before to defend their land. And at least at Thebes itself, such an improved attitude found expression in an elevated level of physical training and military organization. Talented and dedicated men like Pelopidas, Epaminondas and Gorgidas pioneered this effort. A notable step was Gorgidas' creation of an elite fighting unit called the Sacred Band (Hieros Lochos). Modeled after an earlier picked unit at Thebes of the same size (the "Charioteers" of 5th century fame), this comprised 300 select hoplites (said to be 150 pairs of lovers) that served at state expense in the phalanx's leading rank (sometimes possibly dispersed throughout [Balfour 2010, 451). With the Sacred Band at their thrusting edge and powered by row after row of muscular spearmen, the Thebans would become a powerful driving force within Boeotian battle formations.
Thus, it was a reinvigorated foe that Agesilaos faced across the earthen and stake barrier outside of Thebes. Ranging up and down the stockade's length, the Spartan spoiled the land at various points on his side of the divide. Yet he found no way to cross and get at the richer fields beyond. This was because every time that the Spartan shifted his location the Boeotians did the same, always keeping across from him with the barrier providing them a daunting defensive position. Still, Agesilaos did finally manage to breach the stockade. He did this through the simple ploy of setting out unusually early in the morning before the Boeotians could take post against him. Yet though he was now able to attack the Thebans' fields right up to their city walls, he failed to gain the open battle that he wanted. This was due to his foes declining to fight on his terms while he likewise refused on theirs. A famous example of this mutual reluctance to engage at a disadvantage has come down to us via the works of Diodorus (15.32.5-6), Polyaenus (2.1.2) and Nepos (12.1.2).
At some point, the Boeotians set up in battle order along the crest of an elongated hill that lay a few kilometers outside of the city. The Theban hoplites (maybe 4,000) must have taken the far right with their Sacred Band debuting at the fore. The other Boeotian spearmen (perhaps 3,000) would then have held the middle, leaving the left wing to their Athenian allies. The latter had come with 5,000 foot soldiers (probably 4,000 hoplites and 1,000 hired peltasts) and 200 horsemen under Chabrias. It's notable that Chabrias' hoplites seem to have included some mercenaries. Munn (1993, 214) has estimated these hirelings at 500 and reasonably proposes that they formed the entire front rank of an Athenian array standing eight shields deep. On the plain below the Boeotian position, Agesilaos arranged his own phalanx, holding a significant edge in heavy-armed manpower with better than 20,000 spearmen. If he could entice his foes onto level ground then he would be able to overlap a flank (filed at least twelve shields deep against only eight over a 1,700m width versus only 1,500m). Sending his skirmishers forward, the Spartan therefore sought to goad his foes into an unwise charge down the hill. But the Boeotians and Athenians stood their ground and easily beat back this assault, using their elevation to excellent advantage. Taking a different tack, Agesilaos now had his entire phalanx advance at the sort of deliberate pace for which the Lacedaemonians were famed and feared. This was a threatening display of cool, murderous resolve that had in times past broken more than one enemy formation before the Spartans even got within spear-reach. On this occasion, however, the opposition showed nerves of steel. Rather than be intimidated, Chabrias displayed both his men's confidence and well-drilled discipline by having his leading row of veteran professionals lower their shields to rest against their knees while raising their spears alongside in near perfect unison. When Gorgidas and his Sacred Band across the right third of the Boeotian front led their amateur fellows along the rest of the phalanx in copying this adroit maneuver, Agesilaos brought his formation to a halt.
The king realized at this juncture that there was little likelihood that an assault up the slope would succeed, regardless of his hefty numerical edge. The only real hope was for his opponents to break ranks and run in fear, as the Acarnanians had done when he charged them uphill back in 389; and, given his foe's obvious elan, that just wasn't going to happen here. Thus, after offering once more to make a fight of it on level ground and being refused, Agesilaos withdrew. Ulti mately unable to properly set the stage for destroying the Boeotian phalanx, he would retire upon Thespiae. Then, after fortifying that site and likely rotating in half the allied troops he'd brought from the Peloponnese to replace those previously left there, he put the Cadmea's conqueror, Phoebidas, in charge of the place and headed home. Fighting would go on after the main Spartan army left, however, as both sides made hit-and-run raids on each other's territory. These resulted in at least one important action.
The Boeotians marched on Thespiae near summer's end and overran an outpost, killing 200 of its defenders. Phoebidas sallied in response, perhaps hoping in his knowledge of the enemy's considerable strength that he could entice them into the decisive battle on favorable ground that his kings had failed to bring about to date. In any event, his vanguard of mercenary peltasts caught the raiders pulling back toward Thebes and a sharp action ensued. This engagement is variously described in our sources. Xenophon's account (Hellenica 5.4.42-46) makes it a minor skirmish, while Diodorus outlined an engagement of much greater scope (15.33.46). In light of the severe Spartan response afterwards plus the mutually reported size of the Boeotian force and unlikely placement of Phoebidas among his skirmishes (rather than with the hoplites) by Xenophon, much of the account of Diodorus is to be preferred. All the same, Xenophon's version does supply useful details. Reported casualties make it probable that Phoebidas engaged with nearly his entire hoplite contingent. This mi
ght have amounted to some 5,000 spearmen, including all the locals with the rest being Peloponnesian. At the same time, the statement by Xenophon that the Boeotians came "with their entire force" and by Diodorus that the Spartan commander "fell rashly upon the retreating Thebans" (indicating that he was significantly outnumbered, i.e. by a third or more) allow for a good estimate of Boeotian manpower. This was a full levy of around 7,000 spearmen, better than 2,000 peltasts and 600-700 horsemen.
Phoebidas went from pursuer to being the one on the run when his peltasts fell back under pressure from the enemy cavalry. The Spartan quickly set up his phalanx to engage his foe's heavy array, which was now turning to attack. In the fight that followed, Phoebidas went down after "receiving many wounds in front" (Diodorus). This implies that the Theban left might have used deeper manpower to push through his traditional leader's position on the right. Whether this is our first example of a radically overloaded Theban array on that wing (something that would later come to characterize Epaminondas' tactical style) is not documented, though it's certainly possible. Alternatively, Xenophon's description of Thespian spearmen giving way with little or no resistance would place the decisive failure on their side of the line. This was probably on the Spartan left. If so, then Phoebidas and those about him had been enveloped in the course of a collapse rolling up from the other end of their formation. At any rate, the Spartan-allied force was badly mauled. Despite pursuit being limited by fall of night, it suffered over 500 reported fatalities - better than 10 percent if these were only losses among the hoplites as seems likely.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 10