Working under the satrap Pharnabazus, Iphicrates had found the tempo of Persian warfare frustratingly slow, doubtless a reflection of the out-sized scope that the empire's efforts always seem to have attained. After all, the massing of huge conscript armies took time, as did stockpiling the enormous quantity of supplies necessary to maintain those armies and move them over long distances. All the same, sufficient preparation had taken place by early spring 373 for the imperial host to march out at last, traveling along the coast to Egypt with a large fleet for logistical support.
Nectanebos, Pharaoh of Egypt, had made ready to oppose Persia's incursion with fortifications at each of the Nile River's seven mouths. The easternmost of these was the strongest and, though it sat first along its line of advance, the Persian command team decided to avoid it. They chose instead to mount an amphibious operation against another outlet of the Nile (the Mendesian Mouth) that had weaker arrangements and a suitable landing beach. Pharnabazus and Iphicrates came ashore with 3,000 men (Diodorus 15.42.4-5), probably all infantrymen made up from the Greek mercenary legion. On this basis, it's likely that the imperials hit the beach with 2,000-2,500 hoplites and 500-1,000 peltasts. The Egyptians responded by making a sally with 3,000 men of their own, a mix of foot soldiers (mostly heavy-armed shield-bearers) and cavalry, the latter perhaps numbering no more than 300 (10 percent of the total). With such a close match in manpower, the battle was hotly contested in the beginning (a "sharp" action per Diodorus). But when a horde of marines and light-armed rowers from the fleet joined the fray, the Egyptians were quickly overwhelmed on their flanks, doubly enveloped and badly beaten. Killing many (probably 30 percent or more) and capturing others, Iphicrates' men chased those that managed to escape, following them all the way inside their walls (a gate remaining open amid the confusion). The Greeks captured the fortress and razed it to the ground.
The Egyptian campaign had thus gotten off to a rousing start. However, it was soon to unravel in a fit of bickering among its leaders. After Pharnabazus refused to give Iphicrates latitude to operate as he pleased, arguments broke out and distrust grew. Meanwhile, lack of swift action on the invaders' part allowed the Egyptians to recover, improving their defenses to repulse attack after attack and strike back to deal the Persians considerable harm. Then the Nile began to rise, flooding the land and making operations extremely difficult. The Persians finally decided to withdraw. Having argued heatedly with Pharnabazus one more time on the way home, Iphicrates began to suspect that he might be arrested; he therefore escaped the Persian camp by night to sail back to Greece. His fears were confirmed shortly thereafter when representatives of Artaxerxes arrived at Athens to accuse him of having brought about the failure of the Egyptian expedition. But the Athenians resolutely defended Iphicrates against this charge, having already appointed him to take over their own fleet.
Corcyra Cemetery (373 B.c.)
Sparta and Athens began to spar once more shortly after the peace treaty for the Boeotian War went into effect. The focus this time was in the islands skirting the western shores of Greece. There, the Spartans supported a bid to overthrow the democratic government on Corcyra off the far northwest coast, ultimately sending their general Mnasippis there with a large force. He set out with 60-65 vessels under his command, the lower figure per Xenophon (Hellenica 6.2.3) and the higher from Diodorus (15.47.1). These were most likely standard triremes, which could carry 2,400-2,600 troops at a maximum load of 40 passengers and marines per ship above the normal crew complement. The allies having supplied money instead of men for the campaign, these troops included 1,500 mercenaries (likely 1,000 hoplites and 500 peltasts). This left room aboard for around 1,000 Spartans. The exact nature of these latter isn't recorded (Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.5), but they were probably a mix of classes with a majority being perioeci.
Mnasippis came ashore to raid outlying farmland and, having driven a contingent of troops off a nearby hill, put the city of Corcyra under siege. This prompted the Corcyrans to seek help from Athens. The Athenians responded by first sneaking Ctesicles with 600 mercenary peltasts (per Xenophon, only 500 according to Diodorus) onto the island by night to reinforce the city garrison. The newly returned Iphicrates then set sail for Corcyra with 70 ships in late 373. Meanwhile, on the island, an overconfident Mnasippis had discharged some of his hired men and angered the rest with no pay and poor provisioning. Ctesicles, seeing his opposition scattered and inattentive along the siege lines as a result, sent out his javelinmen and a few hoplites to kill 200 peltasts (Diodorus) and capture others to take out fully half of Mnasippis' hireling skirmishers in one fell swoop. Enraged, the Spartan called out his corps of spearmen to retaliate, though the disgruntled mercenary contingent took to the field only reluctantly and without much enthusiasm.
Mnasippis stood with his countrymen on the right wing as he formed up his phalanx eight shields deep. Perhaps counting only 1,500 spearmen now, his formation would have fronted over less than 200m. This array advanced slowly on the enemy troops outside the ramparts and flushed them toward town. However, once these retreating men gained a cemetery close beneath the city wall, they turned to cover behind the tombs and hurl spears and javelins at their pursuers. Meanwhile, Ctesicles led out the Corcyran army and began arranging it in battle order. Based on past musters on the island, his phalanx might have contained at least 2,000 spearmen. Seeing the enemy lining up at depth, the hirelings with Mnasippis sought to increase the length of their own files by folding ranks. This maneuver is known as the anastrophe or "wheeling-back" (Lazenby 1989, 65-69). It called for troops standing on the left side of the mercenary array to make an about-face and walk rearward, then spin left and move in back of their right-side ranks until reaching the far end, where they would halt and face forward once more. Properly carried out, this doubled depth by shifting half the original files behind those that had remained in place on the other side of the formation. Though complex, this move was well within the capability of these well-drilled professionals; still, it was a dangerous thing to do with the enemy so close. And it backfired horribly in this instance. The Corcyrans mistook the planned evolution for a retreat and rushed to attack before the mercenaries could finish.
The islanders' charge rapidly began to rout their now badly disordered foes and there was nothing that Mnasippis could do about it from the other wing, where the enemy had moved up to engage him frontally. The Spartan's phalanx collapsed from the left, leaving him and a small band holding their ground to be surrounded and slaughtered. The rest of his phalanx fled beneath a hot pursuit until reaching their camp, where they rallied under Hypermenes (Mnasippis' second-in-command) and held their walls. But as Iphicrates drew nearer, the surviving Spartans and mercenaries elect to board their ships and leave. Iphicrates went on to carry out other operations in the region, including the capture of some ships from Syracuse (a Spartan ally) from which he gathered booty, including items meant for the shrine at Delphi. It was now clear that Athens was back at war in earnest, no longer concerned with a single campaign, but rather willing to put any and all of Sparta's interests and allies at hazard.
Leuctra (371 B.c.)
Sparta and Athens initially concentrated on each other during the renewed fighting, leaving Thebes free to continue consolidating its position in central Greece. And the Thebans became increasingly aggressive, menacing Phocis, tearing down the fortifications at Thespiae and driving the Plataeans into refuge at Athens. The latter, especially, raised an alarm among the Athenians, who had a long history of friendly relations with Plataea stretching back into the 6th century. Seeking common cause against Thebes, Athens thus took the lead in bringing about a peace that would allow both it and Sparta to turn their efforts against this rising threat in the north. The result was a pact that sought to reinstate the lapsed tenets of the Peace of Antalcidas that had ended the Corinthian War. This called for disbanding military forces now afield and guaranteeing independence for all Greek states. Serious trouble then arose when Thebes objected to ins
istence by Sparta's king Agesilaos that having signed as "Thebans" rather than "Boeotians" meant its confederation must again be dissolved in order to grant autonomy to the member poleis. And when Thebes finally spurned the treaty on this point, it was tantamount to declaring war.
At this time, Cleombrotus was in Phocis with a modest allied army protecting that land from Theban threats. Rather than retiring to release his forces per the peace accord, he set out first to deal with Thebes. Additional troops had arrived from Sparta (Diodorus 15.54.6), probably bringing instructions on how to deal with the quickly developing crisis. The king's army now numbered 1,000 horsemen and 10,000 foot soldiers (Plutarch vol. II Pelopidas, 397) with the latter likely 8,000 hoplites and 2,000 light footmen. The Spartans themselves made up perhaps half of the spearmen on hand at 4,000 strong, most of these having arrived with the reinforcement.
Cleombrotus camped below the passage to Coronea and sent an order to Thebes that it disband its army in accord with the peace agreement. When the Thebans refused to dismiss their men, he then prepared to invade and force them to do so. The most direct paths were now blocked (Diodorus 15.52.7-53.1), so Cleombrotus swung back into Phocis and marched down the mountainous coastal route, wiping out a small Theban force under Chaereas that had moved to block a pass along his path (Pausanius 9.13.3). He then entered Boeotia via Thisbae (see Pritchett [1965] for a discussion of the relevant topography). He moved from there to take Creusis on the Corinthian Gulf, seizing some Theban triremes before setting off up the road toward the old Spartan base at Thespiae. He stopped within Thespian territory and set up for the night on high ground at Leuctra. Meanwhile, Epaminondas, who led the Theban army, had been in place before Coronea when he heard that Cleombrotus had outflanked him. Moving to intercept, the Theban and his men covered the 30km to Leuctra and arranged their own camp on a hill near the Spartan position. Epaminondas had around 6,000 hoplites (Diodorus 15.52.3), who would have had support from perhaps 1,500 in light infantry and 600 riders. This was a full deployment of the available Boeotian forces, which had suffered some minor losses due to withdrawal of a few contingents loath to join in the war.
The opposing hosts set up across the small plain of Leuctra the next day with both commanders seemingly eager to engage. Cleombrotus desired to enhance a reputation tarnished by his having dismissed two earlier armies after failing to bring the Thebans to action. As for Epaminondas, he was in fear for the safety of his homeland and wanted to shelter it from the Spartans' wrath. As the phalanxes arrayed, the mounted forces from either side charged to skirmish across the ground between. Cleombrotus took advantage of his significant edge in hoplite strength to file twelve shields deep (Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.2) with his Spartans holding the entire right wing. This gave him a front of just over 650m. While this deployment was very traditional, that of his opponent was to prove far from the same.
BATTLE OF LEUCRTA (371 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO SHOW RELAFIVE SIZES.)
Epaminondas, perhaps expanding upon precedents set in several previous Theban engagements, loaded up the left extreme of his phalanx at an astounding depth of 50 shields per Xenophon. There are several ways he could have arranged his formation that would have accommodated this singular concentration of manpower on one side while still roughly matching his enemy's line length. One variant was to use nearly all of his Theban spearmen in the deeper element and have the remaining troops stand in minimal files of four. A second variant was to thickly align no more than a single Theban regiment of 1,000 hoplites and set up the remainder of his phalanx with eight-man files. The former most closely matches Xenophon's description and has the virtue of not wasting manpower that (as events would show) Epaminondas never really intended to put into combat. The second is possibly more in tune with what Pelopidas had done at Tegyra, deploying across a 20m front with a depth advantage of maybe just a little over 4 to 1. Either way, the Theban had readied an innovative formation that he might launch a swift and powerful blow at his foe's crimson-clad heart.
Things started well for Epaminondas with a decisive victory by his horsemen, who easily routed their much inferior counterparts. Cleombrotus' bested riders fell back in confusion and would cause some disorder among their hoplite comrades on the Spartan flank as they escaped around that end of the line. The Boeotian footmen were now coming on at the double, their own cavalry clearing from the path after having hid the unusual infantry set-up. The Spartans also started forward, though not with the sort of fanfare to which they were accustomed, since turmoil in the wake of their retreating horsemen and attendant with the rapid enemy advance had managed to silence the pipers that normally set their pace (Polyaenus 1.10, Excerpts 18.1). Meanwhile, a bloodless stand-off was developing on the other end of the field. Epaminondas had ordered his right wing there to hold back from the fight ('refusing' it in military terminology) so as to cut the chance that it might meet defeat before he and his ultra-deep left could win the day. These men, if anything, actually drew back a bit to avoid action. Nor were the allies of Cleombrotus on that side of the field willing to move across and force the matter. Far from enthusiastic, Pausanius claimed (9.13.8) that they actually harbored hostility toward their Spartan overlords and weren't about to endure any additional risk to help them out, and Xenophon noted that some of them "were not even displeased" at Sparta's subsequent defeat (Hellenica 6.4.15). The engagement was therefore to be determined solely by events on the Spartan right.
Cleombrotus' hoplites and those of Epaminondas fought on even terms as the battle opened, both sides thrusting spears along the front and pressing into each other with all the strength their files could impart. This strongly suggests that the advantages of formation depth were proportionally less when files got above an optimum range of eight to twelve (or possibly 16) shields. (A phenomenon well documented in 424 at Delium - see "Deeply Massed Othismos" in Ray [2009, 186-187.1) In fact, it's likely (as Xenophon observed) that the Spartans actually might have had something of an upper hand as the action opened, fighting hard and having slid rightward during their initial advance in an attempt to wrap around the open end of the Theban front (Plutarch vol. I Pelopidas, 398-399). However, this favorite Spartan maneuver of cyclosis met with failure when the extending spearmen on the far end ran into the Sacred Band. Epaminondas had stationed Pelopidas with this elite unit immediately behind his left flank, and they had wheeled out from that hidden post as the formations closed to then move up and block the Spartan attempt at envelopment.
With no opportunity to roll their enemy's flank, the Spartans were locked in a grim duel of spears that became increasingly dominated by shoving from the after-ranks. In this they were badly overmatched against the famously physical Thebans, who could bring much greater manpower into play. Still, the Spartan hoplites heroically held out for a surprisingly long time. It was only after Cleombrotus fell mortally wounded and his comrades carried him away that his men finally started to wear out and falter. Sensing that the decisive moment had come at last, Epaminondas called out to his fellows (Polyaenus 2.3.2): "Give me one step, and we will have the victory!" And with a final surge of othismos they began to shove their fast-fading foemen rearward. The Spartans yielded ground only very reluctantly at first and kept their array intact, but eventually they had no choice but to give way, breaking from the fight to flee under a fierce pursuit. And no sooner did their reluctant allies see them being chased from the fray than they took to their heels as well.
Epaminondas and his Thebans not only held the battleground at the end of the day, but had dealt tremendous damage to Sparta. A probable 1,000 of its vaunted spearmen lay dead on the field, a full quarter of those that had entered the fight that morning. Worse yet for Spartan society, a high proportion of these casualties might have been full citizens (see "Casualties" below). Thebes had won a complete and shocking victory over the Spartans, one that would turn out to mark the end of Lacedaemonian ascendancy over Greece.
Reflections on Leuctra
Leuct
ra is one of the most famous engagements in ancient history. Yet its documentation in our surviving sources is surprisingly weak in many key areas. This has imposed the need for any detailed recreation of the battle to employ a great deal of speculation, with the effort along those lines presented here certainly being no exception. It's prudent therefore to explore in greater depth the inputs and reasoning behind critical choices made in formulating this reconstruction.
MANPOWER • Our surviving ancient texts are remarkably stingy with regard to the sizes of the armies that engaged at Leuctra. In fact, we have only two numbers (infantry and cavalry) for the Spartan force from a single author (Plutarch), a lone entry without qualifications for the Boeotians in total (Diodorus) and one more set for the Thebans separately (Frontinus 4.2.6), with perhaps our most reliable source (Xenophon) giving no army strengths at all. It's assumed here that the number for Boeotians present (6,000) refers solely to hoplites. This matches well with indications elsewhere that the Thebans could throw about 4,000 hoplites into the field at most (matching Frontinus here) and draw 2,000-3,000 others from the rest of Boeotia. The lower figure applies in this case due to lack of cooperation from a few of the lesser poleis (Pausanius 9.13.8). Cavalry in the current reconstruction represents strength equal to about 10 percent of that for the spearmen in accordance with common practice. The light footmen are considered to have been some 25 percent of the infantry as a whole, which seems reasonable for a Boeotian muster that was often very rich in light forces. On the other side, the figure for Cleombrotus' cavalry is taken as presented and the ratio of heavy to light foot soldiers is put at 4 to 1 as seems the more usual case among southern Greeks at this time (any Phocian light infantry present likely operated as substitutes for the mercenaries frequently present in Spartan armies). The result of all this is a significant edge for Cleombrotus in heavy-armed troops. Still, it wasn't so great as to discourage Epaminondas from offering battle. (Mutual consent was generally a prerequisite for pitched combat in this era, something that is well attested by the many engagement refusals that took place during the recent Boeotian War.)
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 12