Meeting Phayllos, Philip would have turned his column to spread out its heavy infantry in battle formation. This probably had his hypaspists stacking at a depth of eight shields on the right wing, foreign hoplites eight-deep in the center and pikemen far left in their usual tenman files. The hetairoi and their screening light footmen would have posted alongside the hypaspists, while the horsemen from Thessaly and remaining light infantry did the same beyond the phalangites. This presented Phayllos with an opposing array on the order of 1,200m across. To avoid being outflanked, he would have split his own riders and light footmen off each wing and filed most of his hoplites at a depth of less than eight.
The following clash must have been a grueling affair, yielding Philip a tactical victory most likely gained through either a real or threatened frontal penetration of the Phocian left wing. However, it seems to have been a success that his played out men couldn't exploit with a proper pursuit due to still intact enemy screening forces off either flank. As a result, casualties must have been modest (fatalities at perhaps 5 percent for Philip and no more than 10 percent for his foes) and Phayllos retired with an army sufficiently whole as to be able to again take the field in short order. It was at this moment that Onomarchos arrived with reinforcements. And maneuvering with skill, he lost little time in bringing about a rematch, no doubt once more close to Pherae where the Macedonians would have been preparing their siege. Assuming a strength having some of the same elements as at Crocus Plain the next year, Onomarchos could probably call upon healthy survivors from Phayllos' retreat to field around 14,000 hoplites, 3,000-4,000 foot skirmishers and close to 2,000 horsemen with matching hamippoi.
The dynamics for this action differed from the one just past in much more than better balanced manpower. Leadership and experience were factors as well. The tactical skills of Onomarchos made for a markedly greater challenge than Philip had dealt with in his sibling (a man later to become notable for losing in the field). At the same time, many among the Phocian's mercenaries had increased experience against the Macedonian phalanx. In fact, some had tangled with this formation twice, having served with Phayllos as well as in Pherae's earlier loss to Philip. Unprepared to cope with the new and exotic pike array in those actions, these savvy professionals were surely by now devising better ways to counter sarissai. This would be crucial to their fighting the next battle in a much more effective manner.
Diodorus claimed (16.35.2) that Onomarchos enjoyed numerical superiority, though the foregoing projections suggest that any such edge was extremely modest with respect to overall manpower. However, the Phocian probably did have around three times as many traditional hoplites, an advantage which let him take the initiative and deploy his heavy corps at a uniform depth of eight shields while dividing the light forces off either wing. Philip then had to respond with a line approaching equal width. This required him to thin a portion of his phalanx below what would otherwise be optimal. And rather than sacrifice offensive potential by handicapping his hoplites on the right, he probably chose the less risky approach of reducing depth for the rest of his formation, which normally stood ten men deep. The phalangites there had a role that was not really much affected by diminished files. This was because they didn't physically support each other beyond overlapping their weapons, and even this involved only the front three ranks. It's therefore likely that not only Philip's spearmen but his pikemen as well ended up arraying eight-deep or less.
When finally locked into shock combat, these formations turned out to be very closely matched, battling long and hard with neither achieving a penetration or envelopment. Sadly, there is no surviving account of just why this action at last took the decisive turn that we know it did in favor of the Phocians. However, we do have a detailed discussion from an expert observer on the strengths and weaknesses of the Macedonian phalanx which suggests a plausible scenario.
Polybios, a veteran Greek general, noted (18.30.5-11) that a Roman swordsman of his era desiring to engage a phalangite had the near impossible task of getting inside at least ten pike points. This reflected that he faced two opponents (since it took roughly twice as much width to swing a blade as to thrust a pole arm) and these foes had the aid of overlapping sarissai from four rows behind. Romans therefore couldn't best an intact phalanx frontally and had to rely on superior flexibility to hit at side or rear. But the chore for Onomarchos might have been much easier. Macedonian pikes at his earlier date were shorter, putting just three points out in front, while an almost as tightly-ranked hoplite faced but a single foe. Moreover, his spear had greater reach than a Roman sword. All this meant that a spearman probably had to break off or push aside no more than two pike points in order to then step in and strike at a phalangite. The pikeman would then be in real trouble, forced to drop his now useless sarissa and defend with a short sidearm and undersized shield. Doubtless with just such observations in mind, Onomarchos and his hoplites must have drawn out the fight, hanging tough until they could make this sort of deadly penetration at several spots along the enemy line. Philip's leading rank would then have begun deteriorating, with some stretches awkwardly struggling to keep sarissai in play even as others were reduced to using swords at great disadvantage. And all so put upon in the front rank had to have felt a rising panic, which would have quickly spread rearward. The phalangites' unusually thin files for this action now emerged as a liability, creating an unnerving sense of vulnerability and making it easier for shaken men to escape from the front.
With center and left wavering, Philip seems to have realized just how dire his predicament had become and signaled to disengage and withdraw. To attempt such a difficult maneuver in mid-battle says a great deal about the faith he had in his army's professional skill. That he actually pulled it off with what must have been only minor losses says more still, not only on how highly disciplined Macedonian troops had grown in recent years, but also about how utterly exhausted his opponents were as the arduous duel dissuaded any real post-battle chase. Onomarchos was thus able at day's end to claim the field and the distinction of handing Philip his first defeat. Still, his inability to pursue and punish the Macedonian meant that the larger, strategic issue remained unresolved. This set the stage for yet another engagement - one that would prove to be among the most unique ever waged on Greek soil.
In casting about for a way to deal Philip a mightier blow, Onomarchos hit upon a plan that called for drawing him up a box-canyon. The exact location of this feature isn't known, but it probably lay along the western fringe of the Mount Pelion complex above ancient Lake Boibeis to the northeast of Pherae. The hills surrounding the canyon formed a crescent that opened to the west, and it was into this entrance that Onomarchos led his army with the Macedonians close on his tail. Nearing the defile's back wall, the Phocian commander turned his soldiers about and put them into a phalanx that anchored against the slopes on either side. Philip's troops pulled up when they realized that their quarry was forming for battle and quickly followed suit. This left the two armies facing each other in formations much like those used previously at Pherae, save for having all of their mounted men and light foot troops in the rear.
Keen to get at a pinned foe, Philip and his phalanx must have begun closing upon the stationary enemy line. At that instant, a signal sounded to trigger an ingenious trap described in some detail by Polyaenus (2.38.2, Excerpts 36.3). It seems that Onomarchos had prepared this site in advance by hiding "petrobolous mechane" (rock-throwing engines) on the enclosing heights. These were likely non-torsion cross-bows of an advanced design (Marsden 1969, 59), which at a length of nearly 9m could hurl stone shot more than 250m on the flat and farther still from the sort of elevated positions occupied here. Now, having enticed his opponent within range, the Phocian unleashed a lethal crossfire from these machines. The account of Polyaenus has Onomarchos firing on his opponents while they are still in full chase and only then reversing his course to form up for a fight, but it's much more likely that he turned before springing the ambush so
as to bring his foe into line of battle. This let him "cross the T" on either end of a nearly static target, giving his artillery a much deeper and therefore easier mark, correct range being harder to achieve than direction.
Philip's advance staggered to a halt as cascades of stones crashed into his wings from either side. Weighing around 2.3kg (5lbs), these projectiles broke bones and crushed skulls, smashing men to the ground as they tore ragged holes in the king's array. Seizing their chance as the enemy milled in some disorder, Onomarchos and his men mounted a charge. The battle that followed must have come to a decision in mere minutes as the wrecked Macedonian line gave way under shock assault, with the less flexible and more lightly protected phalangites in particular being unable to stand fast after the preliminary battering had cut fatal gaps in their front. It was only the mutual rearward stationing of skirmishers and cavalry that then prevented a wholesale slaughter, since this hindered pursuit at the same time that it helped the losers screen their retreat. Philip got away, but at the cost of perhaps 20-30 percent of his men plus a fortune in shields, sarissai and other gear tossed in haste.
Onomarchos' twin victories put Philip out of action for the rest of the year, so damaging the bravado of his troops that a rebellion broke out. Forced to leave Thessaly, the Macedonian vowed to return and spent that winter replacing physical losses as well as mending his army's broken morale. Our sources are silent on just how he did the latter, but his process might have included improving phalangite defenses with longer (4.6m) sarissai that projected an additional row of pike points and required an exclusive two-hand grip. In fact, our first archeological evidence for such attenuated pikes comes from the battle of Chaeronea 15 years later; still, these kinds of finds are haphazard at best and really only set a latest possible date for the weapon's appearance. That its introduction came earlier in direct response to shortcomings exposed by the setbacks against Onomarchos seems to make a lot of sense. What we know for sure is that Philip would return to the field in 353 with an army refreshed in both strength and spirit.
As for the other contestant at Crescent Hills, Onomarchos came away from his great triumph full of confidence. He had earlier forced the Ozolian Locrians into alliance and thus secured his nation's southern and western boundaries; now, holding the mistaken belief that he had done the same in the north by taking Macedonia out of the war, he turned against Boeotia. It must have looked like he might be able to pacify his last remaining hostile frontier by year's end if he could just gain one more victory along his eastern marches.
Thebes and some of the other Boeotians soon gave Onomarchos just what he wanted by engaging him at a location called Hermeum. The Thebans could have deployed up to 7,000 hoplites for this action as well as 700 horsemen and 2,500 peltasts and hamippoi. (Notably missing was their best general, Pammenes, who was preparing to earn funds for his polls by supporting the satrap Artabazus' revolt against the Persian king. Pammenes had 5,000 soldiers in hand, but these were hirelings that would have had no effect upon native manpower available [Parke 1933, 1241.) As for Onomarchos, he must have fielded all of the troops that had come away in good health from the campaign against Philip. These might have totaled as many as 8,000 mercenary, Phocian and allied Achaean spearmen along with 2,000 in light foot soldiers and a few hundred horsemen. There also would have been a contingent from Pherae, likely a two-thirds muster consisting of hired men at 2,000 hoplites and 500 skirmishers plus 1,000 each in homegrown cavalry and hamippoi.
Onomarchos managed to carry the day at Hermeum. With his more abundant foot skirmishers keeping the potent Boeotian horse at bay, he probably was able to use deeper files on his right wing to break the opposing phalanx. Yet any strategic gain seems to have been short lived at best. This likely owed to a low casualty count among those defeated, their withdrawal having been amply protected by a cavalry force of good ability and superior strength. The reality was that Phocis was no closer to resolving the war in its favor despite three straight battlefield successes.
Crocus Plain and Pagasae (353 B.c.)
Philip marched back to Thessaly that spring with an armament not only replenished in terms of its native manpower, but actually much expanded by the addition of foreign soldiers. The latter were a benefit from the mining operations around Crenides, which had grown over the last couple of years to yield a great deal of wealth. Philip had put that resource to use in hiring large numbers of mercenaries (Diodorus 16.8.7), swelling his hoplite forces and upgrading his light foot troops with professional missilemen. Nor was this all he did to ensure success, going on to persuade the Thessalian League to give him sole command over its army as well. Gathering the latter as he moved south, Philip now closed on Pherae to put it under siege. In dire straits, the Pheraeans called upon Athens and Phocis for help.
Onomarchos responded by drawing on Delphic monies to gather another large, mercenary-rich armament of his own. Once having assembled this powerful host, the Phocian leader quickly departed; however, rather than heading straight for Pherae, he first made for the lower shores of the gulf that stretched below that city's port of Pagasae. Here, he met the Athenian general Chares, who led a fleet of triremes loaded with hired men tasked with liberating Pagasae (Philip had captured it in the autumn of 354). With Athens' naval force in the distance off his right shoulder, Onomarchos then turned up along the beach that he might rendezvous with his Thessalian allies. But Philip had no intention of waiting for these foes to join forces. Setting out swiftly, possibly at night (Hammond 1994, 47), he rushed to catch Onomarchos in transit. It must have come as quite a shock to the Phocian when he found that a large force lay in wait just ahead, formed up for action across a broad coastal expanse known as the Crocus Plain. Electing to fight over flight, Onomarchos swung the head of his column landward, rushing to transform it into a battle-ready phalanx.
Diodorus gave Onomarchos a total of 500 riders and 20,000 foot soldiers (16.35.4). The latter probably consisted of 16,000 hoplites (some Phocian, but mostly mercenaries) and 4,000 skirmishers. (Note that Chares made no contribution. The reason for this isn't recorded, but it's possible that he simply had no chance to land before the fight got underway.) Onomarchos spread out his formation from the shore, stacking hoplites eight-deep and stationing all the missilemen off the inland flank. Fronting for what few horsemen he had, the latter would need to buy sufficient time against the enemy's own light forces for his heavy footmen to carry the fight.
On the other side, Philip is said to have had more than 20,000 infantry plus 3,000 cavalry. Given that the infantry number is but a partial accounting, it likely represents just the heavy troops at 3,000 hypaspists, 9,000 phalangites and up to 8,000 hired men (2,000 from the Thessalian League). Philip would have arrayed his pikemen at a depth of ten with their flank resting on the sea, the paid hoplites in eight-man files in the center and his hypaspists at that same depth on the far right. Like his opponent, he then must have set up all of his riders landward (full levies of maybe 1,600 hetairoi beside the hypaspists and 1,500 Thessalians outboard). Leading for these were around 3,000 of the king's own skirmishers plus 3,500 hired peltasts and League hamippoi.
Closing on signal, the armies entered into a combat that Diodorus described as "severe" (16.35.5), suggesting a bitter melee of some duration. Given strong similarities in arms, experience and numbers from west through center, it's not surprising that that part of the front immediately stalemated. Men frantically speared and pushed here, but could make little headway. Meanwhile, the phalangites on the seaward end of the line were facing a stern test. Laced with green replacements for last year's casualties, they were going against men who had twice before gotten the better of their kind. And it was imperative that they now stand fast, since only a repeat of their past vulnerability would give Onomarchos any real hope for victory. Maybe their sarissai fared better in a briefer fight or perhaps they did indeed have new weapons with longer reach. Whatever the reason, Philip's pikemen held long enough against the very best Onomarchos could thro
w at them and effectively sealed his fate.
BATTLE OF CROCUS PLAIN (352 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED "f0 SHOW RELATIVE SIZES.)
With phalanxes stalled in place, the light-armed battle inland proved decisive. That this contest hadn't instantly been resolved probably reflects the kind of dynamic seen at Mantinea II (362), highlighting just how much cavalry needed infantry support in this age. Philip had a six-fold advantage in mounted troops, but they couldn't go into action until their skirmishers had cleared the way. And since the two sides were better matched in light footmen, it took a while for this duel to play out. As it happened, the fight in front of the hetairoi seems never to have been conclusive enough to let them take the lead. Rather, Diodorus' account informs us that it was the Thessalians on the far western fringe who prevailed once their light infantry finally drove off its opposition. The situation turned quickly after these expert horsemen brought their superior numbers to bear, chasing away the few Phocian riders on hand and then wheeling against the enemy's proximal flank and rear.
The hoplites on the Phocian left had been struggling mightily against the hypaspists that were shoving and thrusting into them; all of a sudden, barrages of javelins flung by the Thessalian horsemen began hitting them from behind. This embattled sector rapidly began to fail as men spun about to protect themselves and bled strength out of their push at the front, allowing the elite northern spearmen to break through. At this point, collapse began rippling along Onomarchos' line from left to right and had soon carried all the way to the beach. As the victorious Macedonian right wing curled inward, defeated troops tossed their shields and tried to flee, with most of those rearmost and closest to the sea getting clear. The rest were less fortunate, spears and pikes claiming many at the front as they turned to crowd into what had become a terrified mob behind. And even as this unfolded, Philip's horsemen worked their way down to the water's edge, severing the last avenue of escape.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 22