Diodorus (20.13.1) claimed that Agathocles lost 500 men (4 percent) and Justin (22.6.6) put his losses at 2,000 (15 percent). Common figures for a hard-fought victory in this period favor the former. Diodorus set Carthage's dead at 1,000 (3 percent), but admitted that others listed the cost as high as 6,000 (20 percent). Here, Justin's figure of 3,000 (10 percent) looks the more likely in light of there having been little pursuit.
Though they retained a sizeable fighting force, the Carthaginians were nonetheless badly distressed by this reverse and called to Hamilcar on Sicily for help. After making a failed bid to intimidate Syracuse into surrender, he supplied 5,000 men (many of them Greek and including horsemen). Meanwhile, Agathocles, who lacked the manpower to assault Carthage itself, set about capturing lesser sites. The Carthaginians took this opportunity to make an attempt on Tunis, which the tyrant had fortified as a base. Learning of this, Agathocles made a show of marching to the city's aid and frightened away the Punic forces. Once the reinforcement from Hamilcar arrived, however, the Carthaginians again went after Tunis. This time, Agathocles marched back toward the town in secret and, camping without fires, struck at dawn to take the besiegers unaware, killing over 2,000 and gaining a number of captives as well. The tyrant then hit Libyan tribesmen who had joined in the attack on his base despite having recently pledged loyalty to him. In an action otherwise not described, he slew their king along with many others.
The people of Carthage thus ended the year in tough straits, shut up inside their walls with Agathocles overrunning their territory. And things got no better the next spring when a disaster in Sicily added to their woes. Hamilcar had been trying to take Syracuse by storm. In the course of the action, the defenders had occupied Euryelus, which sat at the western end of the broad, east-west elongated upland of Epipolae that stretched from the city's north side into the interior. They had stationed there some 3,000 infantry (with maybe 2,400 hoplites) and 400 horsemen. Thinking to take this strongpoint and then move across the plateau to threaten Syracuse from above, Hamilcar set out at night, marching with baggage train and all along the north bank of the Anapus River. This put him well south of Epipolae so as to avoid detection as he looped about and came up an access route on the northwest end of the highland for a sneak attack. The Carthaginian general had at least 4,000 African spearmen (from citizens that had sailed with him two years earlier and the troops that had been garrisoned at Ecnomus). He also had local allies and mercenaries to the tune of 16,000-20,000 hoplites as well as 10,000-12,000 mostly barbarian foot skirmishers and 4,000-4,500 horsemen.
The Carthaginian column had Hamilcar and some of his Africans (1,000 or so citizens?) in the lead, followed by the cavalry under the Syracusan exile Deinocrates, the remaining barbarian infantry and, finally, the Greek foot soldiers. Trying to pass along a slender path, the accompanying baggage train and camp followers created a great deal of crowding as they fought for room, the resulting tumult attracting the enemy's attention. Charging down from Euryelus, the Syracusans took the strung out Carthaginian host in the right flank to devastating effect. Under fierce attack in the dark and thinking that their assailants were much more numerous than was actually the case, Hamilcar's army thrashed about and, unable to tell friend from foe in the gloom, killed many of its own before breaking apart into terrified flight. When those about Hamilcar took to their heels, he was left to be overwhelmed and captured by the enemy. The Syracusans would execute him and send his head to Agathocles. Though the Carthaginians rallied and Hamilcar's subordinates took command, their campaign was in tatters. About all that they could do now against the Syracusans was blockade them by sea. Worse yet, Acragas now led most of the other Sicilians out of Punic alliance and began to wage war against both Syracuse and Carthage. Electing Xenodicus as general, the Acraganians captured Gela and added its resources to their own. They then set out to free the island from all foreign influences.
Back in North Africa, Agathocles was riding high, having sway over most of the countryside and able to taut those in the city with the head of their general. But trouble arose at this juncture within his own ranks when the dictator's son Agatharchus murdered a well-respected officer during a drunken argument. Calls for Agatharchus' death nearly led to his father paying that penalty in his place. Hearing of this problem within the enemy camp, the Carthaginians saw a chance to catch their foes in disorder and arrayed for battle in front of White Tunis. They were convinced that Agathocles had lost control and fully expected his army to desert to their side. But the tyrant put on a tremendous display of humility to win back his men and was able to lead them out united. Probably deploying some 12,000 spearmen in files of four, he charged into an opposing heavy force that stood 30,000 strong and ten-deep, yet was unprepared to fight. The attack threw the barbarians into confusion and they broke for the rear, not stopping until they had reached their base. There's no indication that Agathocles gave chase, so he probably didn't deal his beaten foes all that much physical harm; nevertheless, the psychological damage must have been great.
Zuphones Territory (308 B.c.) and Syracuse, Carthage/Midlands, Carthage/Interior and Acragas III (307 B.c.)
Agathocles left Agatharchus in charge at Tunis in early 308 and advanced to engage a Carthaginian army that had taken the field to punish and win back some of the local nomadic tribesmen that had broken away. His picked force included 8,000 infantry (maybe 7,500 hoplites and 500 light missilemen) and 800 horsemen. The latter were likely a mix of Libyan allies and riders that had come with him from Syracuse as foot soldiers and since secured mounts. He also fielded a squadron of 50 Libyan chariots of the three-man variety. Some nomadic warriors joined his column once he entered their realm, but these were to prove of little value save as guides. Agathocles followed the enemy into the territory of the Zuphones tribe. Some of those nomads had now reconciled with the Carthaginians and began to harass the Greek advance; however, Agathocles was able to counter using his archers and slingers
Crossing a stream, Agathocles' phalanx engaged foes likewise arrayed in close order. Manpower for Carthage in this action is unknown beyond being somewhat higher than for Agathocles. A reasonable guess would be 6,000 citizens and/or Liby-Phoenician spearmen (two divisions) plus 3,000 Greek hoplites, some light infantry (1,000 or so) and up to 1,000 horsemen (half of them Greek). The Grecian spearmen on both sides were probably filed at a depth of eight while the African heavy infantry stood ten-deep. Taking advantage of superior position on the far bank, the Punic forces inflicted a fair number of casualties on their enemies, who were fording across with some difficulty; yet, Agathocles' troops proved the better fighters, forcing their way up onto dry ground despite facing greater depth along much of the line.
Where Greek battled Greek at even odds (probably on Carthage's right) the action stalemated; however, Agathocles and his best men on his own right eventually routed the Africans there. And once these gave way, the rest of their formation withdrew to avoid being surrounded from its defeated flank. The Greek horsemen fighting for Carthage then put up hard resistance to delay Agathocles' contingent; still, his hoplites broke through and moved against the last enemy footmen, who had retired to their camp. Working across rough ground with equal losses on either side, the tyrant and his men were well on the way to taking this position when they had to break off to rescue their baggage train, which had come under attack from nomads (both those with Carthage as well as nominal allies). In the end, Agathocles probably lost about 5 percent of his heavy array while taking down maybe three times as many among the opposition. He also captured around 1,000 of the Greeks that fought for his foes, over 500 of them being exiles from his own city (Diodorus 20.39.5).
Returning to Tunis, Agathocles sought to gain strength for a direct attempt on Carthage by allying with Ophellas, whom Ptolemy had put in charge of the region around Cyrene. That ambitious fellow agreed to a pact that would give him all of Libya. For his share, the Greek tyrant would keep Sicily and Italy (to then be free of Punic interference). H
owever, shortly after the Macedonian arrived, Agathocles killed him and took over his army. This let the tyrant increase his host by over 10,000 infantry (mercenary and Cyrenean hoplites plus skirmishers), 600 horsemen and 100 chariots. Even as his Greek foe was carrying out this bit of treachery, Bormilcar was attempting a tyranny at Carthage. This led to fighting in the streets, but ultimately failed and Bormilcar lost his life. The Carthaginians were in considerable disorder at this juncture, and Agathocles, though he was unaware of this, was able to campaign about the Libyan region with great success over the next few months. With all seemingly going well, he then decided in early 307 to personally address the situation back on Sicily. Leaving Agatharchus to command in Africa, he set out for Syracuse with 2,000 soldiers, using some ships built in the captured port of Hippu Acra.
Even as Agathocles set sail, Xenodicus was leading rebel forces against Syracuse in a bold bid to climax his campaign against the tyrant's rule. He had more than 10,000 foot soldiers (probably 8,000 hoplites and 2,000 skirmishers) and 1,000 horsemen (Diodorus 20.56.1-2). The tyrant's generals, Leptines and Demophilus, came out to meet him with 8,200 infantry (including maybe 6,000 spearmen) and 1,200 cavalry. The ensuing phalanx action was "a bitter fight" (Diodorus) in which the Syracusans prevailed. Given that the victors might have been only six shields deep versus eight for Xenodicus, it must have been their more skilled and seasoned mercenary hoplites that secured success, outlasting less capable militia spearmen in a grueling slug-fest on one wing (likely the losers' left) to break the entire enemy formation. Xenodicus retired to his base at Acragas, having lost 1,500 (nearly 20 percent) of his hoplites. Shortly thereafter, Agathocles landed on Sicily to lead marches about the island and add further to rebel woes. Deinocrates, the Syracusan exile, now took leadership of the rebellion. He collected 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry (Diodorus 20.57.2) to renew the fight. But Agathocles, having fewer men, only followed behind him, picking away and badgering, but never submitting to open battle.
The new leadership in Carthage decided upon a different approach to their war with the Greeks. They split their strength into three armies, each with around 10,000 men (perhaps 6,000 heavy infantry plus 4,000 foot skirmishers and cavalry combined), sending one column into the coastal area, another against the nearby midlands and the third deeper into the interior. As these expeditions began to experience success in regaining those sectors for Carthage, Agatharchus tried to counter by dividing his own men among three counter-forces.
The general Aeschrion led the first Greek contingent to see action, tangling with the Punic element operating in the midlands area. Under Hanno, the Carthaginians set up an ambush and fell on their enemies as they marched in column. The Greeks were taken in the flank by surprise and lost 4,000 foot soldiers (50 percent) plus 200 horsemen (25 percent) as well as Aeschrion. Disaster then struck Agatharchus' effort in the interior as well. Here, the Punic commander, Himilco, hid half of his army in a nearby city. He then advanced against the Greeks under Eumachus. Offering at first to fight, he turned about and retreated as if panicked, drawing his foes into a pursuit that passed near town. The division hidden there charged out at this point to utterly rout the Greeks. They fell back onto a hill poorly supplied with water and Himilco, after weakening them with thirst, overpowered their position. This episode cost all but 30 footmen and 40 riders from an initial Greek force of 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (Diodorus 20.60.8).
Agatharchus was badly beaten on multiple fronts and nearly all of his local allies bolted. He sent to his father for help. Agathocles turned over operations on Sicily to Leptines and gathered 17 warships in preparation to aid Agatharchus. Adding another 18 Etruscan ships that arrived at the last minute, he then ventured out and defeated the Carthaginian fleet blockading Syracuse's harbor to clear the way to Africa. While this was happening, Leptines was carrying out a plundering expedition against Acragas, where Xenodicus was still holding out. In political hot water ever since his defeat before Syracuse, Xenodicus chose to silence critics with an open engagement despite having an army of inferior quality. Leptines probably had a force much like the one he and Demophilus had deployed earlier in the year. This would have been 6,000 hoplites, 2,000 foot skirmishers and 1,000 cavalry in round numbers. Xenodicus' manpower "fell little short of that of his opponents" (Diodorus 20.62.4), maybe totaling about as many foot soldiers. but only 500 or so horsemen. However, as had been the case previously at Syracuse, "in morale [he] was far inferior since the citizen army had been formed amid indulgence and a sheltered way of life and the other had been trained in military service in the field in constant campaigns." The battle thus proved an easy one for Leptines' phalanx. Arrayed at the same depth as their foes (likely eight shields), the Syracusan hirelings quickly carried the fight to chase the Acraganians into their city, killing more than 500 hoplites (8-9 percent) and 50 horsemen at very little cost. Xenodicus survived, but fled to Gela a ruined man.
Carthage (307 B.c.) and Torgium (305 B.c.)
Once back in Africa, Agathocles sought to reverse his bad fortune with a march on Carthage. He arrayed his phalanx at a likely six men deep with (per Diodorus 20.64.2) 6,000 Greek hoplites and nearly as many Etruscans (perhaps approaching 4,000 including those who had just sailed in with the tyrant), Samnites and Celts (maybe around 1,000 each). There were also probably several thousand in light infantry on hand (armed rowers and nearly 500 archers and slingers). His mounted forces tallied 1,500 horsemen plus some chariots. (Diodorus claimed 6,000 chariots, but there is probably one digit too many here, making 600 the true count. And even then, only 100 from Cyrene might have been of actual use, since the others were Libyan and that nation's troops don't appear to have been willing to fight, including some 12,000 infantry nominally on Agathocles' side.) The Carthaginians must have had half again more heavy footmen (around 18,000) as well as 12,000 light infantry and horsemen; still, they stuck to high ground and were unwilling to come down to risk battle on the plain.
Agathocles decided to take the fight to his foes and advanced uphill to engage. This assault seems to have had little chance to succeed, with Agathocles' men being "hard pressed" (Diodorus 20.64.4) from the start and able to do no more than hold out for a time. Ultimately, the enemy's greater depth (probably ten) and elevation took its toll and they began to force the Greek mercenaries and others down the slope. Agathocles had no option but to disengage and withdraw into his camp. His losses came to 3,000 on the day (just over 25 percent), indicative of both a disadvantaged fight and fiercely disputed retreat that had likely cost his opponents less than 5 percent killed.
If we are to believe Diodorus (20.65-67) the night after this battle was witness to some truly extraordinary events. These fantastic happenings began with the celebratory burning of captives in the Carthaginian camp setting off a devastating blaze. Then, amid the confusion of this disaster, a large number of the Libyans who were allied to Agathocles (but had not participated in the fighting) approached in the dark trying to give up. Thinking that these soldiers were Greeks come to exploit the holocaust, those in the camp panicked and, in all the disorder and darkness, slaughter ensued in an orgy of "friendly fire" as men mistook comrades for foes. The entire army took fright and fled for Carthage with many falling to their death from cliffs in the rush. While this tragedy was unfolding, the Libyans who had helped to precipitate it turned back toward the Greek lines. As they neared Agathocles' camp, people there reacted in terror, believing their victorious enemies were descending to finish them off. This set off a night-shrouded frenzy with friend fighting friend in a stunning repeat of what had happened to the Carthaginians. Diodorus claimed some 4,000 lives were lost amid the tumult, more than had died in the preceding battle. Morning thus saw both sides in great disarray, having been defeated by their own fears.
With his army now nearly destroyed, Agathocles decided to escape back to Syracuse, but was betrayed by his youngest son, Heracleides, whom he had planned to abandon. Seized at first by his troops, they eventually let
him go and he managed to sneak off and sail home. In doing this, he left behind not only Heracleides but Agatharchus as well and both were killed in revenge for his escape. The Greeks still in Africa then made peace with Carthage, most going into its service right there and the rest settling on Sicily in Punic territory.
Back at Syracuse, Agathocles resumed his civil war with a still powerful rebel faction. The tyrant was plagued by desertions and became so despondent over his lack of success that he offered in 306 to come to favorable terms with Deinocrates. That exile, however, rejected the offer, aspiring now to claim Agathocles' entire empire for himself. The result was that these two met in battle the next year to settle things. This took place near Torgium, which is otherwise unknown, but must have lain some distance from the sea in eastern Sicily (Freeman 1894, 466). Agathocles was at this time down to only 5,000 foot soldiers (maybe 4,000 spearmen and 1,000 skirmishers) and 800 cavalry (Diodorus (20.89.1-2). Deinocrates, on the other hand, fielded a large force of 25,000 infantry (perhaps 16,000-20,000 hoplites) and 3,000 horsemen.
It's hard to believe that the tyrant would risk engagement at such long odds on open ground, thus it seems overwhelmingly probable that the fight took place in some confined terrain where he was able to ward his flanks and engage with his array filed at least four shields deep (if not deeper) against a phalanx that must have had 16 or more per file. Even so, he could never have realistically expected the "stubborn battle" described by Diodorus to go his way if allowed to play out fully. However, he had a surprise in store for Deinocrates, as he had arranged for 2,000 of the exile's spearmen to change sides. The fight had gone on for only "a short time" when the traitors turned against those beside them, throwing the rebel formation into chaos. Convinced that these turncoats were more numerous than was actually true, Deinocrates and his men fled. Most of the horsemen got clear, but between 4,000 and 7,000 of the defeated spearmen took up a hilltop position close by and surrendered that night to Agathocles. The tyrant collected their arms and then had them all shot down to crush the uprising for good. Still, he was a practical man, and would later fend off further trouble by taking in many of the exiles who had escaped, including Deinocrates. Indeed, the latter would become a trusted lieutenant in the remaining years of the tyrant's rule.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 40