by Lin Noueihed
Despite being officially banned from politics for decades, its candidates had long run as individuals in Hosni Mubarak's sham elections and, since emerging as the largest party in Egypt's first post-uprising polls, its officials have emphasised their commitment to empowering parliament and promised that the military would not escape the oversight of elected officials. While all that should help to calm some concerns among liberals, many are simply waiting to see if Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood's deeds match their words. For many, their long and sometimes violent past is an indication that they cannot be trusted.
As an older organization, the Brotherhood not only inspired branches in other countries, like Syria and Jordan, but gave birth to several offshoots. Some of these have been decidedly more unbending and radical in their political vision and in the means they are willing to use to achieve their goals.
A leading Muslim Brother, Sayyid Qutb, espoused a new theory in the 1960s which argued that Muslims had a duty to fight for an Islamic state. Qutb argued that sovereignty and the right to legislate belonged to God alone, a repudiation of democratic systems that vest sovereignty with the people. He articulated the concept of takfir, or declaring someone an unbeliever because they do not adhere to these strict precepts. His ideas set back earlier efforts by Islamic scholars to reinterpret Islam for modern life, and inspired a generation of militant groups.6
When the Muslim Brotherhood, under Hassan al-Hudaybi, repudiated Qutb and renounced violence in the 1970s, several militant members split off to form the Gamaa Islamiya or Islamic Group. They mounted violent attacks, particularly on foreign tourists, culminating in the 1997 slaughter of sixty-two people, mostly sightseers, at a Pharaonic temple in Luxor. Reeling from public disgust at the attack, which hit Egypt's tourism sector hard, the group was rehabilitated and renounced violence.
Another offshoot was the Egyptian Jihad, whose leader Ayman al-Zawahri merged it with the late Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda just three months before 9/11.7 Zawahri, who helped bring more militant members of Gamaa Islamiya into Al-Qaeda in 2006, now leads the latter itself after bin Laden's death in May 2011.8 Both Al-Qaeda and its affiliates reject demo-cracy as a Western import alien to Islam and seek to re-establish the lapsed Islamic caliphate, the empire which once ruled Muslim lands. They reject not only non-Muslims, but practise takfir and have encouraged violence against many fellow Muslims, chief among them the Shi'ites, who do not adhere to their own narrow interpretation of the religion.
Salafism is another conservative strain of Islamist thought that has spread in recent decades. Again, it encompasses a spectrum of views and the definition of the term has mutated over the years. In general, however, Salafists believe in returning to the fundamentals offered by the scriptures and in emulating the behaviour and appearance of the earliest Muslims, known as al-salaf al-salih, or the righteous predecessors. To this end, Salafist men usually grow a certain style of beard and wear shorter robes, in line with the fashions of the Prophet Mohamed's day, and Salafist women often wear the niqab, or full-face veil, in line with the separation of men and women prevalent in seventh-century Arabia.
Many Salafists seek the full implementation of sharia, down to punishments such as amputation and stoning, but they differ in how to achieve this. Some simply practise their beliefs in their own day-to-day lives, and others follow violent means. Al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya, or jihadist Salafism, is closely linked to Al-Qaeda and similar groups who reject as apostates those non-Muslims, Shi'ites and even Sunni Muslims who do not follow their narrow interpretation of Islamic scripture. Salafists took part in 2011 elections in Egypt and performed surprisingly well, winning about a third of seats in the lower house of parliament, which is now dominated by the religious right.
Islamist parties are not only highly diverse but, like other political parties, they have also evolved over time. Many began seeking an Islamic state ruled by a modern-day caliph, but have since come to work within the confines of their own state. Some that once mounted violent campaigns to overthrow secular governments have since renounced violence. The shocking scale of the 9/11 attacks and the deep suspicion it heaped upon ordinary Muslims across the world prompted some organizations, such as Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, to publicly renounce the use of violence as a means to achieve their ends.
That does not convince everyone that even the more moderate Islamist parties have a genuine commitment to democracy. Secularists insist that the Islamists have not changed their beliefs but have simply improved their public relations. They worry that the Islamist groups are playing the long game, reassuring sceptics while they seek to slowly Islamize society with a view to eventually remaining in power permanently.
As of early 2012, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood had not seized power and sought to impose their own vision, nor to violently eliminate their enemies. They had not been involved in or threatened violent acts, but had accepted the principle of rotation of power, and run in elections alongside non-religious parties. However, the biggest test of their democratic commitment is not how Islamist parties behave when they win elections, but how they will respond when they eventually lose.
The Easy Winners
As soon as the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were removed, there was a broad consensus that free and fair elections were the way forward, with little apparent disagreement over the need for a separation of powers to avoid a new dictatorship or the need to strengthen the rule of law. All but the most extreme of Islamist groups in post-uprising Tunisia and Egypt have taken part in elections, simply because they had the most to gain from them. In Egypt and Morocco, it was the more liberal youth who called for elections to be delayed or boycotted because many realised that they lacked the resources and the organization to win against much longer-established religious groups.
The debates that emerged in the vacuum left by the ouster of rulers in Tunisia and Egypt revolved around the role of religion in law-making and society, over the best way to remove the remnants of the anciens régimes and over economic policy, not over the principles of political pluralism or the right of the public to choose their leaders and representatives. Even in Libya, the draft constitution of the transitional council, born in the most conservative region of that country, enshrines the idea of free and fair elections. True, it was likely designed to appeal to an international audience, and it may be heavily rewritten in the years ahead, but those basic political freedoms were regarded as given from the beginning.
Aside from famous exceptions, such as the tragic trajectory of Germany after the 1932 elections which made the Nazis the largest party in parliament, parties that reach power by the ballot box are more likely to leave by the ballot box. Shi'ite Islamists have played a dominant role in Iraqi politics since the 2003 invasion and while that democracy is far from perfect and rights groups have complained of growing repression, there has been no effort to abrogate elections, or to institute the sort of clerical rule found next door in Iran.
Whereas Islamic slogans and anti-Western rhetoric were rife during the Iranian revolution of 1979, while Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini played a leading role in inspiring and encouraging the protests even from exile, this was not the case in the Arab Spring. In Tunisia and Egypt the slogans had universal appeal, and the Islamists did not play a leading role in toppling leaders. In Libya, Islamist fighters were on the front lines of the rebellion that ousted Gaddafi, and are highly influential in the fragile state that followed, but they claim – admittedly a promise still untested as of early 2012 – to have renounced violence and to have embraced democratic principles.
While they were not the driving force of the initial uprisings, the subsequent popularity of Islamist parties in the first elections after the Arab Spring should come as no surprise. There are several explanations for their appeal, but none appear to include a mass desire to create Taliban states in North Africa, and much of that appeal will be less potent by the time the next round of elections begins.
First, Islamist parties are a
mong some of the longest-established political groups in the region. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood dates back to 1928 and Syria's to the 1930s. The predecessor to Tunisia's Ennahda was formally established in 1981 though it was informally active before that. These groups were hierarchical in structure and well-organized, and their members were disciplined. The only way they could survive repeated crackdowns by secular authoritarian rulers was through cohesion and in some cases secrecy – experience that would lubricate the wheels of their well-oiled electoral machines in 2011.
They also offered voters a strong vision of a just society. Islam seeks to provide not just spiritual guidance but an entire design for life, leading to the Muslim Brotherhood's rallying cry of ‘Islam is the solution’. This was a simplistic motto and Islamist parties are notoriously short on detail when it comes to the nitty-gritty of economic policy, for instance, but it was as powerfully attractive to the disenfranchised and downtrodden as socialism or nationalism once were. Like Christian fundamentalist organizations in the United States, Islamists emphasize family values and social conservatism, attracting followers from different classes. In a region where most people are Muslims, they also offer the word of God. It is a value system with a wide reach and one that offers comfort and solace to millions who feel their very identity under attack from globalization and from secular rulers who for decades appeared more interested in pandering to their allies in the West.
Arab rulers reserved their harshest repression for the Islamists because they perceived them to be a genuine threat. Yet while closing down Communist Party offices or banning their newspaper could rob Communists of their means to reach the general public, the Islamists always had the mosque to gather in and spread their message. Their political activities might have been curbed by the state, but in some countries they were able to focus instead on charitable works. The extent of repression in the name of the quasi-secular state in Tunisia or Syria made this impossible. In Egypt, however, while the Muslim Brotherhood was banned as a political party, it was allowed to establish a vast charity network that operated clinics, helped educate poor children, and supported disadvantaged families.
Good deeds in the name of religion, particularly in countries such as Egypt, where the state bureaucracy was too poorly managed and funded to meet the demand for public services and welfare, are sure-fire vote winners. This did not matter for the government of Egypt as long as elections were meaningless, but it gave the Muslim Brotherhood – and the Salafists – a ready-made constituency in 2011 when they could compete far more freely than before. It also meant they were already in contact with the ordinary person, allowing them to better gauge, respond to and influence the public mood.
For secular parties, which performed less well at the 2011 elections in Egypt and Tunisia, the situation was very different. Secular political groups were not linked to charities and were not able to buy backing through good works. The ruling parties in pre-2011 Egypt and Tunisia were secular and, as the upheavals suggest, failed to meet the aspirations of the people. In Syria and Iraq, Ba'athist ideology that sought to emphasize Arab nationalism over religion had appeal in the 1950s and 1960s, but was little more than a tool for oppressive one-party rule by the 2000s. Its exponents were failing to provide the new middle classes with meaningful jobs and adequate pay while their early socialist or nationalist values had been eroded by corruption and political stagnation. A vote for the Islamist parties was not simply or not always a vote for religious values, but a vote to reject the past and a general expression of new-found political freedom.
The young revolutionaries who led the protest movements of 2011 were often associated with neither the Islamist nor the established and discredited secular parties. Some of them were union members, though they acted at grass-roots level in trade syndicates that were controlled by the state. Others were bloggers, using new technology to feel their way around the stifling restrictions of state media. Some were involved in human rights NGOs, advocated for women's rights, or found other specific issues through which they subtly agitated for political change. Some had been able to set up new parties, though they faced sham trials or harassment. These activists were mostly young and had little to lose by taking action. They were not taken as seriously by the authorities as the Islamist parties, who were watched and repressed and forced to weigh up carefully any decision to act.
The focus of these activists on what they did not want – human rights abuses, martial law, one-man rule, high-level corruption – resonated far beyond their own ranks, allowing them to build broad coalitions with groups and activists with whom they did not share a world-view. These coalitions were effective in putting people out on the streets, but their negative demands could not act as a blueprint for government. Where they succeeded in overthrowing their rulers, as in Tunisia or Egypt, or securing reforms, as in Morocco, they were not geared up for elections. They were inexperienced and lacked the charitable networks, the money and the personnel needed to reach people at the local level, particularly outside the major cities. For the Islamists, cash was pouring in from domestic and foreign donors, particularly in the Gulf and from the fees or donations paid by their huge membership. Secularists simply could not compete.
Counterweights and Constitutions
The Islamists may be the most powerful electoral force in the Arab world of 2012, but they are far from alone. In every country where they have made gains, counterweights to their influence will limit the Islamization of state and society, but could also become dangerous flashpoints.
One such limit will simply be the compromise and debate of parliamentary politics itself. The need to form alliances, to consult, to make unpalatable deals with groups and parties with different views, to respond to popular demand but to balance this with economic realities and realistic foreign policies, will likely push Islamist parties towards increasing pragmatism and moderation.
It is easy, while in opposition, to call for measures like the banning of alcohol, for instance. In government, however, an Islamist party in Egypt or Tunisia must also consider the impact on jobs in the crucial tourism sector. Poor management of the economy and declining living standards does not tend to win votes for any party, religious or not. Being in government could also force Islamist groups to take concrete positions on issues such as relations with Israel, and go beyond vague populist railing against the Jewish state. In government, Islamist politicians will need to carefully weigh their words or risk confrontation.
In Tunisia, Ennahda faces a strong secular legacy that is already energetically opposing their influence. It may have won the single largest number of seats in the constituent assembly, but the majority were still controlled by non-religious parties. Ennahda will have a strong influence on the drafting of the new constitution, but will be forced to make concessions to secular groups and powerful women's organizations who have campaigned to ensure that the rights and status of Tunisian women, which are among the most extensive in the Arab world, are not lost. It has already promised not to enforce the hijab or to ban traditional banks, whose payment and receipt of interest is considered usury in Islam.
In Egypt, where society is more outwardly religious and where the term ‘secularism’ carries vote-losing connotations of being anti-God, the situation is more complex. The Muslim Brotherhood's closest rivals in the elections were not secular liberals but rather the Salafist Noor, or Light, party, which has effectively put the Muslim Brotherhood near the centre of a political spectrum that had been shifting to the right since the 1970s. The most obvious measure of increasing religiosity, or at least increased social pressure to conform to religiously prescribed dress codes, has been the growing prevalence of the hijab, to the extent that by 2011 the vast majority of Egyptian Muslim women covered their hair in public.
Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which has said it recognizes the need to protect Egypt's tourism industry, some Salafists have suggested that the pyramids and the sphinx are idolatrous pre-Islamic symbols that should be cover
ed with wax. Salafists have also said they would enforce Islamic dress codes and ban alcohol. The popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood was well known before 2011, but the Salafists were untested in elections and their strong performance at the polls came as a surprise to many observers, particularly in the first round, which covered more cosmopolitan parts of Egypt such as Cairo and Alexandria. Salafists have so far been less organized than the Muslim Brotherhood, but given their more recent arrival on the political scene their popularity has been striking.
The result is that non-religious parties may feel more inclined to team up with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to isolate the Salafists and find a middle ground. This could offer a counterweight to the popularity and clout of more extreme views, but does not change the reality that Islamists of different colours won more than two-thirds of the vote in Egypt's first elections, giving a clear mandate for the implementation of more conservative social policies.
The other obvious counterbalance to more radical forms of Islamism is the Egyptian military. The armed forces might prefer the known quantity of the Muslim Brotherhood to the nebulous youth, who continued to battle them in the streets in late 2011, but they made it clear there would be red lines. Army leaders tried to set out a number of sacrosanct ‘supra-constitutional’ terms that would secure their own power and independence but also pre-empt any group trying to emulate early-1990s Algeria. While they faced opposition from a spectrum of groups reluctant to see restrictions placed on the elected parliament, some analysts see the army as a potential check to the rise of elements that might threaten Egypt's peace treaty with Israel or its internal security.