—Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1940)
Addressing the House of Commons in 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed that in the new age of total warfare, Great Britain’s civil society and businesses were no longer removed from the warfront, but that instead “the front line runs through the factories.” In making this observation, the Prime Minister’s message was clear: confronted by a new and significant challenge, responsibility for ensuring their nation’s security was vested with all Britons, and that only by synchronizing the efforts of the public, civil, and business sectors was victory attainable. Powerful as these words were at the time, they remain equally prescient today.
Today the United States is confronted by an increasingly complex and shifting array of national security challenges, ranging from an assertive Russia to the spread of violent extremism and persistent cyber threats. Many of these challenges are too complex for the U.S. government to address alone, requiring our nation’s public and private sectors to confront them together and work collaboratively in support of our national security.
Indeed, as the owner and operator of over 85 percent of our critical national infrastructure, the private sector can play a significant role in confronting these challenges. For example, American companies have helped to sustain economic sanctions against Russia and Iran by refraining from doing business with specific entities. The result in part: Iran’s oil exports have been reduced by half to just 1 million barrels per day and this week the Russian ruble closed at record lows against the dollar.
Technology and social media companies are also key partners in preventing the spread of violent extremist ideology. In February, representatives from Twitter, Facebook, and Google all attended a White House–sponsored summit on countering violent extremism, and in recent months Twitter has suspended as many as two thousand extremist accounts. As groups such as the so-called Islamic State continue to use social media to spread their virulent ideology, it will be important to collaborate with technology companies to identify extremist users and constrain their ability to incite violence.
Increasingly, the private sector must also confront national security challenges in a more direct manner; namely, as the primary target of state and non-state actors. Nowhere is this truer than in cyberspace, where over 60% of all targeted cyber-attacks affected small and medium-sized companies last year.
In 2014 the average annual cost of cybercrime to a U.S. company was estimated to be $12.7 million. However, what is less quantifiable is the damage a successful cyber-attack can have on a company’s reputation, competitiveness, and ability to innovate. A North Korean attack on Sony Corporation may also portend a worrisome new trend in which private companies are viewed as acceptable targets for nation states to coerce and vent political grievances.
It is here, in cyberspace, where close collaboration between the public and private sectors is essential, and it is also where encouraging progress is being made. Already, private companies are working with the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Secret Service—among other federal agencies—to share cyber threat information and respond to cyber intrusions. Other entities, such as private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), afford an alternative, if imperfect, method of sharing information among industry sectors. In fact, American Express has called the financial services ISAC “one of the best tools any company can have when it comes to cyber protection.”
Recently, Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced a series of new initiatives aimed at leveraging the combined expertise of the public and private sectors to manage cyber threats. As Secretary Carter stated, “In addition to dangers, there are also really great opportunities to be seized through a new level of partnership between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley—opportunities that we can only realize together.”
Encouragingly, the private sector understands this as well. John Donahoe, President and CEO of eBay Inc., recently stated, “When you step back and look at the role of a company versus the role of a government, clearly if we’re going to provide the safest possible experience in aggregate, government and companies need to work together.”
Indeed, as the United States navigates the complex threat environment before it, close collaboration with the private sector will be critical. This collaboration will require private sector leaders to appreciate their potential for helping to ensure our national security, and government leaders to effectively leverage and complement the unique capabilities of our private sector.
Seventy-five years ago Winston Churchill proclaimed that “the fronts are everywhere.” Although the scale of the challenges confronting us today are much less grave, threats such as violent extremism and cyber have blurred the distinction among national security and the private sector. And yet, while the scale has changed, the prescription for confronting them remains the same: determined collaboration between all segments of our society.
Chapter Nine
FLIGHT PLAN
You can’t imagine how many people have asked what I consider to be the “secret to my success,” as if there’s some undisclosed formula that if followed would guarantee a seat at the chairman’s table in the Tank. Did I plot my way to the top? Step on others along the way? Do politics play a role? Well, the answers are “there’s some element of that,” “absolutely not,” and “it’s clearly a backdrop.” Let me explain.
I would be disingenuous to say that I didn’t have ambition. I did. But I would not characterize it as the unbridled ambition that some people have. I had goals, but they were incremental, never some grand scheme that I believed would speed me to the top. My first ambition was to be a pilot, then an instructor pilot, then a flight examiner. This continued through the squadron and wing commander levels and on up the ranks, yet I was always flexible enough to deviate from my plan as alternative opportunities arose along the way. I was fully aware of which jobs were key, and I did what I could to be the most qualified candidate for those jobs. I wanted to be as competitive as I could be, and by that I don’t mean on a one-on-one basis, but rather to have credentials that would place me in favor with hiring authorities. I am an avid student of the bureaucracy and that’s a major part of the flag officer assignment process. But none of that is what drove us. What really lit the fire was a sense of obligation and a love of this culture and community that both Suzie and I came to know. One of the most rewarding things about becoming Chief was having the opportunity to make a substantial, long-term impact on those issues about which we were passionate.
Ambition properly calibrated is a positive attribute; unbridled ambition rarely leads to success.
As for the politics, it’s a backdrop, clearly. Hiring authorities have discretion so there are human factors involved in those kinds of decisions: whether you’re respected, whether there is some relationship there. The truth is:
Politics do matter. Proximity matters more.
A person who is known and trusted has a much better chance of being hired than someone who’s a stranger. My hunch is, the fact that I was a little bit of an outsider actually worked to my advantage. By an outsider I mean that I had been in the joint world for ten years. I wasn’t part of one of the major mainstream “tribes” of the Air Force. I think that caught Secretary Gates’s attention, so maybe that turned out to be an asset rather than a liability.
I also think it’s important that neither Suzie nor I walked up anybody’s back along the way. There were people who did not agree with certain calls I made, but I don’t know of anyone that I would characterize as an enemy or an adversary. This was never a political ploy, it’s just who I am and how I was raised. I believe there were others who were more inclined to do that sort of thing than I think I was. Certain things seem fairly obvious to me. This falls into that category, and it’s one of the standard admonitions I included in every one of my initial command briefs; for both its obvious and more subtle implications:
Keep your zipper zipped. It’s the right
thing to do, and I assure you it will make everyone’s life a lot easier.
I tried to avoid self-promotion, and Suzie would probably argue that I went overboard with this. But I think that’s a big difference between me and others like Wes Clark, who clearly were self-promoters. That could be another reason why we didn’t have many enemies.
Leave it to others to toot your horn.
From the moment we recite the Air Force Oath of Office, we begin the lifelong process of shaping our reputation. There will always be temptations—it’s how we handle them that makes or breaks us. For me, it’s been pretty easy to do the right thing and make the right choices. A lot of that has to do with the values that were instilled in me long before I ever thought about donning Air Force blue. For others, it may not come quite as easily. Benjamin Franklin reminds us that “it takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it.” Warren Buffett has a slightly different observation: “It takes twenty years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you’ll do things differently.” He’s right. So, think about it.
Reputations are hard to earn and easy to lose.
In the words of Don Rumsfeld, “Don’t do or say things you would not like to see on the front page of The Washington Post.”
WORKING WITH BOSSES
I had the honor of directly working for two presidents, three secretaries of defense, and four chairmen, and they all had very different styles, which is not a trivial thing.
Personality and style counts.
PRESIDENTS
I found President Bush to be more approachable and easier to talk to than President Obama, so I felt a little more comfortable in President Bush’s presence. Bush was warmer, less formal, and more gregarious, where President Obama was more reserved and cerebral. Both were keenly interested in our views but it was more official with President Obama. They both really got to know their chiefs, and they got to know Suzie, as well.
SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
Rumsfeld, Gates, and Panetta. One was a businessman, one was a defense professional, and one was a politician. Each of them was successful despite their different managerial styles. Rummy was very demanding, but never cruel. He didn’t suffer fools and required both exquisite knowledge and performance by people who worked for him. He could definitely poke, but only if you gave him an opening. If you showed any weakness or a lack of knowledge, Katie bar the door. You courted disaster if you were not fully prepared when you walked into the room with Don Rumsfeld, and in my view that’s fair. At this level, that’s exactly how it should be.
Bob Gates was equally demanding but less accessible. He played things a little closer to the vest, rarely making a decision at the table or in a more public session. He would take the presentation, make sure that he understood the options, and then typically make a decision separately. No question that he was decisive, but he was much more discreet, which isn’t a big surprise considering his background as an intelligence professional. He was not as open—at least not with me.
Panetta was someone I worried about because he really didn’t have a strong defense background, but he turned out to be a magnificent team builder. Whereas Secretary Gates was the captain of the ship, Leon Panetta was the chief of the boat. He emphasized teamwork and collaboration to a degree that neither Rumsfeld nor Gates had ever done, and with a much greater level of participation and involvement on the part of the senior military and civilian leadership than was ever the case under Secretaries Rumsfeld or Gates—much more open and gregarious, but extremely effective.
There is no cookie cutter for a successful president, secretary of defense, or any leader—that’s the basic theme. There are multiple styles that will work … if we make the necessary midcourse corrections to accommodate those styles. It’s highly doubtful that Bob Gates would suddenly start sharing everything with me just because I told him that I functioned better that way, and can you imagine how President Obama would react if I’d ask him to “lighten up”? My point is that they are not the ones who are going to be doing the changing. It’s largely how we deal with the divergent styles that will determine whether we can work together as an effective team.
From my perspective, I enjoyed working for each of them. Each of them was brilliant, had great instincts, was good at staying ahead of the wave—and every one of them worked their ass off. I felt challenged by them, and I have the utmost of respect and affection for all three, without reservation.
CHAIRMEN
Dick Myers and Pete Pace were a great team as chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were interchangeable, they were mutually supportive, and both of them were excellent bosses. Obviously, Dick and Pete had the special challenge of the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the work-up for OIF—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and continuation of ENDURING FREEDOM. I think that Dick Myers hasn’t gotten enough credit for managing that very demanding and stressful time. It was 24/7 work, and he handled it masterfully. Dick and Mary Jo were the quintessential senior couple.
Mike Mullen and Hoss Cartwright were not a great team. They operated in somewhat different spheres, so there wasn’t the same sense of cohesion and interchangeability between the two of them. They would have somewhat different angles on things. It was a little bit more difficult both as a service chief and as a member of the Joint Chiefs to deal with them because they were not nearly as well aligned as were Pace and Myers.
Mike Mullen and I, and Suzie and Deborah, got along great. I think that the Mullens believe that we did what we said we would do when they hired us, which was to bring the Air Force back and reestablish its reputation both inside the DoD and outside. I think that Admiral Mullen was a little bit more difficult to deal with than Dick Myers had been on general officer matters. I felt that Myers had a broader, more joint perspective of the flag officer management than Mike Mullen. Mike was a little bit tilted toward the Navy. Myers didn’t tilt very much at all. That was one difference that we had to deal with. But both took us into their confidence. Both were instantaneously accessible. Both had challenging moments: for Myers, the buildup to the war; for Mullen, the surge and the friction within the White House over the surge. Those were very demanding times for both of them respectively.
Marty Dempsey came on in the fall of 2011, and we were together for about six months. Marty was dealing with the backside of the conflicts. I think Marty was most likely given guidance from the secretary or even the president that they wanted the chairman to be a little bit less visible and take a somewhat lower profile than Mullen had, and he did that. Marty was a little bit more of an inside person than Mullen was. Mullen also tended to act more independently, which was his privilege. Again, a difference in style. But he was less a representative of the Joint Chiefs than he was his own man. I think Marty reset that and was more representative of the Joint Chiefs and a little bit less his own man.
THE BACKBONE OF THE AIR FORCE—NCOs
You have all kinds of issues when you’re a cadet, many surrounding your own personal identity. I was no different. In the early ’70s, many of us at the Academy tried to make a statement by pushing the limit on the length of our sideburns, and I did too. It was an NCO who turned things around for me, and it was the first of so many times that a noncommissioned officer proved the adage that “NCOs are the backbone of the Air Force.” It’s NCOs who mold and develop young officers.
But it wasn’t always that way at the Academy. It was a relatively new initiative during our time to have an NCO presence. The reason the Air Force chose to do that was, in large measure, to give cadets exposure to the crème de la crème of the NCO corps so that they would be better prepared to interact with professional NCOs when they got into the Air Force. To a man, these were very, very solid NCOs who reminded cadets that there was a bigger team out there. They commanded respect and, as a result, produced more well-rounded cadets and lieutenants.
I’ll never forget the time Senior Master Sergeant Gene Reinartz c
ame up to me and stared at my sideburns, which were considerably longer than Air Force regulations allowed. He was a Security Forces cop. Well over six feet tall, with an imposing physical presence made even more intimidating by an imposing personality; there were a lot of strips on those XXL sleeves. He was one of the tough, gruff NCOs of yesteryear. He did not mince words and he was no politician, and that’s the way it should be.
He looked at my sideburns as he pulled me aside and asked, “Do you want to lead or follow?”
“Clearly I want to lead,” I replied.
“Then you ought to not push your sideburns so much.” That interchange was instrumental in changing my perspective on what it meant to lead instead of following the pack. I got it completely.
The beauty is that we have stayed in touch over the years, and he felt so proud that one of his “babies” became the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He played a big part in that, particularly in those early years. He’s in his late eighties now.
Those traditional Vietnam-era noncommissioned officers were quite tough and damn good at what they did. In recent years some of that toughness has waned, and that’s not for the better. Today’s NCO corps has become more sophisticated and less bare-knuckle. While that’s politically correct, I’m not sure it’s progress. We need NCOs who run a tight ship and who know how to kick ass when nonperforming asses need to be kicked. It’s now increasingly about taking care of airmen and less about pushing them and holding them accountable, and there’s got to be a healthy balance between the two. I equate the role of the Air Force NCO to that of middle management in the private sector. The people that actually do the work need to do it well. They need encouragement and you need supervision that provides that encouragement. Sometimes it’s positive encouragement, but when that fails to do the trick, somebody has to step in and squeeze. That’s the role of the NCO.
Journey Page 40