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INDEX
Abelson, Robert, 161
accessibility, 75–78
addiction, and intelligence, 191–192
ADHD, 54
affect heuristic, 74–75, 181
affective forecasting, 184–185, 200–201
affirmative action, and framing, 97
Ainslie, George, 115, 127
Albanian financial crisis, 152–155
algorithmic mind, 29–32, 38–41, 51, 122–123, 173–177, 190–192
and intelligence, 31–32, 195–196
alternative hypothesis, ignoring, 136–140
anchoring, and adjustment, 79–81
argument evaluation, 36
Ariely, Dan, 207
attribute substitution, 23, 72–75, 122, 147–148, 181–182
Austin, Elizabeth, 192
autism, 130–131
autonomous mind, 32–33, 39–41, 171–177, 188–192
defects of, 185–188
Baron, Jonathan, 86–87, 195, 196
base rates, 144–146
Bayes, Thomas, 134
Bayes’ formula, 134–136
Bayesian reasoning, 133–139, 144–146
belief bias, 120–123, 159, 182–183
belief identification, 149
beliefs: irrational, 152–160
and social Psychology, 163
Benartzi, Shlomo, 204–205
bias blind spot, 109–110, 183
biased self–assessments, 109
Blair, Tony, 43
Block, Jack, 191
Boring, E. G., 50
Boyd, Robert, 59
Bruine de Bruin, Wandi, 37
Bush, George W.: cognitive characteristics of, 1–2, 42–44
fluid intelligence of, 43
intelligence of, 1–2, 6–7, 43–44
thinking dispositions of, 44
Camerer, Colin, 172
Cattell/Horn/Carroll theory of intelligence, 40–42, 50–51, 172
chance, over–reacting to, 61–62
cognitive ability, versus thinking dispositions, 31–32
cognitive miser, 23, 63–66, 176–179
and attribute substitution, 72–75
and belief bias, 122
and defaults, 202–205
and disjunctive reasoning, 70–72
environmental fixes for, 202–208
evolutionary origins, 64–66
and falsifiability, 143
hostile and benign environments, 82–85
loss of autonomy, 79–81, 84–85
and mindware gaps, 147–148
and vividness, 75–78
cognitive science, levels of analysis, 29–31
“cold” cognition, 119–120, 191
conditional probabilities, 148
conjunction error, 147–148
covariation detection, 140
critical thinking, 48, 114, 122
crystallized intelligence (Gc), 13, 40–42, 172
cultural replicator theory, 161–165
Damasio, Antonio, 185–187
D’Antonio, Michael, The State Boys Rebellion, 53
Dawes, Robyn, 148
Dawkins, Richard, 64–65, 162, 165
Deary, Ian, 192
decontextualization, and modernity, 123–124
decoupling, cognitive, 24–25, 28, 40, 50–51, 173–177, 188–192
default heuristic, 82, 202–205
delay of gratification, 125–127
Denby, David, 9–10
Dennett, Daniel, 20
Kinds of Minds, 30
denominator neglect, 120, 182–183
descriptive invariance, 88, 93
diets, and portion size, 206–207
disjunctive reasoning, 70–72
Doherty, Michael, 139
dominance relationship, in decision theory, 72–73
dual process theory, 21–28, 173–177
and intelligence, 26–28
and override function, 22–23, 38–39, 41, 71, 173–174
Type 1 processing, 21–25
Type 2 processing, 21–25
Duckworth, Angela, 37
Dunning, David, 109
dysrationalia, 10–12, 48–50, 188–193
analogy with other cognitive disabilities, 17–19
and contaminated mindware, 157–160
definition, 18; in folk psychology, 55–57
as intuition pump, 17–19
and mindware gaps, 150–151, 159–160
prevalence, 66–68
pseudoscience and, 170–171
within tripartite model, 34–35
egocentrism, 111–113, 179–180, 184
emotions, 117–119
impairment in, 186–188
Epley, Nicholas, 95–96
Epstein, Seymour, 120
equality heuristic, 90–92
Evans, Jonathan, 159
evolution, and rationality, 64–66, 160–161
executive function, 23
and cognitive decoupling, 28
faith, 168–169
falsifiability, 141–144, 167–170, 201
Fenton-O’Creevy, Mark, 110
Fine, Cordelia, 101
fluid/crystallized (Gf/Gc) theory, 13, 40–42, 50–51, 172
fluid intelligence (Gf), 40–41, 50–51
and cognitive decoupling, 28, 50–51
Flynn, James, 52
Flynn effect, 51–52
focal bias, 173–177, 181–185, 190
Fogelin, Robert, 152
four-card selection task, 141–143, 175–176, 183
framing, 183, 190
classic research on, 92–95
and fairness decisions, 9
0–91
and intelligence, 98–100
and medical decisions, 91–92
and personal autonomy, 89–92
and perspective taking, 93
and public policy, 97–98
and tax policy, 86–89, 96
Frankfurt, Harry, 152
Frederick, Shane, 72–73, 190
Friedman, Richard, 206
Friedrich, James, 97
Frum, David, 2, 43
Funder, David, 191
Galton, Francis, 53
Gardner, Howard, 45–47
Gigerenzer, Gerd, 83, 205–206
Gilbert, Dan, 200–201
Gladwell, Malcolm, 115–116
Goldstein, Daniel, 203
Gollwitzer, Peter, 200
Greene, Joshua, 117–119
Harris, Sam, 165
Heath, Chip, 113
Herrnstein, Richard, The Bell Curve, 20
heuristic processing, 22–23, 63–64, 78–79
hostile and benign environments for, 82–85
heuristics and biases tasks, 181–185
“hot” cognition, 119–120, 191
Hsee, Christopher, 74
Hull, David, 70
hypothetical thinking, 23–25, 39–40, 51
illusion of control, 110
implementation intentions, 200
impulsively associative thinking, 181–182
informal reasoning tasks, 38
intellectual disability (mental retardation), 53–54
intelligence:
as adaptive functioning, xi, 12, 51–52, 54
and algorithmic mind, 31–32
broad versus narrow definitions, 12–15, 45–47, 54, 208–209
and contaminated mindware, 157–160
critics of, 20–21, 45–50
debate about, 20–21
deification of, 54
and dual process theory, 26–28
and dysrationalia, 48–50
fluid/crystallized (Gf/Gc) theory, 13, 40–42, 50–51, 172
in folk psychology, 55–57
and framing, 98–100
heritability, 20
as imperialist concept, 47–50
malleability, 197, 208–209
and mindware gaps, 150–151
and myside processing, 113–114
overvaluing of, 195–199, 208–212
and pseudoscientific beliefs, 170–171
and reflective mind, 31–32
relation to rationality, 2–3, 12, 16, 32–33, 48–50, 98–100, 113–114, 171, 188–193
and thinking errors, 188–193
and Type 1 processes, 26–28, 71–72
vernacular definitions, 12
intelligence tests:
cognitive processes missing from, x-xii, 5–6, 171, 193–194, 196–197, 209–211
ubiquity of, 3, 32
intertemporal preference reversal, 125–127
investing, 59–63, 75
irrationality, 68–69, 160–161
caused by contaminated mindware, 160–167
and delayed rewards, 125–127
as descriptive invariance, 88, 93
environmental fixes for, 202–208
and memes, 160–167
and mindware gaps, 130–133, 138–144
relation to intelligence, 188–193
social costs of, 197–199
in stock market investing, 59–63, 75
types of, 177–185
irrational thinking, taxonomy of, 177–185
Johnson, Eric, 202–203
Kahneman, Daniel, ix–xi, 62, 72–73, 79–80, 86, 92–95, 107–108, 129, 185
Kennedy, John F. Jr., 115–116
Klaczynski, Paul, 38, 104
knowledge, 40–42
knowledge calibration, 105–108
knowledge projection, 159–160
Kruger, Justin, 109, 111
Lagerfeld, Steven, 170
Lakoff, George, 97–98
Langer, Ellen, 110
Larrick, Richard, 129
lay psychology theory, 180
learning disabilities, discrepancy definitions of, 17–18
Leslie, Alan, 24–25
Levesque, Hector, 70
libertarian Paternalism, 204–205
Linda problem, 147–148
Loewenstein, George, 91
loss aversion, 62
Mackie, Gerry, 169
Macpherson, Robyn, 104
MAMBIT (mental abilities measured by intelligence tests), 13–15, 45–51
maximal performance situations, 31
McCaffrey, Edward, 86–87
McCain, John, 43
McCallum, Ronald, 43
meme, 161–167
definition of, 162
faithbased, 168–169
memetics, 161–167
fundamental insight of, 162
mindware, 40–42, 67–68, 179–180
adversative, 169–170
avoiding contamination in, 167–170
contaminated, 67, 152–171
counterintuitive assumption of contamination, 166–167
definition of, 40, 129
epidemics, 152–157
and falsifiability, 167–170
and intelligence, 192–193
motivational force of, 127–128
strategic, 148–149
survival strategies, 164–165
mindware gaps, 67, 130–149, 182–183
and intelligence, 150–151
Mischel, Walter, 191
money illusion, 77–78
moral dilemmas, 117–119
Mr. Spock problem, 185–188
multiple intelligences, 46–48
multiple personality disorder, 155–157
Murray, Charles, The Bell Curve, 20
myside bias:
measures of, 38
property of cognitive miser, 104
myside processing, 101–104, 183–184
and communication, 111–112
and intelligence, 113–114
and product design, 112–113
need for cognition, 149
Neisser, Ulric, 52
Newton, Elizabeth, 112
Nozick, Robert, 8
organ donation, 202–204
overconfidence, 61, 105–110
override:
cognitive neuroscience of, 117–119
of cold heuristics, 119–124
of emotions, 117–119
failure, 115–117, 180–183, 190–192
of Type 1 processing, 22–23, 38–39
paranormal phenomena, 170–171
Paulos, John, 8–9
pensions, 204–205
Perkins, David, 11–12, 40
personal finance, 59–63, 84–85
perspective taking, 93
Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works, 21
planning fallacy, 107–108
Ponzi schemes, 152–155
possible world box, 25
Postman, Neil, 68–69
practical intelligence, 46
preattentive processes, 26, 177
prior knowledge, decoupling from, 123–124, 159
probabilistic reasoning, 42, 120, 132–136, 144–148
Pronin, Emily, 109
prospect theory, 95
pseudoscience, 170–171, 198–199
psychometric g, 172
pyramid schemes, 152–155
Rachlin, Howard, 127
Rachlinski, Jeffrey, 150–151
rationality:
and contaminated mindware, 167–170
definition of, 15–17
epistemic, 16, 105–106
and evolution, 64–66, 160–161
in folk psychology, 55–57
fostering via environmental change, 202–208
instrumental, 16
and intelligence, 32–33, 48–50
malleability, 197, 202, 208–209
measures of, 36–38
mindware of, 41–42
, 67–68
taxonomy of failures of, 177–185
teaching, 199–202
tests of, 4, 209–211
thinking dispositions of, 44
three requirements of, 42, 52
and tripartite model, 32–33
undervaluing of, 195–199, 208–212
rationality quotient (RQ), 4, 209–211
recognition heuristic, 83–85
recovered memories, 155–157
reflective mind, 30–32, 38–41, 51, 122–123, 149, 173–177, 188–191
and intelligence, 31–32
and intelligence tests, 195–196
reflectivity/impulsivity, 149
retirement savings, 204–205
Richerson, Peter, 59
Rokeach, Milton, 35
Rozin, Paul, 207–208
Ryan, Desmond, 157
SAT test, as an IQ test, 3
Schelling, Thomas, 86–87
Schkade, David, 185
scientific reasoning, 42
scientific thinking, 130–131, 139–144
self-control, 124–128, 182–183
and intelligence, 191–193
and precommitment, 206–207
Seligman, Martin, 37
serial associative cognition, 173–177, 181–182, 190
Showalter, Elaine, 155–156
simulation, cognitive, 23–25, 39–41, 51, 174
Sinaceur, Marwan, 85
Slovic, Paul 77
Spearman, Charles, 172
status quo bias, 82
Sternberg, Robert, Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid, 11, 45–47, 53, 209
Sunstein, Cass, 204
Surowiecki, James, 113
syllogistic reasoning, 120–123
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, 59
tax policy, 86–89
temporal discounting, 125–127
Tetlock, Philip, 37
Thaler, Richard, 96, 204
thinking dispositions, 2, 31–32, 148–149, 173
and belief bias, 122–123
as predictors of rational thought and action, 36–38
within tripartite model, 34, 38–40
“think of the opposite,” as reasoning strategy, 136–140, 199–200
Thomas, Evan, 43
Toplak, Maggie, 38, 104, 188
tripartite model of mind, 32–35, 38–40, 116–117, 171–177
and dysrationalia, 34–35
expanded, 38–40
trolley problem, 117–119, 183
Tversky, Amos, ix–xi, 62, 79–80, 93–95, 129
Tweney, Ryan, 144
Type 1 Processing, 63–64, 78–79, 115–116, 119, 174–180, 190–192
and intelligence, 26–28
Type 2 Processing, 70–72, 115–116, 119, 174–180, 190–192
typical performance situations, 31
Ubel, Peter, 91–92
Universal Darwinism, 162, 167
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 186–187
visceral responses, 124–127
vividness, 75–78, 85, 181
Wanger, Ralph, 79
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