by Bryn Hammond
To discourage the idea of the Royal Armoured Corps as ‘an army within an army’ and to have more armoured divisions, Auchinleck had already reorganized the armoured divisions, giving to each an armoured brigade group and a motorized infantry brigade group instead of two armoured brigades and a support group. This reorganization was still in progress and was in advance of similar organizational changes in forces in Britain. Now he wanted to go further, abolishing distinctions between infantry and armoured divisions and creating a more mobile formation with greater striking power in place of the infantry division.
These radical proposals were met with horror by ‘traditionalists’ like McCreery and Major-General Douglas Wimberley, the recently-arrived commander of 51st Division, although at least one experienced desert general, Tuker of 4th Indian Division, saw them as a ‘logical and sensible’.16 Harding had a view but was ‘really primarily interested in the tactical training of the individuals, the units and the formations’:
My view at the time was that what was needed was to retain the armoured division formations as such and also to maintain the distinction between armoured divisions and infantry divisions. Dick McCreery held the same view. I think the Auk and Dorman-Smith were rather inclined to think that he should be able to have a number of homogeneous divisions equipped with both armour and infantry. I’m not sure that I was right from subsequent experience – particularly in Italy.17
However, there already existed ‘a definite antipathy between McCreery and Auchinleck’18 which resulted in McCreery refusing to implement the changes and Auchinleck effectively sacking him, telling him that if ‘he would not obey orders he could consider himself relieved of his appointment’.19
Wimberley had ‘had his card marked’ by Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead regarding the manner in which divisions might be organized:
He gave me a lot of sound advice, and it was clear talking to him that the Australians at that time did not have a very high regard for the British Armour, which they thought had let them down. He told me that the Staff were mad on breaking Divisions up into ‘Jock Columns’ and that if I allowed them to break my Division up, when it arrived, I would never be able to collect it together again, and that he had very firmly resisted any attempt to ‘muck about’ his Australians.20
It was almost two weeks later, however, before Wimberley’s resolve was directly challenged:
Soon after the Division arrived, I was told that it was probable that one of my Brigades would be taken away from me to go to some armoured division or other, and in return I was to be given some armour. It was rapidly becoming clear to me that I would have to take a firm stand to prevent what Morshead had already warned me about, ‘the mucking about’ of my Division, which had trained as a single fighting formation for two years and more.21
These reforming changes, which would have meant making changes to new divisions arriving in Egypt as well as existing formations, were probably unworkable and certainly so without the willing co-operation of senior commanders. They were never implemented. However, they were part of a wider programme of changes and rethinking in Eighth Army at the end of July 1942 and indicated that despite a prolonged period of hard fighting, neither Auchinleck nor Eighth Army was suffering from the ‘inexplicable inertia’ ascribed to them.22 Auchinleck’s mind was firmly on achieving success in future operations. Of great importance to him in that process was the work of his ‘field’ Chief of Staff, Major-General Eric Dorman-Smith. Auchinleck’s appointment of de Guingand had been intended to free up Dorman-Smith for work on these organizational reforms, but events were to intervene.
Much of Auchinleck’s information regarding the state of Eighth Army and its opponents provided to Brooke in his letter of 27 July was from an ‘appreciation’ produced by Dorman-Smith. This was the most controversial document of the Desert War, chiefly because for supporters of Auchinleck (and, by implication, of Dorman-Smith), this was a superb model of analytical thinking and clear expression that correctly predicted many of the subsequent events around El Alamein as well as defining how Auchinleck would defeat any further offensive by Rommel by fighting a ‘modern defensive battle’.23 For the critics of Auchinleck (usually the supporters of Montgomery), it was a depressing and sorry document – proof positive of Dorman-Smith’s ‘unsound’24 ideas that had caused ‘a state of complete muddle and disorganization’25 in Eighth Army. This was because of their influence on Auchinleck, who had ‘sent for “Chink” Dorman-Smith as a kind of personal evil genius.’26 Dorman-Smith was a prime example for some of Auchinleck’s being a poor ‘chooser’.27 Comparisons between him and John Frederick Charles Fuller, the gifted but flawed Tank Corps staff officer and military theorist, do not help his cause.
Dorman-Smith’s ‘Appreciation’ began by stating the obvious. It recognized that the Axis positions were now too strong to assault with the available resources and suggested that Eighth Army would not be strong enough to attack again until mid-September at the earliest and, even then, the British and Commonwealth forces might not have a sufficient superiority to justify a direct attack. However, Dorman-Smith went further in his analysis. He anticipated an attack by the Axis forces before the end of August and predicted that the attempt would be made on the southern flank of the Alamein position where it would be met by his plans to fight a ‘modern defensive battle’. However, the document also gave considerable attention to the defensive preparations in the Nile Delta and around Alexandria and Cairo. Although these details provided important context to the rest of his analysis and were intended to indicate that planning did not stop with front-line preparations, they had an unfortunate influence, according to some historians, for their suggestion of confused thinking and pessimistic outlook.
It is too easy to see Dorman-Smith’s ‘Appreciation’ with the benefit of hindsight and unhelpful to consider it solely as a paper exercise. What was important about it was its influence at the time. In this regard, it worked in both negative and positive ways and its detail is better considered in connection with these influences.
In a positive way, it influenced Auchinleck in deciding Eighth Army’s short-term goals, which he expounded at a meeting with his corps commanders, Gott and Lieutenant-General William Ramsden, on 30 July – a meeting at which Corbett was also present – and further developed in an ‘appreciation’ of his own on 1 August. Thus, Auchinleck accepted Dorman-Smith’s advice that Eighth Army adopt the tactical defensive until strong enough to attack. In the meantime, raids would be mounted to harass the Panzerarmee’s rear.28 He also accepted Dorman-Smith’s assessment of the importance of the air superiority the Desert Air Force had fought to achieve during July in harassing Axis supply routes.
It was also a positive influence on Gott’s thinking and planning for the defence of XIII Corps against a possible Axis attack in the south of the Alamein position: in particular, the employment of a mobile harassing wing of light tanks, armoured cars and Crusader i.e. faster, more lightly armoured tanks. Gott’s ideas about the Alam Halfa Ridge as the likely first objective of an Axis attack were his own (although he made reference to Rommel’s shortages in infantry mentioned by Dorman-Smith as a possible influencing factor). However, he accepted Dorman-Smith’s assessment that the attack could come at a critical time for Eighth Army – the second half of August – when the Panzerarmee might have between 150 and 200 tanks and before new divisions sent to Egypt were ready for action.29 From this point forward, the staff of XIII Corps developed and honed plans for defence of the Alam Halfa Ridge and began to implement extensive defensive preparations.
It was undoubtedly the case that the negatives outweighed the positives and were more obvious in their influence. They may have been partly the result of the cumulative effect of the ‘appreciation’ and Auchinleck’s 28 June assessment of the situation (also drafted by Dorman-Smith). In June, the C-in-C had outlined to Brooke how he would fight if driven from the Alamein position.30 This had also been passed to Corbett and, through him, to Gott
and Ramsden. Its meaning had been the subject of considerable misinterpretation throughout all levels of the army and the defensive preparations it outlined had perturbed some at even the most senior levels.
Now Dorman-Smith’s ‘Appreciation’ suggested a possible retreat once more. Indirectly, therefore, it was responsible for a crisis in morale. Men could see for themselves the continued preparations many miles behind the front line aimed at putting the Delta and other localities in a state of effective defence. The effect on morale was obviously detrimental. It was compounded still further by the extensive forward defensive preparations organized by Dorman-Smith and Brigadier Frederick Kisch, Eighth Army’s Commander Royal Engineers. These involved men digging trenches and laying out barbed wire and minefields seemingly in the middle of the open desert without an obvious reason (at least to those doing the work).
After some months of hard fighting, Eighth Army needed clarity regarding its position and plans. Both Dorman-Smith and Auchinleck possessed a clear vision of how they would fight defensively, but they failed to communicate this to the wider army. The ambiguity remained unresolved.
In plans for a future attack, however, Auchinleck was clearer. On 2 August a further ‘Appreciation’ outlined Eighth Army’s approach to offensive operations planned for mid-September. Based on ideas from Ramsden, the suggestion was for ‘a deliberate attack on the extreme NORTH of the enemy’s position’ with deception measures to suggest an attack in the south. The army was to ‘train and rehearse intensively for the main operation’ and motorized and armoured forces were to be organized to exploit any successful breakthrough.31 This plan would not be implemented whilst Auchinleck was C-in-C, but army staff continued to work with it as a general aspiration for a future when the Allied forces would return to the offensive.
Brooke’s stopover in Malta was a salutary reminder of the misery of civilian life in the front line of total war. Continued attempts at an air and sea blockade of the island were gradually starving the inhabitants. Repeated air strikes were destroying their homes and killing or wounding many. The constant threat of a Crete-like invasion was sapping morale. Brooke witnessed it all and described how ‘the destruction is inconceivable and reminds one of Ypres, Arras, Lens at their worst during the last war.’ Brooke continued:
The conditions prevailing in Malta were distinctly depressing, to put it mildly! Shortage of rations, shortage of petrol, a hungry population that rubbed their tummies looking at Gort as he went by, destruction and ruin of docks, loss of convoys just as they approached the island, and the continual possibility of an attack on the island without much hope of help or reinforcements.32
Brooke’s visit was a brief one. He hoped to have convinced Gort, at least, of the possibility that if Allied plans came to fruition Malta, rather than being a backwater, might be an outpost of an advance that would ultimately win the war in the Mediterranean.33 Meanwhile, it was vital for the British forces in the desert for Malta and the forces based there to survive.
Both Brooke and Churchill arrived in Cairo on 3 August. Astonishingly, given the supposed premise for the visit, major changes in the Middle East High Command had been decided on, and the detail agreed between Churchill and Brooke, within 24 hours. The first decision was that Corbett was not the man to command Eighth Army. Brooke’s verdict, with its unwitting puns, was severe:
Went over to GHQ after breakfast and had long talk with Corbett the CGS. The more I saw of him the less I thought of him — he is a very small man. One interview with him was enough to size him up. He was a very, very small man unfit for his job of CGS and totally unsuited for command of the 8th Army, an appointment which the Auk had suggested. Consequently Corbett’s selection reflected very unfavourably on the Auk’s ability to select men and confirmed my fears in that respect.34
For the moment, Brooke did not disabuse Corbett of his belief that he was to succeed Auchinleck as Army Commander.
Churchill, having discussed matters with the South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, then met with Brooke and Auchinleck. Afterwards, Churchill was clearly unhappy that no attack was planned before 15 September. Later, in a discussion with a weary Brooke that lasted until 0130hrs, they agreed that a new Eighth Army commander was needed; Churchill first suggested Gott, who Brooke felt was ‘very tired’, and then Brooke himself. Flattered, Brooke discussed the offer with Smuts, before very reluctantly declining. It was an agonizing choice. Brooke, seemingly, had in mind the man he wanted:
I did not feel that Gott in his present state was the man to instil a new spirit of self confidence in the 8th Army. It would require someone like Montgomery, bounding with self-confidence and capable of instilling this confidence in those under his command. At any rate I wanted to see Gott for myself to find out how tired he was before putting him down definitely as unfit for the 8th Army.35
The following afternoon Brooke discussed his ideas for command changes with Auchinleck. It says a great deal about Auchinleck’s character that he accepted Brooke’s suggestions for change, which were:
a) new commander for 8th Army Montgomery; b) new CGS to be selected vice Corbett; c) ‘Jumbo’ Wilson too old and to be replaced by Gott; d) Quinan unsuitable for 10th Army, to be replaced by Anderson. These changes should lead to improvements but I must still pass them through the PM and there will be the difficulty.36
Brooke, aware of a personal enmity between the two men, had not expected that Auchinleck would accept Montgomery and doubted, in any case, that the combination would work. Brooke’s idée fixe was now to see his protégé, Montgomery, command Eighth Army. He was prepared to move Auchinleck to another command, if necessary, to achieve this.
Churchill, meanwhile, was obsessed with launching attacks before Eighth Army, regardless of its commander, could be ready. However, he had also taken reconnaissance in typical fashion, as Brigadier Davy discovered when summoned that morning to the British Embassy:
Winston came in, followed by a waiter with a beaker of neat whiskey. He made me sit beside him at his desk, and let his cigar go out. It did this many times in the next two hours, as he only took one puff each time he re-lit it. He just quietly grilled me. He wanted a lot of detailed information and in his characteristic fashion he asked questions which cut at right-angles across one’s normal method of assessing military strength. At school I had been fairly quick at mental arithmetic and it stood me in good stead at the interview. How many tanks have we? How many cannon have we? How many bayonets have we?37
Churchill demanded details of the state of training of divisions not in the Eighth Army and their dates of readiness; the reserves of mines and ammunition, and a vast number of administrative details.
He horrified me by taking notes of what I said on a bit of embassy writing paper, as I was answering ‘off the cuff’ and with probably not more than 80 percent accuracy. Having pumped me on statistics and the tactical and strategical situation in the desert, he threw a tactful fly over me on personalities. I gave it merely a sniff, as I did not wish to be disloyal to the Auk and I felt that Casey* would already have said enough about Corbett and Chink. When someone came to announce luncheon, the PM said to me, ‘Thank you and you might let me have confirmation of these figures by five o’clock’. And he handed me his notes, much to my relief, and took his neglected cigar with him.38
After another exhausting late-night discussion, he and Churchill still disagreed about Montgomery’s appointment. An early morning start and a visit to Eighth Army’s spartan headquarters the next day decided matters for Churchill. Auchinleck had always seemed sensitive to the idea of personal comfort whilst his men endured privations and hardship. This was not Churchill’s style at all, even as a battalion commander in the Great War. In Cairo, he had enjoyed ‘princely’ hospitality and an air-conditioned bedroom and study. In the desert, he was given breakfast in a ‘wire-netted cube, full of flies’ and high-ranking people.39 He did not enjoy the heat. Conditions drew no comment from Brooke who, in typical soldierly style, got a go
od feel for the terrain and its differences from his expectations.
A briefing for Churchill by Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith using maps proved an unmitigated disaster. According to Dorman-Smith:
[Churchill] quickly began to demand that Eighth Army should attack afresh. He thrust stubby fingers against the talc; ‘Here’, he said, ‘or here’. We were alone with him, for the CIGS had gone forward up the line. It was a little like being caged with a gorilla. Eventually Auchinleck said quietly, and finally, ‘No, Sir, we cannot attack again yet’. The Prime Minister swung round to [me]: ‘Do you say that too; why don’t you use the 44th Division?’ ‘Because Sir, that division isn’t ready and anyhow a one-division attack would not get us anywhere.’ Churchill rose, grunted, stumped down from the caravan and stood alone in the sand, back turned to us. The chill was now icy.40
Nevertheless, Churchill got his opportunity to meet Gott and afterwards was happy that this was the man to command Eighth Army. He returned to Cairo eager to put matters in chain with Brooke to enact his decisions. However, his next move was unexpected – in more ways than one!