by Bryn Hammond
The Army Commander called together all officers of the rank of brigadier and above. With a big map he explained his plan for the battle and his view of the way it would be fought, in four phases: ‘the break in, the dog-fight, the breakthrough, and the exploitation’. All the infantry brigadiers were a little maliciously pleased when he said that he had altered his plan after seeing that the armour was not trained.40
Kippenberger’s account suggests an even closer correlation between Montgomery’s four phases of the planned battle and the four necessary stages of war which, according to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, ‘have marked all the conclusive battles of history’.41 These were: the manoeuvre for position, the first clash of battle, the wearing-out fight and the decisive blow.42 The influence of their Staff College training on the military theories of both men was clear.
Montgomery also visited 1st South African Division’s headquarters to allay Major-General Dan Pienaar’s concerns regarding the likely casualties to his division in the attack. Their meeting, as recounted by Carol Mather, provided an example of the value of Montgomery’s ebullient and confident public persona:
The South Africans had very few men on the ground. Getting reinforcements was quite difficult. Pienaar was casualty conscious. The South Africans it has to be said had had a pretty good beating on several occasions. They’d lost a lot of men. Pienaar started saying to me that he didn’t believe in this plan of Monty’s. I didn’t think that was a very good ‘ord group’ for a battle and then he started drawing figures in the sand showing how he would have done it. The next moment Monty arrived and they disappeared into this dugout. Monty came out saying ‘Splendid chap, splendid chap. He wants to kill as many Germans as possible!’43
In a coalition force like Eighth Army, it was vital that good relations were maintained with the commanders and troops of all the nations. Both Montgomery and Leese excelled at this work in the weeks before the battle.
In July 1942, Eighth Army’s operations had foundered repeatedly on the ability of the engineers to deal with mines. Yet, only two months later, in planning for the Alamein battle, there was tacit acceptance that the problems posed by mines could be overcome. Chiefly, efforts were directed towards providing the means for this task to be accomplished as swiftly as possible, and educating men about the relative risks of the various types of mines. Progress was due to a variety of factors, but the influence of Brigadier Frederick Kisch was especially important.
In August, Kisch had co-ordinated analysis of Eighth Army’s experiences of mine-clearing operations and, from this and training exercises and experiments, distilled the key lessons. He now selected the man he thought capable of tackling the task of minefield clearance which, he recognized, would form an essential part of the work of Royal Engineers in all future offensive operations. Major Peter Moore of 3rd (Cheshire) Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, had just left hospital when he was told Kisch had a job for him.
He got me into his caravan and told me that I was to open the Eighth Army School of Minefield Clearance. He said that the nature of the Desert War had changed. There was no longer an open flank. There were continuous deep minefields right across our front and that we were to be prepared to force our way through it against heavy opposition. There must be a drill for clearing mines just as there was a drill for the loading and firing of field guns. The old methods of detailing a sub-unit, giving them a mine detector or two and telling them to get on with it were all right for clearing minefields not under fire or those met during a night approach march, for extricating vehicles from our own minefields or for getting through very shallow minefields. The lack of a uniform method had led to divisional engineers being asked to perform impossible tasks or being asked to make gaps which were quite inadequate for the tactical operations in view.44
Moore’s brief was to define a standard method for minefield clearance that could be taught at an Eighth Army School of Mine Clearance, which he was to establish at Burg-el-Arab. This School’s work was soon seen as sufficiently important for it to merit a visit from Montgomery, as Moore recounted:
We had a good commander who wouldn’t ask us to do more than was reasonable and generally an air of confidence grew up. Not least was the fact that the army commander himself came to this quite small unit that had just been formed. This created a very favourable impression on all ranks. All I can say was that he was like a tonic.45
Two technological innovations had been devised in time for use at Alamein and the School worked with both. The first, and most important, was a reliable portable mine detector, of which the most noted example was invented by a Polish officer, Józef Stanisław Kosacki. This was capable of detecting mines with some degree of accuracy and 500 Mine Detectors No 2 (Polish) and other types were rushed to the Western Desert in time for the attack. Their use dramatically increased the rate of clearance in heavily mined areas. Based on experimental use, and the evidence of the employment of detectors in earlier operations, Moore concluded that:
the detector – except on very rocky ground or in newly laid fields was the quickest means of clearing mines and the only reliable one; the choice of ground for a gap was extremely important; that tapes were required to keep the clearance parties going straight; that the operation of the detector itself was an important skill which must also be taught as a drill.46
The drill eventually adopted was a mix of choreography and gradual enhancement from small beginnings.
The first task was for a ‘confirming reconnaissance party’, usually of five men and an officer, to find and mark the near edge of an enemy minefield. The men could walk through the minefields with little likelihood of setting off the anti-tank mines but the reconnaissance party ‘had to find and neutralize any tripwire-operated [anti-personnel] S-Mines as these with their hundreds of steel balls were murder to detector operators who had to stand up and swing their detectors’ coils in front of them’. Having gone through, the far edge was also marked. In each case a shielded blue light facing the British lines was used. Moore described the procedure:
Initial gaps were to be eight yards wide and these were to be widened to sixteen yards as soon as possible. Three detector men were each to sweep an eight-foot lane and were to be echeloned back at ten-yard intervals. This echeloning back was most important. It ensured that a mistake by one detector man would not write off all three. They could advance using detectors at a rate of three yards a minute or three times as fast as it took to locate mines by prodding. Each detector man had an assistant – No 2 – who paid out a tape to the left of the detector man’s swing and pegged it down, put a half-inch nail through the safety pin hole of any S-mine with horns and marked all mines with a conical hat – light enough to be safe, but robust enough not to be blown away. We soon found that laying out the tapes was best left to a separate party. Altogether we required an NCO to supervise, a man – No 3 – to pull mines while everybody else lay down, a party to mark the edge of the gap with signs and coloured lights, a medical orderly and four stretcher bearers, a reserves party to replace casualties of one NCO and six sappers. Then there was an ‘O i/c gap’* plus four sappers and a control party. We also needed a party carrying gap-marking stores. These were quite heavy but could be carried on the back of a Dingo Scout Car.47
Only the mention of a medical orderly and stretcher bearers hinted at the incredibly dangerous and stressful nature of the work. The detector men, carrying portable battery packs and wearing headphones, had to walk upright and concentrate their eyes and ears for the tell-tale indications of mines: all this under fire from shot and shell that they could not hear. These men started their task thirty yards behind the tape-layers, with the disarming and lifting parties fifty yards behind the detectors. This last group had to take particular care because of booby traps.
The ultimate aim was a ‘lane’ forty yards wide. Gap-marking parties placed signs on each edge of the cleared lane. Small electric torches on posts were used at night. For Alamein, each track and minefield la
ne would be named. These tracks were, starting from the North: Sun, Moon, Star, Bottle, Boat and Hat. They were marked with signs corresponding to these names by empty petrol cans with a patterned hole cut into them and illuminated from the inside.
Eight training teams went through the Minefield Clearance School and taught seven eight-day courses each between 26 August and 20 October. By mid-October, the courses incorporated a competitive element to hone the sappers’ skills. Lieutenant Robert Pearson of 276 Army Field Company recorded:
This p.m. we have a competition – four teams of eight clearing an eight-yard gap 200 yards long of mines; missing a mine means disqualification. The Highland Div swept the board and won the sixteen bottles of beer. All very bucked because best time was fourteen minutes and worst only sixteen.48
The basic drill remained unchanged but refinements and improvements were made by individual divisions, as Moore described:
Perhaps the biggest and the best of these was the establishment of a minefield clearance task force by 1st Armoured Division with an infantry battalion headquarters, a close infantry escort of at least a company, provost, line and wireless communications as well as sappers to clear the mines. This recognized the truth of the saying I heard as a young officer, ‘Sappers can either work or fight; they cannot do both simultaneously’.49
Another advance tested by the Mine Clearance School was the ‘Scorpion’. Major-General Francis ‘Gertie’ Tuker of 4th Indian Division noted:
In early October we went to a demonstration of mine clearing by ‘Scorpions’ near Burg-el-Arab. The Scorpion was the old infantry tank stripped of its superfluities and fitted with a roller and chains to flail the ground ahead of it in order to explode the mines. These had been under design and construction for some months but it was heartening to see that we British were at last thinking in terms of machines to do the job of men.50
However, the Scorpions were not available in large numbers and were usually held in reserve for emergencies.
It should be stressed that not every unit required to clear mines had detectors. For those that did not, the procedure was to probe with a bayonet – a much slower method. Any approach was laden with risk from booby traps, as Frank Devaney experienced:
Der Stern von Afrika – Hans-Joachim Marseille recording his 100th ‘victory’. (Courtest of Jerry Scutts)
A newly-arrived Sherman tank attracts close attention, 15 September 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 16861)
Lieutenant-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott, XIII Corps commander. (Imperial War Museum, E 2623)
A 6-pdr anti-tank gun in action, 29 October 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 18802)
A Crusader II tank of 22nd Armoured Brigade returning from action, 28 July 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 14950)
Crew of a Humber Mk II armoured car of 4th Armoured Brigade keep a sharp look out whilst on patrol, 10 August 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 15509)
A solitary soldier: General Sir Claude Auchinleck watches retreating transport on the North African coast, El Daba, 28 June 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 13882)
M3 Grant tank and its Royal Scots Greys crew, 19 September 1942. (Australian War Memorial)
Der Wüstenfuchs: Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel. (Imperial War Museum, HU 5623)
General Major Georg von Bismarck, commander 21 Panzer Division, in front of one of his division’s Panzer IIIs. Von Bismarck was killed during the fighting on the first day of the battle of Alam Halfa on 1 September 1942. (Bundesarchiv 1011-784-0231-35)
A Panzer III Ausf. H – the workhorse of the Panzer Divisions. (Imperial War Museum, MH 5852)
Panzer III negotiating a sand dune. (HITM)
German infantry occupy a heavy machine-gun position, probably in the Alamein defences, 1942. (HITM)
After Tobruk's fall, Italian Bersaglieri guard two British prisoners in a captured Bedford MWD 15cwt lorry, June 1942. (ACS)
Italian M13/40 tanks of Divisione Ariete. (Private Collection)
A German Luftwaffe Flak battery moving forwards during the First Battle of El Alamein, July 1942. SdKfz 7 half-track pulling an 88mm gun. (Imperial War Museum, MH 5869)
A German 88mm gun in action. (Imperial War Museum, MH 5853)
Brigadier Freddie de Guingand, Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery. (Courtesy of Tim Moreman)
General Sir Claude Auchinleck, British Commander in Chief, Middle East Command. (Imperial War Museum, E 13794)
Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Norrie. (Imperial War Museum, E 13290)
Lieutenant-General William Ramsden, XXX Corps commander Dismissed by Montgomery: ‘You’re not exactly on the crest of a wave, Ramsden.’ (Imperial War Museum, E 13566)
2-pdr anti-tank guns firing portee. (Imperial War Museum, E 11223)
Winston Churchill with General Harold Alexander and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery during his second visit to the Western Desert, 23 August 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 15905)
Montgomery with Brigadier Philip ‘Pip’ Roberts and Major-General Alec Gatehouse. (Imperial War Museum, E 16484)
Rommel with (from left) Oberst Fritz Bayerlein, Oberstleutnant Friederich von Mellenthin and Generalleutnant Walther Nehring, commander of the Afrika Korps. (Bundesarchive Bild, 1011-784-0203-14A)
Sherman tanks of the Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) moving up to the Alamein line, 24 October 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 18380)
Captured Panzer III ‘Special’ with long-barrel 50mm gun. (Imperial War Museum, E 16567)
Italian crew of a 149/40 Modello 35 gun. The Italian artillery was generally well-respected by both enemy and ally alike. (Private Collection)
Italian Semovente da 75/18 self-propelled gun. Capable of tackling both the Grant and Sherman tanks. (Private Collection)
Panzer IV Ausf F1 from Panzer-Regiment 8 of 15. Panzer-Division with short 75mm gun. (Bundesarchive Bild, 1011-439-1276-12)
German signals post near Tel el Eisa, close to where wireless intercept unit, NFAK 621, was lost. (Imperial War Museum, MG 5581)
88mm Flak being used in an anti-tank role. The gun's high silhouette made it vulnerable in the flat, featureless desert unless well dug-in. (Bundesarchive Bild, 1011-443-1574-24)
Rommel with Generalmajor Georg von Bismarck at the headquarters of 21. Panzer-Division. (Bundesarchive Bild, 1011-785-0286-31)
Sappers of the Royal Engineers using a mine-detector, 28 August 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 16226)
A 25-pdr gun firing during the British night artillery barrage which opened Second Battle of El Alamein, 23 October 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 18467)
A British 5.5-inch gun in action in the desert. A plentiful supply of 100lb shells lie to hand, 14 September 1942. (Imperial War Museum, E 16776
If they hit anything metallic they cleared round about it and cleared underneath it because you could often get what they called an anti-personnel tripwire attached – a small barbed-like thing screwed into the base of the mine which had a small wire attached. A trigger effected a spring inside which when you lifted the mine out, this wire was locked and set off this other anti-personnel detonator which, of course, blew the whole lot up and took the RE with it.51
The work of all the specialists involved drew admiration, summed up by infantryman Jack York:
These courageous men made possible the breakthrough at Alamein. In doing so they suffered wounds, hardships and disappointments – but saw their task through to the end. Perhaps they were the real heroes at Alamein.52
Further training exercises by 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions were still being carried out in mid-October, striving for a preparedness to match Montgomery’s expectations for the battle. In 1st Armoured Division exercises on 12 October, after several daylight rehearsals, the whole process of passing the division including tanks, armoured cars, 25-pounders, self-propelled guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, ambulances, HQ armoured control vehicles, and infantry was tried at night and took ‘about three hours’.53 Any delay in starting, or during the advanc
e, would be critical.
The supply of battle-ready tanks to armoured regiments was not completed until early October. Generally, opinions on the new tanks were positive, and a welcome boost to morale. Len Flanakin noted:
More tanks arrived and gradually the Regiment became fully equipped. One Squadron had British Crusaders while B and C Squadrons had American Grant and Sherman tanks. HQ Squadron had a mixture of tanks, recce vehicles and Dingo scout cars. C Squadron, my Squadron, was equipped with Shermans, the newest of the American tanks whose main armament was a 75mm gun along with Browning machine guns of different calibre. The Sherman was a magnificent machine. It had a stabilized turret with full 360 degree traverse while the telescopic equipment, if tested and adjusted properly, made the gun deadly accurate. Its power supply came from a nine cylinder aero engine running on high octane fuel giving a top speed of approximately 30mph.54
With the new tanks came new tactical possibilities – in particular those offered by the 75mm gun which could fire both armour-piercing (AP) and high explosive (HE) ammunition. Sergeant Douglas Covill of the 10th Hussars soon learned the benefits:
This was the first time that we had a gun that was equivalent to the Germans’. We were then taught how to fire the gun properly. We had a man called Henri Le Grand who was a Belgian artillery officer – a major – attached to the squadron, and he said we don’t need to fire direct; we can fire indirect. That is to say that we could lay behind a ridge and fire as long as the commander could see where the shots were going. We could then go up 200 or down 300 and we were able to do that on the sights. The gunner could do it.55