by Daniel Wrinn
Nakagawa believed the western beaches were the most probable route of attack. But he did not leave the southern and eastern beaches undefended. He committed one battalion on each beach to organize defenses. The eastern beaches were thoroughly prepared with contingents of defenders to move into central Peleliu if the battle expanded from the west as he expected.
Colonel Nakagawa assigned 600 infantry and artillery to defend Ngesebus and 1,100 Naval personnel to defend northern Peleliu. The only troops not under his command were the 1,500 defenders on Angaur.
The central part of his force and effort was committed to the 500 tunnels, caves, and firing embrasures in the coral ridges of central Peleliu. The naval units’ prior extensive tunneling into limestone ridges rendered the occupants mainly immune to any Allied bombardments. Only an occasional lucky hit in the cave’s mouth or a point-blank direct fire could damage the hidden defenses and the enemy troops.
Map of most elaborate tunnel system on Peleliu
Tunnels were designed for several purposes: command centers, hospitals, barracks, storage, ammunition dumps, and cooking areas with freshwater springs and basins—and of course, firing embrasures. He added elaborate concealment and protective devices including a few sliding steel doors.
Nakagawa expected an intense pre-landing bombardment. He believed his troops would endure it and carry out their mission of delaying and bleeding the Allies for as long as possible before Peleliu fell.
General Inoue was busy with his troops on Koror. He prepared for expected Allied attacks against Babelthuap. The Allied plan, Operation Stalemate, also called for the invasion of Babelthuap. As the expected invasion drew closer, Inoue made a statement to his troops, reflecting Tojo’s instructions to bleed and delay the American forces. He pointed out the necessity to expect and endure the naval bombardment and how to use terrain to inflict casualties on the attacking force.
General Inoue said: “Dying and losing the territory to the enemy would contribute to opening a new phase of the war. We are ready to die honorably.”
D-Day Center Assault
The 1st Marines fought to secure the left flank. The 7th Marines battled to isolate and reduce enemy defenses on the southern end of Peleliu. The 5th Marines were tasked with driving across the airfield to cut the island in half, reorient north, and secure the island’s eastern half.
The 2/5 Marines under Major Gordon Gayle landed on Orange Beach 2 and advanced east through scrub jungle and dunes. They moved in and out of the anti-tank barrier to the west edge of the clearing surrounding the airfield.
Gayle’s battalion passed through the lines of the 3/5 Marines and attacked scattered resistance through the scrub in dugouts and bomb shelters near the southern end of the airfield. The 3rd Battalion’s mission was to clear that scrub and maintain contact with the 3/7 Marines on the right flank, while the 2/5 Marines advanced across the open area to reach the far side of the island.
The 2/5 Marines advanced in the center and right, fighting entirely across the island by midafternoon. They kept contact with the 1/5 Marines and moved to reorient their attack northward.
The Japanese anti-tank ditch along the center and right of the Orange Beaches was notable because of the several command posts along its length.
The 1st Tank Battalion’s M-48A1 Shermans—a third of which were left behind at the last moment—finally crossed the reef. These tanks had developed special reef-crossing maneuvers in anticipation of terrain obstacles.
Moving the fire and logistical support onto the beach was challenging and under direct observation from Japanese observers. This was an inescapable risk because of Peleliu’s terrain. As long as the enemy had observation posts atop the Umurbrogol Point over the airfield and beach—there was no alternative but to advance rapidly and coordinate fire support.
The rapid beach advance caused heavy casualties. General Rupertus’ concern for early momentum seemed to be correct. Marines on the left flank assaulted the foot of the Pocket’s ridges and swiftly got to the crest. In the center, the 5th Marines advanced and secured all likely routes to outflank the Pocket. In the south, the 7th Marines destroyed the now cut-off forces before they could regroup and join the fight in central Peleliu.
The 5th Marines moved across the airfield to the western edge of the lagoon. They separated the airfield area from the eastern peninsula. They created a line of attacking Marines across the eastern and northern part of the island, believed to be the center of the enemy’s strength.
Colonel Hanneken’s 7th Marines pushed south and divided the Japanese forces. Hanneken’s troops were fully engaged and mostly concealed against enemy observation.
It was becoming clear that the D-Day line objectives would not be met in either the north or south. General Rupertus was alarmed by the loss of his momentum, and he ordered the 2/7 (his last uncommitted infantry battalion), under Colonel Spencer Berger, into the fight. No commander onshore felt a need for the 2/7 Marines. Colonel Hanneken cleared an assembly area for them where they wouldn’t be in the way.
General Rupertus was now fully committed. He told his staff that he’d “shot his bolt.” On the crowded beachhead, more troops were not needed—they needed more room to maneuver them and more artillery.
Rupertus decided to land himself and the key elements of his command group onshore. His chief of staff, Colonel John Selden, convinced the general to stay on the flagship because it was too dangerous. So Rupertus ordered Colonel Selden ashore.
The shortage of LVTs stalled the timely landing of the following waves. Neither Selden’s small command post group nor Berger’s 2/7 Marines could get past the transfer line. The landing craft had to return to the ships, despite their orders to land.
At 1700, Colonel Nakagawa launched his counterattack. Marine commanders had been alerted to the Japanese capability to make an armored attack on D-Day and were well prepared. The enemy assault came from north of the airfield and headed south across the 1st Marines’ line on the eastern edge of the airfield clearing.
This attack went directly into the 5th Marines’ sector, where the 1/5 was dug in across the southern area of the airfield. Marines opened up on the enemy attackers’ infantry and tanks. A bazooka gunner in front hit two tanks. The CO of the 1/5 Marines had his tanks in defilade behind the front lines. They fired on the enemy armor, running through the front lines as they advanced. The Marines’ lines held, and they fired on the enemy infantry and tanks with all available weapons.
Major John Gustafson of the 2/5 was in the forward command post halfway across the airfield and had his tank platoon close at hand. While the enemy had not yet come into his zone, he launched a platoon of tanks into the fight. In minutes it was over. The enemy tanks were destroyed, and the Japanese infantry was ripped apart.
While Colonel Nakagawa’s attack was bold, it was a failure. Even where the Japanese tanks broke through Allied lines, the Marines did not retreat. Instead, all anti-tank fire of every caliber concentrated on the enemy armor. Japanese light tanks were blown apart into pieces on the battlefield. Over one hundred were destroyed, although that figure may be exaggerated because of the amount of fire directed their way. Each Marine anti-tank gunner and grenadier thought they destroyed each tank they fired at and reported it that way.
With the Japanese counterattack repulsed and the enemy in shambles, Marines resumed their attack. They moved north along the eastern half of the airfield and advanced halfway up the length of the clearing before stopping to re-organize for the night. This was the farthest advance of the day over favorable terrain on the division’s front. This advance provided the needed space for logistics and artillery deployment to support the next day’s attack.
But this quick advance left a hole in the right flank. The 3/5 Marines were supposed to keep contact with the north-facing 2/5. But 3/5 command and control had been destroyed. The battalion’s XO, Major Robert Ash, was killed earlier in the day from a direct hit into his LVT.
When the Japanese attack started, a
mortar barrage hit the 3/5 command post in the anti-tank ditch and killed several staff officers and caused the evacuation of the battalion commander. At 1700, the 3/5 Marine companies weren’t in contact with each other—nor their battalions.
The 5th Marines CO ordered his XO, Colonel Lewis Walt, to take command of the 3/5 and redeploy them in between the gap of the 5th and 7th Marines. Walt moved the 2nd Battalion’s reserve company to his right flank in a tie-in position to form a more continuous regimental line. By 2200, he came under several sharp counterattacks from central and southern defenders throughout the night.
Enemy attacks came from the north and south. None had any significant success but were persistent enough to require an ammunition resupply. At dawn, dozens of Japanese bodies laid ripped to pieces north of the Marine lines.
Elsewhere across the front, there were more menacing night counterattacks. None drove the Marines back or penetrated Allied lines in significant strength.
In the south, the 7th Marines expected substantial night attacks from the enemy battalion opposing them. Marines were dug in and in strength. They had communications to call in fire support, including naval gunfire and star shell illumination—they easily turned back the sporadic enemy attacks.
At the end of the first twelve hours ashore, the 1st Marine Division held its beachhead across their projected front. Marine positions were strong everywhere except on the extreme left flank. General Smith, from his forward command post had communication with all three regimental commanders. The report he received from Colonel Puller was not a realistic assessment of the 1st Marines’ weak hold on the Point. This was because of Colonel Puller’s own limited information.
Besides all three infantry regiments, the 1st Division had three battalions of light artillery emplaced onshore. All thirty tanks were also now onshore. The shore party was operating on the beach under sporatic enemy fire and full daylight observation. The division was preparing to press their advance on D +1. Their objective was to capture the commanding crests on the left, advance farther into the center, and destroy isolated enemy defenders in the south.
By the end of the day, at least two colonels on Peleliu had misleading information about their situations and gave inaccurate reports to their superiors. When General Smith finally got a telephone wire into the 1st Marines’ command post, he was told the regiment had secured the beachhead and was on the objective line. He was not told about the gaps in his lines nor of the gravity of the 1st Division’s struggle on the Point—where thirty-eight Marines battled to keep the position.
Colonel Nakagawa reported that the Marines’ landings attempt had been routed. He also reported that his brave counterattack had thrown the Marines into the sea.
The Umurbrogol Pocket
General Rupertus was irritated that after his failed efforts to land, his division reserve into the southern sector of the beachhead. Now he was informed that his northern sector—on the extreme left flank—needed reinforcements. Rupertus ordered the 2/7 into Colonel Puller’s sector to assist.
Division headquarters afloat had reported the Marine D-Day casualties had exceeded 1,100, of which 210 Marines were killed in action. While not a substantial percentage of the total divisional strength, this number threatened the overall cutting-edge strength. Most of those 1,100 casualties were from each of the division’s nine infantry battalions (with the exception of the center). General Rupertus was still not on the O-1 objective line—the first of his eight planned phase lines.
Rupertus had inaccurate information about the 1st Marines’ situation. The general was determined to get ashore and see what he could do to reignite the lost momentum. He had a broken ankle from a pre-assault training exercise. His foot was in a cast, but his gimpy leg dragging in a sandy trench would not hold him back from seeing the situation on Peleliu for himself.
On Colonel Nakagawa’s side, he saw a different situation from his high ground because of the incredible reports being sent out from his headquarters. The Marine landing force had not been routed. He watched while a division of Marines deployed across two miles of beach. While the Marines had been punished on D-Day, they were still in the fight.
Nakagawa predicted the next assault would be preceded by a hailstorm of naval artillery, gunfire, and aerial bombardments. Also, that they’d be supported by the US tanks that annihilated the Japanese armor on D-Day.
In Nakagawa’s D-Day counterattack, he lost one of his five infantry battalions.
Across Peleliu, he lost hundreds of beach defenders in fighting across the front, and in futile night attacks. Still, he had several thousand courageous, well-armed and well-trained soldiers ready to fight and die for the empire. They were deployed through strong defensive complexes and fortifications, with abundant underground support facilities. Nakagawa’s troops were determined to kill as many Marines as they could before they fell.
Colonel Nakagawa had the terrain advantage. He focused his defensive strategy around the occupation and organization of that terrain. Until he was driven from the commanding crests of the Point, he still had a dominant position. He could observe and direct hidden fire on the attackers while his forces were largely invisible to the Marines and their fire superiority. Continuing to hold this terrain was a key component of his overall defensive strategy.
The Marines were assaulting fortified positions, and precise fire preparations were needed. Marines on the left flank were under extreme pressure to advance rapidly, sacrificing speed for careful preparation. General Rupertus understood that enemy weapons and observation dominated the Marine position and troops were getting picked off at the enemy’s leisure. Rupertus’ concern for momentum was a priority and would save Marine lives.
The rapid advance burden was on the 1st Marines—on the left flank—and on the 5th in the airfield area. In the south, the 7th Marines already held the edge of the airfield’s terrain. The scrub jungle screened the regiment from enemy observation.
Colonel “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Marines had suffered the most casualties on D-Day. They fought through the most formidable terrain and assaulted the toughest positions. They had to attack and relieve Company K of the 3/1 on the Point and then assault the Pocket ridges north to south.
Puller’s Marines (aided by the 2/1) swung leftward and secured the built-up area between the airfield in the ridges. When Puller was at the foot of the cliffs, his Marines fought in a savage, scratch and scramble attack against the enemy troops in the ridges.
Puller closed the gaps on his left flank and swung his entire regiment north. With the help of the 3/1, he reinforced Company K on the Point. Then he moved north, keeping his left on the beach and his right close to the West Road, along the foot of the Pocket. While the terrain allowed for tank support, maneuverability was tight, and hard fighting was involved.
The rapid rate of movement along the boundary and the more open zone created a pressing need for reserves. Tactically, it was necessary to press east into and over the rough terrain and destroy enemy defenses. That job was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Marines and the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines. But more troops were still needed to move north and encircle the rugged landscape of the Umurbrogol Pocket area. By September 17, reserves were needed along the 1st Division’s western (left) advance, but neither division nor III Amphibious Corps had reserves.
The 3/1 Marines battled up easier terrain on the left flank. In the center, the 1/1 Marines advanced between the coral ridge and an open flat zone. One of their early surprises, as they approached the foot of the ridge area, was another enemy blockhouse. Admiral Oldendorf had reported that blockhouse destroyed from pre-landing naval gunfire, but the Marines who first encountered it reported the enemy placement as “not even having a mark on it.”
This blockhouse was part of an impressive defensive complex. It was connected and supported by a web of adjacent emplacements and pillboxes. It had four-foot-thick walls of reinforced concrete. The naval gunfire support team from the USS Mississippi
was called on to help. They annihilated the entire complex. The 1/1 Marines advanced again until running into the far more challenging Japanese ridge defense systems. Major Davis, in command of the 1/1 Marines (later to earn a Medal of Honor in Korea) said the attack into and along the ridges: “was the most difficult assignment I’d ever been tasked with.”
All three of the 1st Marines’ Battalions battled beside each other onto the Pocket and its wicked, cave-filled coral ridges. The initial reserve, the 2/7 Marines, was assigned to the 1st Marines and immediately thrown into the fight. Colonel Puller fed companies into the battle piecemeal. Shortly afterward, the 2/7 took the central zone of action between the 1st and 2nd Marine Battalions.
The 1st Marines continued to assault the stubborn enemy defenders in their underground caves and fortifications. Every new advance opened the Marines to new fire from the incredible number of cliffs and ridges and concealed positions in the caves above and below the newly won ground.
Nothing exemplified this tactical dilemma better than the September 19 seizure and withdrawal from Hill 100. This ridge bordered the Horseshoe Valley on the eastern limit of the Pocket. The 2/1 Marines landed with 240 Marines. Now they had only 90 Marines left when they were ordered to take Hill 100. The Japanese called it East Mountain (Higashiyama).
Marines were at first supported by tanks but lost that support when the leading two tanks slipped off the approach causeway. The Marines continued with only mortar support into the face of heavy machine gun and mortar fire. When the Marines reached the summit at twilight, they discovered the ridge’s northeast extension continued to even higher ground, where Japanese troops poured fire on the hill.