by Daniel Wrinn
The Marines fared better. They learned in earlier campaigns how to integrate artillery and infantry in a close protective over-watch of their tanks and to keep the “human bullet” suicide squads at bay. While enemy mines and guns took their toll on the Shermans, only one Marine tank sustained damage from a Japanese suicide attack.
Colonel Arthur Stewart commanded the 1st Tank Battalion on Okinawa. His unit had fought with distinction at Peleliu six months earlier, despite shipping shortfalls that kept a third of his tanks out of the fight. Stewart insisted on keeping the battalion’s older M-4A2 Shermans because their twin (General Motors) diesel engines were safer in combat: “The tanks were not so easily set on fire and blown up under enemy fire,” Stewart wrote after the war.
Colonel Rob Denig preferred the newer Sherman model M-4A3 for his 6th Tank Battalion. Denig’s tank crews liked the greater horsepower provided by the water-cooled Ford V-8 engines. They considered the reversion to gasoline from diesel an acceptable risk. The 6th Tank Battalion faced its greatest challenge against Admiral Ota’s naval guns and mines on the Oroku Peninsula.
Sherman tanks were harshly criticized in the European theater for coming up short against the heavier German Tiger Tanks. But they were ideal for island fighting in the Pacific. On Okinawa, the Sherman’s limitations were obvious. Their 75mm gun was too light against most of Ushijima’s fortifications. But the new M-7 self-propelled 155mm gun worked well. Shermans were never known for their armor protection. At thirty-three tons, their strength was more in mobility and reliability. Japanese anti-tank weapons and mines reached the height of their deadliness on Okinawa. The Sherman’s thin-skinned weak points (1.5-inch armor on the rear and sides) caused considerable concern.
Marine tank crews sheathed the sides of their tanks with lumber to thwart hand-lobbed Japanese magnetic mines as early as the Marshalls. By Okinawa, the Shermans were draped with spot-welded track blocks, sandbags, wire mesh, and clusters of large nails—designed to enhance armor protection.
Both tank battalions had their Shermans configured with dozer blades (valuable for cave fighting), but neither deployed with flame tanks. Despite the rave reports of the USN Mark I turret-mounted flame system installed on the Shermans in the Iwo Jima battle, there was no retrofit program for the Okinawa-bound Marine tank units. All flame tanks on Okinawa were provided courtesy of the US Army’s 713th Armored Flamethrower Battalion. Company B of that unit supported the Marines with three brand-new H1 flame tanks. Each carried 290 gallons of napalm thickened fuel—good for two-and-a-half minutes of flame at a range of 200 yards.
Marines used the new T-6 “tank flotation devices” to get the initial waves of Shermans ashore on L-Day. The T-6 was a series of floating tanks welded around the hull. They had a provisional steering device that made use of the tracks and electric bilge pumps. Once ashore, the crew jettisoned the bulky rig with built-in explosive charges.
The April 1 landing for the 1st Tank Battalion was truly “April Fool’s Day.” An LST (Landing Ship Tank) captain carrying six Shermans equipped with a T-6 launched the vehicles an hour late and eleven miles out to sea. It took them five hours to reach the beach (losing two tanks on the reef at ebb tide). Most of Colonel Stewart’s other Shermans made it ashore before noon, but some of his reserves could not make it across the reef for another forty-eight hours.
The Sixth Tank Battalion had better luck. Their LST skippers launched their T-6 tanks on time and close in. Two tanks were lost: one sank after its main engine failed, and the other broke a track and swerved into a hole. The other Shermans surged ashore and were ready to roll.
Enemy gunners and mine warfare experts knocked out three Marine Shermans in the battle. Many more tanks took damage from the fighting but were repaired by the hard-working maintenance crews. Because of their ingenuity, the assault infantry battalions never lacked armored firepower, shock action, and mobility.
Amphibious Reconnaissance
A series of smaller amphibious operations around the periphery of Okinawa helped contribute to victory. These landing forces varied in size from the company level to an entire division. Each reflected the apex of amphibious expertise learned in the Pacific theater by 1945. These landings produced fleet anchorages, auxiliary airfields, fire support bases, and expeditionary radar sites, giving an early warning to the fleet against the dreaded kamikazes.
The Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion commanded by Major James Jones provided outstanding service to landing force commanders in a series of audacious exploits in the Marianas, Marshalls, Gilberts, and on Iwo Jima. Before L-Day on Okinawa, these Marines supported the Army’s 77th Division with stealthy landings on Awara Saki, Keise Shima, and other islands in the East China Sea. Later in the battle, this recon unit executed night landings on the islands guarding the eastern approaches to Nakagusuku Wan (later known as Buckner Bay).
On one of those islands—Tsugen Jima, the main Japanese outpost—Jones and his recon Marines had a ferocious firefight before he could extract his men through the darkness. The Army’s 105th Infantry stormed ashore on Tsugen Jima three days later and eliminated the stronghold and all resistance. On April 13, Jones’ Marines then sailed northwest and executed a night landing on Minna Shima to seize a firebase supporting the 77th’s main landing on Ie Shima.
The post-L-Day amphibious operations with the 27th and 77th Divisions were helpful—but not decisive. By mid-April, the Tenth Army had waged a campaign of massive firepower against the primary Japanese defenses. General Buckner chose not to employ amphibious resources to break the gridlock. Buckner’s long deliberation of whether to use the “amphib card” was not helped by a lack of flexibility by the Joint Chiefs, who kept strings attached to the use of the Marine divisions. The Japanese Thirty-second Army in southern Okinawa was the enemy’s center of gravity in the Ryukyu Islands. But still, the Joint Chiefs let weeks pass before scrubbing earlier commitments to send the 2nd Marine Division into attack Kikai Shima—an obscure island north of Okinawa.
General Buckner used the 8th Marines in a pair of amphibious landings on June 3 to seize outlying islands for early warning radar facilities against the kamikaze raids. Then, the commanding general attached the reinforced regiment to the 1st Marine Division for the final overland assaults on the south.
Buckner consented to the 6th Marine Division’s request to conduct its own amphibious assault below Naha to surprise the Naval Guard Force on the Oroku Peninsula. This was a jewel of an operation in which the Marines used every component of amphibious warfare to their great advantage.
If the 77th Division’s amphibious landings on Ie Shima or the 6th Marine Division’s landing on Oroku had been executed separately from the Okinawan campaign, they would both have received major historical study for the size of forces, brilliant orchestration, and intensity of the fighting.
While both operations provided valuable objectives: unrestricted access to Naha’s ports and Ie Shima airfields. They were only secondary to the more extensive campaign and barely received a passing mention. The Oroku operation would be the final unopposed amphibious landing of the war.
Legacy of Okinawa
The exhausted Marines on Okinawa showed little joy at the official proclamation of victory. The death throes of the Thirty-second Army kept the battlefield deadly. The last of General Ushijima’s infantry may have died defending Yuza Dake and Kunishi Ridge, but the remaining mishmash of support troops sold their lives dearly to the last man.
On June 18, diehard enemy survivors wounded Major Earl Cook, CO of the 1/22 Marines, and Colonel Hunter Hurst, CO of the 3/7. Even Day and Bertoli, who’d survived so long in that crater on Sugar Loaf, watched their luck run out in the final days. Private First Class Bertoli died in action. Corporal Day was seriously wounded by a satchel charge and required urgent evacuation to the hospital ship Solace.
The butcher’s bill on Okinawa was costly to both sides. Over 120,000 Japanese died defending the island, while 7,000 surrendered at the end. The native Okinaw
ans suffered the worst. Recent studies show that over 150,000 civilians died in the fighting—one-third of the island’s population. The Tenth Army suffered over 45,000 combat casualties, including 7,264 dead Americans. An additional 26,000 nonviolent casualties were incurred: primarily cases of combat fatigue.
The Marine Corps’ overall casualties: air, ship detachments, and ground were 19,821. In addition, 562 members of the Navy Medical Corps were wounded or killed. General Shepherd described the corpsmen on Okinawa as: “the finest and most courageous men that I’d ever known. They did a magnificent job.”
Losses within the infantry (as usual) were disproportionate with other Allied outfits. Colonel Shapley reported his losses as 110 percent in the 4th Marines. This number represents the replacements and their high attrition in the battle. Corporal Day of the 2/22 Marines experienced the death of his battalion and regimental commanders, plus the killing and wounding of his two company commanders, seven platoon commanders, and every other member of his rifle squad.
The legacy of this epic battle can be defined through the following points:
Foreshadow to the Invasion of Japan
Admiral Spruance described the Okinawan battle as: “the bloody and hellish prelude to the invasion of Japan.” As wicked a nightmare as Okinawa was, every survivor knew the subsequent battles on Honshu and Kyushu would be worse. The operational plans for invading Japan specified the use of surviving veterans from Iwo Jima and Luzon. The reward for the Okinawan survivors would be to land on the main island of Honshu. Most of the men were fatalistic—no man’s luck could last through those hellish infernos.
Mastery of amphibious tactics
The massive and nearly flawless amphibious assault on Okinawa happened thirty years (to the month) after the disaster at Gallipoli in World War I. By 1945, the Allied forces had refined this difficult naval mission into an art form. Admiral Nimitz had every advantage in place for Okinawa: specialized ships and landing craft, a proven doctrine, mission-oriented weapons systems, flexible logistics, trained shock troops, and unity of command. Everything clicked and everything worked. The projection (and execution) of 60,000 combat troops landed ashore on L-Day validated an amphibious doctrine earlier considered suicidal.
Attrition style warfare
Ignoring the great opportunities for maneuver and surprise available in the amphibious task force, the Tenth Army executed most assaults on Okinawa using an unimaginative attrition style of warfare, which played to the Japanese defenders’ strength. This unrealistic reliance on firepower and siege tactics only prolonged the fighting. The Oroku Peninsula and Ie Shima Landings (despite being successful) comprise the only division-level amphibious assaults after L-Day. Also, the few night attacks made in unison by the Army and Marine forces (which were successful) were not encouraged. The Tenth Army squandered several opportunities for tactical innovations that could have hastened a breakthrough into enemy defenses.
Unity of service
Excluding squabbles between the 77th Infantry Division and 1st Marine Division after the Marines’ seizure of Shuri Castle (in the Army’s zone), the battle for Okinawa represented joint service cooperation at its finest. This was General Buckner’s finest achievement, and General Geiger continued with this level of teamwork after Buckner was impaled through the chest and killed in action. The battle of Okinawa today is still a model of study in inter-service cooperation for succeeding generations of military professionals.
The best training
Marines deployed in Okinawa received the most practical and thoroughly advanced training of the war. Well-seasoned and battle-hardened division and regimental commanders anticipated Okinawa’s requirements for cave warfare. They built-up areas to conduct realistic rehearsals and training. This battle produced few surprises.
Many Marines who survived Okinawa went on to top positions of leadership that influenced the Marine Corps for the next two decades. Two Marine Corps commandants emerged from this hellish ordeal: General Lemuel Shepherd of the 6th Marine Division and Colonel Leonard Chapman, CO of the 4/11 Marines. Oliver Smith and Vernon McGee were promoted to the rank of four-star general. At least seventeen others achieved the rank of lieutenant general—including George Axtell, Alan Shapley, Ed Snedeker, and Victor Krulak.
Corporal James Day recovered from his wounds and returned to Okinawa forty years later as a Major General in command of all Marine Corps bases on the island.
During the taping of the battle’s fiftieth anniversary, General Victor Krulak gave a fitting epitaph to the brave men who gave their lives on Okinawa. Speaking on camera, he said: “The cheerfulness with which they went to their death has stayed with me forever. What is it that makes them all the same? I watched them in Korea, I watched them in Vietnam, and it’s the same. American youth is one hell of a lot better than he is usually credited.”
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