by Adel Beshara
AN ANALYSIS OF FAYEZ’S ACCOUNT
Clearly, Fayez harbored some pent up frustrations and petulance well before his public confrontation with Sa’adeh. The intensity and gravity of his allegations clearly attest to this. No less important was Fayez’s intentness to blame the dispute entirely on Sa’adeh instead of taking some responsibility for his own actions. He dodges the charge of ideological deviation leveled against him and raises new issues that were not part of the original disagreement. Veering the row in a different direction may have been the motive. Depending on one’s perspective, this could be a sign of weakness stemming from an inability to cope with the core issue or the mark of a deliberate tactic to push Sa’adeh into a defensive position.
More significantly, the intellectual substance of Fayez’s response raised (or was thought to raise by some) fundamental issues that struck at the core of the Party’s outlook. For the sake of manageability, these issues are set out and analyzed under five headings:
1. BREACH OF THE “CONTRACT”
The first fundamental issue was breach of the “contract”. Before we discuss this issue, we must observe that the SSNP was founded based on a contract between its founder, Antun Sa’adeh, and the members who accepted his call. The terms of this contract are stated explicitly in the preamble of the Party’s constitution:
The SSNP is founded on the basis of a contract between the legislator (al-shari’), who originated the idea of Syrian social nationalism and all those who have accepted it, on condition that the formulator of the principles of the Syrian social nationalist renaissance shall be the leader of the of the Party for life, and that all those who believe in its principles and mission shall therefore become members of the Party, defend its cause, and give absolute support and allegiance to the leader, his legislations and constitutional administration.
No other political party in the Arab World, and perhaps in the entire world, has been founded on a contract of this kind. Even totalitarian parties are not exempt from this criterion since absolute power in those parties is often the product of strength, fear, and sheer force or the subtler forms of deception, cronyism, and persuasion. With the SSNP, members were invited to join the party based on a written “contract” that clearly and unequivocally defined exactly what they were expected to do and where their loyalty must lie. No hidden clauses, small print, or catches were involved, and the members were notified of the terms and meaning of the “contract” before joining. The rationale behind the contract was to ensure strict conformity to the Party’s ideology as defined by its originator (i.e. Sa’adeh), and by extension, impede anyone from changing or tampering with its principles.
One of Fayez’s major grievances enunciated in Whither To? is that Sa’adeh had committed a breach that went to the root of the “contract” by “changing” the Party’s ideology without the consent of the members. Fayez classified this as an act of gross misconduct and dishonesty:
[The changes] amount to an application in our country of the principle of breaching of treaties and contracts at the discretion of the individual, without any justifications or legal rights … It is a replication of the actions of recent tyrants. What Sa’adeh did does not, in any sense, flow from the Syrian heritage, which was, in its finest manifestations, a heritage based on legality and legitimacy.16
A breach of contract is a serious matter. Morally reprehensible, it could set a bad precedent if left unchallenged: especially when a psychological element is involved and the contract is not about only promising but about the expectations of the parties of one another in a mutually beneficial deal.17 This is commonly referred to in the legal and political realms as a “psychological contract” whereby the parties understand their contractual obligations to encompass general moral and social norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.18 The psychological contract is, by definition, subjective, and its terms do not depend on actual or even constructive mutual agreement.
Fayez’s allegation of breach of contract against Sa’adeh would be completely justified if not for his narrow and somewhat lopsided interpretation of the “contract”. For some reason, or by mistake, he saw the “contract” primarily in commercial terms as a negotiated deal between two parties (Sa’adeh and the Party members), and thus subject to the elementary process of making a contract: offer, acceptance, consideration, and a mutual intent to be bound. This is not how the “contract” with Sa’adeh was formed. The fundamental character of the “contract” is a moral psychological one based on normative notions: trust, faith, support, mutual respect, and obligation. It is not based on an exchange economy of give and take. Although it is intended to guide both the conduct of the ruler (Sa’adeh) and the relations that ought to exist between him and the ruled (members), it is not a “political contract” in the traditional sense of the word. In terms of actual governing, a political contract, which is an actual contract, “is what is immediately required to keep the governor in check”.19 In the present case, the purpose of the contract was to keep the governed in check versus the governor. This priority reversal stemmed from the well-founded fear that the Party’s ideology had to be protected from potential saboteurs and that the only way of doing this was binding the members directly to its originator. It was assumed, logically, that the originator of a new idea is likely to be more faithful and concerned for its safety than any other person.
The contention that Sa’adeh’s unilateral “changes” to the Party’s ideology amounted to a breach of faith is hard to sustain. The allegation might hold if the “contract” had been of the common kind, and thus would have proscribed any party from changing the terms of the agreement without the consent of the other party or parties. In this case, however, the contract contained no prohibition clause. It was not even implied in its concise text. The terms of the contract were framed purposely in a way that gave one side a clear advantage over the other. As such, it should be treated for what it is: a unilateral contract whereby, at the point of its forming, one party was expected to perform certain acts in the pursuit of a particular aim created and specified to it by the other party. Moreover, since no formal negotiations between the two parties were involved, the contract automatically put the onus of responsibility on the accepting (members) rather than on the offering party (Sa’adeh).
Fayez pointed out with perfect justification that, if Sa’adeh could breach the contractual agreement with such ease and simplicity, what guarantee was there that he would not do it again? At stake was not only Sa’adeh’s right to “tamper” with the contract, but also whether members were entitled to challenge him. This valid question needs to be addressed carefully. The answer is simple. Under the terms of the contract, Sa’adeh was obligated strictly to the criterion of his offer: “the idea of Syrian social nationalism”. Provided he adhered to this criterion, he was legally and morally responsible. The point Fayez missed is that the contract did not state, explicitly or implicitly, that Sa’adeh could not alter or modify the “details” or contents of this criterion. As the formulator of the idea, he was, ethically speaking, entitled to develop and re-shape it as he saw fit provided he stayed within the parameters of its core framework. He could meddle with the “offer”, but he could not change or negate it. The right to meddle arises from his status as the legislator (shari’) of the offer. Divesting Sa’adeh of this right, as Fayez attempted to do, (1) reduced Sa’adeh’s legislative prerogative in the “contract” to almost non-existent and (2) rendered the “offer” virtually static and impossible to modify by its originator. Thus, practically, according to Fayez, Sa’adeh had no right to modify the particulars of the offer even if the modification was necessary and did not bear on the offer’s core substance. It also meant that Sa’adeh could exercise his legislative right under the contract only and strictly with the approval of the members even though no such condition was stipulated in it.
Fayez’s insistence on consultation with the members was both impractical and unfair. It was impractical because the members, having
originally played no part in the making of the offer, were not entitled to negotiate something they did not negotiate in the first place. Giving them a negotiating role after accepting the contract would also have invited opportunists and interlopers to steer the offer in a different direction from that intended by its originator, and thus, annul the original purpose of the contract. It was unfair because it effectively put the members on an equal par with Sa’adeh even though the basic idea on which the offer was predicated (i.e. Syrian social nationalism) was solely and entirely Sa’adeh’s.
This brings us to the final point: did members have rights under the contract, and, if so, when and how? As stated above, the contract was framed deliberately in Sa’adeh’s favor to protect the idea-offer from the tampering and modification of others. Under its terms, the burden of performance lay mainly with the members, but this did not necessarily render them completely helpless. Members were entitled to break the contract if Sa’adeh “changed” (as opposed to modify) the offer without their consent or if he reneged on his promise to dedicate himself to the Party’s cause. Moreover, if any member was not satisfied with modifications to the contract, he could choose to opt out. Fayez described the “opt out” option as a “mockery” that reduced the member to a mere “puppet in Sa’adeh’s hands”.20 Sa’adeh did not respond to this allegation, as overall, he considered the integrity of the Party’s ideology more important than the contribution and services of any individual member.
2. AMENDMENT OF THE IDEOLOGY
The second major reservation raised by Fayez relates to the actual amendments or “changes” to the Party’s ideology. As indicated above, Fayez regarded those “changes” as a “coup” that transformed the SSNP into a new entity with a different character and identity. The expression “coup” was used to convey a sense of sharp break from a past or an existing condition to another. For Fayez, it differed from evolution:
It is axiomatic that evolution occurs when the seeds for all subsequent phases exist in the previous phases. As for “emergent evolution”, during which entirely new properties, features and phenomena not included in the previous phases emerge at certain critical stages or levels in the course of evolution, is not an evolution at all but a coup in every sense of the word. And if, in the final stages, something contradicts with the essence of the first stages, then it is a complete coup as sharp as the contradiction itself.21
According to Fayez, the “coup” occurred at various levels of the Party’s program and ideology. It involved:
A change to the explanation of the Party’s Program.
A change to the Fifth Fundamental Principle to incorporate Iraq in the east and Cyprus in the West within Syria’s national frontiers.
A change to the Seventh Fundamental Principle with the adding of a “cultural” element.
A change to the Eighth Fundamental Principle with the adding a new sentence.
Does the above actually amount to a coup? Let us examine the facts. Concerning the Party’s Program, the original explanation stated:
The central theme in the program of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party is national revival, which includes guaranteeing the life of the Syrian nation and the creation of the conditions necessary for its progress and unity…
The new explanation:
The central theme in the program of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party is national revival, which includes laying down the foundations of the concept of nationhood in Syria and the guaranteeing of the life of the Syrian nation and the creation of the conditions necessary for its progress and unity…
Why Fayez considered the add-on “lying down the foundations of the concept of nationhood in Syria” a drastic change is bewildering. Was the SSNP not a nationalist movement? Was the concept of nationhood not at the essence of its revival program? Did Sa’adeh not write a book specifically on the concept of the nation (The Rise of Nations) because its meaning in Syria was ambiguous? The additional sentence merely reaffirmed something that already existed. It did not affect the essence of the Party’s program or change its meaning. Only if the Party was not “nationalist” and had suddenly decided to become nationalist could we call it a coup. In that case, it would constitute a paradigm shift in the sense laid down by Thomas Kuhn:22 a different mental outlook of the world.
Except for one amendment discussed below, all the other amendments to the Party’s principles involved minor, scattered sentence adjustments. It would be tedious to reproduce all of them here. However, as an example, we will consider the amendment to the Seventh Fundamental Principle. The original wording of that Principle was:
The Syrian Social Nationalist movement derives its inspiration from the talents of the Syrian nation and its political national history.
In 1947, Sa’adeh “changed” it to:
The Syrian Social Nationalist movement derives its inspiration from the talents of the Syrian nation and its cultural political national history.
Fayez expressed vigorous objection to the inclusion of “cultural” in the Principle’s text. He regarded it as a suffocating restriction on members’ right to cultural freedom and as an attempt to impose a single cultural outlook on the nation. Why he would infer that is both baffling and bizarre. Sa’adeh added “cultural” to highlight Syria’s rich cultural heritage and to stimulate greater interest into the country’s cultural roots. The amendment was the product of an exhaustive study23 on Syria’s intellectual and cultural history that Sa’adeh had undertaken during his Argentine exile. It was not a spur-of-the-moment decision. Even if it were a spontaneous decision, what harm could be done in demanding cultural recognition or in directing the eyes of the country’s intellectuals toward the nation’s culture? Is culture not an intrinsic part of national life? Is it practical to speak of national revival without reference to culture? The irony is that, on various occasions, Fayez had produced material on Syria’s cultural past and took great pride in it.24
To the extent that the amendment in question did not change the meaning of the Principle or alter its purpose and general function, it cannot be classified as a complete change. This applies also to the perfunctory adjustments made to the other Principles.
One amendment deserves special attention: the enlargement of Syria’s national frontiers. This amendment can easily be construed as a breach to the “contract” if the background details are not clearly known.
Until 1947, Sa’adeh had defined Syria under the Fifth Fundamental Principle as
…geographic territory in which the Syrian nation was formed. It has geographical boundaries rendering Syria a country distinctly separate and independent from any other country. It extends from the Taurus Range in the north to the Suez Canal in the south including the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba, and from the Syrian [Mediterranean] Sea in the west to the desert in the east until its junction with the Tigris.
This definition, which is really an extension of the Bilad as-Sham concept that early Arab geographers formulated,25 was widely accepted in the social and literary milieu in which Sa’adeh was born and raised. Even so, in the 1940s, Sa’adeh began to question its validity and authenticity. While the northern and western boundaries were more or less definite and clear, the southern and eastern frontiers varied from one author to another. The final line of demarcation depended on the political arrangements that prevailed in Syria and on the movements of the nomadic peoples living in these parts of the country.26 Sa’adeh, who was anchored in the search for national clarity, regarded this discrepancy as more than a problem of intellectual inconsistency: it was a dilemma of national proportion.
Consequently, he embarked on a long investigation into the issue, which he described as “almost equivalent to an exploration into historical archaeology ... [and] a kind of search through the layers of history as painstaking as that which the archaeologist conducts when he searches through the strata of the earth”.27 He did not elaborate fully on the scope and character of his investigation. Nor did he reveal precisely when a
nd where it was undertaken. Nevertheless, a shift in his thinking style is discernible as early as 1942.28 Upon the completion of his investigation, Sa’adeh proclaimed a second definition: Syria’s new boundaries now coincided with those of the Fertile Crescent. Thereby, Bilad al-Sham and Mesopotamia were merged into a single nation. This meant that Iraq was no longer a politically separate entity from Syria but part of it. The incorporation of the eastern part of the Fertile Crescent also brought the regions of Kuwait and Shat-al-Arab into the Syrian orbit. The other significant change was the incorporation of Cyprus in the west.
Sa’adeh justified those modifications on sociological and geographical grounds. Sociologically, the Fertile Crescent was perceived as a single organic unit: a community of people without any great variation in their physical or psychological make-up. He considered this a new actuality arising from a single social interaction process and a common sense of belonging. In other words, social assimilation in the Fertile Crescent was never limited to one part to the exclusion of the other. There was always contact between the groups that lived in the area, and there were often conflicts because of the attempts of these groups to establish control over the others. To exclude the Chaldaeans and the Assyrians, from whom the name “Syria” probably derives, would be a grave error, and to regard the Chaldaeans and the Aramaeans as two separate people was illogical because, in essence, “they were, in origin and speech, one people”.29
Sa’adeh conceded that warfare was a common denominator in the relationship between the groups that settled in the Fertile Crescent. He observed, however, that such warfare never assumed a “national” character. Rather, “they were internal wars, a struggle for supremacy among the powerful tribes and dynasties within the one nation which was in the making and which later attained maturity”.30 Each community strove to extend its control over the entire region and to establish its own hegemony, though few succeeded. This led to civil strife between the groups and conflict within the one community. For Sa’adeh, the political development of Syria had not always been stable and various centers of power had emerged not because of separate national loyalties, but because of lust for power.