by Adel Beshara
Conclusion
The story of Sayegh’s “Party Years” is a neglected period in an eventful life. It is worth telling and knowing if we are to understand Sayegh’s character and convictions. The roots of Sayegh’s subsequent life and thinking are planted firmly in that period. His hardline opposition to Zionism, pragmatic attitude toward pan-Arabism, advocacy for positive nationalism, acrimony for Communism, and affection for Existentialism are grounded in his early years when he engaged in a broad range of academic and political inquiries and debates as a student at the American University of Beirut and as a pupil in the national ideological school of Antun Sa’adeh. After 1950, Sayegh built on this dual exposure: perfecting certain things and discarding others, yet never breaking completely or even partially from it.
I
Three distinctive features mark Sayegh’s character and the course of his Party years. The first is his exceptional intelligence and oratory skills. He was a magnificent speaker. His ability to present logical and coordinated arguments in a pleasing manner and to display an elocutionary style of delivery common to great speakers earned him the respect and admiration of superiors and peers alike. No less important was Sayegh’s encyclopedic knowledge, which he used efficiently and effectively to convey his message with logical proof. His audience was often captivated by his ability to improvise with thoroughness and incisiveness and to speak on a wide variety of subjects with almost flawless grammar. Sayegh was a gifted orator by instinct, but this gift may have remained dormant or marginal if not for his exposure to nationalism, which depends on oratory power or ensnarement by a political party that valued and encouraged oratory and public debate. The Syrian National Party provided Sayegh with both the opportunity to develop his oratory skills and a stable platform from which he displayed his speaking power.
The second feature to be considered is Sayegh’s activism and advocacy. The period of 1938-1947 was the most intense phase in Sayegh’s lengthy career as an activist. During those years, he established himself as a campaigner for social and political reform, an advocate for national unity, and a crusader against Zionism and Communism. Inspired by Sa’adeh’s exemplary leadership and selfless devotion, Sayegh became a senior leader in Sa’adeh’s Party. His meteoric rise to occupy important positions in two of its most vital departments, culture and information, gave him control over party publications, including its newspaper an-Nahda, access to its varied resources, and the opportunity to act as its primary spokesman on public issues. His record and performance were impeccable. Despite the war, the overbearing control of the French, and mounting academic commitments, Sayegh remained active on several fronts. He was both outspoken and passionate about the principles and key message he was assigned to convey. The breadth and depth of his political and social activism were so intense that his presence was felt well beyond the parameters of the Party.
The third feature is the asymmetrical trajectory that Sayegh’s intellectual development assumed between 1938 and 1947. This asymmetry is evident in his determination to pursue and attempt to reconcile between two conflicting currents: (1) a society-first nationalism and (2) an individual-foremost existentialism. The two currents had some points of similarity with each other, but also several noteworthy points of departure. That Sayegh would endeavor to strike a balance between them indicates that he found each current agreeable, in one way or another, with some aspects of his personal convictions and ingrained values. His insatiable desire for national unity was interpolated with an inner yearning for moral and individual self-perfection in an act of delicate balancing. However, the contradictions proved insurmountable and eventually caught up with him. He found himself on a collision course with Sa’adeh, who balked at the idea of subordinating society to existential and individual self-perfection. During the course of their confrontation, the two men discussed and debated many issues relating to ideology, freedom, and the final aim of human existence, but the disagreement proved more intractable than anyone could have imagined. When given an ultimatum to toe the Party’s line or leave, Sayegh elected to leave despite some hesitation and reluctance. His ejection from the Party in December 1947 ended almost a decade of accomplishments, but much more remained to be accomplished without the SSNP.
II
Sayegh’s rise and fall from the SSNP evoke several intriguing questions:
Where do individual rights inside political parties start and end?
To what extent do personality differences influence internal party disputes?
Is absolute leadership sometimes inevitable, and if so, under what circumstances?
What kind of relationship should exist between the individual and society?
Is freedom of thought more important than the general/public interest?
How does ideology relate to philosophy?
These and other questions, which are debated extensively to this day, emerged patently during the course of Sayegh’s disagreement with Sa’adeh. The two men discussed and debated them in a succession of private meetings. To make sense of this disagreement, it is important to identify and understand the factors that influenced Sayegh’s thinking and the context in which he formulated his responses. Five factors stand out:
Sa’adeh’s absence: The first and perhaps most important factor was Sa’adeh’s absence during Sayegh’s Party years. This absence, due to a forced exile, (a) deprived Sayegh of the opportunity to master the Party under Sa’adeh’s close supervision and (b) gave Sayegh power and free rein before he had gained sufficient grasp of the national ideology. Consequently, Sayegh formed a conception of the Party that fell below, or did not meet, Sa’adeh’s expectations. He was left to his own devices for far too long and fell under the influence of two unpropitious currents: (a) an internal current that metamorphosed the Party into a parochial agenda, and (b) an external current that frowned at collective ideologies and promoted a mostly individualist perspective.
Such a situation would not likely have arisen if Sa’adeh had been around to advise Sayegh or to identify the potential problems associated with both currents for him. No doubt, an intimate introduction to Sa’adeh’s philosophical views would have allowed Sayegh to arrive at a more balanced perspective than the one he did.
The Second World War: The new climate of opinion and resurgent spirit of anti-nationalism and anti-collectivism generated by the Second World War bore directly on Sayegh either through his academic pursuits or through his personal interest in moral philosophy. Exposure to a dramatic change of perspectives can be both mentally and emotionally draining. It often puts an intellectual in a predicament that involves the reassessment of values and propositions. Some intellectuals may weather the storm, while others may not.
In the case of Sayegh, it perched on a fragile balance. Although he did not cave in to the new climate and continued to associate with the SSNP, his perception of the Party’s national doctrine underwent a series of rapid metamorphosis. The notion of “positive nationalism” began to creep into his nationalist discourse coupled with new concepts and moral values congenial to the post-World War climate. Also, his previous politically charged method gradually tapered off to make way for a more human-centered approach grounded in universal norms and principles.
Existential philosophy: Sayegh’s brush with this philosophy reinvented by the War while Sa’adeh was absent, contributed vastly to his disagreement with his idol and leader. It is claimed that the irresistible attraction of Existentialism is such that, once a person finds a way into its labyrinth, it is difficult to find a way out. Its accent on freedom, individuality, free choice, and personal will is a powerful and binding force that cannot be easily shaken off. For those seeking an exit from the woes of reality, it can be a life-changing experience from which it is hard to turn back or stop believing in it. This seemed to be clearly the case with Sayegh, and thus, it should not be overlooked or underestimated. However, contrary to established beliefs, its significance in his disagreement with Sa’adeh lay not in the ideolog
ical dimension, but in the psychological dimension. For even if Sayegh had acquiesced to Sa’adeh’s demand to desist from Existentialist assertions inside the Party, their disagreement would not have dissipated because Existentialism exercised such a psychological hold on Sayegh that it would have resurfaced. In other words, the new perspective on the world that Sayegh had obtained from Existentialism rendered his clash with Sa’adeh both inevitable and insurmountable.
Sayegh’s academic stature. Academics generally approach political party work differently from ordinary members. They can be more “deviant” and sharper than others and prone to express their personal views on party political matters. Academics are likely to ask difficult questions, broach complex issues, and be eclectic about answers. They are inclined, by training and practice, to demand greater freedom, resist authoritarian directives, and be more attuned to political perspectives and realities. Their priorities and values are also different. Most importantly, academic intellectuals generally do not like to admit defeat or to backtrack. Their sense of pride and self-worth can sometimes be a source of irritation and make them fiercely competitive. These features cannot be ignored or masked when pondering Sayegh’s disagreement with Sa’adeh.
Not only do we need to consider Sayegh’s academic character, but we also need to consider the breadth and aura of his academic achievement and the sense of elation and self-pride he obtained from it. It should be coupled as well with the aspects of Sayegh’s personality, which was alarmingly stubborn and very argumentative. These traits, which seemingly made him an excellent speaker and an academic, made him impervious to the authority and power of others.
Sa’adeh’s homecoming: If Sa’adeh’s absence was critical, his homecoming on March 2, 1947 was decisive. The reason is fundamental because Sa’adeh’s return turned Sayegh’s life upside down in a most undermining and unexpected way. Until then, and for almost three years, Sayegh had occupied a central position in the Party. His oratory power and dynamic performance had gained him wide popularity and acclaim at all levels of the Party and beyond. He enjoyed a free hand in all its cultural affairs and the overwhelming support of his superiors in almost all his initiatives.
With Sa’adeh’s return, all of this ended abruptly. Sa’adeh eclipsed Sayegh almost instantly starting with his extempore and fiery return speech. His impact was so strong and far-reaching that Sayegh’s stature inside the Party dwindled to almost nothing overnight. He faded from the limelight for the rest of 1947. His public appearances and writings were markedly reduced, and with that, the attention and affection he once commanded.
The psychological impact of such a transformation on Sayegh, coupled with the inferiority complex that usually results from it, is a pertinent factor. The loss of authority or strength can lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty and even melancholy. It can breed a sense of meaninglessness, contempt, and grievance and lead to negative and false assumptions. Empirically, it is difficult to establish how much Sayegh was hurt by his dwindling fortunes, but he could not have continued to feel as comfortable and secure as he once did.
By looking at Sayegh’s clash with Sa’adeh from this broader perspective, two facts emerge: (1) the clash was not a spur of the moment episode, but the product of cumulative factors that spanned an entire spectrum of psychological, historical and ideological concerns; and (2) the clash was somewhat inevitable given the divergent paths that each man had pursued afar from each other, especially from towards the end of World War II. Even if Sayegh had relented and bowed to Sa’adeh’s demands, it would only have deferred the encounter, not averted it. The divide between the two men was so wide it seemed insurmountable. Eventually, their divergent worldviews were bound to clash, as Sayegh reached a point of no return with Existentialism and his perspectives on life underwent a dramatic change.
III
Sayegh’s fallout with Sa’adeh, whom he held in the highest regard until their disagreement, transcended the standard boundaries of internal party politics and backroom business. Sayegh pushed Sa’adeh to the limit. He did not accept Sa’adeh’s explanations at face value and challenged him with pointed questions and not-so-subtle suggestions about the Party’s central vision. During his almost six-month debate with Sa’adeh, he committed to a particular viewpoint and made himself very clear to his leader. Regardless whether he was right or wrong, the fact that he revealed himself to Sa’adeh and took the challenge right up to him attests to his intelligence, strong character, and self-confidence and belief in his views. Despite all this, Sayegh came second while Sa’adeh won the contest decisively. Sa’adeh retained full control of the Party and managed to ostracize Sayegh with the minimum of fuss and repercussions.
Any number of reasons can explain this outcome: not the least of which was Sayegh’s intransigence. Contrary to early beliefs, Sayegh, not Sa’adeh, leaned toward a stubborn and rugged position. Sayegh’s unbreakable attitude and the relentlessness with which he pursued his views often bordered on obsession. In contrast, Sa’adeh maintained an open mind and paid courteous attention to Sayegh’s opinions and feelings. He abstained from dismissing Sayegh until his patience had been exhausted and he could no longer bear Sayegh’s obstinacy.
Sayegh’s inflexibility, coupled with his refusal to defer the matter, affected his reputation negatively. He came across as a wantonly cruel and capricious villain who placed his own personal views ahead of the Party. This contradicted what he had been preaching about loyalty and commitment. The ferocity of his challenge, hard on the heels of a political confrontation between Sa’adeh and the Lebanese government, did not bode well with members, who expected him to show restraint and dignity rather than defiance and acrimony. Having observed him in action and experienced his enterprising spirit, they were bewildered by his lackluster and casual approach during that confrontation. They felt, not without good reason, that he had let the Party down by not jumping to Sa’adeh’s defense or speaking out against the intimidation of the Lebanese regime. Consequently, Sayegh’s standing inside the Party declined so dramatically that, when his clash with Sa’adeh became public, members chose Sa’adeh en masse.
Another shortcoming was Sayegh’s strict and exceedingly academic approach. This problem occurs when academic-minded activists allow their intellectual and scholarly pursuits to interfere with political exigencies. Sayegh’s mistake was precisely that: he tried to superimpose on the Party and its issues an overly intellectual academic perspective even when it seemed disproportionate with the Party’s national vision and the special and difficult conditions under which it functioned. His approach was awkward, too, especially concerning existentialism and freedom of thought. With existentialism, for example, he drove himself into a vulnerable position by focusing on the “individualist” dimension in Berdyaev’s philosophy rather than on its “societalist” underpinnings. Likewise, his approach to the touchy question of freedom of thought verged on a moral utopia and the introduction of values and standards that are incompatible with the pressing demands and circumstances of a national revival. Such a confrontational and abrasive style can only last so long, and eventually, it backfired. Sayegh’s style alienated many members and created sympathy for Sa’adeh, whose pragmatic approach was already widely received and appreciated inside the Party.
Additionally, several ambiguities left Sayegh vulnerable to serious criticism. The perceptions and ideas he tried to promote failed to resonate with Party members because they targeted the wrong issues at the wrong time for the wrong reasons. Usually, his views, though intelligent and thought-provoking, appertained to a post-revival stage in national life rather than the stage of actual revival. An example is his stand on “freedom of thought” inside the Party. It has been utilized to depict him as a crusader for individual freedom fighting an unbending perspective of a totalitarian leader, Sa’adeh. If that was the case, why did Sayegh’s views receive hardly any support from the Party? The answer is because his views on “freedom of thought,” and the fury with which he expressed them,
did not reverberate with the Party. Most members unreservedly accepted Sa’adeh’s analysis that, during revival, the nation must enlist every atom of its strength and unity and develop into a unified entity with a single outlook on life. This demands not only the subordination of individual freedom to national freedom, but also the formulation of a shared philosophical vision to prevent factionalism and to keep the revival going in the right direction. Sayegh’s error was not that he broached the question of “freedom of thought”, but that he broached it ahead of its time. This weakened his case against Sa’adeh and cost him the support and admiration of people who could have furthered his cause at the right time.
However, the most important reason for Sayegh’s defeat was Sa’adeh himself. Sayegh had miscalculated at two levels: he underestimated Sa’adeh’s popularity and competence while overestimating his own popularity and competence. Sa’adeh was a man of tremendous strength of character, unquestioned integrity, and strong intellectual ability. He could respond to philosophical objections with equal force and coherence. He was also very popular with members and widely admired for the dignity and courage with which he led the Party. How Sayegh could have failed to notice the obvious is a mystery. Some say that he was the victim of an over-inflated ego that allowed him to believe that he was permanently invulnerable; others that his existentialist Party colleagues who consoled him during the encounter and urged him not to back down had misled him. Either way, Sayegh only had himself to blame for his defeat. Having witnessed Sa’adeh in action and observing the ease and facility with which he was able to purge the “transgressors” in the Party’s senior ranks, just a few months earlier, he should have known better than to challenge a popular leader on his turf of natural advantage.