by Polybius
84. The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the greater part of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point at once. Flaminius was taken completely by surprise: the mist was so thick, and the enemy were charging down from the upper ground at so many points at once, that not only were the Centurions and Tribunes unable to relieve any part of the line that was in difficulties, but were not even able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for they were attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks. The result was that most of them were cut down in the order of march, without being able to defend themselves: exactly as though they had been actually given up to slaughter by the folly of their leader. Flaminius himself, in a state of the utmost distress and despair, was attacked and killed by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen thousand Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme duty not to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were caught in the defile between the lake and the cliff perished in a shameful, or rather a most miserable, manner: for being thrust into the lake, some in their frantic terror endeavoured to swim with their armour on, and presently sank and were drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they could into the lake, remained there with their heads above water; and when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death stared them in the face, they raised their hands and begged for quarter, offering to surrender, and using every imaginary appeal for mercy; but were finally despatched by the enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the fatal blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A number of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand, who were in the valley, defeated the enemy immediately in front of them; but though they might have done much to retrieve the fortune of the day, they were unable to go to the relief of their comrades, or get to the rear of their opponents, because they could not see what was going on. They accordingly pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they discovered that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon the higher ground. But when they were on the crest of the hills, the mist broke and they saw clearly the disaster which had befallen them; and being no longer able to do any good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line, and in complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal was sent by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops to besiege the village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a complication of dangers, they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared. Such was the end of the final engagement between the Romans and Carthaginians in Etruria.
85. When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms were with the other prisoners brought to Hannibal, he had them all collected together to the number of more than fifteen thousand, and began by saying that Maharbal had no authority to grant them their lives without consulting him. He then launched out into an invective against Rome: and when he had finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping; but allowed all the allies to depart without ransom to their own country, with the same remark as he had made before, that “he was not come to fight against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome.” He then gave his army time to refresh themselves after their fatigue, and buried those of highest rank who had fallen in his army, amounting to about thirty; the total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of whom were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with his brother and friends, where and how he should continue his attack, for he now felt confident of ultimate success.
When the news of this disaster reached Rome, the chief men of the state could not, in view of the gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people and tell them the truth. When the Praetor, therefore, from the Rostra said, “We have been beaten in a great battle,” there was such a consternation, that those who had been present at the battle as well as at this meeting, felt the disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be wondered at. For many years they had been unaccustomed to the word or the fact of defeat, and they could not now endure reverse with patience or dignity. The Senate, however, rose to the occasion, and held protracted debates and consultations as to the future, anxiously considering what it was the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it.
86. About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene, the Consul Gnaeus Servilius, who had been stationed on duty at Ariminum, — which is on the coast of the Adriatic, where the plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join the rest of Italy, not far from the mouths of the Padus, — having heard that Hannibal had entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius, designed to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he sent Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand horse, intending that he should be there before himself in case of need. But Hannibal, getting early intelligence after the battle of Thrasymene of this reinforcement of the enemy, sent Maharbal with his light-armed troops, and a detachment of cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly half his men at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder to a certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners. The news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days’ old at Rome, and the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its hottest, when this further disaster was announced. The consternation caused by it was no longer confined to the people. The Senate now fully shared in it; and it was resolved that the usual annual arrangements for the election of magistrates should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that their affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander with absolute powers.
Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected the idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed the country plundering it without resistance, and directing his march towards the coast of the Adriatic. Having passed through Umbria and Picenum, he came upon the coast after a ten days’ march with such enormous booty, that the army could neither drive nor carry all the wealth which they had taken, and after killing a large number of people on his road. For the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill all adults who came in their way: an order which Hannibal was prompted to give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.
87. Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a district extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains to refresh his men and restore their health, and no less so that of the horses. For the cold and squalor of a winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina without the protection of a roof, and then the painful march through the marshes, had brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well, an attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore now got possession of a rich country, he got his horses into condition again, and restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers; and made the Libyans change their own for Roman arms selected for the purpose, which he could easily do from being possessed of so many sets stripped from the bodies of the enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by sea, to report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had reached the sea since he entered Italy. The Carthaginians were greatly rejoiced at the news: and took measures with enthusiasm for forwarding supplies to their armies, both in Iberia and Italy.
Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius Dictator, a man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his high birth; as is still commemorated by the fact that the members of his family are even now called Maximi, that is “Greatest,” in honour of his successful achievements. A Dictator differs from the Consuls in this, that each Consul is follow
ed by twelve lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four. Again, the Consuls have frequently to refer to the Senate to enable them to carry out their proposed plans, but the Dictator is absolute, and when he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People. I shall, however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail about these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius master of the horse; this is an officer under the Dictator, and takes his place when engaged elsewhere.
88. Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to time for short distances in one direction or another, he remained in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic; and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which he had a great store, cured them of the scab and got them into condition again. By a similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the service before them. After traversing with fire and sword the territories of Praetutia, Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana, he started on his road to Iapygia. This district is divided among three peoples, each with a district name, Daunii [Peucetii], and Messapii. Hannibal first invaded the territory of the Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a Roman colony, and laid the country waste. He next encamped near Vibo, and overran the territory of Arpi, and plundered all Daunia without resistance.
Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the gods upon his appointment, started with his master of the horse and four legions which had been enrolled for the purpose; and having effected a junction near Daunia with the troops that had come to the rescue from Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus of his command on shore and sent him with an escort to Rome, with orders to be ready with help for any emergency, in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius himself, with his master of the horse, took over the command of the whole army and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians, near a place called Aecae, about six miles from the enemy.
89. When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he determined to terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. He therefore led out his army, approached the Roman camp, and there drew up his men in order of battle; but when he had waited some time, and nobody came out to attack him, he drew off and retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made up his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept resolutely to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and gave rise to scandalous insinuations that he was an utter coward and dared not face an engagement: but in course of time he compelled everybody to confess and allow that it was impossible for any one to have acted, in the existing circumstances, with greater discretion and prudence. And it was not long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his opponents had been trained from their earliest youth without intermission in war; had a general who had grown up with them and from childhood had been instructed in the arts of the camp; had won many battles in Iberia, and twice running had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what was more than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite of these; and therefore, their manifest inferiority making it impossible for Fabius to offer the enemy battle, he fell back upon those resources in which the Romans had the advantage of the enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their means: and they were — an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of men.
90. He, then, during the following months, kept his army continually hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his superior knowledge of the country enabling him to occupy beforehand all the posts of vantage; and having supplies in abundance on his rear, he never allowed his soldiers to go on foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any pretence, from the camp; but keeping them continually massed together and in close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and killed a large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of him straggled from their camp in search of plunder. His object in these manœuvres was twofold, — to gradually diminish the limited numbers of the enemy: and to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his own men, which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to give his enemy a set battle. This policy however was by no means approved of by his master of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general verdict, and decried Fabius in every one’s hearing, as conducting his command in a cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and was himself eager to venture upon a decisive engagement.
Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts, crossed the Apennines; and descending upon Samnium, which was rich and had been free from war for many years past, found themselves in possession of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of them neither by use nor waste. They overran also the territory of Beneventum, which was a Roman colony; and took the town of Venusia, which was unwalled and richly furnished with every kind of property. All this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping one or two days’ march behind him, but never venturing to approach or engage the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal saw that Fabius plainly meant to decline a battle, but yet would not abandon the country altogether, he formed the bold resolution of penetrating to the plains round Capua; and actually did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he should do one of two things, — force the enemy to give him battle, or make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the Romans had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped would strike terror into the various cities, and cause them to be eager to revolt from Rome. For up to that time, though the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single city in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians; but all maintained their fidelity, although some of them were suffering severely; — a fact which may show us the awe and respect which the Republic had inspired in its allies.
91. Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without good reason. For the plains about Capua are the best in Italy for fertility and beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into which merchants run who are sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of the world. They contain, moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities of Italy. On its seaboard are Sinuessa, Cumae, Puteoli, Naples, and Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum, to the east and south [Caudium] and Nola. In the centre of these plains lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua. No tale in all mythology wears a greater appearance of probability than that which is told of these, which, like others remarkable for their beauty, are called the Phlegraean plains; for surely none are more likely for beauty and fertility to have been contended for by gods. In addition to these advantages, they are strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach; for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a long and high chain of mountains, through which there are but three passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from Samnium [a second from Latium] and a third from Hirpini. So that if the Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters in these plains, they would have the advantage of a kind of theatre, in which to display the terrors of their power before the gaze of all Italy; and would make a spectacle also of the cowardice of their enemies in shrinking from giving them battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond dispute to be masters of the country.
92. With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by the pass of the hill called Eribianus, and encamped on the bank of the river Vulturnus, which almost divides these plains in half. His camp was on the side of the river towards Rome, but he overran the whole plain with foraging parties. Though utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy’s proceedings, Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which he had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the centurions and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had caught the enemy in an excellent trap, were of opinion that they should make all haste into the plains
, and not allow the most splendid part of the country to be devastated. Until they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned to share their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near the ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and kept in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by the allies to abandon the country: but he would not let his army descend into the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general engagement, partly for the same reasons as before, and partly because the enemy were conspicuously superior in cavalry.
After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an unlimited amount of booty by laying waste the whole plain, Hannibal began taking measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty, but to stow it in some safe place, which he might also make his winter quarters; that the army might not only be well off for the present, but might have abundant supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that the pass was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an attack by ambush, placed about four thousand men at the exact spot that he would have to pass; while he, with the main body of his troops, encamped on a hill which commanded the entrance of the pass.
93. Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither, and encamped on the plain immediately under the foot of the hill, that he would be able to snatch away their plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of all, might even put an end to the whole war by means of the excellent situation for an attack in which he now was. He was accordingly wholly intent on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in what direction and in what manner he should avail himself of the advantages of the ground, and which of his men were to be the first to attack the enemy. Whilst his enemies were making these preparations for the next day, Hannibal, guessing the truth, took care to give them no time or leisure for executing their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the captain of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as many fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting two thousand of the strongest of the working oxen from the booty, to collect them outside the camp. When this was done, he summoned the pioneers, and pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between the camp and the gorge by which he meant to march. To this ridge they were to drive the oxen, when the order was given, as actively and energetically as they could, until they came to the top. Having given these instructions, he bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards the end of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of the camp, and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the oxen. The men being numerous, this did not take long to do; and he then ordered them to set the fagots all alight, and to drive the oxen off and force them to mount the ridge; and placing his light-armed troops behind them he ordered them to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as soon as the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make for the top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy there, they might close with and attack them at once. At the same time he himself led the main army towards the narrow gorge of the pass, — his heavy-armed men in front, next to them the cavalry, then the booty, and the Iberians and Celts bringing up the rear.