by Polybius
12. The road from Apollonia to Macedonia is called the Via Egnatia, which has been measured in miles and marked out with milestones as far as Cypselus and the River Hebrus, a distance of five hundred and thirty-five miles. Reckoning eight and one-third stades to a mile, the number of stades will be four thousand four hundred and fifty-eight. The distance is exactly the same whether you start from Apollonia or Epidamnus. The whole road is called the Egnatia, but its first part has got a name from Candavia, a mountain of Illyria, and leads through the town of Lycnidus, and through Pylon, which is the point on the road where Illyria and Macedonia join. Thence it leads over Mount Barnūs, through Heracleia, Lyncestia, and Eordea, to Edessa and Pella, and finally to Thessalonica; and the number of miles is altogether two hundred and sixty-seven.... And the whole distance from the Ionian Gulf at Apollonia to Byzantium is seven thousand five hundred stades....
The circumference of the Peloponnesus, if you do not follow the indentations, is four thousand stades....
The distance from Cape Malea to the Ister is ten thousand stades....
13. On matters concerning the country between the Euphrates and India, Eratosthenes is a better authority than Artemidorus....
14. A personal visit to Alexandria filled me with disgust at the state of the city. It is inhabited by three distinct races, — native Egyptians, an acute and civilised race; secondly, mercenary soldiers (for the custom of hiring and supporting men-at-arms is an ancient one), who have learnt to rule rather than obey owing to the feeble character of the kings; and a third class, consisting of native Alexandrians, who have never from the same cause become properly accustomed to civil life, but who are yet better than the second class; for though they are now a mongrel race, yet they were originally Greek, and have retained some recollection of Greek principles. But this last class has become almost extinct, thanks to Euergetes Physcon, in whose reign I visited Alexandria; for that king being troubled with seditions, frequently exposed the common people to the fury of the soldiery and caused their destruction. So that in this state of the city the poet’s words only expressed the truth —
“To Egypt ’tis a long and toilsome road.”
BOOK XXXV
Spain, the eastern and southern parts of which were, since the 2d Punic war, governed by the Romans under a kind of military occupation without being reduced to the form of regular provinces, was always in a disturbed state, partly from sudden uprisings of various tribes against the Roman authority, and partly from numerous bodies of banditti, who seized strongholds or fortified towns and carried on their depredations from these centres. Hence it had been the policy of the Roman praetors and consuls to insist on the demolition of fortresses and city walls, as we learn from the accounts of Cato in B.C. 195 and others. In B.C. 177 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus had inflicted a severe defeat upon the Celtiberians, and had made a settlement of the country, which for a few years produced comparative quiet and content. But in B.C. 154 an outbreak of the Lusitani led to a considerable disaster to the Roman army under Lucius Mummius; and when the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior arrived in B.C. 153, he found that the war had accordingly spread to the Celtiberian tribes, the Belli and Titthi, who attempted to build the walls of Segeda. On Nobilior ordering them to desist, in accordance with Gracchan settlement, most of them obeyed after some resistance, but some of them fled to the Arevacae (near the sources of the Douro and Tagus); and this powerful tribe, after defeating the Roman army, entrenched themselves in Numantia, under the walls of which Nobilior sustained further losses. He was superseded in B.C. 152 by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who, partly by strategy, and partly by administrative skill and conciliation, restored the Roman fortunes to a better position. The Belli and Titthi became allies of Rome, and the Arevacae at least thought it worth while to ask for a truce to enable them to send envoys to Rome to arrange peace. — Appian, Hispan. 44-50.
1. The war between the Romans and Celtiberians was called the “fiery war;” for it was of a peculiarly fierce kind and remarkable for the frequency of its battles. The wars in Greece and Asia were as a rule settled by one battle, or in rare cases by two; and the battles themselves were decided by the result of the first charge and shock of the two armies. But in this war things were quite different. As a rule the battles were only stopped by the fall of night; the men neither lost heart nor would yield to bodily fatigue; but returned again and again with fresh resolution to renew the combat. The whole war, and its series of pitched battles, was at length interrupted for a time by the winter. One therefore could hardly conceive a war more nearly answering to our notion of a “fiery war” than this....
2. The Celtiberians, after making a truce with the consul M. Claudius Marcellus, had sent ambassadors to Rome who remained there quietly waiting for the answer of the Senate. Meanwhile M. Claudius went on an expedition against the Lusitani, took Nercobrica by assault, and then went into winter quarters at Corduba. Of the ambassadors who came to Rome the Senate admitted those from the Belli and Titthi, who were on the side of Rome, to enter the city; but ordered those from the Arevacae to lodge on the other side of the Tiber, as being at war with Rome, until such time as the Senate should have decided the whole question. When the time for the interview was come, the praetor introduced the envoys from their allies first. Barbarians as they were, they made a set speech, and endeavoured to explain clearly the causes of all the dissension prevailing in their country: pointing out that “Unless those who had broken out into war were reduced to tranquillity and punished as they deserved, the very moment the Roman legions left Iberia, they would inflict punishment upon the Belli and Titthi as traitors; and that if they escaped unpunished for their first act of hostility, they would make all the tribes in Iberia ripe for an outbreak from the belief that they were capable of coping with Rome.” They begged, therefore, that the legions should remain in Iberia, and that each year a consul should come thither to protect the allies of Rome and punish the depredations of the Arevacae; or, if they wished to withdraw the legions, they should first take signal vengeance for the outbreak of this tribe, that no one might venture to do the like again.” Such, or to this effect, was the speech of the envoys of the Belli and Titthi who were in alliance with Rome. The envoys of the hostile tribe were then introduced. On coming forward the Arevacae assumed a feigned tone of submission and humility in the language of their answer, without being, as was evident, at all yielding in their hearts or acknowledging themselves beaten. On the contrary, they continually hinted at the uncertainty of fortune; and speaking of the battles that had taken place as undecided, they conveyed the impression that they had had the best of the contest in them all. The upshot of their speech was this: “If they must submit to some definite mulct for their error, they were ready to do so: but, when that was completed, they demanded that things should revert to the position fixed by their treaty made with the Senate in the time of Tiberius Gracchus.”
3. The Senators having thus heard both sides called in the legates from Marcellus; and when they saw that they also were inclined to a pacification, and that Marcellus was more inclined to favour the enemy than the allied tribes, they answered the Arevacae that Marcellus would declare in Iberia to both parties the decision of the Senate. However, they were convinced in their own minds that their true interests were such as the envoys of the allied tribes suggested, and that the Arevacae were still inclined to haughty independence, and that their own commander was afraid of them: they therefore gave secret instructions to the legates of Marcellus to carry on the war with spirit, and as the honour of the country demanded. But when they had thus determined on a continuance of the war, feeling no confidence in Marcellus, they determined first of all to send a commander to relieve him in Iberia, as the new consuls Aulus Postumius and Lucius Licinius Lucullus had just taken up their office. They then entered with spirit and vigour on their preparations, because they believed that the Iberian question would be decided by the result of this campaign: if these enemies were beaten, they assumed that all oth
ers would accept the orders of Rome; but that, if the Arevacae proved able to ward off the punishment that threatened them, not only would their spirits be again raised, but those of all the other Iberian tribes besides.
4. The more determined however the Senate was to carry on the war, the greater became their embarrassment. For the report brought to Rome by Q. Fulvius Nobilior, the commander in Iberia in the previous year (B.C. 153), and those who had served under him, of the perpetual recurrence of the pitched battles, the number of the fallen, and the valour of the Celtiberians, combined with the notorious fact that Marcellus shrank in terror from the war, caused such a panic in the minds of the new levies as the old men declared had never happened before. To such an extent did the panic go, that sufficient men were not found to come forward for the office of military tribune, and these posts were consequently not entirely filled up; whereas heretofore a larger number than were wanted had been wont to volunteer for the duty: nor would the men nominated by the Consuls as legati to accompany the commanders consent to serve; and, worst of all, the young men tried to avoid the levies, and put forward such excuses as were disgraceful for them to allege, and beneath the investigation of the Consuls, and yet impossible to refute. But at length, in this embarrassment of the Senate and magistrates, when they were wondering what was to be the end of this shameless conduct of the young men, for they could call it nothing else, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who, though still a young man, had been one of those to advise the war, and who, though he had already acquired a reputation for high principle and pure morality, had not been known for his personal courage, seeing the Senate was in a difficulty, stood up and bade them send him to Iberia, either as military tribune or legatus, for he was ready to serve in either capacity. “Though, as far as I am concerned,” he said, “my mission to Macedonia would be safer and more appropriate” — for it happened that at that time Scipio was personally and by name invited by the Macedonians to come and settle the disputes which were raging among them— “yet the needs of my own country are the more pressing of the two, and imperatively summon to Iberia all who have a genuine love of honour.” This offer was unexpected by all, both from the youth of Scipio and his general character for caution, and consequently he became exceedingly popular on the spot, and still more so on subsequent days. For those who had before shrunk from the danger of the service, now, from dislike of the sorry figure they made in comparison with him, began volunteering to serve. Some offered to go as legati to the generals, and others in groups and clubs entered their names on the muster rolls.... Lucius Lucinius Lucullus, consul for B.C. 151, is sent to Spain, Scipio Aemilianus acting as his legatus. They found that the Arevacae had already submitted to Marcellus; but being in want of money Lucullus was determined not to be deprived of a campaign. He therefore attacked the next tribe, the Vaccaei, who lived on the other side of the Tagus, nominally on the pretext of their having injured the Carpetani. The war which followed was marked by signal acts of cruelty and treachery on the part of Lucullus, as on that of the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba among the Lusitani. Appian, Hisp. 49-55. 5. In Scipio’s mind there rose a contest of feelings, and a hesitation as to whether he ought to meet the barbarian and fight him in single combat....
Scipio’s horse was much distressed by the blow, but did not come down entirely, and accordingly Scipio managed to light on his feet....
6. Cato was consulted by Scipio, at the request of Polybius, on behalf of the Achaeans; and when the debate in the Senate, between the party who wished to grant it and the party that opposed it, was protracted to a considerable length, Cato stood up and said: “As though we had nothing else to do, we sit here the whole day debating whether some old Greek dotards should be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers!” Their restoration being voted, Polybius and his friends, after a few days’ interval, were for appearing before the Senate again, with a petition that the exiles should enjoy the same honours in Achaia as they had before. Cato, however, remarked with a smile that Polybius, like another Odysseus, wanted to go a second time into the cave of the Cyclops, because he had forgotten his cap and belt....
BOOK XXXVI
THE THIRD PUNIC WAR
1. It may occur to some to ask why I have not given a dramatic turn to my narrative, now that I have so striking a theme and a subject of such importance, by recording the actual speeches delivered; a thing which the majority of historians have done, by giving the appropriate arguments used on either side. That I do not reject this method altogether I have shown in several parts of my work, in which I have recorded popular harangues and expositions delivered by statesmen; but that I am not inclined to employ it on every occasion alike will now be made clear; for it would not be easy to find a subject more remarkable than this, nor material more ample for instituting a comparison of such a character. Nor indeed could any form of composition be more convenient to me. Still, as I do not think it becoming in statesmen to be ready with argument and exposition on every subject of debate without distinction, but rather to adapt their speeches to the nature of the particular occasion, so neither do I think it right for historians to practise their skill or show off their ability upon their readers: they ought on the contrary to devote their whole energies to discover and record what was really and truly said, and even of such words only those that are the most opportune and essential....
2. This idea having been firmly fixed in the minds of all, they looked out for a suitable opportunity and a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of the world. For indeed the Romans were quite rightly very careful on this point. For instance, the general impression that they were justified in entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their defeats; but if the pretext for doing so is lame and poor the contrary effects are produced. Accordingly, as they differed as to the sentiments of the outer world on the subject, they were very nearly abandoning the war.... The policy of Rome in Africa of constantly supporting Massanissa against Carthage was mentioned in 32, 2. Frequent complaints came to Rome from the Numidian king, and the Carthaginians were said to be collecting an army contrary to treaty. Commissioners were sent over in 154 B.C. on the advice of Cato, who were roughly treated at Carthage; and when, in B.C. 151, Massanissa sent his son Gulussa with similar complaints to Rome, Cato urged immediate war. The Senate, however, again sent commissioners, among whom was Cato himself, to examine into the matter. They reported that the Carthaginians had an army and navy. An ultimatum was therefore sent, that the army and navy were to be broken up within the year, or that the next consuls should bring the question of war before the Senate (B.C. 150). Just at this crisis Utica, in enmity with Carthage, placed itself under the protection of Rome. Livy, Ep. 48; Appian, Pun. 75. 3. When the Carthaginians had been some time deliberating how they should meet the message from Rome they were reduced to a state of the utmost embarrassment by the people of Utica anticipating their design by putting themselves under the protection of Rome. This seemed their only hope of safety left: and they imagined that such a step must win them favour at Rome: for to submit to put themselves and their country under control was a thing which they had never done even in their darkest hour of danger and defeat, with the enemy at their very walls. And now they had lost all the fruit of this resolve by being anticipated by the people of Utica; for it would appear nothing novel or strange to the Romans if they only did the same as that people. Accordingly, with a choice of two evils only left, to accept war with courage or to surrender their independence, after a long and anxious discussion held secretly in the Senate-house, they appointed two ambassadors with plenary powers, and instructed them, that, in view of the existing state of things, they should do what seemed for the advantage of their country. The names of these envoys were Gisco Strytanus, Hamilcar, Misdes, Gillimas, and Mago. When they reached Rome from Carthage, they found war already decreed and the generals actually started with their forces. Circumstances, therefore, no longer giving them any p
ower of deliberating, they offered an unconditional surrender.
4. I have spoken before about what this implies, but I must in this place also briefly remind my readers of its import. Those who thus surrender themselves to the Roman authority, surrender all territory and the cities in it, together with all men and women in all such territory or cities, likewise rivers, harbours, temples, and tombs, so that the Romans should become actual lords of all these, and those who surrender should remain lords of nothing whatever. On the Carthaginians making a surrender to this effect, they were summoned into the Senate-house and the Praetor delivered the Senate’s decision, which was to this effect: “They had been well advised, and therefore the Senate granted them freedom and the enjoyment of their laws; and moreover, all their territory and the possession of their other property, public or private.” The Carthaginian envoys were much relieved when they heard this; thinking that, where the alternatives were both miserable, the Senate had treated them well in conceding their most necessary and important requirements. But presently the Praetor went on to state that they would enjoy these concessions on condition of sending three hundred hostages to Lilybaeum within thirty days, sons of members of the Hundred or the Senate, and obeying such commands as should be imposed on them by the consuls. This dashed their satisfaction for a time, because they had no means of knowing what orders were to be given them through the consuls; however, they started at once, being anxious to report what had occurred to their countrymen with all speed. When they arrived in Carthage and stated the facts, the citizens considered that the envoys had in all respects acted with proper caution; but they were greatly alarmed and distressed by the fact that in the answer no mention was made of the city itself.