by Polybius
8. But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians gave themselves after they became masters of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors of Rhegium, not only exercised absolute control over their own town and district undisturbed, but about the neighbouring territory also gave no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and levied tribute from many parts of Sicily. But when they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now invested and besieged, they were themselves promptly forced back into the town again by the Syracusans, under circumstances which I will now detail.
Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had quarrelled with the citizens, and while stationed near Merganè elected commanders from their own body. These were Artemidorus and Hiero, the latter of whom afterwards became King of Syracuse. At this time he was quite a young man, but had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft and the politic conduct of affairs. Having taken over the command, and having by means of some of his connexions made his way into the city, he got his political opponents into his hands; but conducted the government with such mildness, and in so lofty a spirit, that the Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing in the election of officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion unanimously approve of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general.
[1] μενος ἐλπίδων ἢ κατὰ τὴν στρατηγίαν. θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Συρακοσίους, ἐπειδὰν ἐκπέμψωσι τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, αὐτοὺς ἐν αὑτοῖς στασιάζοντας καὶ καινοτομοῦντας αἰεί τι, [2] τὸν δὲ Λεπτίνην εἰδὼς καὶ τῇ προστασίᾳ καὶ τῇ πίστει πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, εὐδοκιμοῦντα δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει διαφερόντως, συνάπτεται κηδείαν πρὸς αὐτόν, βουλόμενος οἷον ἐφεδρείαν ἀπολιπεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῦτον, ὅτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξιέναι δέοι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις. [3] γήμας δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ προειρημένου καὶ συνθεωρῶν τοὺς ἀρχαίους μισθοφόρους καχέκτας ὄντας καὶ κινητικοὺς ἐξάγει στρατείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατασχόντας. [4] ἀντιστρατοπεδεύσας δὲ περὶ Κεντόριπα καὶ παραταξάμενος περὶ τὸν Κυαμόσωρον ποταμὸν τοὺς μὲν πολιτικοὺς ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς αὐτὸς ἐν ἀποστήματι συνεῖχεν, ὡς κατ᾽ ἄλλον τόπον τοῖς πολεμίοις συμμίξων, τοὺς δὲ ξένους προβαλόμενος εἴασε πάντας ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων διαφθαρῆναι: [5] κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς ἐκείνων τροπῆς καιρὸν ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸς ἀπεχώρησεν μετὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. [6] συντελεσάμενος δὲ τὸ προκείμενον πραγματικῶς καὶ παρῃρηκὼς πᾶν τὸ κινητικὸν καὶ στασιῶδες τῆς δυνάμεως, ξενολογήσας δι᾽ αὑτοῦ πλῆθος ἱκανὸν μισθοφόρων, ἀσφαλῶς ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διεξῆγεν. [7] θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκ τοῦ προτερήματος θρασέως καὶ προπετῶς ἀναστρεφομένους, καθοπλίσας καὶ γυμνάσας ἐνεργῶς τὰς πολιτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐξῆγεν καὶ συμβάλλει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν τῷ Μυλαίῳ πεδίῳ περὶ τὸν Λογγανὸν καλούμενον ποταμόν. [8] τροπὴν δὲ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος ζωγρίᾳ τὴν μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατέπαυσε τόλμαν, αὐτὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ πάντων προσηγορεύθη τῶν συμμάχων.
9. He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops, and of magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for revolutionary movements of some sort or another. He knew, too, that of all the citizens Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit, and that among the common people especially he was by far the most influential man existing. He accordingly contracted a relationship by marriage with him, that he might have a representative of his interests left at home at such times as he should be himself bound to go abroad with the troops for a campaign. After marrying the daughter of this man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries. He observed that they were disaffected and mutinous: and he accordingly led out an expedition, with the ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene. He pitched a camp against the enemy near Centuripa, and drew up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus. But the cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he kept together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he thrust to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by the foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a safe retreat for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of policy was skilful and successful. He had got rid of the mutinous and seditious element in the army; and after enlisting on his own account a sufficient body of mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business of the government in security. But seeing that the Mamertines were encouraged by their success to greater confidence and recklessness in their excursions, he fully armed and energetically drilled the citizen levies, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near the River Longanus. He inflicted a severe defeat upon them: took their leaders prisoners: put a complete end to their audacious proceedings: and on his return to Syracuse was himself greeted by all the allies with the title of King.
[1] οἱ δὲ Μαμερτῖνοι πρότερον μὲν ἐστερημένοι τῆς ἐπικουρίας τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Ῥηγίου, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον εἶπον, τότε δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐπταικότες ὁλοσχερῶς διὰ τὰς νῦν ῥηθείσας αἰτίας, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίους κατέφευγον καὶ τούτοις ἐνεχείριζον σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄκραν, [2] οἱ δὲ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐπρέσβευον, παραδιδόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ δεόμενοι βοηθήσειν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμοφύλοις ὑπάρχουσιν. [3] Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρησαν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐξόφθαλμον εἶναι τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς βοηθείας. [4] τὸ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον τοὺς ἰδίους πολίτας μετὰ τῆς μεγίστης ἀνῃρηκότας τιμωρίας, ὅτι Ῥηγίνους παρεσπόνδησαν, παραχρῆμα Μαμερτίνοις βοηθεῖν ζητεῖν τοῖς τὰ παραπλήσια πεποιηκόσιν οὐ μόνον εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων πόλιν, δυσαπολόγητον εἶχε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. [5] οὐ μὴν ἀγνοοῦντές γε τούτων οὐδέν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ὑπήκοα πολλὰ μέρη πεποιημένους, ἔτι δὲ τῶν νήσων ἁπασῶν ἐγκρατεῖς ὑπάρχοντας τῶν κατὰ τὸ Σαρδόνιον καὶ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, ἠγωνίων, εἰ Σικελίας ἔτι κυριε�
�σαιεν, [6] μὴ λίαν βαρεῖς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοιεν, κύκλῳ σφᾶς περιέχοντες καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς Ἰταλίας μέρεσιν ἐπικείμενοι. [7] διότι δὲ ταχέως ὑφ᾽ αὑτοὺς ποιήσονται τὴν Σικελίαν, μὴ τυχόντων ἐπικουρίας τῶν Μαμερτίνων, προφανὲς ἦν. [8] κρατήσαντες γὰρ ἐγχειριζομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς Μεσσήνης ἔμελλον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπανελέσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσης σχεδὸν δεσπόζειν τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας. [9] ὃ προορώμενοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ νομίζοντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι τὸ μὴ προέσθαι τὴν Μεσσήνην μηδ᾽ ἐᾶσαι Καρχηδονίους οἱονεὶ γεφυρῶσαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν αὑτοῖς διάβασιν,
10. Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from Rhegium, and then subjected, from causes which I have just stated, to a complete defeat on their own account. Thereupon some of them betook themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and were for putting themselves and their citadel into their hands; while others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a surrender of their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of race which united them. The Romans were long in doubt. The inconsistency of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put some of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of the law, for having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now so soon afterwards to assist the Mamertines, who had done precisely the same to Messene as well as Rhegium, involved a breach of equity very hard to justify. But while fully alive to these points, they yet saw that Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to Libya, but had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage was, besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest, if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find them very dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as they would on every side, and occupying a position which commanded all the coasts of Italy. Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not obtain the assistance they asked for, the Carthaginians would very soon reduce Sicily. For should they avail themselves of the voluntary offer of Messene and become masters of it, they were certain before long to crush Syracuse also, since they were already lords of nearly the whole of the rest of Sicily. The Romans saw all this, and felt that it was absolutely necessary not to let Messene slip, or allow the Carthaginians to secure what would be like a bridge to enable them to cross into Italy.
[1] πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἐβουλεύσαντο, καὶ τὸ μὲν συνέδριον οὐδ᾽ εἰς τέλος ἐκύρωσε τὴν γνώμην διὰ τὰς ἄρτι ῥηθείσας αἰτίας. ἐδόκει γὰρ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς τοῖς Μαμερτίνοις ἐπικουρίας ἰσορροπεῖν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς βοηθείας συμφέρουσιν. [2] οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τετρυμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν προγεγονότων πολέμων καὶ προσδεόμενοι παντοδαπῆς ἐπανορθώσεως, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς ἄρτι ῥηθεῖσι περὶ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἑκάστοις ὠφελείας προδήλους καὶ μεγάλας ὑποδεικνυόντων τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν. [3] κυρωθέντος δὲ τοῦ δόγματος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, προχειρισάμενοι τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ὑπάτων στρατηγὸν Ἄππιον Κλαύδιον ἐξαπέστειλαν, κελεύσαντες βοηθεῖν καὶ διαβαίνειν εἰς Μεσσήνην. [4] οἱ δὲ Μαμερτῖνοι τὸν μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν ἤδη κατέχοντα τὴν ἄκραν ἐξέβαλον, τὰ μὲν καταπληξάμενοι, τὰ δὲ παραλογισάμενοι: τὸν δ᾽ Ἄππιον ἐπεσπῶντο καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν ἐνεχείριζον. [5] Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, νομίσαντες αὐτὸν ἀβούλως, ἅμα δ᾽ ἀνάνδρως προέσθαι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν: [6] αὐτοὶ δὲ τῇ μὲν ναυτικῇ δυνάμει περὶ Πελωριάδα στρατοπεδεύσαντες, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι περὶ τὰς Σύνεις καλουμένας ἐνεργῶς προσέκειντο τῇ Μεσσήνῃ. [7] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἱέρων νομίσας εὐφυῶς ἔχειν τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὸ τοὺς βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατέχοντας ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας, τίθεται πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους συνθήκας. [8] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν προειρημένην πόλιν: καταστρατοπεδεύσας δ᾽ ἐκ θατέρου μέρους περὶ τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν ὄρος καλούμενον ἀπέκλεισε καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐξόδου τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει. [9] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Ἄππιος νυκτὸς καὶ παραβόλως περαιωθεὶς τὸν πορθμὸν ἧκεν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. [10] ὁρῶν δὲ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς προσηρεικότας τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ συλλογισάμενος ἅμα μὲν αἰσχράν, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐπισφαλῆ γίνεσθαι τὴν πολιορκίαν αὑτῷ, τῆς τε γῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατούντων καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, [11] τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπρεσβεύετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, βουλόμενος ἐξελέσθαι τοῦ πολέμου τοὺς Μαμερτίνους: οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῷ, [12] τέλος ἐπαναγκαζόμενος ἔκρινε διακινδυνεύειν καὶ πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. [13] ἐξαγαγὼν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν παρέταξε πρὸς μάχην, ἑτοίμως εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα συγκαταβάντος αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ τῶν Συρακοσίων βασιλέως: [14] ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον διαγωνισάμενος ἐπεκράτησεν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ κατεδίωξε τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἕως εἰς τὸν χάρακα πάντας. [15] Ἄππιος μὲν οὖν σκυλεύσας τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐπανῆλθεν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. ὁ δ᾽ Ἱέρων ὀττευσάμενός τι περὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνεχώρησε κατὰ σπουδὴν
11. In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives proved too strong, after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians appeared to them to be evenly balanced by the advantages to be gained by doing so. The people, however, had suffered much from the previous wars, and wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained in every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained by the war, the military commanders suggested that individually they would get manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly voted in favour of giving the aid. The decree having thus been passed by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, to the command, and sent him out with instructions to cross to Messene and relieve the Mamertines. These latter managed, between threats and false representations, to oust the Carthaginian commander who was already in possession of the citadel, invited Appius in, and offered to del
iver the city into his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their commander for what they considered to be his cowardice and folly in thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near Pelorus; their land forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to Messene. Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a favourable opportunity for totally expelling from Sicily the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this, he started from Syracuse upon an expedition against that city. He pitched his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians, near what was called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut off from that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius, for his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene. But he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that the siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the enemy commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endeavoured to relieve the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending embassies to both of the attacking forces. Neither of them received his proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up his mind to hazard an engagement, and that he would begin with the Syracusans. So he led out his forces and drew them up for the fight: nor was the Syracusan backward in accepting the challenge, but descended simultaneously to give him battle. After a prolonged struggle, Appius got the better of the enemy, and chased the opposing forces right up to their entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after stripping the dead, retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a foreboding of the final result, only waited for nightfall to beat a hasty retreat to Syracuse.