Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

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by Polybius


  20. Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had taken place at Agrigentum arrived. Their ideas too were so raised that they no longer confined themselves to their original designs. They were not content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages gained in the course of the war; but conceived the idea that it was possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and that if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to this subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going on as well as they could wish. For the Consuls elected in succession to those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian business as well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians were in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not incline decisively in their favour. For instance, in the period which followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held aloof from them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Seeing therefore that it was ever more and more the case that the balance of success oscillated from one side to the other from these causes; and, moreover, that while Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya remained permanently uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea and meet the Carthaginians there.

  It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced me to give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I otherwise should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this kind should be unknown, — namely how, and when, and why the Romans first started a navy.

  It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken lingered to a weary length, that they first thought of getting a fleet built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. But one part of their undertaking caused them much difficulty. Their shipbuilders were entirely unacquainted with the construction of quinqueremes, because no one in Italy had at that time employed vessels of that description. There could be no more signal proof of the courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of the Roman enterprise. Not only had they no resources for it of reasonable sufficiency; but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever entertained an idea of naval war, — for it was the first time they had thought of it, — they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy. Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. It was on this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a model on which they constructed their whole fleet. And if this had not happened it is clear that they would have been completely hindered from carrying out their design by want of constructive knowledge.

  [1] θησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οἷς μὲν ἐπιμελὲς ἦν τῆς ναυπηγίας, ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν πλοίων κατασκευήν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πληρώματα συναθροίσαντες ἐδίδασκον ἐν τῇ γῇ κωπηλατεῖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον: [2] καθίσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρεσιῶν ἐν τῇ χέρσῳ τοὺς ἄνδρας τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας τάξιν ταῖς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν πλοίων καθέδραις, μέσον δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς στήσαντες τὸν κελευστήν, ἅμα πάντας ἀναπίπτειν ἐφ᾽ αὑτοὺς ἄγοντας τὰς χεῖρας καὶ πάλιν προνεύειν ἐξωθοῦντας ταύτας συνείθιζον ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ λήγειν τῶν κινήσεων πρὸς τὰ τοῦ κελευστοῦ παραγγέλματα. προκατασκευασθέντων δὲ τούτων, [3] ἅμα τῷ συντελεσθῆναι τὰς ναῦς καθελκύσαντες καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν θαλάττῃ πειραθέντες ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. [4] ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως τεταγμένος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις Γνάιος Κορνήλιος ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πρότερον, συντάξας τοῖς ναυάρχοις, ἐπειδὰν καταρτίσωσι τὸν στόλον, πλεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν πορθμόν, αὐτὸς ἀναχθεὶς μετὰ νεῶν ἑπτακαίδεκα προκατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην, σπουδάζων τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν παρασκευάσαι τῷ στόλῳ. [5] προσπεσούσης δ᾽ αὐτῷ πράξεως ἐκεῖ περὶ τῆς τῶν Λιπαραίων πόλεως, δεξάμενος τὴν ἐλπίδα προχειρότερον τοῦ δέοντος ἔπλει ταῖς προειρημέναις ναυσὶ καὶ καθωρμίσθη πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. [6] ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ἀκούσας ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐξαποστέλλει Βοώδη τῆς γερουσίας ὑπάρχοντα, ναῦς εἴκοσι δούς. [7] ὃς ἐπιπλεύσας νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ λιμένι συνέκλεισε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γνάιον. ἡμέρας δ᾽ ἐπιγενομένης τὰ μὲν πληρώματα πρὸς φυγὴν ὥρμησεν εἰς τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ Γνάιος ἐκπλαγὴς γενόμενος καὶ ποιεῖν ἔχων οὐδὲν τέλος παρέδωκεν αὑτὸν τοῖς πολεμίοις. [8] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὑποχείριον ἔχοντες παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀπῆραν. [9] μετ᾽ οὐ πολλὰς δ᾽ ἡμέρας, οὕτως ἐναργοῦς ὄντος καὶ προσφάτου τοῦ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἀτυχήματος, παρ᾽ ὀλίγον αὐτὸς Ἀννίβας εἰς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἁμάρτημα προφανῶς ἐνέπεσεν. [10] ἀκούσας γὰρ τὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλον κομιζόμενον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν σύνεγγυς εἶναι, κατιδεῖν βουλόμενος τό τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λαβὼν πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἐπιπλεῖ. [11] κάμπτων δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον ἐμπίπτει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει ποιουμένοις τὸν πλοῦν καὶ τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀπέβαλε τῶν νεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῶν ὑπολειφθεισῶν ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως διέφυγεν.

  21. Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men sit on rower’s benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again, and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes. By the time these preparati
ons were completed the ships were built. They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s order. For Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits, had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for the surrender of the town of Lipara. Snatching at the prospect somewhat too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boodes, a member of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour. When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do, eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days afterwards, though the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake. For having been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of the enemy’s number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty ships, and just as he was rounding the “Italian Headland” he fell in with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a manner beyond hope or expectation.

  [1] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα συνεγγίσαντες τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις καὶ συνέντες τὸ γεγονὸς σύμπτωμα περὶ τὸν Γνάιον παραυτίκα μὲν διεπέμποντο πρὸς Γάιον Βίλιον τὸν ἡγούμενον τῆς πεζῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦτον ἀνέμενον, [2] ἅμα δ᾽ ἀκούοντες οὐ μακρὰν εἶναι τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στόλον ἐγίνοντο πρὸς παρασκευὴν τοῦ ναυμαχεῖν. [3] ὄντων δὲ τῶν πλοίων φαύλων ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ δυσκινήτων, ὑποτίθεταί τις αὐτοῖς βοήθημα πρὸς τὴν μάχην τοὺς ἐπικληθέντας μετὰ ταῦτα κόρακας ὧν συνέβαινε τὴν κατασκευὴν εἶναι τοιαύτην. [4] στῦλος ἐν πρώρρᾳ στρογγύλος εἱστήκει, μῆκος μὲν ὀργυιῶν τεττάρων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος τριῶν παλαιστῶν ἔχων τὴν διάμετρον. [5] οὗτος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς τροχιλίαν εἶχεν, περιετίθετο δ᾽ αὐτῷ κλῖμαξ ἐπικαρσίαις σανίσι καθηλωμένη, πλάτος μὲν ποδῶν τεττάρων, τὸ δὲ μῆκος ἓξ ὀργυιῶν. [6] τὸ δὲ τρῆμα τοῦ σανιδώματος ἦν παράμηκες καὶ περιέβαινε περὶ τὸν στῦλον μετὰ τὰς πρώτας εὐθέως τῆς κλίμακος δύ᾽ ὀργυιάς. εἶχεν δὲ καὶ δρύφακτον αὕτη παρ᾽ ἑκατέραν τὴν ἐπιμήκη πλευρὰν εἰς γόνυ τὸ βάθος. [7] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πέρατος αὐτοῦ προσήρμοστο σιδηροῦν οἷον ὕπερον ἀπωξυσμένον, ἔχον δακτύλιον ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς, ὡς τὸ ὅλον φαίνεσθαι παραπλήσιον ταῖς σιτοποιικαῖς μηχανήσεσιν. [8] εἰς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν δακτύλιον ἐνεδέδετο κάλως, ᾧ κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν πλοίων ἐξαίροντες τοὺς κόρακας διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ στύλῳ τροχιλίας ἀφίεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα τῆς ἀλλοτρίας νεὼς ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ πρῶρραν, ποτὲ δ᾽ ἀντιπεριάγοντες τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων προσπιπτούσας ἐμβολάς. [9] ὅτε δὲ ταῖς σανίσι τῶν καταστρωμάτων ἐμπαγέντες οἱ κόρακες ὁμοῦ συνδήσαιεν τὰς ναῦς, εἰ μὲν πλάγιαι παραβάλοιεν ἀλλήλαις, πανταχόθεν ἐπεπήδων, εἰ δὲ κατὰ πρῶρραν, δι᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος ἐπὶ δύο συνεχεῖς ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἔφοδον: [10] ὧν οἱ μὲν ἡγούμενοι τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐπιφάνειαν ἐσκέπαζον ταῖς τῶν θυρεῶν προβολαῖς, οἱ δ᾽ ἑπόμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἠσφάλιζον πλευρὰς ὑπὲρ τὸν δρύφακτον ὑπερτιθέμενοι τὰς ἴτυς τῶν ὅπλων. [11] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τοιαύτῃ κεχρημένοι πα

  22. When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that the enemy’s fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with preparations for a sea-fight. Now their ships were badly fitted out and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as likely to serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards called “crows.” Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long, was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it to the height of a man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was fastened an iron spike like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked like the machines for braising corn. To this ring the rope was fastened with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the “crows,” by means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides. And as soon as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow, they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they watched an opportunity of engaging at sea.

  [1] ρασκευῇ καιρὸν ἐπετήρουν πρὸς ναυμαχίαν: ὁ δὲ Γάιος Βίλιος ὡς θᾶττον ἔγνω τὴν περιπέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγουμένου, παραδοὺς τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα τοῖς χιλιάρχοις αὐτὸς διεκομίσθη πρὸς τὸν στόλον. [2] πυθόμενος δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους πορθεῖν τὴν Μυλαῗτιν χώραν ἐπιπλεῖ στόλῳ παντί. [3] συνιδόντες δ᾽ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἀνήγοντο ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τριάκοντα, καταφρονοῦντες τῆς ἀπειρίας τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ πάντες ἔπλεον ἀντίπρωρροι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐδὲ τάξεως καταξιώσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ λείαν τινὰ πρόδ
ηλον. [4] ἡγεῖτο δ᾽ Ἀννίβας αὐτῶν — οὗτος δ᾽ ἦν ὁ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκκλέψας νυκτὸς ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλεως — ἔχων ἑπτήρη τὴν γενομένην Πύρρου τοῦ βασιλέως. [5] ἅμα δὲ τῷ πλησιάζειν συνθεωροῦντες ἀνανενευκότας τοὺς κόρακας ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων πρώρραις, ἐπὶ ποσὸν μὲν ἠπόρουν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, ξενιζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν ὀργάνων κατασκευαῖς: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τελέως κατεγνωκότες τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέβαλον οἱ πρῶτοι πλέοντες τετολμηκότως. [6] τῶν δὲ συμπλεκομένων σκαφῶν ἀεὶ δεδεμένων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐθὺς ἐπιπορευομένων δι᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος καὶ συμπλεκομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς καταστρώμασιν, οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἱ δὲ παρεδίδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκπληττόμενοι τὸ γινόμενον: παραπλήσιον γὰρ πεζομαχίας συνέβαινε τὸν κίνδυνον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. [7] διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τὰς πρώτας συμβαλούσας ναῦς αὐτάνδρους ἀπέβαλον, σὺν αἷς ἐγένετ᾽ αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πλοῖον: Ἀννίβας δ᾽ ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραβόλως αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ σκάφῃ διέφυγεν. [8] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐποιεῖτο μὲν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὡς εἰς ἐμβολήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν θεωροῦντες τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ τὰς προπλεούσας ναῦς ἐξέκλινον καὶ διένευον τὰς τῶν ὀργάνων ἐπιβολάς. [9] πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ πλαγίων, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρύμναν ἐκπεριπλέοντες ἀσφαλῶς ἤλπιζον ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἐμβολάς. [10] πάντη δὲ καὶ πάντως ἀντιπεριισταμένων καὶ συνδιανευόντων τῶν ὀργάνων οὕτως ὥστε κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην τοὺς ἐγγίσαντας συνδεδέσθαι, τέλος ἐγκλίναντες ἔφυγον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καταπλαγέντες τὴν καινοτομίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἀποβαλόντες.

 

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