by Polybius
61. There is another illustration of this writer’s manner to be found in his treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis. The misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than with instances of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers would be less improved by the record of what is great and worthy of imitation, than by that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be avoided. For instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes took the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a despatch, offering them the safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw in their lot with him; — and his object in telling all this is to enhance the magnanimity and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not allow the letter to be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so appropriate to an historian, — the commendation, I mean, and honourable mention of their noble conduct, — this he has altogether left out. And yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with approval the conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and votes support a war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those who go so far as to endure the devastation of their territory, and a siege of their town, we give not only praise but active gratitude: what must be our estimate of the people of Megalopolis? Must it not be of the most exalted character? First of all, they allowed their territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented to be entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league: and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they deliberately preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their ancestors, their temples, their homes and property, of everything in fact which men value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies. No nobler action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to which an historian could better draw his reader’s attention. For what could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank and permanent relations between states? But of all this Phylarchus says not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian.
[1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως λαφύρων ἑξακισχίλια τάλαντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πεσεῖν, ὧν τὰ δισχίλια Κλεομένει δοθῆναι κατὰ τοὺς ἐθισμούς. [2] ἐν δὲ τούτοις πρῶτον μὲν τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων χορηγίας καὶ δυνάμεως; ἣν μάλιστα δεῖ παρὰ τοῖς ἱστοριογράφοις ὑπάρχειν. [3] ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ λέγω κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ἐν οἷς ὑπό τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων ἄρδην κατέφθαρτο τὰ Πελοποννησίων, [4] ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ λέγοντες μεγίστην καρποῦσθαι δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὅμως ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπίπλων χωρὶς σωμάτων οὐχ οἷόν τε συναχθῆναι τοσοῦτο πλῆθος χρημάτων. [5] καὶ διότι τοῦτο νῦν οὐκ εἰκῇ, λόγῳ δέ τινι μᾶλλον ἀποφαινόμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. [6] τίς γὰρ ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων οὐχ ἱστόρηκε διότι καθ᾽ οὓς καιροὺς μετὰ Θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνέβαινον πόλεμον καὶ μυρίους μὲν ἐξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, ἑκατὸν δ᾽ ἐπλήρουν τριήρεις, [7] ὅτι τότε κρίναντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσφορὰς ἐτιμήσαντο τήν τε χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν οὐσίαν: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τὸ σύμπαν τίμημα τῆς ἀξίας ἐνέλιπε τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων διακοσίοις καὶ πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις. [8] ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἀπεοικὸς ἂν φανείη τὸ περὶ Πελοποννησίων ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ. [9] κατὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ὑπερβολικῶς ἀποφαινόμενος οὐκ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν τολμήσειεν πλείω γενέσθαι τριακοσίων, [10] ἐπειδήπερ ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι διότι καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δουλικῶν σωμάτων τὰ πλεῖστα συνέβη διαφυγεῖν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. μέγιστον δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τεκμήριον: [11] οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὄντες δεύτεροι τῶν Ἀρκάδων Μαντινεῖς οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν περιουσίαν, ὡς αὐτὸς οὗτός φησιν, ἐκ πολιορκίας δὲ καὶ παραδόσεως ἁλόντες, ὥστε μήτε διαφυγεῖν μηδένα μήτε διακλαπῆναι ῥᾳδίως μηδέν, [12] ὅμως τὸ πᾶν λάφυρον ἐποίησαν μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς τάλαντα τριακόσια.
62. He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that, from the spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand, according to custom, were given to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge which above all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course now speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by the Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by the establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity of which it is capable. Still even at this period, if you could collect all the movable property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving out the value of slaves), it would be impossible to get so large a sum of money together. That I speak on good grounds and not at random will appear from the following fact. Every one has read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered upon the war with the Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty thousand men, and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that what I have just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the mark. But at this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely give more than three hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free and slaves, escaped to Messene. But the strongest confirmation of my words is the case of Mantinea, which, as he himself observes, was second to no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after a siege, so that no one could escape, and no property could without great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the town, including the price of the captives sold, amounte
d at this same period to only three hundred talents.
[1] τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τούτῳ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάσειε; ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποφαινόμενος λέγει πρὸ τῆς παρατάξεως δέχ᾽ ἡμέραις μάλιστα τὸν παρὰ Πτολεμαίου πρεσβευτὴν ἐλθεῖν ἀγγέλλοντα πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη διότι Πτολεμαῖος τὸ μὲν χορηγεῖν ἀπολέγει, διαλύεσθαι δὲ παρακαλεῖ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον. [2] τὸν δ᾽ ἀκούσαντά φησι κρῖναι διότι δεῖ τὴν ταχίστην ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὅλοις πρὸ τοῦ συνεῖναι τὰ προσπεπτωκότα τὰς δυνάμεις, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνασθαι μισθοδοτεῖν. [3] ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἑξακισχιλίων ἐγκρατὴς ἐγεγόνει ταλάντων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, τὸν Πτολεμαῖον αὐτὸν ἠδύνατο ταῖς χορηγίαις ὑπερθέσθαι. [4] πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἀντίγονον, εἰ μόνον τριακοσίων ὑπῆρχε κύριος, καὶ λίαν ἱκανὸς ἦν ἀσφαλῶς ὑπομένων τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον. [5] τὸ δ᾽ ἅμα μὲν πάσας ἀποφαίνειν τῷ Κλεομένει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν Πτολεμαίῳ διὰ τὰς χορηγίας, ἅμα δὲ τοσούτων χρημάτων αὐτὸν φάναι κύριον γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ἀλογίας, ἔτι δ᾽ ἀσκεψίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον; [6] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα τῷ συγγραφεῖ τοιαῦτα καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιροὺς καὶ παρ᾽ ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν κατατέτακται, περὶ ὧν ἀρκεῖν ὑπολαμβάνω κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.
63. But a more astonishing misstatement remains to be remarked. In the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts “that about ten days before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible, before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope to provide the soldiers’ pay from his own resources.” But if he had at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would have been better supplied than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the writer states two inconsistent propositions — that Cleomenes depended wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but I think for my present purpose enough has been said.
[1] μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ἅλωσιν Ἀντιγόνου παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀργείων πόλει, συναγαγὼν Κλεομένης ἅμα τῷ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν ἐνίστασθαι καὶ παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς καιροῖς, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων χώραν, [2] ὡς μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐδόκει, παραβόλως καὶ τολμηρῶς διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα τῶν κατὰ τὰς εἰσόδους τόπων, ὡς δὲ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις, ἀσφαλῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς. [3] ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν Ἀντίγονον διαφεικότα τὰς δυνάμεις, ᾔδει σαφῶς ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἀκινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεύτερον ἔτι τῆς χώρας καταφθειρομένης ἕως τῶν τειχῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς Ἀργείους θεωροῦντας τὸ γινόμενον ἀσχάλλειν καὶ καταμέμφεσθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. [4] εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίη μὴ δυνάμενον αὐτὸν ὑποφέρειν τὸν ἐπιρραπισμὸν τῶν ὄχλων ἐξελθεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεῦσαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, πρόδηλον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν αὐτῷ διότι νικήσει ῥᾳδίως. [5] εἰ δ᾽ ἐμμείνας τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀφησυχάζοι, καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι θάρσος ἐνεργασάμενος ἀσφαλῶς ὑπέλαβε ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. [6] τῆς γὰρ χώρας δῃουμένης οἱ μὲν ὄχλοι συστρεφόμενοι τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἐλοιδόρουν. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἡγεμονικῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατὰ λόγον χρήσασθαι τοῖς [7] πράγμασιν ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καταφθείρας μὲν τὴν χώραν, καταπληξάμενος δὲ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, εὐθαρσεῖς δὲ πεποιηκὼς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπανῆλθεν.
64. Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at Argos. But at the approach of spring Cleomenes collected his army, addressed a suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive territory. Most people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step, because the places at which the frontier was crossed were strongly fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the measure as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed his forces, he reckoned on two things, — there would be no one to resist him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would be certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus: therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints of the populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the other hand Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently aloof, he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat home, after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own forces with courage. And this was the actual result. For as the devastation of the country went on, crowds began to collect and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise general and king, he refused to allow any consideration to outweigh that of sound strategy, and persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of his plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his own army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested.