by Polybius
27. At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was made, of which the chief provisions were these: “The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sicily and all islands lying between Italy and Sicily.
“The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be attacked by the other.
“Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any public building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other, nor make any compact of friendship with the allies of the other.
“The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the Romans two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand on the spot; and shall restore all prisoners, without ransom, to the Romans.”
Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa, the Romans went so far as to pass a decree for war with Carthage, but eventually made a treaty to the following effect: “The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sardinia, and pay an additional twelve hundred talents.”
Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated with Hasdrubal in Iberia, in which it was stipulated that “the Carthaginians should not cross the Iber with arms.”
Such were the mutual obligations established between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to that of Hannibal.
[1] ὥσπερ οὖν τὴν εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν Ῥωμαίων οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους εὑρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθ᾽ ὃν ἐποιήσαντο τὰς περὶ Σαρδόνος συνθήκας, οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ᾽ αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἂν εὔλογον, [2] ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογουμένως τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἠναγκασμένους παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρῆσαι μὲν Σαρδόνος, ἐξενεγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων. [3] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων περὶ τούτων λεγόμενον ἔγκλημα, διότι τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν πλοϊζομένους ἠδίκουν κατὰ τὸν Λιβυκὸν πόλεμον, ἐλύθη καθ᾽ οὓς καιροὺς κομισάμενοι παρὰ Καρχηδονίων ἅπαντας τοὺς κατηγμένους ἀντεδωρήσαντο χωρὶς λύτρων ἐν χάριτι τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντας αἰχμαλώτους. [4] ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ δεδηλώκαμεν. [5] τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, λοιπὸν διευκρινῆσαι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου ποτέροις αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον.
28. As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was not in contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge in the case of the second proclamation of war, in consequence of which the treaty for the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that it is impossible to find any reasonable pretext or ground for the Roman action. The Carthaginians were beyond question compelled by the necessities of their position, contrary to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia, and to pay this enormous sum of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they had during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility to ships sailing from Rome, — that was barred by their own act in restoring, without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in gratitude for similar conduct on the part of Carthage to Romans who had landed on their shores; a transaction which I have spoken of at length in my previous book.
These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the Hannibalian war is to be imputed.
[1] τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων τότε ῥηθέντα δεδηλώκαμεν, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων λεγόμενα νῦν ἐροῦμεν: οἷς τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο διὰ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ Ζακανθαίων ἀπωλείᾳ θυμόν: λέγεται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς. [2] πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰς πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν γενομένας ὁμολογίας οὐκ ἀθετητέον, καθάπερ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι λέγειν ἐθάρρουν: οὐ γὰρ προσέκειτο, [3] καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου, “1κυρίας εἶναι ταύτας, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ δόξῃ τῶν “1Ῥωμαίων:”2 ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοτελῶς ἐποιήσατο τὰς ὁμολογίας Ἀσδρούβας, ἐν αἷς ἦν, “1τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν μὴ δια” [4] 1βαίνειν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους.”2 καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Σικελίαν συνθήκαις ἦν ἔγγραπτον, καθάπερ κἀκεῖνοί φασιν, “1ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων συμ”1μάχοις τὴν παρ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν,”2 οὐκ αὐτοῖς μόνον τοῖς τότε συμμαχοῦσι, καθάπερ ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἐκδοχὴν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι: [5] προσέκειτο γὰρ ἂν ἤτοι τὸ μὴ προσλαμβάνειν ἑτέρους συμμάχους παρὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας ἢ τὸ μὴ παραλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς ὕστερον προσληφθέντας τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν. [6] ὅτε δὲ τούτων οὐδέτερον ἐγράφη, προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις, καὶ τοῖς οὖσι τότε καὶ τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα προσληφθησομένοις, τὴν παρ᾽ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν ἀεὶ δέον ἦν ὑπάρχειν. [7] ὃ δὴ καὶ πάντως ἂν εἰκὸς εἶναι δόξειεν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοιαύτας ἔμελλον ποιήσεσθαι συνθήκας δι᾽ ὧν ἀφελοῦνται τὴν ἐξουσίαν σφῶν αὐτῶν τοῦ προσλαμβάνειν κατὰ καιρούς, ἄν τινες ἐπιτήδειοι φανῶσιν αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι, [8] οὐδὲ μὴν προσλαβόντες εἰς τὴν σφετέραν πίστιν περιόψεσθαι τούτους ὑπό τινων ἀδικουμένους: [9] ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀμφοτέρων τὸ συνέχον τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ἀμφοτέροις τότε συμμάχων ἀφέξεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον τοὺς ἑτέρους παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐπιδέξεσθαί τινας τούτων εἰς συμμαχίαν, [10] περὶ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα προσληφθησομένων αὐτὸ τοῦτο, μήτε ξενολογεῖν μήτ᾽ ἐπιτάττειν μηδετέρους μηδὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἐπαρχίαις καὶ συμμαχίαις, ὑπάρχειν τε τὴν ἀσφάλειαν πᾶσι τὴν παρ᾽ ἀμφοῖν.
29. I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians; I must now state what is alleged on the contrary by the Romans. For though it is true that in this particular interview, owing to their anger at the fall of Saguntum, they did not use these arguments, yet they were appealed to on many occasions, and by many of their citizens. First, they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the assurance to do: for it did not contain the clause, which that of Lutatius did, making its validity conditional on its ratification by the people of Rome; but Hasdrubal made the agreement absolutely and authoritatively that “the Carthaginians should not cross the Iber in arms.”
Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting Sicily, which by their own admission stipulated that “the allies of neither party should be attacked by the other,” did not refer to then existing allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case a clause would have been added, disabling either from making new alliances in addition to those already existing, or excluding allies, taken subsequently to the
making of the treaty, from its benefits. But since neither of these provisions was made, it was plain that both the then existing allies, and all those taken subsequently on either side, were entitled to reciprocal security. And this was only reasonable. For it was not likely that they would have made a treaty depriving them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking on such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor, again, if they had taken any such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would allow them to be injured by any persons whatever. But, in fact, the main thing present in the minds of both parties to the treaty was, that they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each other’s allies, and on no account admit into alliance with themselves the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent allies that this particular clause applied, “Neither shall enlist soldiers, or impose contributions on the provinces or allies of the other; and all shall be alike secure of attack from the other side.”
[1] τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, ὁμολογούμενον ἦν κἀκεῖνο διότι Ζακανθαῖοι πλείοσιν ἔτεσιν ἤδη πρότερον τῶν κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν καιρῶν ἐδεδώκεισαν αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν. [2] σημεῖον δὲ τοῦτο μέγιστον καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὁμολογούμενον ὅτι στασιάσαντες Ζακανθαῖοι πρὸς σφᾶς οὐ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέτρεψαν, καίπερ ἐγγὺς ὄντων αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἤδη πραττόντων, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐποιήσαντο τὴν κατόρθωσιν τῆς πολιτείας. [3] διόπερ εἰ μέν τις τὴν Ζακάνθης ἀπώλειαν αἰτίαν τίθησι τοῦ πολέμου, συγχωρητέον ἀδίκως ἐξενηνοχέναι τὸν πόλεμον Καρχηδονίους κατά τε τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου συνθήκας, καθ᾽ ἃς ἔδει τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν ὑφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ὑπάρχειν ἀσφάλειαν, κατά τε τὰς ἐπ᾽ Ἀσδρούβου, καθ᾽ ἃς οὐκ ἔδει διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους: [4] εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρδόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάντως ὁμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους: καιρῷ γὰρ πεισθέντες ἠμύνοντο σὺν καιρῷ τοὺς βλάψαντας.
30. These things being so, they argued that it was beyond controversy that Saguntum had accepted the protection of Rome, several years before the time of Hannibal. The strongest proof of this, and one which would not be contested by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when political disturbances broke out at Saguntum, the people chose the Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the dispute and restore their constitution, although the latter were close at hand and were already established in Iberia.
I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to be regarded as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians must be acknowledged to be in the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which secured immunity from attack for the allies of both parties, and in view of the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled the Carthaginians from passing the Iber with arms. If on the other hand the taking Sardinia from them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war: for as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves on their injurers.
[1] ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν ἀκρίτως τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωμένων τάχ᾽ ἂν φήσαιεν ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λόγους. [2] ἐγὼ δ᾽, εἰ μέν τις ὑπείληφεν πρὸς πᾶσαν περίστασιν αὐτάρκης ὑπάρχειν, καλὴν μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν δ᾽ ἴσως φήσαιμ᾽ ἂν εἶναι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην: [3] εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς ἂν μήτε περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἰδίαν μήτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν τολμήσαι τοῦτ᾽ εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπος ὢν διὰ τό, κἂν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτυχῇ, τήν γε περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίδα μηδὲν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν παρόντων εὐλόγως βεβαιώσασθαι μηδένα τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων, οὐ μόνον καλήν, [4] ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναγκαίαν εἶναί φημι διὰ ταῦτα τὴν τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐπίγνωσιν. [5] πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀδικούμενός τις ἢ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδικουμένης βοηθοὺς εὕροι καὶ συμμάχους, εἴτε κτήσασθαί τι καὶ προκατάρξασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς συνεργήσοντας αὐτῷ παρορμήσαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολάς; [6] πῶς δ᾽ ἂν εὐδοκούμενος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τοὺς βεβαιώσοντας τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν καὶ διαφυλάξοντας τὴν κατάστασιν παροξύναι δικαίως, εἰ μηδὲν εἰδείη τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ ἑκάστους ὑπομνήσεως; [7] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ἀεί πως ἁρμοζόμενοι καὶ συνυποκρινόμενοι τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγουσι καὶ πράττουσι πάντες ὥστε δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν ἑκάστου προαίρεσιν καὶ λίαν ἐν πολλοῖς ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. [8] τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἑκάστων αἱρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις καὶ δηλοῖ παρ᾽ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, παρ᾽ οἷς δὲ τἀναντία τούτων. [9] ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα, πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν εὑρεῖν ἔστιν. [10] ἅπερ ἔχει μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. [11] διόπερ οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶ φροντιστέον τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων ἐξηγήσεως οὔτε τοῖς γράφουσιν οὔτε τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν τὰς ἱστορίας, ὡς τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἅμα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις. [12] ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη τὸ πραχθὲν καὶ πότερον εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται, [13] καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.
31. Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such minute discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And if any man were entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this, either in public or private affairs, — seeing that no man of sense, even if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty on the future, — then I say that such knowledge
is essential, and not merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first, a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to desire to maintain the status quo. In all these cases it is history alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of things. In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an insight into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the necessity of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth is too often obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past admit of being tested by naked fact; and accordingly display without disguise the motives and purposes of the several persons engaged; and teach us from what sort of people to expect favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the reverse. They give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who would be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend our cause, — a power that contributes very greatly to national as well as individual security. Neither the writer nor the reader of history, therefore, should confine his attention to a bare statement of facts: he must take into account all that preceded, accompanied, or followed them. For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle, and motive, and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though it may please for the moment, has no abiding value.