by Polybius
69. Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by the treachery of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans. Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn he used the latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour, by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained, the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow: and once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of the greater part of his cavalry; and a thousand sharp-shooters of his infantry along with them; who having speedily come up with the enemy on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and lost very few themselves.
[1] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος μετεωρισθεὶς καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ προτερήματι φιλοτίμως εἶχε πρὸς τὸ τὴν ταχίστην κρῖναι τὰ ὅλα. [2] προέκειτο μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι διὰ τὸ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀρρωστεῖν: ὅμως δὲ βουλόμενος προσλαβέσθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ συνάρχοντος γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο λόγους περὶ τούτων πρὸς αὐτόν. [3] ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάληψιν περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων: [4] τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήσαντα βελτίω τὰ παρ᾽ αὑτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἀθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πίστει, τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσειν τι πάλιν κατ᾽ ἐκείνων. [5] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθινὴν παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἤλπιζε τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν. [6] διὸ καὶ τοιούτοις χρώμενος λογισμοῖς μένειν ἠξίου τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. [7] ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ᾔδει μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἔσπευδεν κρῖναι δι᾽ αὑτοῦ τὰ ὅλα καὶ μήτε τὸν Πόπλιον δύνασθαι παρατυχεῖν τῇ μάχῃ μήτε τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους στρατηγοὺς φθάσαι παραλαβόντας τὴν ἀρχήν: οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ χρόνος. [8] διόπερ οὐ τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων καιρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδιον ἔμελλε τοῦ δέοντος σφαλήσεσθαι προφανῶς. [9] ὁ δ᾽ Ἀννίβας παραπλησίους ἔχων ἐπινοίας Ποπλίῳ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἔσπευδε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὁρμαῖς, [10] δεύτερον ἀνασκήτοις καὶ νεοσυλλόγοις συμβαλεῖν τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπέδοις, τρίτον ἀδυνατοῦντος ἔτι τοῦ Ποπλίου ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προΐεσθαι διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον. [11] τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν καθέντι χώραν στρατόπεδα καὶ παραδόξοις ἐγχειροῦντι πράγμασιν εἷς τρόπος ἐστὶν οὗτος σωτηρίας, τὸ συνεχῶς καινοποιεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλπίδας. [12] Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμὴν
70. Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was all eagerness for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion in support of his own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune, he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself, before Scipio should be able to be present at the battle, or the next Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure.
Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place, he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually striking some fresh blow.
Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the intended attack of Tiberius.
[1] τοῦ Τεβερίου πρὸς τούτοις ἦν. πάλαι δὲ συνεωρακὼς μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τόπον ἐπίπεδον μὲν καὶ ψιλόν, εὐφυῆ δὲ πρὸς ἐνέδραν διά τι ῥεῖθρον ἔχον ὀφρῦν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης �
��κάνθας καὶ βάτους συνεχεῖς ἐπιπεφυκότας, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ στρατηγεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. [2] ἔμελλεν δ᾽ εὐχερῶς λήσειν: οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑλώδεις τόπους ὑπόπτως εἶχον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἀεὶ τιθέναι τὰς ἐνέδρας ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις χωρίοις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις καὶ ψιλοῖς ἀπεπίστευον, [3] οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λαθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν τοὺς ἐνεδρεύσαντας εὐφυέστεροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τῶν ὑλωδῶν διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι μὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ προορᾶν πάντα τοὺς ἐνεδρεύοντας, εἶναι δ᾽ ἐπιπροσθήσεις ἱκανὰς ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τόποις. [4] τὸ γὰρ τυχὸν ῥεῖθρον μετὰ βραχείας ὀφρύος, ποτὲ δὲ κάλαμοι καὶ πτέρεις καί τι γένος ἀκανθῶν, οὐ μόνον πεζοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐνίοτε δύναται κρύπτειν, ἐὰν βραχέα τις προνοηθῇ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐπίσημα τῶν ὅπλων ὕπτια τιθέναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν, τὰς δὲ περικεφαλαίας ὑποτιθέναι τοῖς ὅπλοις. [5] πλὴν ὅ γε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς κοινολογηθεὶς Μάγωνι τἀδελφῷ καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγῶνος, συγκατατιθεμένων αὐτῷ πάντων ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, [6] ἅμα τῷ δειπνοποιήσασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀνακαλεσάμενος Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὄντα νέον μὲν ὁρμῆς δὲ πλήρη καὶ παιδομαθῆ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, συνέστησε τῶν ἱππέων ἄνδρας ἑκατὸν καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς ἴσους. [7] ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ στρατοπέδου σημηνάμενος τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους παρηγγέλκει δειπνοποιησαμένους ἥκειν ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ σκηνήν. [8] παρακαλέσας δὲ καὶ παραστήσας τούτοις τὴν πρέπουσαν ὁρμὴν τῷ καιρῷ παρήγγελλε δέκα τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἕκαστον ἐπιλεξάμενον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τάξεων ἥκειν εἴς τινα τόπον τακτὸν ἤδη τῆς στρατοπεδείας. [9] τῶν δὲ πραξάντων τὸ συνταχθέν, τούτους μὲν ὄντας ἱππεῖς χιλίους καὶ πεζοὺς ἄλλους τοσούτους ἐξαπέστειλε νυκτὸς εἰς τὴν ἐνέδραν, συστήσας ὁδηγοὺς καὶ τἀδελφῷ διαταξάμενος περὶ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως: [10] αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς συναγαγών, ὄντας φερεκάκους διαφερόντως, παρεκάλεσε καί τινας δωρεὰς ἐπαγγειλάμενος τοῖς ἀνδραγαθήσασι προσέταξε πελάσαντας τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων χάρακι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπιδιαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ προσακροβολιζομένους κινεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, βουλόμενος ἀναρίστους καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπαρασκεύους λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. [11] τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἡγεμόνας ἁθροίσας ὁμοίως παρεκάλεσε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι παρήγγειλε καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν ἵππων γίνεσθαι θεραπείαν.
71. Now he had some time before remarked a certain piece of ground which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to make concealment possible, — a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes, — which are good enough to hide not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution is taken of laying conspicuous arms flat upon the ground and hiding helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly, when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them, and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered them to ride up to the enemy’s lines, and then quickly cross the river, and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast, or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle, ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and horses.
[1] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς παραυτίκα μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν ἵππον ἐξαπέστελλε, προστάξας ἔχεσθαι καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. [2] ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς πεζακοντιστὰς εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους: ἐκίνει δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ὡς ἐξ ἐπιφανείας κριθησομένων τῶν ὅλων, ἐπαιρόμενος τῷ τε πλήθει τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῷ γεγονότι τῇ προτεραίᾳ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς εὐημερήματι. [3] οὔσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας περὶ χειμερινὰς τροπὰς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας νιφετώδους καὶ ψυχρᾶς διαφερόντως, τῶν δ᾽ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππων σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων ἀναρίστων ἐκπεπορευμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁρμῇ καὶ προθυμίᾳ περιῆν τὸ πλῆθος: [4] ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως, καὶ προσαναβεβηκότος τῷ ῥεύματι διὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ γενόμενον ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατόπεδα τόποις ὄμβρον, μόλις ἕως τῶν μασθῶν οἱ πεζοὶ βαπτιζόμενοι διέβαινον: [5] ἐξ ὧν ἐκακοπάθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑπό τε τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας, ὡς ἂν ἤδη καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαινούσης. [6] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατὰ σκ
ηνὰς βεβρωκότες καὶ πεπωκότες καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἡτοιμακότες ἠλείφοντο καὶ καθωπλίζοντο περὶ τὰ πυρὰ πάντες. [7] Ἀννίβας δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτηρῶν ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν διαβεβηκότας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τὸν ποταμὸν προβαλόμενος ἐφεδρείαν τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, ὄντας εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν. [8] καὶ προαγαγὼν ὡς ὀκτὼ στάδια πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθεῖαν παρενέβαλε, περὶ δισμυρίους ὄντας τὸν ἀριθμόν, Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς καὶ Λίβυας, [9] τοὺς δ᾽ ἱππεῖς διελὼν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον παρέστησε τὸ κέρας, πλείους ὄντας μυρίων σὺν τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν συμμάχοις, τὰ δὲ θηρία μερίσας πρὸ τῶν κεράτων δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων προεβάλετο. [10] Τεβέριος δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς ἀνεκαλεῖτο, θεωρῶν οὐκ ἔχοντας ὅ,τι χρήσονται τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὸ τοὺς Νομάδας ἀποχωρεῖν μὲν εὐχερῶς καὶ σποράδην, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς τολμηρῶς καὶ θρασέως: τὸ γὰρ τῆς Νομαδικῆς μάχης ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦτο: [11] τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς παρενέβαλε κατὰ τὰς εἰθισμένας παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τάξεις, ὄντας τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους εἰς μυρίους ἑξακισχιλίους, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους εἰς δισμυρίους. [12] τὸ γὰρ τέλειον στρατόπεδον παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς ἐπιβολὰς ἐκ τοσούτων ἀνδρῶν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὁμοῦ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἑκατέρους οἱ καιροὶ συνάγωσιν. [13] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον θεὶς τὸ κέρας, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἐπῄει τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις σοβαρῶς, ἐν τάξει