by Polybius
105. As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the Roman light-armed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops, but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their standards, and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and bravado of a soldier, and the far-seeing prudence and cool calculation of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more, and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with their preparations for the winter unmolested.
[1] τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων ὥρας συνεγγιζούσης, εἵλοντο στρατηγοὺς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι Λεύκιον Αἰμίλιον καὶ Γάιον Τερέντιον. ὧν κατασταθέντων οἱ μὲν δικτάτορες ἀπέθεντο τὴν ἀρχήν, [2] οἱ δὲ προϋπάρχοντες ὕπατοι, Γνάιος Σερουίλιος καὶ Μάρκος Ῥήγουλος ὁ μετὰ τὴν Φλαμινίου τελευτὴν ἐπικατασταθείς, τότε προχειρισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀντιστράτηγοι καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις ἐξουσίαν ἐχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γνώμην τὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. [3] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τῆς συγκλήτου τὸ μὲν ἐλλεῖπον πλῆθος ἔτι τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολὴν παραχρῆμα καταγράψαντες ἐξαπέστειλαν, [4] τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον διεσάφησαν ὁλοσχερῆ μὲν κίνδυνον κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον συνίστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοὺς ὡς ἐνεργοτάτους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ συνεχεστάτους χάριν τοῦ γυμνάζειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν εὐθαρσεῖς τοὺς νέους πρὸς τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς ἀγῶνας, [5] τῷ καὶ τὰ πρότερον αὐτοῖς συμπτώματα δοκεῖν οὐχ ἥκιστα γεγονέναι διὰ τὸ νεοσυλλόγοις καὶ τελέως ἀνασκήτοις κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις. [6] αὐτοὶ δὲ Λεύκιον μὲν Ποστόμιον, ἑξαπέλεκυν ὄντα στρατηγόν, στρατόπεδον δόντες εἰς Γαλατίαν ἐξαπέστειλαν, βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν ἀντιπερίσπασμα τοῖς Κελτοῖς τοῖς μετ᾽ Ἀννίβου στρατευομένοις. [7] πρόνοιαν δ᾽ ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῆς ἀνακομιδῆς τοῦ παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῷ Λιλυβαίῳ στόλου, διεπέμψαντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ στρατηγοῖς πάντα τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. [8] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐγίνοντο παρασκευὰς ἐπιμελῶς. [9] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον κομισάμενοι τὰς παρὰ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐντολὰς πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην: [10] διὸ καὶ τὸ πλείω γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν παρήσομεν. ὁλοσχερὲς μὲν γὰρ ἢ μνήμης ἄξιον ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν ἐπράχθη διὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καιροῦ περίστασιν, [11] ἀκροβολισμοὶ δὲ μόνον καὶ συμπλοκαὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐγίνοντο πλείους, ἐν αἷς εὐδοκίμουν οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ῥωμαίων: καὶ γὰρ ἀνδρωδῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς ἐδόκουν ἕκαστα χειρίζειν.
106. The Consular elections being now come, the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus — who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius, — were invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius; and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing, as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor Lucius Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum, and for sending to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular. The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances; but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for courage and prudence.
[1] τὸν μὲν οὖν χειμῶνα καὶ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν διέμειναν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύοντες ἀλλήλοις: ἤδη δὲ παραδιδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπετείων καρπῶν χορηγίαν, ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον χάρακος Ἀννίβας. [2] κρίνων δὲ συμφέρειν τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναγκάσαι μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καταλαμβάνει τὴν τῆς Κάννης προσαγορευομένης πόλεως ἄκραν. [3] εἰς γὰρ ταύτην συνέβαινε τόν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χορηγίας ἁθροίζεσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ τῶν περὶ Κανύσιον τόπων: ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον παρακομ
ίζεσθαι. [4] τὴν μὲν οὖν πόλιν ἔτι πρότερον συνέβαινε κατεσκάφθαι, τῆς παρασκευῆς δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄκρας τότε καταληφθείσης, οὐ μικρὰν συνέπεσε ταραχὴν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις: [5] οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὰς χορηγίας ἐδυσχρηστοῦντ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ κατειλῆφθαι τὸν προειρημένον τόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πέριξ εὐφυῶς κεῖσθαι χώραν. [6] πέμποντες οὖν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην συνεχῶς ἐπυνθάνοντο τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐὰν ἐγγίσωσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ δυνησόμενοι φυγομαχεῖν, τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων πάντων μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖς διανοίαις, [7] οἱ δ᾽ ἐβουλεύσαντο μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἐπισχεῖν ἔτι διεσάφησαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἐξαπέστελλον. [8] συνέβαινε δὲ πάντας εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπερείδεσθαι τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας διά τε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ βίου καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ μικροῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἀνδρωδῶς ἅμα καὶ συμφερόντως δοκεῖν κεχειρικέναι τὸν πρὸς Ἰλλυριοὺς πόλεμον. [9] προέθεντο δὲ στρατοπέδοις ὀκτὼ διακινδυνεύειν, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἑκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔχοντος ἄνδρας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων. [10] Ῥωμαῖοι γάρ, καθά που καὶ πρότερον εἰρήκαμεν, ἀεί ποτε τέτταρα στρατόπεδα προχειρίζονται. τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον πεζοὺς μὲν λαμβάνει περὶ τετρακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους. [11] ἐπὰν δέ τις ὁλοσχερεστέρα προφαίνηται χρεία, τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐν ἑκάστῳ στρατοπέδῳ ποιοῦσι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τοὺς δ᾽ ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους. [12] τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος πάρισον ποιοῦσι τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ὡς ἐπίπαν τριπλάσιον. [13] τούτων δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα δόντες ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξαποστέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις. [14] καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀγῶνας δι᾽ ἑνὸς ὑπάτου καὶ δύο στρατοπέδων καὶ τοῦ προειρημένου πλήθους τῶν συμμάχων κρίνουσι, σπανίως δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς ἕνα καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕνα χρῶνται κίνδυνον. [15] τότε γε μὴν οὕτως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ κατάφοβοι τὸ μέλλον ὡς οὐ μόνον τέτταρσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὀκτὼ στρατοπέδοις Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ὁμοῦ προῄρηντο διακινδυνεύειν.
107. Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they, however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated before, habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.
[1] διὸ καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον καὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέντες τὸ μέγεθος τῶν εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸ μέρος ἀποβησομένων ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐξαπέστειλαν, ἐντειλάμενοι σὺν καιρῷ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα γενναίως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίως. [2] οἳ καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ συναθροίσαντες τὰ πλήθη τήν τε τῆς συγκλήτου γνώμην διεσάφησαν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ παρεκάλουν τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς παρεστῶσι καιροῖς, ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας τοῦ Λευκίου διατιθεμένου τοὺς λόγους. [3] ἦν δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τοῦτον τείνοντα τὸν νοῦν, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγονότων συμπτωμάτων: ὧδε γὰρ καὶ τῇδέ που συνέβαινε διατετράφθαι καὶ προσδεῖσθαι παραινέσεως τοὺς πολλούς. [4] διόπερ ἐπειρᾶτο συνιστάνειν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἐν ταῖς προγεγενημέναις μάχαις ἐλαττωμάτων οὐχ ἓν οὐδὲ δεύτερον, καὶ πλείω δ᾽ ἂν εὕροι τις αἴτια, δι᾽ ἃ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἐξέβη τὸ τέλος, [5] ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νῦν καιρῶν οὐδεμία λείπεται πρόφασις, ἐὰν ἄνδρες ὦσι, τοῦ μὴ νικᾶν τοὺς ἐχθρούς. [6] τότε μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρους οὐδέποτε συνηγωνίσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις οὔτε ταῖς δυνάμεσι κεχρῆσθαι γεγυμνασμέναις, ἀλλὰ νεοσυλλόγοις καὶ ἀοράτοις παντὸς δεινοῦ: [7] τό τε μέγιστον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοεῖσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς πρότερον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ὥστε σχεδὸν μηδ᾽ ἑωρακότας τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς παρατάττεσθαι καὶ συγκαταβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους. [8] “1οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν σφαλέντες, ἐκ Σ
ικελίας τῇ προτεραίᾳ παραγενηθέντες, ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ παρετάξαντο: [9] τοῖς δὲ κατὰ Τυρρηνίαν ἀγωνισαμένοις οὐχ οἷον πρότερον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ συνιδεῖν ἐξεγένετο τοὺς πολεμίους διὰ τὸ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα γενόμενον σύμπτωμα. [10] νῦν γε μὴν πάντα τἀναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις ὑπάρχει.