937 The first line of this verse is exceedingly terse. The construction, as explained by the commentator, is Tatra (samsaye) purusham prati Jnanam (jnanajanakam) chet (karma) syat, (tarhi) sa (eva) Vedavidhih. One cannot help admiring Nilakantha for his patience and ingenuity.
938 Daiva is explained by the commentator as Grahah or Kalah. I think, it is used to signify some kind of blind force whose origin is untraceable. Hence, I render it necessity. Vritti in verse 5 is evidently Exertion, for the word implies course of conduct, Avivekam is samuchchayam or a combination of all the three.
939 ‘Inspired with doubt,’ with reference to the declarations of the Srutis. ‘Possessed of tranquil souls,’ i.e., not penetrated by doubts of any kind.
940 In the Treta and the other Yugas people are seen professing attachment or devotion to one only of the Vedas and not to the others, be it the Richs, the Samans, or the Yajuses. The speaker, dissatisfied with this refers to the Krita age as one in which such difference of faith were not observable. The men of that age regarded all the Vedas equally, and, in fact, as even identical.
941 Jiva or Chit becomes puissant and succeeds in creating the universe by means of penance. By penance one attains to Brahma, and, therefore, universal puissance. This has been sufficiently explained in the previous Sections.
942 This is one of the most important verses in this section, for, as the commentator explains, this furnishes the answer to the question proposed in the previous section, viz., ‘what is that knowledge?’ In the Vedas both acts and knowledge have been spoken of. In the province of acts, Brahma has been represented as Indra and the other gods. Brahma, therefore, as spoken of there, is ‘gahana’, or hidden to (or inconceivable by) even those that are conversant with that province or sphere of the Vedas. In the Vedanta, again, knowledge or Vidya has been spoken of as the means by which to attain to Brahma. The knowledge or Vidya, therefore, which is the subject of the question, is not what is implied by Pravritti dharma or by Nivritti as used in the previous section.
943 The second line of this verse corresponds with the second line of verse 87 of Chapter II of Manusmriti.
944 They are seen and not seen is an idiomatic expression for ‘becoming invisible.’
945 i.e., kine do not yield copious and sweet milk; the soil ceases to be fertile; water ceases to be sweet; and the medicinal and edible herbs lose their virtues of healing as also their flavour.
946 The commentator thinks that Swadharmasthah is connected with asramah in the first line. I prefer the more obvious construction.
947 Varshati means pushnati. Angani means the observances necessary for the practice of Yoga as also all kinds of rites and vows. The Vedas cause these to grow, and they, in their turn, aid all students of the Vedas in achieving their purposes.
948 Prabhavah is uttpattih, or origin; sthanam is poshanam. Both the Vernacular translators skip over the last word, thinking that prabhavasthanam, is one word. The commentator notices them as separate. In the beginning of the second line, yatra is understood, Swabhavena, is explained by the commentator as Brahmabhavena, natu vikritena rupena. I think the explanation is correct, and have adopted it accordingly in the text.
949 Yatha in the first line of verse means, as the commentator explains, yat prakarakam.
950 The commentator points out that by these four words the four modes of life are indicated.
951 The commentator explains that this means that amongst embodied creatures they that are ignorant take those great entities which are really non-ego for either the ego or its Possessions.
952 The commentator explains that the object of this verse is to show that the Yoga view of the Soul being only the enjoyer but not the actor, is not correct. On the other hand, the Sankhya view of the Soul being neither the enjoyer nor the actor, is true. The deities, remaining in the several senses, act and enjoy. It is through ignorance that the Soul ascribes to itself their enjoyments and their actions.
953 I render Bhutatma by knowledge, following the commentator who uses the words buddhyupadhirjivah for explaining it.
954 Niyama and Visarga are explained by the commentator as ‘destruction’ and ‘creation.’ I prefer to take them as meaning ‘guiding or restraining,’ and ‘employing.’ Practically, the explanations are identical.
955 What is meant by the objects of the senses residing within the bodies of living creatures is that (as the commentator explains) their concepts exist in ‘the cavity of the heart’ (probably, mind) so that when necessary or called for, they appear (before the mind’s eye). Swabhava is explained as ‘attributes’ like heat and cold, etc.
956 This is a very difficult verse. I have rendered it, following Nilakantha’s gloss. In verse the speaker lays down what entities dwell in the body. In the rest he expounds the nature of Sattwa which the commentator takes to mean buddhi or knowledge. He begins with the statement that Sattwasya asrayah nasti. This does not mean that the knowledge has no refuge, for that would be absurd, but it means that the asraya of the knowledge, i.e., that in which the knowledge dwells, viz., the body, does not exist, the true doctrine being that the body has no real existence but that it exists like to its image in a dream. The body being non-existent, what then is the real refuge of the knowledge? The speaker answers it by saying Gunah, implying that primeval Prakriti characterised by the three attributes is that real refuge. Then it is said that Chetana (by which is implied the Soul here) is not the refuge of the knowledge for the Soul is dissociated from everything and incapable of transformation of any kind. The question is then mentally stated, — May not the Gunas be the qualities of the knowledge (instead of being, as said above, its refuge)? For dispelling this doubt, it is stated that Sattwa is the product of Tejas (Desire). The Gunas are not the product of Tejas. Hence the Gunas, which have a different origin cannot be the properties of Sattwa. The Gunas exist independently of Desire. Thus the knowledge, which has Desire for its originating cause, rests on the Gunas or has them for its refuge. In this verse, therefore, the nature of the body, the knowledge, and the Gunas, is expounded. The grammatical construction of the first line is exceedingly terse.
957 Such men behold Brahma in all things. Abhijanah is explained by the commentator as sishyakuladih. This seems to be the true meaning of the word here.
958 In rendering this word tatam (where it occurs in the Gita), it has been shown that to take it as equivalent to ‘spread’ is incorrect. In such connections, it is evident that it means ‘pervaded.’
959 If I have understood the gloss aright, this is what the first line of 21 means. Vedatma is explained as Vedic sound, i.e., the instructions inculcated in the Vedas. The word atma in the second clause means simply oneself or a person or individual. The sense then is this. The Vedas teach that all is one’s soul. The extent to which one succeeds in realising this is the measure of one’s attainment of Brahma. If one can realise it fully, one attains to Brahma fully. If partially, one’s attainment of Brahma also is partial.
960 The track of such a person, it is said, is as invisible as the skies. The commentator explains that the very gods become stupefied in respect of the object which such a man seeks, the object, of course, being Brahma.
961 That, of course, in which Time is cooked, is Brahma.
962 By this the speaker says that Brahma is not to be found in any particular spot however holy.
963 Because Brahma is infinite.
964 ‘Niyatah’ is explained by the commentator as achanchalah, and vasi as without the fault of upadhi. ‘Hansati, i.e., gachechati ite,’ hence gatimati.
965 The sense is that the Soul residing within the body is identical with the Supreme Soul, and men of wisdom only know it.
966 The construction is Hansoktancha yat aksharam tat (eva) kutastham aksharam, meaning that there is no difference between Jivatman and Paramatman. Both are identical.
967 Sattwena is explained as ‘by intelligence or the knowledge.’
968 The construction, as explained by the commentator, is B
rahma tejomayam sukram; yasya sukrasya sarvam idam tasyapi Brahma rasah. The last word means sarah.
969 Both the Vernacular translators have skipped over this line. The meaning is this: Brahma opened his eyes for becoming many, as the Srutis declare, and thereupon he became many. This, as the commentator explains, Ikshana-kartritvena sarvatmakatwam gatam, or by a glance Brahma became the Soul of all things mobile and immobile.
970 The commentator explains that Brahmanah padam means prakritim. He thinks, therefore, that the last clause of the second line means ‘should seek to subdue prakriti which is the layasthanam of mahattattwa.’ I prefer the obvious sense of the words.
971 Parimitam Kalam is explained by the commentator as equivalent to six months as the srutis declare.
972 These two verses set forth the Yoga ideal. By the practice of Yoga all these are capable of being acquired or attained. But then the Yogin who suffers himself to be led away by those valuable possessions is said to fall in hell, for the enjoyment of this kind is nothing but hell compared to the high object for which Yogins should strive. Pramoha, Brahma, and Avarta, are technical terms. Equality with the wind means speed of motion, power to disappear at will, and capacity to move through the skies.
973 A chaitya is a sacred or a large tree which stands firm on its roots and about which all round a platform of earth is raised. Vrikshagra means ‘in the front of a tree,’ probably implying ‘under the shade of its spreading branches.’
974 The commentator explains that he should imitate the wind by becoming asangah, i.e., unattached to all things. Aniketah means without a house or fixed abode.
975 It is difficult to understand what is meant by Savda-Brahmativartate. I follow the commentator. ‘Brahma as represented by sound, is, of course, Pranavah or Om, the mystic monosyllable standing for the trinity.’ K.P. Singha, taking Savda-Brahma for an accusative, regards it as implying,— ‘such a man transcends all Vedic rites.’ This is precisely the meaning attached to it by the commentator where it occurs in verse 7 of section 236 ante.
976 The inferior order here referred to is, of course, the Sudra order. The commentator points out that whereas only the three superior orders are regarded to be eligible for the study of Sankhya and for inculcation of such Srutis as Tattwamasi (That thou art), here Vyasa lays down that as regards the Yoga path, all are eligible to betake themselves to it.
977 ‘Fixed senses,’ i.e., when the senses are fixed on the mind and the mind on the understanding. Ajaram is immutable or unchanging, or that in which there is no change for the worse (or for the better). By subtility is indicated the incapacity of being apprehended, and by mahattaram is meant infinity.
978 The anu anudrisya is explained as Guruvachanamanu. Thus seems to be the true meaning, otherwise avekshya would be pleonastic, abhutagatim is bhutasamplavaparyantam, i.e., till the destruction of all beings. Imam is sastraprasiddham.
979 The Vedas proclaim the efficacy of both acts and knowledge. Acts are not laid down for those that have knowledge.
980 Subhashita is explained by the commentator as ayam tu paramo dharma yat yogena atmadarsanam.
981 Na vartate does not mean annihilated but, as the commentator explains, aham asmi iti na jana atmanam.
982 Manasena karmana is explained by the commentator as sankalpena.
983 The meaning is this: the man of acts is like the new-born moon, i.e., subject to growth and decay.
984 This has been explained in a previous section.
985 The soul resides in the body without partaking of any of the attributes of the body. It is, therefore, likened to a drop of water on a lotus leaf, which, though on the leaf, is not yet attached to it, in so much that it may go off without at all soaking or drenching any part of the leaf. Yogajitatmakam is yogena jito niruddha atma chittam yena tam, as explained by the commentator.
986 Literally, ‘Tamas and Rajas and Sattwa have the attribute of Jiva for their essence.’ The particular attribute of Jiva here referred to is the Jnanamaya kosha. Jiva, again, is all accident of the Soul. The Soul comes from the Supreme Soul. Thus the chain of existence is traced to the Supreme Soul. In verse 20 again it is said that the body, which by itself is inanimate, when it exists with the Soul, is an accident of Jiva as uninvested with attributes.
987 I follow Nilakantha substantially in his interpretation of this verse. Two kinds of creation are here referred to as those of which Vyasa has spoken in the previous Sections. The first is Ksharat prabhriti yah sargah, meaning that creation which consists of the four and twenty entities commencing with Kshara or Prakriti. The other creation, consisting of the senses with their objects, represents buddhaiswarya or the puissance of the buddhi, these being all buddhikalpitah. This second creation is also atisargah which means, according to the commentator, utkrishtah and which is also pradhanah or foremost, the reason being bandhakatwam or its power to bind all individuals. I take atisargah to mean ‘derivative creation,’ the second kind of creation being derived from or based upon the other, or (as I have put it in the text) transcends or overlies the other.
988 It is explained in previous sections how the course of righteousness is regulated by the character of the particular Yuga that sets in.
989 Vyasa has already explained the character of the two apparently hostile declarations. The meaning of Suka’s question, therefore, is that if two declarations are only apparently hostile, — if, as explained in the Gita, they are identical, — how is that identity to be clearly ascertained? The fact is, Suka wishes his sire to explain the topic more clearly.
990 The course of conduct of human beings,’ i.e., the distinctions between right and wrong. Vimuktatma is taken by the commentator to imply tyaktadehah. The second line may also mean ‘having cast off (by Yoga) the consciousness of body, I shall behold my own Soul.’
991 I do not follow the commentator in his interpretation of this line.
992 ‘When the huts become smokeless,’ i.e., when the cooking and the eating of the inmates are over. ‘When the sound of the husking rod is hushed,’ i.e., when the pestle for cleaning rice no longer works, and consequently when the inmates are not likely to be able to give much to the mendicant.
993 There is an apparent conflict between the two declarations. If both are authoritative, they cannot be regarded to be scriptural declarations in consequence of their conflict; if one is so and the other not so, the scriptural character of the latter at least is lost. The scriptures cannot but be certain and free from fault. How then (the question proceeds) is the scriptural character of both to be maintained?
994 The Burdwan translator makes a ridiculous blunder in rendering Jaghanyasayi, which he takes to mean ‘sleeping on a wretched bed.’ Jaghanya implies, here as elsewhere, subsequence in point of time.
995 Both the Vernacular translators have misunderstood the last part of the second line. It does not mean that the disciple should approach the preceptor when summoned, implying that he should be prompt to answer the summons, but that he should not disturb his Preceptor by clamouring for lessons or instruction. He should go to his preceptor for taking lessons only when his preceptor summons him for it.
996 Meaning, he should cast submissive or humble glances instead of staring boldly or rudely.
997 Learning was never sold in this country in ancient times. The final fee is not a return for the services of the preceptor but a token of gratitude from the pupil. Its value depended upon the ability of the disciple, though there are stories in the scriptures of disciples coming to grief on account of their persistent forwardness in pressing the acceptance of this fee. Vide the story of Galava in the Udyoga Parva.
998 The fourth kind of conduct, called kapoti is also called unchha. It consists of collecting such seeds of grain as have fallen down from the ears and as have been abandoned by the reapers.
999 Thus the second is more meritorious than the first, the third than the second, and the fourth than the third. The fourth or last, therefore, is the first in point of merit.
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nbsp; 1000 It is said that the householder who cooks must give a share of the cooked food to a Brahmacharin or Yati or any one who comes as a guest. If he does not do it but eats the whole of what has been cooked, he is regarded as eating what belongs to a Brahmana. This, of course, is a high sin.
1001 The commentator supposes that these relatives and kinsmen are named because of the great likelihood there is of disputes arising with them on account of shares of inheritance.
1002 The sense is this: these various persons, if duly reverenced by the householder, are able to send the latter to the places indicated or make him comfortable in those places.
1003 Vide verses 2 and 3 of this Section. Of the four courses, the first or Kusaladhanya, is left out here. The three others, of course, are the Kumbhadhanya, the Aswastana (otherwise called Unchhasila), and the Kapoti. The Burdwan translator makes a blunder in enumerating the three kinds of domesticity here referred to.
1004 The Burdwan version of this verse is incorrect.
1005 The cow is a sacred animal and there is merit in feeding and properly tending a cow. Forest recluses kept kine for merit as also for homa or sacrifice with the ghee obtained from them. The story of Vasishtha’s cow is well-known.
1006 These five are Agnihotra, Darsapurnamasi, Chaturmasya, Pasu sacrifice and Soma sacrifice.
1007 The Burdwan translator misunderstands the words abhravakasah. It is a well-known word occurring in almost every lexicon. Wilson explains it correctly.
1008 i.e., They do not use a regular husking or cleaning apparatus for cleaning the grain they use as food.
1009 So that very small portion of the grain comes out for drink or mixes with the water.
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