414 What the speaker inculcates in verses 41 and 42 is this: some are of opinion that with the apparent destruction of the body, the attributes that make up the body do not cease to exist. It is true that they cease to become apprehensible by the senses; but then, though removed from the ken of the senses, their existence may be affirmed by inference. The argument is that, if destroyed, their reappearance would be impossible. The reappearance, however, is certain. (For rebirth is a doctrine that is believed to be a solemn truth requiring no argument to prove it). Hence, the attributes, when apparently destroyed, do continue to exist. They are regarded as then inhering in the linga or subtile body. The counter opinion is that, when destroyed, they are destroyed for ever. The latter opinion is condemned by the speaker.
415 In the second line the word is Gadhamavidwansah, i.e., ‘ignorant of its bottom or depth.’ K.P. Singha gives the meaning correctly, without translating the verse literally. The Burdwan translator makes nonsense of it. Both however, wrongly take agadha as the final word in yathagadha, forgetting that agadham is a masculine adjective incapable of qualifying nadim which is feminine. Ayam is Jiva. The last clause is to be taken as buddhiyogam anuprachyuta ayam tatha.
416 This is not a difficult verse, yet both the vernacular translators have misunderstood it. What is said in the first line is this: yat vahudosham karoti, yat (cha) purakritam, ekatah cha dushyati. Both the finite verbs have jnanin (the man of knowledge) for their nominative understood. Dushyati means nasyati or destroys. The meaning then is that the man of Knowledge destroys his sinful acts of both this and past lives. The commentator cites the well-known simile of the lotus leaf not being drenched or soaked with water even when dipped in water. Now, this is that unseen fruit of Knowledge. In the second line, the visible fruits are indicated. The man of Knowledge refrains from censuring the wicked acts of others and from perpetrating any wicked act himself. Yat cha dushyati means yat parakritam anishtam dushyati or nindati, yat karoti means yat swayam ragadi-doshat karoti; tadubhayam apriyam (sa) na karoti, the reason being dwaitadarsana-bhavah. Such a man truly regards the universe as identifiable with himself.
417 i.e., in even thy direst distress thou dependest on thyself. To cross the fearful river of life without a raft and with the aid of only one’s bare arms implies great self-dependence.
418 That which did not exist and will not exist, exists not at the present moment. Everything, therefore, which is of the nature of asat is non-existent. Our sorrows are connected with the asat. Knowing this, I have cast off all sorrows.
419 I have understood that acts are for sorrow; that the fruits also of acts are for sorrow in spite of the apparent character of some; and that the fruits of acts are varied, sometimes other fruits appearing than those expected. Hence, I do not indulge in sorrow, for I avoid acts and do not grieve for not obtaining the fruits of acts or for the accession of fruits other than those apparently agreeable.
420 The sense is that we who avoid acts, are not dead; in fact, we live quite as others do; and those others, how unequally circumstanced! The Burdwan translator makes nonsense of the first line simple though it is.
421 Ignorance lies at the root of sorrow. By casting off ignorance, we have avoided sorrow. Hence, neither religion or religious acts such as Sacrifices, etc., can do us any good or harm. As regards happiness and misery again, these two cannot agitate us at all, since we know their value, both being ephemeral in comparison with the period for which we are to exist.
422 Hence, no one should indulge in pride, saying, ‘I am happy,’ nor yield to sorrow, saying, ‘I am miserable.’ Both happiness and misery are transitory. The man of wisdom should never suffer himself to be agitated by these transitory states of his mind.
423 The first word is read either as bhavatmakam or bhavatmakam. The first means samsararupam; the second, drisyatmakam.
424 I am obliged to behold them because I am a living being having a body, but then I behold them as an unconcerned witness.
425 The scriptures contain both kinds of instruction. There are declarations that are entirely in favour of Acts or observances. There are again declarations in favour of Knowledge. What the speaker asks is that the Rishi should discourse upon what the speaker should do, i.e., whether he should betake himself to the acquisition of Knowledge or to the doing of acts.
426 i.e., Each Asrama speaks of particular observances and courses of conduct as beneficial. This, therefore, is a source of confusion to men of plain understandings. Is there no distinction then among duties or observances in respect of their beneficial character? This is the question propounded. The commentator thinks by the word asramas is meant the four principal faiths and not the modes of life.
427 I retain the word asrama in the English version as it is very doubtful in what sense it has been used in the original. The commentator explains that by four asramas are meant the four principal forms of creed prevalent at one time in India. The first is that there is no such thing as virtue or righteousness. This is ascribed to Sakya Simha or Buddha. The second is that righteousness consists in only the worship of trees, etc. The third is that only is righteousness which the Vedas have laid down. The fourth is that transcending righteousness and its reverse there is something for whose attainment one should strive. Yatha samkalpitah is explained by the commentator as yo yena sreyastena bhavitastasya tadeva sreyah.
428 Gunoddesam is Gunakirtanam or the announcement of merits. What Narada says here is this: the asramas are four. The merits of each have been proclaimed by their respective founders. The principal merit each claims is that it leads to knowledge of Self. Now, the announcement is nanarupam; it is also prithak; and lastly, it is viprasthitam or contradictory, for, as the commentator points out, that which a particular asrama announces to be righteous is according to another unrighteous. Both the vernacular translators give incorrect versions.
429 Te refers to asramas. Abhipretam is atma-tattwarupam. Yanti is equivalent to prapayanti.
430 Mitranam is taken by the commentator to be equivalent to sarva-bhuta-labhayapadanam, i.e., they who have given the pledge of harmlessness to all creatures. By enemies is meant here the envious and harmful.
431 In previous Sections the nature of Truth has been discussed. A formal truth may be as sinful as a lie, and a lie may be as meritorious as a Truth. Hence, the ascertainment of Truth is not easy.
432 Atiyoga and Ayoga are well-known words which have no chance of being misunderstood in the way in which they have been misunderstood by both the vernacular translators. Indeed, K.P. Singha blunders ridiculously, while the Burdwan translator limits them to only the use of food, supposing the commentator’s concrete examples exhaust the meaning.
433 i.e., where an intermingling takes place of the four orders of men, viz., where Varna-sankara occurs.
434 Mere companionship with the righteous leads to righteous acts; while that with the sinful leads to acts of sinfulness.
435 Anuvishayam is vishayam anu vartate, i.e., rasah or flavour. An eater of vighasa is a good or pious man. What is said here is that such men eat for only filling their stomachs and not because eating is source of enjoyment or gratification. Atmavishayan is Buddherviseshatovandhakan, i.e., rasa-viseshan.
436 Agamayamanam is Agamam pramanajam jnanam atmana ichcchatam.
437 Akasasthah is niralamvanah, i.e., men who have no foundations to stand upon. The Bombay text reads dosham, the Bengal texts, doshan; the sense remains unaltered. The Bombay reading is atmapujabhikama, while the Bengal reading is the same word in the plural form. I accept the singular form and take it as qualifying panditah.
438 Some of the Bengal texts read khattam. The Bombay reading is khatwam. The commentator explains that khatwam samarudhah Tibra duhkha-grastah. Anusayi means purvakarmavasanavan. The sense seems to be this: the desires born of one’s past acts, i.e., acts of previous lives, adhere to the mind. Nothing can wipe them off, save Nivritti and Tattwajnanam or knowledge of truth. One should, therefore, practise the religion of Nivrit
ti and seek to acquire knowledge of Truth.
439 Both the vernacular translators quietly skip over the word pratyanantarah.
440 i.e., where the people are virtuous and given to the performance of their duties.
441 Kamesah is possessor of all objects of desire or enjoyment. The sense is this: where the king, casting off desire, wins prosperity for himself; i.e., though possessed of wealth, is not attached to wealth. The expression may also mean ‘master of desire,’ i.e., where the king casts off desire and masters his desires without allowing the latter to master him.
442 Pratyupasthite is pritipatwena upasthite, i.e., hiyantanesati.
443 I am not sure that I have understood aright the second line of this verse. It may also mean, ‘No one is able to enumerate all that is beneficial for the Soul in consequence of the wideness of subject.’
444 Vrittam has uddisya understood after it. The Bombay text reads pranihitatmanah; the Bengal reading is pranihitatmanah. If the Bengal reading be accepted, it would mean ‘whose soul is fixed or established on Yoga.’ Tapasa is explained by the commentator as swadharmena, in view of the question of Galava which Narada answers. The sense, however, would remain unaltered if it be taken as standing for Self-control or penances.
445 Sampadam is explained by the commentator as upadesa-yogyata-sriyam.
446 Some texts read sakyam; the reading sakyah also occurs. If the former be accepted, it must be taken as referring to tadawayam as the commentator explains. No alteration in sense occurs by adhering to the one reading or the other.
447 In the second line some of the Bengal texts read lobheshu. The correct reading is lokeshu. Both the vernacular translators adhere to the wrong reading.
448 Mokshartha is moksha-prayojanah.
449 The argument contained in these verses is this: as thou dost not know what becomes of thy relatives when they die, thou canst not help them then. It seems plain, therefore, that when thou shalt die thy relatives will not be able to do thee any good. Hence, thou gainest nothing by bestowing thy thoughts on thy relatives, forgetting thy own great concern, viz., the acquisition of Emancipation. Similarly, when thy relatives live and suffer irrespective of thy life or death, and thou too must enjoy or endure irrespective of their existence or efforts, it is meant that thou shouldst not be forgetful of thy own highest good by busying thyself with the concerns of thy relatives.
450 The sense is that one who takes only a handful of corn for the support of life even when millions upon millions of carts loaded with corn await his acceptance, is certainly to be regarded as freed. Literally rendered, the second line is— ‘who beholds a shed of bamboo or reeds in a palace,’ meaning, of course, as put above, ‘one who sees no difference between the two.’
451 Avritti is want of the means of sustaining life: thence, scarcity or famine.
452 The sense is that as the maintenance of wives and children is painful, one should withdraw from the world and retire into solitude.
453 The sense seems to be this: Is it a life of domesticity that thou wouldst lead? There is no harm in thy doing this, provided thou behavest in the way pointed out. Is it Emancipation that thou wouldst pursue (in the usual way), i.e., by retiring into solitude and betaking thyself to Sannyasa? Thou mayst then behave in the way pointed out, and, indeed, that is the way of Sannyasa which leads to Emancipation.
454 The planet Venus is supposed to be the sage Usanas or Sukra.
455 The commentator explains the allusion by saying that formerly Vishnu, induced by the deities, used his discus for striking off the head of Usanas’ mother. Hence the wrath of Usanas against the deities and his desire to succour their foes, the Danavas.
456 The construction of this verse is very difficult. The order of the words, is — Indrotha jagatah prabhuh. Dhanada, etc., tasya kosasaya prabhavishnuh.
457 Persons crowned with Yoga-success are competent to enter the bodies of others and deprive the latter of the power of will. Indeed, the belief is that the latter then become mere automata incapable of acting in any other way except as directed by the enlivening possessor.
458 The etymology of Pinaka is panina anamayat. The initial and final letter of pani (pi) and the middle letter of anamayat (na), with the suffix ka make Pinaka.
459 The last half of the last line may be taken as applying to Usanas.
460 The vriddhim that Mahadeva saw could not be his own, for the greatest cannot be greater. The commentator, therefore, is right in holding that vriddhim refers to the greatness of Usanas within Mahadeva’s stomach.
461 The sa refers to Usanas and not to Mahadeva, as the commentator rightly points out.
462 i.e., the religions of all the orders and all the modes of life.
463 The scriptural injunctions are that one should sacrifice in honour of the gods, pour libations on the sacred fire, make gifts etc. In these exists Righteousness.
464 The grammar of the third line is a little involved. Tasmin refers to Dharme. Supply nisthavantah after tasmin. The sense, of course, is that believing in the efficacy of righteousness, people of all modes of life accomplish the duties of their respective modes.
465 The sinful become intermediate animals. The virtuous attain to heaven. They that are both virtuous and sinful attain to the status of humanity. They that acquire Knowledge become Emancipated.
466 Destiny here means the result of the acts of past lives.
467 The reading I adopt is jatikritam karma etc. Hence, this Verse also represents the arguments of the sceptic or the Charvakas. The four kinds of acts are Nitya, Naimittika, Kamya, and Nishiddha. If, however, for ‘jatikritam karma, etc.,’ the reading yantyakritam karma be adopted, the meaning would be— ‘In one’s next life one does not meet with fruits that are not the results of one’s acts of past life.’ This must be so, for the opposite opinion would imply the destruction of acts and their consequences. Then again, such an opinion would conflict with the received opinion of mankind, for men, when they obtain the fruits of any act, always recollect the four kinds of acts of a past life for explaining the accession of those fruits.
468 Verses 12 to 14 represent the theory of the sceptic, and I have rendered them as such. Only by reading verse 13 as ‘yantyakritam karma, etc.,’ the commentator points out that it may be taken as an observation of Parasara himself. As regards verse 15, it represents the ipse dixit of the speaker. He does not think that the sceptic is at all entitled to a reply. It is scarcely necessary to say that the Burdwan translator makes a thorough mess of these verses. K.P. Singha gives the substance correctly.
469 The commentator shows that this is an answer to the sceptic’s averment about Nature being the cause of everything. Fire is hot by nature, therefore, it does not become hot at one time, cold at another, and lukewarm at another time. One becomes either wholly happy or wholly unhappy or wholly happy and unhappy at the same time. Man’s nature should not be such. The difference of state is produced by difference of causes.
470 A Brahmana is precluded from eating many things. Many things again that he is competent to eat on all days of the year. In fact, there are many rules for regulating the fare of a Brahmana. To this day, an orthodox Brahmana abstains from many kinds of food. A Brahmana, therefore, who is unscrupulous in respect of his food, is no Brahmana and deserves to be pitied. Similarly, a man who cooks food for himself is an object of pity. Raw food, such as fruits, etc., one may take without offering a share thereof to guests and others. But cooked food can never be taken without a share thereof being given to others. Yati cha Brahmachari cha pakvannaswaminavubhau, hence he that takes cooked food without giving a share to these is said to eat Brahmaswam or that which belongs to a Brahmana.
471 This is a very abstruse verse. The grammatical construction of the first line is asritena manasa vrittihinasya seva sasyate. Asritena is niralamvanena. By seva is meant homage paid to the Supreme in the form of devotion and concentrated meditation. It implies, of course, a thorough reliance on God. Vrittihina is one who has cast off the m
eans of livelihood, implying one who abstains from worldly objects. In the second line, dwija is a vocative. Nirvritta is nishpanna, qualifying seva. Atihastat is ‘from one who has transcended the use of the hand,’ i.e., the necessity of acts. Atihastanirvritta, means ‘obtained from a competent preceptor.’ In brief, what is stated here is that such seva should be learnt from competent preceptors and not by discussion among persons in the stage of spiritual progress.
472 The object of this verse, the commentator points out, is to show the desirability of practising that seva soon or without loss of time.
473 In the discourse of Sanatkumara to Vritra, these six colours have been mentioned, and the nature of the acts by which one attains to a superior colour or falls down from a superior to an inferior one. Vide Sec. 280, ante.
474 A particular kind of Chandala is called kusalin.
475 Pratyapannasya is viparita-drishteh. Natma is dehadih. Tatah is papaddhetoh. Virochate, is viseshena atmatwena rochate.
476 Pratyapattih is Vairagyam or Renunciation. As regards Prasthitasya it may be taken either as implying one that is dead or one that has betaken himself to Yoga. In the latter case, the verse would mean that that man who betakes himself to Yoga without adopting Renunciation meets with much sorrow.
477 The object of this verse is to show that conscious sin can never be destroyed by expiation. The only means by which sin can be destroyed is by enduring its fruits.
478 The Burdwan translator makes utter nonsense of this verse. Guna-yuktam is explained by the commentator as equivalent to punyakarma. Prakasam is equivalent to budhipurvakam prakasya or jnatwa. It is formed by the suffix namul.
479 Yathatatham is sthula-sukshma-taratamyena. The sense is that all acts done knowingly produce fruits according to their nature. If gross, the fruits produced are gross; if subtile, the fruits produced are subtile.
480 The speaker’s opinion is that all acts are productive of fruits. If good, the fruits are good. If bad, the fruits are bad. There is this difference, however, between acts done knowingly and those done in ignorance: the former produce commensurate fruits i.e., if gross, their fruits are gross; if subtile, the fruits are subtile; but the latter produce fruits that are not so, so that even if heinous, the fruits do not involve a large but only a small measure of misery. There is no other difference between the two kinds of acts.
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