The politics of the scandal changed dramatically as the inquiry deepened, especially when North testified before Congress on live television. Initially, the “big three” networks missed the importance of the moment. The networks revived the approach they had used for the televised Watergate hearings, rotating coverage among them a day at a time. NBC News “drew the long straw,” network president Lawrence Grossman told reporters, and would therefore be the first to preempt its profitable daytime programming of game shows and soap operas to air the hearings. In contrast, CNN aired the hearings live and in full, tapping into public interest but also increasing it with its own breathless coverage. Television critics took note. “The notion that there is nothing to watch on TV during the summer is belied by the contentious morality play gathering steam in the Senate Caucus Room this week,” wrote Steve Daley of the Chicago Tribune. “The folks at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington made a point of telling us they had better things to do with their time than watch television, but millions of the rest of us were not in agreement with that assessment.” Almost five times as many television viewers tuned in to watch North as watched the hit soap opera General Hospital. “The event is high drama,” admitted the vice president and executive producer of special programming at ABC News. “The event is enthralling. This is a piece of historic theater that’s being played out here. The key word is historic, but it is also theater.” 5
The public was fascinated with the drama of the hearings, giving cable news and the live coverage of the networks a huge ratings boom. North made the most of his time in the spotlight. Though he had not worn his Marine uniform in his role at the White House, he put it on again for the hearings, presenting an impressive military image for the cameras. Granted limited immunity from prosecution, after having initially invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, North knew he had some leeway with the committee and used it to cut a melodramatic tone. Alternately abrasive and humble in his answers, “North mixed Clint Eastwood with Jimmy Stewart, Dirty Harry with Mr. North Goes to Washington,” a media critic noted. But it was all an act, “the pose of a man threatening to leap from a street-level window.” Defending everything that he and his colleagues had done, North insisted the administration had merely acted for the good of the nation. Turning the tables on his critics, he blamed congressional Democrats for blocking the money the administration needed to fight Communism. “Olliemania” briefly swept the country as some seemed moved by North’s testimony, seeing the White House staffer now as a populist hero. “People like the idea of the little guy beating up on the big guys,” said a disc jockey at WLW radio in Cincinnati. “He’s proving that you really can beat city hall.” Businesses quickly cranked out Oliver North dolls, action figures, bumper stickers, T-shirts, and videotapes. In Tonawanda, New York, a local deli promoted an Oliver North sandwich—a hero. “It consists of red-blooded American beef,” the owner explained. “And a little bologna.” 6
“Olliemania” did not last long, but long enough to dampen the energy behind the congressional investigation and quiet the calls for impeachment. The Democratic Congress ultimately decided that the country—only a dozen years removed from Watergate—could not afford to go through the process again. Speaker of the House Jim Wright opted to forgo impeachment, believing that Reagan would be on the defensive for the rest of his term as he struggled to survive. And indeed, though Reagan escaped an impeachment inquiry, Iran-Contra still cost him and his presidency dearly. The televised hearings, viewed by millions of Americans, had led many to conclude that Reagan had created an environment conducive to nefarious activity. For most Americans, there were only two possible conclusions, neither of them good: the president had either sanctioned the illegal actions of his closest advisors, or else he had lost control of his administration and had no idea what it was doing. For the remainder of his term, Reagan spent much of his political capital fighting off the scandal, and the public never saw him in the same light again. His approval ratings plateaued at the 50 percent mark, where they largely stayed for the next year.
For some on the right, however, the scandal offered different lessons. Republicans on the congressional committee, led by Wyoming representative Dick Cheney, released a stinging minority report that condemned the investigation as a partisan witch hunt. Echoing Oliver North, the minority argued that administration officials had rationally pursued these policies in response to excessive congressional restraints on the executive branch’s pursuit of foreign policy. “Congressional actions to limit the president in this area,” they argued, “should be reviewed with a considerable degree of skepticism. If they interfere with the core presidential foreign policy functions, they should be struck down.” Ignoring the constitutional role set for Congress in crafting foreign policy, they argued that all decision-making power lay with the president. Republicans and Democrats were beginning to see the same set of facts through very different partisan lenses. While they had once been united on foreign affairs, increasingly there was little room for common ground.
Toward the end of his presidency, Reagan was able to revitalize his standing on foreign policy, but only through a surprising reversal of course. Abandoning his early stance of confrontation, Reagan suddenly turned in earnest to negotiation. Between 1985 and 1987, he negotiated a major arms agreement with the new Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev. Younger and more cosmopolitan than his predecessors, Gorbachev represented a new generation of Soviet leadership. He thought the nation was nearing bankruptcy due to the endless military spending necessitated by the long Cold War. The entire Communist system, Gorbachev believed, had to be changed. Accordingly, he pushed for transformative new policies. Domestically, Gorbachev pursued the liberalization of the economy (perestroika) on the belief that the weight of state management and military spending was crushing the Soviets. He also undertook a new spirit of political openness and transparency (glasnost).
As he looked abroad, Gorbachev saw the potential for an unlikely new partner in the old Cold Warrior Reagan. “Everything points to the fact that Reagan is trying persistently to capture the initiative in international affairs,” stated a memo prepared for Gorbachev, “to create an image of America as a country that is purposefully striving to improve relations with the Soviet Union and to improve the global political climate.” 7 To be sure, there were significant political risks for Reagan. Many members of the administration, including in the Pentagon, warned that Gorbachev’s new pronouncements were part of a plot by Kremlin hard-liners that threatened the security of the United States. Defense Secretary Weinberger, for one, dismissed Gorbachev’s new style and insisted the nation he led remained the same. “I don’t think just because he wears Gucci shoes and smiles occasionally,” he argued, “that the Soviet Union has changed its basic doctrines.” 8 Despite his past criticism of détente and negotiations, Reagan decided to try a new direction and meet with Gorbachev. As a result, the end of the Cold War unfolded in elegant negotiating rooms instead of on battlefields.
At the first meeting in November 1985, Reagan focused on stagecraft as much as statecraft. He understood that the public perception of their meeting might matter more than the realities of what went on inside, and accordingly sought to craft images that would work to his advantage. When CBS and CNN set up live broadcasts of the two leaders’ arrivals in Geneva, Reagan tried to set the tone when he stepped out in the cool weather without a coat. He offered a sharp contrast to Gorbachev, who despite being two decades younger, appeared in a hat and heavy overcoat. “Where is your coat?” Gorbachev asked. “It’s inside,” Reagan responded as he grabbed Gorbachev by the arm and started to walk into the Chateau Fleur d’Eau.9 As the summit went on, other images of Reagan and Gorbachev—especially one of the two sitting in front of a fireplace—conveyed the impression that relations between the Cold War enemies had thawed considerably. Despite the public relations successes, the talks ultimately broke down over the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets insisted that the plans had to be abandoned, but Reaga
n stubbornly refused.10
Although the first summit stalled, the two met again in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. This time, Gorbachev tried to move things forward by accepting a dramatic proposal Reagan had made earlier in his presidency called the “zero-zero option.” It would end further expansions of their nuclear arsenals but also spark a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons, all leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years. “All nuclear weapons?” Reagan asked in disbelief. “Well, Mikhail, that’s exactly what I’ve been talking about all along.” 11 Once again, however, the two men reached an impasse over SDI.
As Reagan negotiated privately with Gorbachev, he still worked to maintain a public image of strength. In June 1987, as the Iran-Contra hearings in Congress were starting to take their toll on his standing, Reagan delivered a confident speech at the Berlin Wall. His advisors had urged him not to make the address, but Reagan believed he needed to look tough, not just to maintain support of his allies at home and abroad, but also to make sure the Soviets continued to negotiate. To create that image, White House advance men convinced their skeptical West German hosts to stage the address in front of the Brandenburg Gate, located on the other side of the wall in East Berlin. The West Germans worried such a move would be “provocative,” but Reagan’s aides insisted, claiming the gate had “the highest recognition factor.” At the same time, they convinced West German officials to double the size of the crowd at the address, even though each person would have to be cleared by security forces. The Secret Service placed two panes of bulletproof glass behind Reagan, worried that snipers from the other side of the wall might attempt to assassinate him.12 In the end, though, the stagecraft worked and Reagan secured an iconic moment. Most memorably, at the end of the speech, Reagan uttered a line that would thrill his conservative supporters at home: “Mr. Gorbachev—Tear Down This Wall!” 13
The final breakthrough occurred in December 1987, when Gorbachev traveled to the United States to meet with Reagan once more. In an act that nearly derailed the diplomatic overture, conservatives pressured the White House to rescind an invitation to the Soviet premier to speak before a joint session of Congress. But Gorbachev, refusing to let anything deter this final moment, moved forward with determination to bring the deal to a successful resolution. The media covered every step of his trip, with Americans swarming to see the Soviet leader as if he were a Hollywood celebrity. “In a relatively brief period,” a reporter marveled, “he has managed to rebut the enduring Soviet stereotype of the brutal, mindless, oafish skinhead. The man is good, really good—an instinctive, charming and smooth salesman with just the right package for Western eyes.” Boutiques in the United States sold hammer-and-sickle t-shirts. Some vendors even converted leftover Oliver North dolls, unsold after the brief euphoria from the Iran-Contra hearings fizzled, into new Gorbachev figures. “Everything Soviet is suddenly very romantic,” said one tour operator. “Everybody’s into it.” A gay newspaper, The Washington Blade, even held a Gorbachev look-alike contest.14
Gorbachev seized the moment and, in a crucial step, agreed to let arms reductions and SDI be dealt with separately. The impasse removed, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to a historic arms agreement called the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) that required each country to eliminate its weapons that could travel between 300 and 3,400 miles. Significantly, the treaty was the first agreement to reduce nuclear stockpiles while eliminating an entire category of weapons.15 As Reagan signed an agreement that contradicted the fierce anti-Communist image so many Americans had of him, public opinion remained steady. The Cold Warrior suddenly emerged as the champion of peace.
Many conservatives refused to accept the deal. Paul Weyrich, for instance, complained that “Reagan is a weakened president, weakened in sprit as well as clout, and not in a position to make judgments about Gorbachev at this time.” 16 In response, Reagan castigated the Right. “I think that some of the people who are objecting the most and just refusing even to accede to the idea of ever getting any understanding, whether they realize it or not, those people basically down in their deepest thoughts have accepted that war is inevitable and that there must come to be a war between the superpowers,” the president said. “Well, I think as long as you’ve got a chance to strive for peace, you strive for peace.” 17 Although many conservatives opposed ratification of the INF, those in Congress rallied around the president, with the Senate soon ratifying the treaty by a margin of 93 to 5. Within a few years, nearly 2,700 nuclear missiles were dismantled under its terms.
The Cold War did not end on Reagan’s watch. When he left the Oval Office, the Soviet Union was still intact and there remained an intense distrust of its leadership within US national security circles. But gradually, further changes started to generate support for reform within Russia and all the other Communist states. In December 1988, Gorbachev announced at the United Nations that the Soviet Union would no longer follow the Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention in the Communist bloc and would instead allow each satellite state to determine its own path, giving them the “freedom of choice,” as he said. (As some Soviet officials joked, the “Brezhnev Doctrine” had been replaced with the “Sinatra Doctrine”: from that point on, Communist countries would be allowed to do it their way.) As a sign of Gorbachev’s sincerity, the Soviets withdrew 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe. For residents in those nations, the announcement created excitement and hope for the possibility of liberation from the Soviet regime. It energized anti-Communist activists to push for democratic change, and lowered the defenses of the status quo.
The changing zeitgeist within the Soviet bloc was on display on July 19, 1988, when Bruce Springsteen performed to hundreds of thousands in a large plaza in East Berlin. The leaders of the German Democratic Republic, one of the most brutal and repressive Soviet clients, had been inviting Western rock artists to perform in an effort to bolster their international image. The New Jersey–born rock singer, who devoted most of his lyrics to the plight of working-class Americans struggling in the postmanufacturing economy, had been eager to sing across the Cold War divide. In the middle of the concert, broadcast to over a million people on delay on television and radio, Springsteen noted, “I’m not here for or against any government. I’ve come to play rock ’n’ roll for you, in the hope that one day all the barriers will be torn down.” The crowd roared in approval. Springsteen had been frustrated that Ronald Reagan had co-opted his antiwar song, “Born in the USA,” as a jingoistic anthem for his 1984 presidential reelection campaign. Now, he could join Reagan’s efforts, in a liberal way, by appealing to a global desire for human rights and performing Bob Dylan’s “Chimes of Freedom.” East Berliners, who had been trapped under Communism for decades, heard an American icon sing: “Tolling for the rebel, tolling for the rake. . . . An’ we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing.” For some in the audience, the concert was a revelation. “It made people . . . more eager for more and more change,” noted one historian. “Springsteen aroused a greater interest in the West. It showed people how locked up they really were.” 18
The breakthrough came on November 9, 1989, when residents from East and West Berlin rejected the wall that had separated them and literally tore it down. “This entire era in the history of the socialist system is over,” wrote an assistant to Gorbachev. This was just the beginning. Violent and nonviolent revolutions spread throughout the Soviet bloc, bringing down the Communist governments in these countries. Although President George H. W. Bush hesitated from making any bold proclamations that might trigger a backlash against the United States, Soviet Communism diminished as a major force. When the Russians stopped an attempted hard-line coup in 1991, which included the arrest of Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, the new Russian nation’s first president, led the forces that brought down the rebels. Referring to the old regulars of the Communist Party, former American ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock quipped that the coup had been the “last hurrah of the apparatchiks.” 19 The Co
ld War was over.
The Divided Court
As the Cold War wound down abroad, the Supreme Court emerged as an important new battlefield at home. The court had often ruled on controversial, divisive issues in the past, but during the Reagan era, it increasingly served not just as a site of polarization, but a source of it. Reagan and his aides understood that if their conservative counterrevolution were to have any lasting impact, it would need to manifest not just in the Republican White House and its allies in Congress, but in the federal judiciary. In an era when Democrats still held considerable power in Congress, a reliably conservative court would prove to be essential.
The conservative shift in the Supreme Court began in May 1986, when Chief Justice Warren Burger informed the White House that he would be resigning at the end of that year’s term. Burger had served as chief justice since 1969, when President Nixon selected him in an effort to undo the “permissive rulings” in the realm of law and order that had been made under his predecessor, Earl Warren. While Burger proved to be a fairly reliable conservative vote on the high court, he had failed to organize his fellow conservatives into a force that would undo the liberal decisions of the 1960s, as Nixon had once hoped. “Under Burger’s leadership the court has left the great bulk of the Warren Court legacy in civil rights, federal power over the states and other areas virtually intact,” the Washington Post reflected. “Headed but never really led by Burger, the court continued to expand on many of those rulings, ordering school busing for desegregation and establishing a constitutional right to abortion.” 20 Just as Reagan had failed to dismantle many New Deal and Great Society programs, the Burger court had left much of Warren’s work in place.
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