As the recruits were all volunteers, trainers could work them harder than the potentially less committed army conscripts, although it would seem that even if the training was tough it was not unduly harsh by the standards of the day. Hans-Gerhard Stack, subsequently an Oberscharführer in Leibstandarte, wrote of his early experiences:
The days spent in training were long and hard. The training was always intense and repetitive, and very realistic. It was repeated until everything was done almost automatically, but I think that helped save many lives when we were in combat. We were all good at sports, but the instructors always pushed us to the limits of our endurance and gave us tasks to prove our steadfastness. One day, for example, we were taken on a march carrying full kit. We reached a large pool with water around 180cm deep. We were ordered to march on, straight into the water, singing all the while. Nobody faltered. Then when the water reached our necks we were, at last, ordered to turn back. We returned to barracks soaking wet, at the double.7
Central to SS training—as in all military elites—was the ability to cover long distances over rough terrain and then be fit enough to fight at the end of the march. The two other essentials of traditional elite training were a comprehensive knowledge of the weapons they would use in combat and an ultra-attentive detail to cleanliness and tidiness, which extended to the recruits, their uniforms, and their barrack rooms.
Dutch volunteer Jan Munck described the latter process: “On a Saturday morning we usually had our major cleaning exercise. It started with all the lads on hands and knees scrubbing the long stone corridors and stairs. That done (and to get it to their satisfaction could mean doing it two three times over) we started on our own rooms, moving beds and wardrobes, scrubbing the floor and dusting every ledge or shelf. After that—the inspection.”8
Munck described the consequences of one failed inspection, when a single matchstick was discovered behind a wardrobe:
Nothing was said at the time, but that night at about 2300 hours, when we were all fast asleep, there was a call-out with full pack. We were ordered to bring one blanket as well. When we were assembled and ready, four men were ordered to carry the blanket, one at each corner with the match in the center. We then marched for about an hour, and then we had to dig a hole exactly one meter by one meter and bury the match. Next morning it was back to normal as if nothing had happened.9
Sleep deprivation was also factored into the training, reflecting real battlefield conditions where sleep is a luxury. Werner Volkner, a future Flak gunner in the Totenkopf Division, recalled one form of torture known to the training staff as the “masked ball”:
This would always happen in the middle of the night, the squad, platoon or even the whole company would be called out and then told we had three minutes to report in full sports kit. The first three were allowed to return to their beds. The remainder, however, were told they had six minutes to get changed into full battle dress and report back again, the first three back would also be allowed to return to their beds. As we had about six different uniforms it could go on all night. Of course it did create the spirit of competition and harden us, making us determined not to let the instructors break our spirits, and so in the end it was a useful exercise.10
Having completed his basic training the SS soldier would be sent to one of the three SS-VT regiments: the 1st Regiment “Deutschland” (based in Munich), the 2nd Regiment “Germania” (Hamburg), or Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler” (Berlin).
ON 1 OCTOBER 1936, Himmler promoted Hausser to Brigadeführer and appointed him as inspector of the SS-VT. Hausser and his small staff were to oversee the training and equipment of the armed SS and ensure appropriate military standards were maintained throughout—a task that would prove more difficult than anticipated.
While Hausser was responsible for overall direction of the armed SS, much of its tactical development came under the charge of Felix Steiner, a battalion commander within “Deutschland” who took overall regimental command in July 1936. The Prussian-born Steiner had joined the German Army as an officer cadet on the outbreak of war in 1914. He was severely wounded in 1915 but returned to active service as leader of a machine-gun detachment in a storm-troop battalion. These elite soldiers were organized in combat groups whose responsibility was to break through the enemy front line, employing speed, aggression, and initiative. The battlefield success of the storm-troop units in the final battles of World War I convinced Steiner that in this lay the future of land warfare.
Post-1918, Steiner remained in the army but was frustrated by the lack of interest in his ideas from what he considered a hidebound military establishment. Leaving the army, Steiner was attracted to the SA as an avenue to develop his storm-troop concepts but prudently transferred over to the SS, where Hausser gave him his chance with “Deutschland.” Steiner adopted the armed SS’s more relaxed attitudes toward discipline, which fostered unity of purpose and good fellowship within all ranks.
In his own words, Steiner wished to create a “supple adaptable type of soldier, athletic of bearing, capable of more than average endurance on the march and in combat.”11 In this he succeeded, his troops able to march three kilometers in just twenty minutes. Once his men had completed their basic training, he introduced them to live-firing range exercises, which attempted to replicate combat conditions with preplanned explosions and machine guns firing from fixed positions over the heads of the advancing infantry. Steiner insisted that his infantrymen must be aggressively proactive in the hostile conditions encountered on the battlefield.
Steiner also played his part in the introduction of camouflage uniforms. Although the army had made some tentative experiments with camouflage patterns, it was Steiner who in 1935 took up a suggestion for camouflaged uniforms made by an SS officer with an engineering background, Dr. Wilhelm Brandt. Working with Professor Otto Schick, Brandt developed a series of tree-based patterns that led to the introduction of a camouflage smock and helmet cover. In 1937 the camouflage items were used by the “Germania” Regiment, the first stage in a general issue to all armed SS units. Having proved its worth in combat, the Wehrmacht subsequently took up the idea.
By 1938 “Deutschland” was the showpiece unit of the armed SS. Himmler—despite misgivings over Steiner’s lack of Nazi zeal—was certainly impressed. A little sourly, Hausser noted that Steiner was “definitely his favorite baby.”12 Yet Steiner’s work with “Deutschland” and other SS units was not as revolutionary as has often been supposed, nor was the German Army as conservative as some SS officers claimed. In the new panzer and mechanized light divisions, for example, ideas similar to those of Steiner had already been introduced. Steiner was just one of many able and thoughtful German officers looking to transcend the tactical restraints of the attritional warfare of 1914–1918.
Understandably, SS staff took every opportunity to proclaim the uniqueness of the armed SS and its superiority to the Wehrmacht. The first step in creating an elite force is constantly to drum into its members that it is indeed an elite force. SS recruits were encouraged to develop an aggressive sense of ascendancy over the army, which at times boiled over into garrison-town street fights.
The head of the army, General von Fritsch, was sufficiently annoyed to complain that the attitude of the SS-VT was “frigid, if not hostile. One cannot avoid the impression that this hostile attitude is deliberately cultivated.”13 Friedrich-Karl Wacker, later of the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division, would have probably agreed: “Our confidence was overwhelming. We had an arrogant pride in ourselves, and immense esprit de corps. I always felt better than any Wehrmacht soldier. I wasn’t, of course, but I felt that I was.”14
What made the armed SS unique was its intense level of comradeship, even in peacetime. Accounts from former SS troops repeatedly speak of this sense of togetherness. Heinz Köhne, subsequently a Leibstandarte staff sergeant, recalled how “the comradeship of the Waffen-SS was based on the test of ‘all for one and one for all.’ Throughout training great emphasis was put
on this to ensure the principle would be adhered to.”15 Herbert Walther, also from Leibstandarte, explained further: “In the Waffen-SS we left our lockers open all the time. Stealing from your comrades was an offense that would be very heavily punished. You had to learn to trust, to depend on your comrades, and to share. This all helped in the formation of the sense of comradeship that went right through the Waffen-SS.”16 Even before a shot had been fired in anger, the training staff had created an elite ethos within their students.
By the end of 1936 Hausser was pleased with the progress made by “Deutschland.” The “Germania” Regiment had also performed to a generally high standard, with capable officers, such as Walter Krüger and Herbert Gille, advancing through its ranks. Based around Hamburg, it did, however, experience some disciplinary problems when its III Battalion was separated from the rest of the regiment and stationed on Lake Constance near the Swiss border.
The commander of “Germania,” Karl-Maria Demelhuber, followed a path taken by several successful SS commanders: after frontline service in World War I, he transferred to the police before joining the SS. Demelhuber—a Bavarian who cultivated a thickly bristled toothbrush mustache—was an early convert to the Nazism and had a close relationship with Himmler. He had little of Steiner’s obsession with military improvement, however. Like many German men of the period, Demelhuber was a regular user of cologne as an aftershave, sufficiently so for him to be nicknamed “Tosca,” after his favorite brand. Himmler even quipped to him: “You may not be my best general, but you are certainly my sweetest!”17
Hausser, meanwhile, was exasperated in his dealings with the other regiment of the SS-VT, Leibstandarte SS “Adolf Hitler.” Leibstandarte commander Sepp Dietrich considered his regiment a special unit within the armed SS, its prime responsibility being the protection of the Führer. As one of Hitler’s old comrades, Dietrich was given remarkable latitude in his dealings with both Hausser and Himmler. Confident in Hitler’s support, Dietrich paid little heed to orders from his superiors, determined to carve out his own sphere of influence within the SS.
In 1934 Leibstandarte had taken over the Lichterfelde barracks in Berlin, which Dietrich helped develop into a first-rate military complex, the equal of the cadet schools at Bad Tölz and Braunschweig. In an expansive moment, Dietrich took a journalist on a tour of the barracks.18 After passing through the main gate, guarded by two massive, heroically carved stone statues of German soldiers, the newspaperman was guided through the parade ground into the main instructional area, bounded by four huge dormitory blocks.
Once inside the barracks, Dietrich proudly displayed the enormous mess hall, capable of feeding 1,700 men at one sitting and adorned with paintings depicting the Nazi rise to power. Beyond that was the officers’ quarters, complete with a dining hall dominated by a painting of Hitler and an oak-paneled reception area with one of its walls inscribed with silver Nordic runes. There was no shortage of space outside. Alongside the barracks were several playing fields, a riding stables, an indoor swimming pool, a 200-meter underground shooting range, and a vast garage capable of holding the vehicles of a motorized regiment.
The journalist noted the enthusiasm of the recruits when Dietrich was present. The five-foot-seven balding, barrel-chested Dietrich was not much of a physical specimen when compared to the soldiers under his command, but he possessed that most vital of military attributes: men wanted to follow him into action. He also displayed a genuine concern for their welfare that was reciprocated.
Military instruction for Leibstandarte had been provided by the army’s Berlin-based 9th Infantry Regiment. The training was rudimentary but involved parade-ground drill, an essential requirement for the conduct of Leibstandarte’s ceremonial duties, which included escorting the Führer and providing guards at the Reich Chancellery. Looking back to the traditions of the Prussian Guard, the Leibstandarte soldiers achieved an enviable reputation for the smartness of their appearance and the crispness of their drill, well recorded in Nazi propaganda photographs and newsreels. But this concentration on the parade ground took time and resources away from field training, so much so that other SS units gave Leibstandarte the derisory nickname of the “Asphalt Soldiers.”
Leibstandarte typically waved away criticisms of this nature, although one NCO provided this unusually candid assessment of his regiment in 1936: “The men can handle a rifle all right, but little else. If you told them to assault a strong point they would probably bunch together and run at it hoping that the combination of noise and numbers would suffice. Some have never practiced fire and movement. We are smart enough and tough enough, but there’s a long way to go.”19
Hausser’s attempts to bring Dietrich and Leibstandarte into line were simply ignored. Himmler, too, seemed unable to contain his unruly subordinate. In a plaintive letter to Dietrich in March 1938, he complained, “Your officers are good enough to recognize me personally; otherwise, however, Leibstandarte is a complete law unto itself; it does and allows anything it likes without taking the slightest notice of orders from above.”20
Events came to head later in 1938, when an exasperated Hausser threatened to resign as inspector of the SS-VT, sarcastically informing Himmler that maybe Dietrich should take full command of the armed SS. At this point, under renewed pressure, Dietrich finally gave way, grudgingly accepting Hausser’s authority and agreeing to an exchange of officers between his regiment and the rest of the SS-VT.
Among the officers sent to educate Leibstandarte in the latest tactical methods was Wilhelm Bittrich, then a company commander in “Deutschland.” Bittrich, the son of a commercial traveler, had joined the Imperial Army just before the outbreak of war in 1914. While recovering from wounds suffered in the fighting along the Carpathians in 1915, he transferred to the flying corps and qualified as a pilot in the air force, where he remained for the rest of the war. As an air force was banned by the Versailles Treaty, he worked as a civilian flight instructor in the 1920s, all the while covertly supervising the training of German military pilots in the Soviet Union. On joining the SS in 1932 he returned to the infantry. A capable and well-educated officer, Bittrich held a poor opinion of his new commander. He later wrote, “I once spent an hour and a half trying to explain a situation to Sepp Dietrich with the aid of a map. It was quite useless. He understood nothing at all.”21
Dietrich, for his part, resented the interference of outsiders in his regiment, which he believed a cut above the other units in the armed SS. Despite his lowly, provincial origins, his time in Berlin at Hitler’s side had given him a rather superior outlook, so that at one occasion he dismissed a unit from the Bavarian-recruited “Deutschland” with a resigned wave of his hand: “Oh well—the peasant battalion.”22 Yet whatever the differences between Hausser and Dietrich, Leibstandarte was the beneficiary, acquiring a new and vital military edge. Leibstandarte would ultimately break away from the SS-VT as a separate formation, but the system of cross-posting capable officers to reinvigorate command positions continued into the war years.
The SS-VT would evolve into the fearsome Das Reich Panzer Division, and experienced officers were regularly dispatched from the division to take command of new formations. Bittrich’s career provided a good example of the system in operation. Following his time with Leibstandarte, he returned to command “Deutschland” and briefly Das Reich Division itself. After recovering from wounds on the Eastern Front, he was sent to lead the new SS Cavalry Division in May 1942 and then, in February 1943, to raise and command the Hohenstaufen Panzer Division, before taking charge of II SS Panzer Corps in 1944.
The SS-VT was also required to donate complete units to strengthen other formations. In October 1939 it provided an artillery battalion to the Totenkopf Division, while at the end of 1940 the entire “Germania” Regiment became the core around which the new Wiking Division was built. Thus, the SS-VT acted as a prime mover for the wartime expansion of the Waffen-SS, all the while maintaining a benchmark of excellence for others to follow.
/> Chapter 3
THE MARCH TO WAR
IN 1935 HITLER publicly repudiated the military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty by introducing conscription, expanding the army to a force of thirty-six divisions and instigating a policy of comprehensive rearmament. The old Reichswehr was replaced by the Wehrmacht (armed forces) that included the German Army (Heer), Navy (Kriegsmarine), and the newly formed Air Force (Luftwaffe). The armed forces high command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht [OKW]) was delighted to free itself from the shackles of Versailles. There was, however, some disquiet about the increase in size of the armed SS, which seemed to fly in the face of Hitler’s promise that the Wehrmacht would be Germany’s “sole bearer of arms.”
Toward the end of 1934 Himmler urged Hitler to allow the armed SS to develop into a divisional formation, complete with artillery and supporting units. The army, which had previously looked favorably on the SS, vehemently opposed this suggestion. At this time, Hitler did not share’s Himmler’s empire-building enthusiasm for the SS and, not wishing to unduly alarm the army, held the Reichsführer-SS’s ambitions in check.
In a secret decree of 2 February 1935, Hitler partially changed his mind and accepted in principle that the armed SS might expand to divisional size, but only at some point in the future. The decree also integrated the armed SS units within the army’s mobilization plans. While the army would exercise control over the armed SS in time of war, the decree was also an official acknowledgment of the armed SS’s legitimacy as a military force, with the army responsible for its training and equipment.
The army was justified in seeing the armed SS as a threat. It was appropriating precious resources—in terms of weapons and equipment as well as manpower—while lurking in the minds of the General Staff was a fear that the SS might ultimately prove as dangerous a foe as the SA, which had once openly boasted of its intention of replacing the army. Throughout the 1930s the army would fight a rearguard action against any further growth of the SS.
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