Not all Waffen-SS commanders welcomed this official inclusion of soldiers who had not gone through the rigorous selection methods of the SS-VT. As leader of the old guard, Hausser lamented “this infusion of inferior material.” After the war he wrote that “thousands of men were thrown at us who had not been selected and would never have been in normal circumstances, by which I mean if we had been left to our own devices.”9
From a purely military perspective, there was little point in the raising of the Totenkopf and Polizei Divisions, but Himmler was looking beyond simple military considerations. Such was his determination to increase Waffen-SS numbers that he was prepared to lower not only general selection criteria but those of race as well. This was especially true of the Polizei Division, although this caused him some qualms, which he attempted to assuage by declaring that because of wartime circumstances, “not everybody in the Ordnungspolizei can be an SS man.”10 To reflect this distinction, until February 1942 men of the Polizei Division wore police/army insignia.
In contrast to the police in the United States or Britain, those of continental Europe had substantial paramilitary elements, especially so in Germany. The order or regular police (Ordnungspolizei) performed the usual police duties, but most possessed basic military knowledge. This made the transition from the civilian to the military world somewhat easier, but they remained, at best, semitrained infantrymen.
The division—which subsequently became 4th SS Polizei Panzergrenadier Division—was established in October 1939 and commanded by Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, a career policeman who had served as an army staff officer during World War I. The Polizei Division was a purely infantry formation, whose men marched on foot, their vehicles and artillery drawn by horse. To speed up its expansion to divisional level, the army temporarily supplied a full artillery regiment and a signals battalion. The division was ordered to begin training as part of Army Group C, holding a defensive position in the Black Forest opposite the French-held Maginot Line.
If Pfeffer-Wildenbruch accepted the lowly status of the Polizei Division, Theodor Eicke bristled at the idea that his Totenkopf not be included in Germany’s military vanguard. Also established in October 1939, the Totenkopf Division had at its core the three original Totenkopfstandarten (“Oberbayern,” “Brandenburg,” and “Thuringen”) that now became Infantry Regiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively. They were reinforced with some experienced troops transferred from the SS-V Division, including a complete artillery battalion. The remaining manpower was supplied by police and General-SS reservists.
Through dogged willpower Eicke had built up his concentration camp guards into an effective paramilitary force. A far harder task now awaited him: to combine these separate units into the complex formation of a motorized infantry division. As the army was reluctant to provide practical assistance, Eicke was forced to improvise. The camp at Dachau became the division’s first training ground, the inmates temporarily dispersed to other camps.
Eicke was supported in his mission by a band of lieutenants, most drawn from the camp system.11 Of these, Standartenführer Max Simon—assigned to lead the 1st Infantry Regiment—was Eicke’s closest confidant. Simon had been recruited into a German cavalry regiment in World War I and served on the Western Front and in Macedonia. After periods with a Freikorps unit and the Reichswehr, he joined the General SS, where he came to Eicke’s attention. Promotion was rapid, as Simon headed the guard unit at the Sachsenburg concentration camp before rising to regimental commander of the “Oberbayern” Standarte.
Eicke’s officers lacked one vital ingredient: military knowledge at a higher level. This was supplied from an unlikely source: Baron Cassius von Montigny, an aristocratic naval officer who had been a U-boat commander during World War I. In the postwar period he fought with the Freikorps and served in the police and army before joining the SS. His military experience and able mind were swiftly utilized by Himmler, who assigned him to the Bad Tölz Junkerschule. On the formation of the Totenkopf Division, Himmler offered Montigny the position of chief operational officer.
The army’s antipathy toward the Totenkopf Division was expressed in its refusal to allocate it uniforms, military equipment, and weapons. The rapid expansion of the German armed forces made intense demands on German industry, and the army insisted that its own troops must be supplied first. Eicke badgered both Himmler and the SS Main Office for access to the necessary supplies but when this was not forthcoming he looked elsewhere. Vehicles, small arms, and ammunition were requisitioned from concentration-camp guard units, while heavier weapons and equipment were pilfered from SS-VT stocks, which included a consignment of radio equipment destined for the signals battalion of the SS-V Division.
These still proved insufficient for the needs of a 20,000-strong formation, and as a gesture of goodwill the army provided Czech small arms impounded during the German takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Although a logistical nuisance, the Czech weapons were of a high standard and armed Totenkopf throughout the 1940 campaign. But to Eicke’s intense frustration, the army refused to release essential medium and heavy artillery pieces built in the Czech Skoda works, guns and howitzers that he could not secure from other sources.
Eicke and Montigny instituted an intensive training regime during the autumn of 1939, although the program was interrupted at the beginning of December with orders for Totenkopf to move westward to the area around Ludwigsburg and Heilbronn, where it would come under army command. Of all the SS barons, Eicke was the most determined in protecting his fiefdom from outside interference. Army supervision did, however, bring advantages in the form of improved training facilities and, from March 1940 onward, a growing supply of arms and equipment. By this time the army had equipped most its frontline divisions and was more generous in listening to requests from the Waffen-SS.
All the while the division worked hard to improve its efficiency, although hampered by the poor weather of the extremely cold winter of 1939–1940 and repeated cases of ill-discipline centered around drunkenness, fighting, and theft. Eicke returned offenders to the concentration camps as guards, and for the most serious crimes the men were dismissed from the SS and sent back as inmates.
At the end of February the Totenkopf Division was assigned to General von Weichs’s Second Army, acting in reserve. Eicke protested that his men should be deployed on the front line, but the army wisely decided that the SS division was not yet ready for such a testing role. Weichs, initially suspicious of Totenkopf, inspected it on 2 April. He came away from his day with the division pleasantly surprised, noting that it had “select troops, rare élan and a great deal of discipline.”12 And, as his only motorized formation, Totenkopf was a useful addition to Second Army’s mobile forces. He even looked favorably on Eicke’s request to supply the 15cm heavy howitzers the division still lacked.
THE GERMANS DEPLOYED three army groups for the attack in the West, with 135 divisions (including reserves) spread out along a 400-mile front from Switzerland to the North Sea. The original German plan was for General von Bock’s Army Group B (in the North) to invade neutral Belgium and the Netherlands and then outflank and divide the Anglo-French forces in northern France. Hitler was never happy with the plan, and in the spring of 1940 he adopted a more daring proposal suggested by Lieutenant General von Manstein, the chief of staff of General von Rundstedt’s Army Group A, deployed in the center of the German line.
Manstein’s plan called for the main German thrust to be conducted by Army Group A, which would be assigned most of the panzer and motorized divisions. The initial assault would be directed through the hilly, wooded Ardennes region, lightly defended by the French, who believed it unsuitable for armored warfare. Once through the French defenses, the massed armor of Army Group A would drive straight toward the English Channel, cutting the Allies in two. Army Group B—which contained the SS-V Division and Leibstandarte—was still vital to the success of the operation, as its advance would draw large numbers of British and French divisions into nor
thern Belgium and away from the main blow being struck by Army Group A in the South.
On 9 May 1940 the message for the invasion in the West was issued to all German units. The Polizei Division held its position around Tübingen—as part of Army Group C facing the Maginot Line—while Eicke fretted at the rearward deployment of Totenkopf in the general reserve. It was a different matter for the SS-V Division and Leibstandarte, both preparing to attack the Netherlands.
Chapter 6
INVADING THE NETHERLANDS
ON THE EVENING of 9 May 1940, the three battalions of the “Der Führer” Regiment silently took up position around the German village of Elten, a short distance from the border with the Netherlands. The regiment—commanded by Oberführer Georg Keppler and reinforced by an SS artillery battalion and support troops—was to be the cutting edge of the 207th Infantry Division, tasked with the immediate capture of the crossing over the River IJssel. In the early hours of 10 May radio reports of aerial bombing far to the west reached the “Der Führer” headquarters, situated in a house just 500 feet from Dutch soil. An SS officer remembered the calm atmosphere at the headquarters, the silence broken only by the ticking of a clock in the adjoining dispatch rider’s room.1 The bespectacled Keppler looked an unlikely commander of an elite infantry regiment, his studious appearance suggesting a university academic, but he and his Austrian troops would experience some of the campaign’s toughest fighting.
“Der Führer’s” III Battalion launched the assault at 5:30 A.M., easily overpowering the border guards at the customs post at Babberik. Supported by armored cars and a platoon of motorcyclists, the battalion pushed aside what little opposition there was to reach the IJssel by 7:20 A.M. There they would encounter the Netherlands Army, holding a defensive position in Fort Westervoort on the far side of the river.
Lacking the military resources to guard its long frontier with Germany, the Dutch had built a series of defensive lines behind its many rivers and canals, ready to blow vital bridges and flood low-lying areas to delay any invading force. The final defensive line—Fortress Holland—acted as a ring around the key cities of Rotterdam, The Hague, and Amsterdam. Although a neutral country, the Netherlands, like Belgium, feared a possible German invasion. Both countries had entered into secret talks with France and Britain, so that in the event of war they would allow Anglo-French forces to enter their countries to help repel a German assault. In May 1940 the Netherlands government hoped its troops could hold off the Germans long enough for the arrival of Allied reinforcements.
Wehrmacht strategy on the Western Front was committed to a main assault through the Ardennes region of southern Belgium. The Netherlands—with its small underresourced army—was a subsidiary theater, and OKW assumed it would offer only minimal resistance. General von Küchler’s Eighteenth Army comprised second-rate infantry divisions and just one armored formation, 9th Panzer Division (mainly equipped with obsolete Mark I and II light tanks).
To prevent the Dutch from falling back behind the defenses of Fortress Holland, the Germans deployed their trump card: the paratroopers of General Kurt Student’s 7th Airborne Division and the glider-borne infantry of 22nd Air Landing Division. Dropped deep inside the Netherlands, they were to capture key installations—bridges, airfields, government buildings—around Rotterdam and The Hague. Unable to hold out indefinitely, the airborne forces would await the swift arrival of German ground units. This gave the Waffen-SS a special importance in the campaign, as apart from 9th Panzer Division the Leibstandarte and SS-V Divisions were the only motorized formations in Küchler’s otherwise all-infantry army.
Speed was of the essence for the German ground troops. The airborne forces experienced mixed fortunes during the morning of 10 May: the bridge at Moerdijk that opened the way to Rotterdam had been successfully captured, but elsewhere the attacks on The Hague had largely failed, with isolated groups of airborne soldiers now fighting for their survival.
The commander of III Battalion “Der Führer,” Obersturmbannführer Hilmar Wäckerle, was aware that nothing must delay the advance. Wäckerle, the original commandant of the Dachau concentration camp, had forged a new career as an officer in the Waffen-SS. He was determined that his inexperienced troops, who had not seen action in Poland, would make a name for themselves in the battle for the Netherlands.
German Blitzkrieg: The Low Countries, 1940
The IJssel was 500 feet wide with clear fields of fire for the Dutch defenders. Keppler deployed an SS artillery battery—with units from the 207th Infantry Division—to provide suppressive fire for III Battalion, crossing the river using inflatable rubber boats. The ensuing barrage was sufficient to minimize Dutch return fire, and a small bridgehead was established on the far bank.
The bridge over the IJssel had been partially destroyed, but an enterprising NCO, Oberscharführer Ludwig Kepplinger, managed to lead a patrol over the damaged crossing. The surprise appearance of Kepplinger and his men under the walls of Fort Westervoort helped swing the battle in the Germans’ favor, leading to the surrender of the Dutch garrison. For his bravery and initiative, Kepplinger would become the first soldier in the Waffen-SS to be awarded the Knight’s Cross.
Urged on by Wäckerle, the men of III Battalion passed through Arnhem and after a swift firefight at Heelsum reached the woods near Renkum in the evening, where they came under heavy artillery fire from Dutch troops guarding a key defensive position along the River Grebbe. There the regiment halted, making preparations for an assault on the Grebbe Line on the following morning. It had been an impressive day’s performance from “Der Führer,” forcing a major river crossing and advancing more than twenty-five miles.
SEPP DIETRICH’S LEIBSTANDARTE was also in the thick of the action from the outset. Deployed just to the north of “Der Führer,” Leibstandarte was divided into two Kampfgruppen (battle groups) that swiftly overwhelmed the border guards at De Poppe and drove deep into enemy territory. The reconnaissance company, now under the leadership of Hauptsturmführer Kurt Meyer, headed the northern group, and by 2:00 P.M. it had reached Zwolle on the IJssel. The defenders, totally unaware of the German advance, were sunning themselves as Meyer’s motorcycles roared into the town, which fell to the Germans without a fight. But the bridges over the river had been destroyed earlier in the morning, forcing Meyer’s troops to move due south to Zutphen and join the other Kampfgruppe in an attempt to cross the river.
Not all of Leibstandarte was fully motorized, and one company on the road to Zutphen found itself without motor transport. Not wishing to be left behind, the troops commandeered all the bicycles they could find. Within two hours the company was fully mounted, although it was found that two men had never ridden a bicycle before. A swift ten-minute training session provided them with the necessary skills to pedal to Zutphen. War correspondent Walter Krüger was especially pleased with his bicycle, which he considered “very chic, with chrome wheels, dual caliper brakes, pennants and saddlebags.”2
The bridges at Zutphen had also been blown, but men of Leibstandarte’s III Battalion, supported by artillery, managed to cross the river farther downstream later in the day. Despite this success, General von Bock, the Army Group commander, considered the advance stalled. During the night of 10–11 May he ordered Leibstandarte to withdraw and support the main drive on Rotterdam, spearheaded by 9th Panzer Division.
The panzer division’s advance to Rotterdam was made through the southern Netherlands, and almost immediately it encountered the barrier of the River Maas. A few crossings were made, but they were insufficient to allow the swift passage of the German armored units, leading to enormous traffic jams. Following behind the panzers was Hausser’s SS-V Division (minus “Der Führer”). During 10 May the division crawled toward the border, and, to Hausser’s immense frustration, the following day’s advance was similarly slow.
The division’s chief operational officer, Werner Ostendorff, tried fruitlessly to get the division onto the far side of the Maas. Hausser considered Demelhu
ber’s “Germania” Regiment to be especially remiss, with units hopelessly confused and in the wrong advance order. When Demelhuber reported to divisional headquarters on the evening of the eleventh, Hausser, who was well known for his heavy-handed sarcastic tongue, greeted him accordingly: “I thought you intended to open operations with the [supply] train. They’ve been here for some time.”3
On 12 May the SS-V Division was finally able to cross the river, but progress remained sluggish, prompting the divisional history to complain: “The character of the marches throughout the following days is always the same: hours of waiting in front of destroyed bridges or long, difficult detours along poor, quickly ruined secondary routes. The division’s motorization, its quick mobility, has no effect whatsoever here.”4
The SS-V Division was divided into two Kampfgruppen based around “Germania” and Steiner’s “Deutschland.” Their twofold responsibilities included mopping up Dutch resistance behind 9th Panzer Division’s advance and guarding the German left flank against any Allied forces pushing up through Belgium.
Once past the defenses of the Peel Line—a southerly extension of the Grebbe Line—the German panzers and SS-V Division began to make good progress through the open terrain of the southern Netherlands, their objective to relieve Student’s paratroopers holding the bridge at Moerdijk before pushing on to Rotterdam. A short distance behind was Leibstandarte.
Hausser had been informed on 12 May that lead elements of a French mechanized division had crossed through Belgium into the Netherlands. The SS-V Division and half of 9th Panzer Division then turned to face the French, who had occupied the Dutch city of Breda and landed troops on the island of Walcheren. Supported by massed aerial attacks from the Luftwaffe, the German panzers and SS motorized infantry repulsed the French advance (which had not been made with any great determination). On 13 May the French retreated back into Belgium, and while its force on Walcheren remained in place, the Netherlands was effectively on its own, isolated from Allied assistance.
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