Judge Stephens perused the judgment, scribbled his name on the signature line, and handed it to the Clerk to enter into the file. The judgment decreed “that the Defendant, Jason Lynn Young, willfully and unlawfully killed Plaintiff’s decedent, Michelle Marie Fisher Young, within the definition of ‘slayer’ under General Statute § 31A-3(3)d” and he was therefore barred from recovering any life insurance proceeds on her life.
Rather, those proceeds would be owed to the person who was next in line to receive them had Jason predeceased Michelle—namely, Cassidy Elizabeth Young.
Linda and Meredith were elated. Finally, more than two years after Michelle’s murder, justice, at least at some level, had been attained. They could now publicly refer to Jason as Michelle’s killer. And their leverage over Jason and Pat in their effort to establish a formal visitation schedule with Cassidy had now changed considerably.
• • • • •
With the civil judgment in hand that decreed Jason had murdered Michelle, Mike Schilawski could now assert Jason had forfeited his Constitutionally protected rights as Cassidy’s father. The blood relatives with greatest past relationships with her—Meredith and Linda—finally had standing to file suit in family court.
On December 17—just twelve days following the wrongful death hearing and judgment—Schilawski filed a custody lawsuit, naming both Meredith and Linda as plaintiffs and Jason as the sole defendant. Two days later, Pat Young was greeted at her front door by yet another process server, who, this time, handed her a custody complaint.
Much like the wrongful death suit, the custody complaint contended, “In the early morning hours of November 3, 2006, the Defendant brutally murdered Michelle Marie Fisher Young (‘Michelle’) at their residence. Michelle was pregnant with Defendant’s son at the time of her murder. Upon information and belief, Cassidy was in the residence at the time the Defendant murdered her mother.”
The complaint further asserted, “Extreme tension exists between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and between the Plaintiffs and Defendant’s family. Defendant and his family are unable and/or unwilling to encourage Cassidy’s relationship with the Plaintiffs.” It contended Jason had “consistently denied telephone and personal contact between Plaintiffs and Cassidy.”
Schilawski included even more incendiary language in the complaint, detailing a pattern of conduct that had been “degrading to Michelle, erratic, and inappropriate,” including Jason’s extramarital affairs, drinking alcohol in excess—including the occasion at Ryan and Shelly’s home in which he sat on their couch stark naked while engaged in conversation—and his frequent display of “penis tricks” at social gatherings.
The complaint alleged Jason had “not behaved as a grieving spouse would since Michelle’s murder,” noting he was still in touch with at least one woman with whom he had a sexual affair, and was posting pictures of Cassidy online in an effort to solicit dates. It also alleged Jason hadn’t cooperated with law enforcement officers investigating Michelle’s murder.
The custody complaint quoted from the wrongful death judgment that declared Jason had “willfully and unlawfully killed Michelle.” It alleged Jason was “not a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and control of Cassidy. By his conduct as set out herein, the Defendant has acted inconsistently with his Constitutionally-protected status as the biological parent to Cassidy.”
Meredith and Linda asked the court to award them “the exclusive care, custody and control of the minor child, Cassidy Elizabeth Young” and also “appoint a qualified physician or psychologist to conduct a psychological evaluation of the Defendant to assist the Court in making a determination regarding custody and visitation.” Their request for temporary custody, as well as their motion for a psychological evaluation of Jason, were set for a one-hour hearing on February 4, 2009.
At the time he filed the complaint, Schilawski anticipated Stubbs would contend the proper venue for the custody case was Transylvania County, where Cassidy had resided since moving in with Pat and Gerald in December 2007, rather than Wake County, where she hadn’t lived for over two years.
He therefore wasn’t at all surprised when, instead of responding directly to the complaint, Stubbs filed a motion to dismiss it for improper venue. Recognizing this likelihood even before Stubbs filed her motion, Schilawski had been in touch with an attorney in Brevard who agreed to represent Meredith and Linda if venue were actually transferred.
Since the family court needed to resolve Stubbs’s venue motion before hearing the custody issues, Schilawski and Stubbs agreed that the February 4 hearing would be devoted solely to her venue motion. Everything else would have to await the outcome of that hearing.
But that didn’t stop Meredith’s and Linda’s lawyer from continuing to press for a visitation schedule and restoration of telephone contact with Cassidy. He proposed a schedule to last them until his request for temporary custody could be heard.
In late January 2009—with the scheduled hearing just a week away—Stubbs informed Schilawski she had a proposal to discuss. The two lawyers met at Tharrington Smith a couple of days later.
Jason’s attorney let Schilawski know she had a lengthy discussion with her client about the custody case. She then outlined the type of arrangement to which Jason could agree and asked Schilawski to draft a consent order fleshing out that arrangement.
When he got back to his office, Schilawski called his clients to schedule a meeting. “I think you’re going to like this proposal,” he told them, without providing any details.
The following day, Meredith and Linda found themselves sitting at a conference room table at Schilawski’s law office, anxiously awaiting his arrival. They assumed he was going to tell them Stubbs had convinced Jason to accept their proposed visitation schedule. That would have allowed them monthly, unsupervised weekend visits, just like the one they had in Brevard in October 2008. They were also hopeful their telephone contact with Cassidy would finally be restored.
After what seemed like an eternity, Schilawski finally entered the room, holding three copies of a document. He placed one in front of Meredith, another in front of Linda, and the final copy at his seat. The eight-page document was entitled “Child Custody Consent Order.”
He explained that this proposal was not at all what he was expecting when Stubbs asked to meet.
Rather than providing a visitation schedule, the proposed order would actually transition Cassidy’s custody—to Meredith. Under the proposed order, Jason’s daughter would spend three- to five-day blocks with Meredith each month from February to May; a full week in June; and two weeks in July. As of August 1, Meredith would have permanent custody of Cassidy in Wake County, where she would attend kindergarten.
From that point forward, Jason would have visitation only every other weekend during the school year and four weeks over the summer. Ironically, the order called for custodial exchanges to take place at the Cracker Barrel restaurant in Statesville, about half way between Fuquay-Varina and Brevard. It also provided for telephone contact for both Meredith and Linda while Cassidy was in Jason’s care.
Meredith and Linda were stunned. The only reason they had Schilawski file the lawsuit was to obtain visitation rights with Cassidy and to ensure they had access to her by telephone. Though the complaint included a claim for custody, their actual goal was merely to ensure their legal right to be part of Cassidy’s life. They never expected to be awarded custody. And they certainly didn’t expect Jason to voluntarily surrender custody.
“Why is he all of a sudden agreeing to this?” a bewildered Linda quizzed her lawyer. Though Stubbs never revealed Jason’s motivation directly, the answer to this question seemed obvious.
“He doesn’t want to have to answer any questions about what happened to Michelle,” Schilawski responded. The consent order ensured he wouldn’t have to. He wouldn’t need to respond to the complaint’s allegation he had brutally murdered her. He wouldn’t be examined under oath at a deposition. No psychologic
al evaluation would be performed.
In exchange for those provisions—through which he protected himself against possible repercussions in a criminal courtroom—Jason signed the consent order, legally transferring custody of his nearly five-year-old daughter to Meredith. Without much fanfare, the family-court judge affixed her signature and entered the order on February 6.
Meredith and Linda were overjoyed. Their relationship with Cassidy would finally be restored. For the second time in two months, justice had prevailed.
• • • • •
To the great relief of Paul and Jack Michaels, Prudential Insurance Company didn’t put up any fight at all. Instead, the insurer paid the full $4.25 million owed under Michelle’s life insurance policy. Seventy-five percent of that amount was placed in trust for Cassidy’s benefit until her eighteenth birthday; the other 25% was paid to the Michaels brothers as legal fees.
But there was still the matter of establishing damages for Michelle’s wrongful death. A hearing for that purpose was set for March 16, 2009, before Judge Osmond Smith. Once again, neither Jason nor anyone representing him appeared. On this occasion, Jack and Paul Michaels presented live testimony from several witnesses, including Linda, Meredith, Sergeant Spivey, and two of Michelle’s Progress Energy co-workers. They also played a video showing Michelle interacting with Cassidy at her kitchen table. “I love you, Mommy,” a smiling Cassidy beamed at the end of the video.
Meredith’s testimony was heart-wrenching. She told Judge Smith Cassidy had recently asked her, “‘How did my mommy used to hold me?’” Fighting back tears, Meredith testified that she “grabbed her real tight and told her that her mom loved her so much and that she would squeeze her and hug her like this every chance she could.”
Through her own tears, Linda told the judge she felt as if “my heart’s been ripped out of me,” and the void in Cassidy’s life would never be filled.
Sergeant Spivey testified Michelle’s murder involved “the most severe physical beating I’ve ever seen someone encounter.” He described it as “pretty extreme, a pretty vicious attack that she underwent.”
The detective told Judge Smith the evidence the Sheriff’s Office had amassed pointed directly at Jason, and established Michelle’s murder was “premeditated.”
When the evidence closed, Jack Michaels asked the judge, in calculating damages, to “send some sort of message to the community that what happened here to Michelle Young is not the way to end a marriage.”
Judge Smith found that Linda, as executrix of Michelle’s estate, was entitled to $3.9 million in compensatory damages for Michelle’s pain and suffering and funeral expenses, as well as the value of Cassidy’s loss of Michelle’s income, care, comfort, society, and companionship. He awarded an additional $11.7 million in punitive damages, finding Jason’s conduct “was a premeditated, brutal intentional tort” and that he “willfully and maliciously” caused Michelle’s death.
Though no one expected any part of this $15.6 million to be collected, the magnitude of the award did send a powerful message and served as yet another measure of justice for Michelle Fisher Young.
8
Circumstantial Evidence
A criminal case can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, or some combination of the two. In a murder case, unfortunately, the eyewitness in the best position to provide direct evidence of the crime—the victim—is of course unable to do so. That is why circumstantial evidence tends to be so critical in proving murder.
There is a common misconception that circumstantial evidence is, by its very nature, less compelling than direct evidence. Yet the opposite is often true. In a simple car crash case, three different eyewitnesses might each have a different perception—or recollection—of what actually happened. The human mind, after all, has many imperfections and frailties.
A qualified accident reconstructionist, however, after measuring the skid marks of both vehicles, and evaluating the extent and location of damage to each, can typically conclude with amazing precision exactly how the accident occurred. Thus, when circumstantial evidence is grounded on hard science such as physics, chemistry, or biology, it can be extremely powerful.
In a similar vein, in the criminal arena, a sexual assault can be proven by establishing the presence of the defendant’s DNA on the victim’s body. Because DNA is so incredibly unique, a match between the defendant’s sample and a swab taken from the victim often constitutes irrefutable proof that the defendant was the perpetrator—even absent eyewitness testimony from the victim.
But circumstantial evidence doesn’t need to be grounded on hard science to be convincing. Sometimes, common sense alone is sufficient to make circumstantial evidence powerful.
If one wakes up in the morning to find snow covering the ground, they know it snowed overnight. Yet the evidence one is relying on to reach that conclusion is entirely circumstantial and not at all based on science. It is based solely on life experience.
Sometimes circumstantial evidence establishes beyond doubt what happened, but not who was responsible. Upon discovering Michelle Young’s lifeless body lying beside her side of the bed in the master bedroom, investigators quickly concluded she had been murdered and a weapon of some kind had been involved. But without a murder weapon lying by her side—bearing the assailant’s fingerprints or DNA—those revelations did nothing to establish who had killed her.
Circumstantial evidence is most powerful when clustered or layered. Human hair had been found in Michelle’s left hand and on the floor beneath her body. Had SBI crime lab personnel been able to match that hair to Jason, that additional layer likely would have been sufficient to solve the crime.
Because the crime lab concluded the hair matched Michelle’s, however, its discovery did nothing to identify her assailant. Similarly, had Michelle’s blood been found on any of the clothing in the luggage in Jason’s Explorer, that additional layer also would have been enough to establish his guilt. But none of her blood was found on any of his clothing.
Even more ideal layering of circumstantial evidence would have been a bloody fingerprint, which would have clearly placed that finger—and the body to which it belonged—at the murder scene. But not a single bloody fingerprint, other than Cassidy’s, was ever found.
On the other hand, the bloody shoe impressions found on the embroidered pillow held the promise of solving the crime. Like a bloody fingerprint, those impressions had to have been made at the time of the murder and were quite obviously made by someone other than Michelle or Cassidy. Though shoe impressions are not nearly as unique as fingerprints or DNA, if they turned out to match the size and type of shoes Jason owned, that would have constituted powerful circumstantial evidence pointing directly at him.
Yet the SBI crime lab had been hard at work analyzing the shoe impressions for many months without being able to reach firm conclusions.
Another way of looking at circumstantial evidence is through the lens of coincidence. Using the shoe impressions as an example, if they did turn out to match the size and type of shoes Jason owned, how astronomical would the odds have been that those facts would have been mere coincidences, rather than circumstances pointing to Jason’s involvement in the murder?
The Hampton Inn presented several such examples. Was it a coincidence the shirt a surveillance camera captured Jason wearing during his second appearance at the front desk wasn’t found in his luggage or his Explorer? Or did the absence of that shirt suggest he had been wearing it at the time of the murder and discarded it because it contained Michelle’s blood? Was it a coincidence the hotel’s western stairwell security camera had been disabled some twenty minutes after Jason’s arrival, and was then pointed at the ceiling at 6:35 a.m. the next morning? Was it plausible someone else besides Jason tampered with that camera—twice—within hours of his wife’s murder?
Similarly, was it a coincidence a rock was found propping open the emergency exit door adjacent to the western stairwell? And that Jason’s keycard
hadn’t been used a single time after he first entered his room shortly before 11:00 p.m.—even though he clearly left his room just before midnight? Could each of these pieces of evidence merely have been coincidences or, at some point, did their cumulative weight make that likelihood entirely implausible?
Motive is nearly always proven by circumstantial evidence. Several pieces of evidence clustered around Jason’s motive. The $2 million life insurance policy with a double-indemnity provision. Jason’s affair with Michelle Money—evidenced by several dozen calls and texts with her on November 2 and 3 as well as his profession of love for her. His deteriorating relationship with Michelle. And his extreme displeasure with the thought of his mother-in-law descending upon his home for the holidays—and then perhaps permanently following the birth of Rylan.
Was each of these pieces of evidence a mere coincidence, disconnected entirely from whether Jason was the one who bludgeoned Michelle to death? Or did all of them—piled together—establish precisely why he was the most logical person to have done so?
Was it also a coincidence that Jason successfully pulled the MapQuest directions off the printer before leaving home on November 2, but, for some reason, left the eBay printouts lying on the very same printer? Or that in the space of less than ninety minutes during the afternoon of November 3, he made three calls designed to get Meredith to go to 5108 Birchleaf Drive (two to her and one to his mother), specifically trying to get her upstairs where both Cassidy and Michelle’s body were found? Did those three calls, in such rapid succession, create the inference he was desperate for Michelle’s dead body to be found? And equally desperate to ensure Cassidy was safe? Were those calls circumstantial evidence of a guilty mind? Were the eBay printouts circumstantial evidence of premeditation?
In the same vein, was it merely a coincidence that Jason made calls to the home phone that morning, and to Michelle’s work phone and cell phone that afternoon? Or were those calls intended to make it appear he had no idea she had been killed? How many coincidences were necessary to reach the tipping point? At what point would common sense dictate there was simply no way each and every one of those pieces of evidence was merely a coincidence?
Murder on Birchleaf Drive Page 9