12. Guerrilla movements have frequently been beset by internal strife, within their own ranks or between rival groups. Internal dissension has been caused by quarrels about the strategy to be pursued (China, Greece) or by the conflicting ambitions of individual leaders (Frelimo, Columbia). The rivalry between the political and the military leadership, unless these were identical, has also been a frequent cause of friction. Contemporary Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Communist guerrilla movements have been relatively free of such internal struggle; elsewhere splits have been the rule rather than the exception. The Algerian rebels and the PAIGC succeeded in immobilizing their competitors early on in their struggle. In other countries as much effort has been devoted by the insurgents to fighting against their rivals as against the common enemy (IMRO, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Angola). Sometimes a division of labor between rival organizations prevented open clashes while the struggle against the common enemy lasted. This was true for instance of Mexico, Mandatory Palestine, the Palestine Arab resistance and Ulster. But once the fight against the foreign enemy has been won the struggle for power frequently results in a free-for-all between rival guerrilla groups (Congo, Angola) or sets former comrades-in-arms against each other (the Irish Civil War).
The Future Of Guerrilla Warfare
The assessment of the future prospects of guerrilla warfare has to take historical experience as its starting point: in what conditions did such warfare occur, and why did it succeed or fail? The historical record shows, to repeat once again, that nineteenth-century guerrilla wars invariably failed to achieve their objectives except with the support of a regular army, domestic or foreign. During the Second World War guerrilla movements had limited successes against overextended enemy units; but they used the war to consolidate their power and in the political vacuum after the war they emerged as the chief contenders for power (China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Vietnam).
A powerful impetus was given to guerrilla war after 1945 with the disintegration of colonial empires. The colonial powers no longer had the will to fight, and even if guerrilla operations were militarily quite ineffective, to combat them became so costly that the imperial power eventually withdrew its forces.
Guerrilla war against domestic rulers has succeeded in the past— with one exception — only during a general war or immediately following it, with the collapse of central state power. Weakened as the South Vietnam regime was by Vietcong activities, the decisive assault was launched by a regular army. Separatist guerrilla movements have not so far scored decisive victories. Their future prospects will depend to a large extent on the amount of foreign aid they receive. If their political demands are limited in character (administrative-cultural autonomy) or if their secession would not decisively weaken the state they may succeed in certain cases. If on the other hand the loss would be unacceptable, their chances must be rated low, except at a time of general crisis such as war. The appeal of a separatist guerrilla movement is of necessity limited; its survival and success depends on the assumption that the authorities will not apply extreme measures ranging from resettlement on a massive scale to physical extermination.
The conditions conducive to the success of guerrillas have become much less promising with the virtual end of decolonization and the absence of general war. Could the Cuban example be emulated elsewhere? Could, in other words, a guerrilla movement succeed in peacetime in undermining an existing government to such an extent that its collapse became a distinct possibility? Certain developments favor insurrection: urban terrorism has become transnational, supported by foreign governments or by terrorist movements abroad. At the same time, the destructive power of the weapons used by terrorists has greatly increased. While the rifle, the machine gun and the hand grenade (or the bomb) were the classical weapons of the guerrilla during the last hundred years, the guerrilla of the future will have advanced weapons such as missiles at his disposal; he may be able to manufacture a crude atomic bomb or steal one.17 But the political uses of nuclear blackmail by terrorist groups should not be exaggerated — it is not an instrument for the seizure of power.18 In any case, the destructive power of the weapons in the hands of the state has grown even more and the outcome will depend in the last resort on the will and the ability of the government to apply this force. The military balance of power has shifted to the detriment of the guerrillas; they can seldom operate in the open country, and the scope of terrorist activities in urban centers is limited (the decline of hijacking).
It has been maintained that large-scale conventional wars have become so difficult and expensive that terrorists may be employed by foreign governments to engage in surrogate warfare and that terrorism may become the conventional war of the future. This seems unlikely for both military and political reasons. Recent technological advances such as precision-guided munitions provide more destructive energy in smaller packages than ever before and have revolutionized delivery accuracy. These new weapons however are effective above all against tanks and combat aircraft. But tanks and combat aircraft were never the guerrilla's worst enemies whereas in fighting in urban areas precision-guided munitions will be of strictly limited use. It is quite likely that in a future war massed forces will count for less and small forces with great firepower will be of considerable importance. There may well be a dispersal of forces, a return, on a higher level of technological development, to the partisan tactics of the eighteenth century with comparatively small, highly mobile units raiding the enemy's rear. But it is unlikely that guerrilla units operating in peacetime will derive much benefit from these innovations. They will not be able, as a rule, to retransfer their activities from the cities to the countryside, for means of detection in the open have greatly improved. If it is true that military power will become more diffuse, it is equally true that military power without a central command, close coordination, supply and logistics is ineffective.
In peace a determined army or police force will always be able to destroy the guerrillas and terrorists. The guerrillas have to rely on the government's inability to use the full power at its disposal, the constraints imposed by world opinion and public opinion at home. But this applies only to liberal-democratic regimes. Their number has been shrinking and guerrilla or terrorist activities could well hasten this process. What Regis Debray said about the Tupamaros applies mutatis mutandis to guerrillas and terrorists operating in democratic societies in general; that digging the grave of the "system" they dig their own grave, for the removal of democratic restraints spells the guerrilla's doom. Is it safe to expect that governments will be either so inefficient or so permissive as not to employ effective antiguerrilla or antiterrorist measures in an emergency? This is becoming less and less likely. The strategy of guerrilla war may be used between sovereign states with attacks launched from sanctuaries beyond state borders. But such war by proxy will usually be dangerous for it may lead to full-scale war; it is unlikely in time of peace that the Chinese will instigate guerrilla warfare in Siberia or vice versa. A guerrilla campaign may still be possible against a small country in certain circumstances if support by a major power discreetly (or not so discreetly) is provided to various separatist or opposition groups.
Democratic regimes always seem highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. The constitutional restraints in these regimes make it difficult to combat terrorism and such failure exposes democratic governments to ridicule and contempt. If, on the other hand, they adopt stringent measures they are charged with oppression, and the violation of basic human rights. If terrorists are put on trial they will try to disrupt the legal procedure and to make fair administration of justice impossible. Having been sentenced, terrorists and their sympathizers could then claim that they are victims of gross injustice. Up to this point, the media (always inclined to give wide publicity to acts of violence), are the terrorists' natural ally. But as terrorist operations become more frequent, as insecurity spreads and as wide sections of the population are adversely affected, there is a growing demand for tougher action
by the government even if this should involve occasional (or systematic) infringements of human rights. The swing in popular opinion is reflected in the media focusing no longer on the courage and unselfishness of the terrorists but on the psychopathological sources of terrorism and the criminal element — sometimes marginal, at others quite prominent, but always present in "urban guerrilla" operations. Unless the moral fiber of the regime is in a state of advanced decay, and the political will paralyzed, the urban terrorists would fail to make headway beyond the stage of provocation, in which, according to plan, public opinion should have been won over to their cause, but is in fact antagonized.
Prospects for urban terror seem a little more promising in the Third World, but only in certain rare constellations, some of which have already been discussed. The security forces in these countries are less experienced and effective than in Communist regimes, but usually they will be capable of coping with challenges of this kind unless the rebels receive powerful support from abroad. Irrespective of how brutally a guerrilla movement is suppressed it will be next to impossible to mobilize foreign public opinion against an oil-producing country or one that has good relations with its neighbors and other Third World nations. World public opinion can be mobilized only against a relatively weak country that has powerful enemies among its neighbors, and few friends.
Even if the authority of the state is fatally undermined, even if a power vacuum exists, the prospects of guerrilla or terrorist victory have dimmed, for there is a stronger contender for power — the army. Military coups have become more and more frequent: they may in future become the normal form of political change in most parts of the world.
Latin American Communist leaders have noted that the revolutionary process largely depends on enlisting the "patriotic forces" among the military on the side of the Communists.19 The same applies mutatis mutandis to the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia. But such military coups can turn right as well as left. The slogans will be nationalist-populist in any case and the difference in policy between left- and right-wing military dictatorships may not always be visible to the naked eye. Those with a more pronounced left-wing bias will steal much of the guerrillas' thunder, those inclined more to the right will effectively suppress them. The army command seizes the key positions of the state apparatus and quite frequently establishes a state party. The help of civilian (or guerrilla) political activists may be accepted in this process but they are regarded at the same time as rivals and since the army officers have no desire to share power the civilians will be kept at a safe distance from the levers of power.
During the last fifteen years some hundred and twenty military coups have taken place whereas only five guerrilla movements have come to power; three of them as the result of the Portuguese military coup in 1974; Laos and Cambodia fell after the collapse of Vietnam. The military dictator may be overthrown but the challenge will again come from within the army. Not being overextended and weakened by foreign wars, the army in Third World countries is in a strong position as a contender for domestic power.
The conditions that caused insurgencies have not disappeared — men and women are still exploited, oppressed, deprived of their rights and alienated. "Objective, revolutionary situations" still abound and will continue to exist. But the prospects for conducting successful guerrilla war in the postcolonial period have worsened, except, perhaps, to a limited extent in the secessionist-separatist context. Guerrilla war may not entirely disappear but, seen in historical perspective, it is on the decline, together with its traditional foes — colonialism on the one hand and liberal democracy on the other. Thus the function of guerrilla movements is reverting to what it originally was — that of paving the way for and supporting the regular army. In the past such assistance was military — today it is mainly political. It is holding the stirrup so that others may get into the saddle.
The transition from high to low tide in the fortunes of guerrilla war has been sudden. This is not to say that the conditions that once favored its rise may not recur — following a major war or a natural catastrophe or the weakening of the authority of the state for some other reasons. But at present the age of the guerrilla is drawing to a close. The retreat into urban terror, noisy but politically ineffective, is not a new departure but, on the contrary, the end of an era.
* The inhabitants of Calabria and Basilicata have every reason to feel aggrieved and frustrated for these are among the very poorest provinces of Italy. But they are at the bottom of the scale inasmuch as the rate of suicide and the crime rate are concerned whereas prosperous Piemont, Lombardy and Liguria are on top. Social statistics in other countries show a similar picture.
Notes
Chapter One: Partisans in History
1. C, W. Abeli, Savage Life in New Guinea (London, 1901), 138; James Adair, The History of the American Indians (London, 1775), 382 et seq; Η. H. Turney-High, Primitive War, Its Practice and Concepts (New York, 1971), 128.
2. Niese, ed., Josephus Flavins (Berlin, 1887), Book 2, chapter 19.
3. Dio Cassius, chapter 6g, 12-13.
4. Thucydides, III, 94-98, quoted in F. E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, 1957), 17.
5. The main sources for the Battle of Teutoburg Forest are Tacitus's Annali, Dio Cassius, and Suetonius.
6. Caesar, De hello Gallico, Book VII. See also Camille Jullian, Vercingetorix (Paris, 1921), and T. Rice Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul (London, 1899).
7. Antonio Garcia y Bellido, "Bandas y Guerrillas en las luchas con Roma," Hispania,V, No. 21, 548.
8. The main sources are Appian, Diodorus, Dio Cassius. The best short summary is Hans Gundel's "Viriathus" in Pauly and Wissowa, Real Encyclopaedie d. klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 1893-.
9. Appian, Roman History, I, trans. Horace White (London, 1958), 258.
10. Cambridge Ancient History, VIII, 316.
11. "Su coincidencia con los practicados por las guerrillas en nuestra Guerra de la Independencia es absoluta." Bellido, "Bandas . ..," 589.
12. The question whether Viriathus should be considered Portuguese or Celtibero remains in dispute.
13. Plutarch 12-13. See also the dissertation by Stahl, De Bello Sertoriano (Erlangen, 1907); Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, III, and Schulten, in Pauly and Wissowa, Real Encyclopaedie.
14. Mommsen,Römische Geschichte, III, 37.
15· See G. Köhler, Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesens und der Kriegsführung in der Ritterzeit (Breslau, 1886) II; Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, (Berlin, 1907) III; Emil Daniels, Geschichte des Kriegswesen (Leipzig, 1910).
16. Oeuvres de Froissart, VI, 32.
17. The main source for the Tuchins is M. Boudet, La Jacquerie des Tuchins 1363-84 (Paris, 1895).
18. H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia (London, 1919), 125
19. F. S. Stevenson, History of Montenegro (London, 1912), 123; G. Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution (London, 1861), I.
20. Lieutenant G. Arbuthnot, Herzegovina or Omer Pasha and the Christian Rebels (London, 1862), 152.
21. Ibid., 266.
22. The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1668),
23. G. Rosen, Die Balkan Haiducken (Leipzig, 1878), 26-27.
24. Finlay, History ..., 32.
25. General Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, I,313.
26. J. B. Parsons, "Attitudes towards the late Ming Rebellions," in Oriens Extremus, VI (1959); Erich Hauer, "Li Tsu-cheng and Chang Hsien-chung," in Asia Minor, II (1925). For a short general description see Roland Mousnier, Fureurs Paysannes (Paris, 1967), 238-306.
27. Basing himself on Ewald (Abhandlung), Clausewitz refers to the many incidents in which American riflemen had abducted English generals (Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg, Schriften, I [Göttingen, 1966], 439). Frederick the Great, on the other hand, took a dim view of the importance of the lessons of the war in America. On one occasion he wrote: "The people who come back from America imagine they know all there is to know a
bout war, and yet they have to start learning war all over again in Europe." (Quoted in Peter Paret, York and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815 [Princeton, 1966],43).
28. Piers Mackesy, The War for America (London, 1964), 30,366.
29. The most recent biography of Marion is Hugh F. Rankin, The Swamp Fox (New York, 1973). Of the earlier works Κ. T. Headley, Washington and his Generals (New York, 1847), II, and W. Gilmore Simms, The Life of Francis Marion (New York, 1846) should also be mentioned.
30. Rankin, op. cit., 173. See also Mark Boatner, ed., Cassell's Biographical Dictionary of the American War of Independence, 1773-1783 (London, 1966).
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