The war itself in Roman eyes was the result of Tarentine denial of Roman claims to the entirety of Italy. In 282 a Roman fleet sailed into what the Tarentines claimed as territorial waters that were guaranteed by treaty. Later Roman writers either denied this treaty or diminished its relevance, but either way portray the Roman expedition as within their rights. The people of Taras were angered by what they saw as Roman intrusions in areas of Magna Graecia they saw as within their own sphere of influence. The Tarentines then compound their folly by inviting an outsider, Pyrrhus, into the peninsula. The Pyrrhic War has been shaped into the culmination of Rome’s inevitable rise to Italian hegemony. Dionysius himself made it the climax of his history, ending it as the Romans took control of the peninsula and were on the verge of stepping out into the wider Mediterranean.
Dionysius demonstrates the pan-Italian nature of Roman power in his description of the Roman forces at the battle of Ausculum. Alongside the four legions of Romans were “the Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians, Marrucini, Paeligni, Ferentani, and their other subjects.”53 This is a demonstration of the expansive nature of Roman power, which Dionysius reinforces by referring to these peoples as subjects, which can be seen in other descriptions of Rome’s armies. A similar, albeit more Homeric, description of Roman control of Italy is found in the Punica of Silius Italicus where, at the battle of Cannae, he catalogues the Italians in the Roman army.54 Polybius too uses a catalogue of Italian peoples gathering for war in 225 to contrast Italian unity (and numbers) with the invading Hannibal.55 The listing of Roman allies in all three instances is an expression of power and space. But while the army at Ausculum was expansive in nature, it did not encompass the entire peninsula. Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and Italiote Greeks fought alongside Pyrrhus, which Dionysius also highlights. This array of peoples on the other side of the battlefield calls to mind the coalition of peoples that fought the Romans at the battle of Sentinum. The Pyrrhic War thus becomes a final effort at resisting Roman expansion that the reader knows is ultimately doomed to failure as Italy submits to their rightful Roman masters. The armies arrayed at Ausculum can be divided into two categories: Roman subjects and soon-to-be subjects.
But the idea of Italy as Roman space is an anachronism of later generations that slowly developed over the course of the third century and became a significant ideological factor for Roman writers at the end of the second. At the turn of the third century the Roman alliance system only firmly encompassed central Italy, including Latium, Campania, the Abruzzi region, and portions of Apulia, which Dionysius includes in his list of peoples at Ausculum. Etruria and the areas inhabited by the Gauls in the north as well as Samnium and the rest of southern Italy remained either independent or only periodically subject to Rome. Livy attempted to place these areas under Roman hegemony by right of conquest through his use of language, referring to conflicts of the late fourth century as revolts and rebellions. Similarly, the antiquarian Varro retrojected the idea of Roman Italy, perhaps unintentionally, when he describes a map of Italy that he says was located in a temple of Tellus built by the consul P. Sempronius Sophus sometime after battling the Picentes in 268. However, this picta Italia is used by Varro as a vehicle for his own discussion of Italian agriculture based on a road system that was not in existence in the mid-third century and was likely modified during restoration work in the first century.56 The idea of Italy as a distinct and cohesive unit was a product of Roman conquest, not a precursor to it.57
The reality of Roman control of Italy was realized by the middle of the third century, but it would take time for the ideological perception of the peninsula as a geographically defined space to develop. Peninsular Italy had been closely tied to the surrounding regions, economically and culturally, for centuries. Most relevant in the context of the Pyrrhic War were the close ties of southern Italy to the wider Greek world. Various Syracusan leaders even created an empire of sorts that spanned Sicily and southern Italy. While later Romans pointed towards strict legal definitions of Italy as Roman space prior to the wars with Carthage, it is notable that after Sicily was seized in the First Punic War it took time for extra-Italian regions to be transformed into subordinate provinces. It was only at the dawn of the second century that a relatively regular system of provincial administration was developed, which would see the empire divided into provinces on the one hand and Italy on the other.58 As the Romans forged an idea of empire in the mid to late third century, the concept of Italy as something separate developed in conjunction. Provincialization was one of the factors that gave rise to the conception of a geographically and ideologically discrete Roman Italy. This distinction would itself fuel the grievances among the peoples of Italy that led to the Social War and eventual Romanization of Italy that so heavily weighed on the writers of the first century.
The Second Punic War at the end of the third century, in which Hannibal waged a brutal campaign in the peninsula, also played a significant role in defining Italy as Roman space. The Romans had controlled all of Italy since the mid-260s, reinforcing their dominion by founding Latin colonies throughout the peninsula. Hannibal’s campaign in Italy pushed the Romans to the brink of destruction, which was further exacerbated by the subsequent decision of the Samnites and other southern Italian peoples to support the Carthaginian. Roman strength was built on their Italian alliance network, which Hannibal set about undermining. The peoples of Italy were necessary not only for the expansion and maintenance of Rome’s empire, but its very survival. The violation of Italy by Hannibal helped to crystalize the developing idea of its geographic distinctiveness, which was projected backwards into the Pyrrhic War alongside a denigration of the Carthaginians in general.
Although unhistorical, the idea of Roman Italy heavily influenced the perception of the Pyrrhic War for later generations. Italy would in time become a geographically and ideologically distinct Roman space, but that was not true in the early third century. Pyrrhus was the first major extra-Italian opponent that the Romans faced, but that title is a misnomer as Italy was closely tied to the wider Mediterranean world. By emphasizing the idea of Roman Italy, later writers buttressed the false narrative of the war as a virtuous Rome versus the Alexander-esque Pyrrhus. It was, in fact, a multipolar conflict in which the Romans were merely one of many communities interacting within a complex web of politics, culture, trade, and war.
Notes
1 … σὲ δὲ παρατηρεῖ καὶ τέτακεν ἐπὶ σοι τὸ νοῦν, DH 19.12.2.
2 Assmann (2011) 34–36.
3 DH 1.72–73.
4 Livy pr. 1–3.
5 Corbier (2009) 227–228; Barnes (2005) 18–19.
6 Richardson (2012).
7 See Chapter 3.
8 Oakley (1997–2005) 1:76–78.
9 The general idea of a basic foundation of the historical narrative and possibility of ‘plausible reconstruction’ is followed by Oakley (1997–2005) 1:76–78, 100–102; Pelling (1990); and Wiseman (1987) 257–259. A much more critical approach is taken by Barnes (2005); Salmon (1967); and Beloch (1926). For an overview of memory in the study of Rome, see Galinsky in Galinsky (2016) 1–35.
10 The Ineditum Vaticanum (FGrH 839) may derive from Timaeus, Humm (2007).
11 The most significant example of this approach regarding Pyrrhus is Rudolf Schubert’s Geschichte des Pyrrhus (1894), although he at times makes assertions that push the boundaries of his sources (a not uncommon problem of Quellenforschung). See Momigliano (1966) 107; Miles (1995) 1–5.
12 Mossman (2005) 499.
13 Lévêque (1957) 22–26; Pearson (1987) 256.
14 Lévêque (1957) 20–22; Schubert (1894) 1–4. Jacoby (1923) 2c:653, asserts that the memoirs were fabricated, which is unlikely, Bengtson (1950) 367.
15 For an in-depth discussion of the book, see Skutsch (1985) 328–366.
16 Lévêque (1957) 46.
17 Pelling (1990) 175, who makes the point within the context of Plutarch’s comprehension and port
rayal of internal Roman politics.
18 Lévêque (1957) 60.
19 Nenci’s Pyrro (1953) focused on exploring Pyrrhus’ political interactions with the other great men of the early Hellenistic east rather than the minutiae of his activities, arguing that he was little more than a pawn. Garoufalias’ Pyrrhus (original Greek publication in 1946 and republished in English in 1979 with few changes) presents a fawning narrative that, while extensively footnoted, fails to approach the subject with any real criticalness given the difficult nature of the sources. The more recent Pyrrhus of Epirus by Champion (2009) is an uncritical retelling of the ancient sources that rarely incorporates scholarly discussions and is aimed at a popular audience.
20 For an in-depth bibliography of the expansive works on Pyrrhus, the Pyrrhic War, and related topics, see Lafon and Pittia (2009).
21 Livy 3.26–29; DH 10.23–25; MRR 1:39.
22 Vasaly (2015) 85–86.
23 Pyrrhus: Dio fr. 40.19; Zon. 8.3; Eutrop. 2.12. Cineas: Plut. Pyrr. 19.5; Justin 18.2.10–11; App. Samn. 10.3.
24 DH 19.13–18; see Chapter 4.
25 Levene (2010) 173–175, who considers Livy in a broader context of his entire work, thus affording a look at characters who sometimes act in internally inconsistent ways, which is difficult in the fragmented nature of Pyrrhic War sources.
26 Pfeilschifter (2000).
27 See Chapter 6. Later in the Second Punic War when Capua joined Hannibal, the Campanians are labeled as ‘luxury-loving and arrogant’ despite their familial ties to the Romans, Levene (2010) 216 n. 129. But in the Pyrrhic War, they remained loyal and do not elicit similar criticism in the surviving sources.
28 Buszard (2005); Barnes (2005) 26–28; Lomas (1993) 14; Wuilleumier (1939) 99–100; Peirano (2010) 43–44. Taras in the Roman historical tradition, Livy 9.14, Strabo 6.3.4; Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.1. Plato (Lg. 1.637b) refers to drunken festivals like the ones that appear in the Pyrrhic War.
29 Athenaeus (12.522) links Tarentine moral decline with their prosperity.
30 Plb. 8.24.1; Walbank (1957–1971) 2:101.
31 In general, see Levene (2010) 214–260. The Roman concept builds upon earlier Greek models, Prandi (1979). The stereotype became more pronounced over time as the Carthaginians faded as a distinct people, Waldherr (2000).
32 Peirano (2010) 44–45.
33 Swain (1996) 350–352.
34 Schepens (2000) 416; Mossman (2005) 503–504.
35 “πολεμισταὶ μέν, ῷ Πύρρε, ‘Ρωμαῖα λέγονται καὶ πολλῶν ἐθνῶν μαχίμων ἂρχοντες· εἰ δέ δοίν θεὸς περιγενέσθαι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τί χρησόμεθα τῇ νίκη”; Plut. Pyrr. 14.2.
36 “ἡ Σικελία χεῖρας ὀρέγει …” Plut. Pyrr. 14.4.
37 “τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀπόσχοιτο Λιβύης καὶ Καρχηδόνος ἐν ἐφικτῷ γενομένης …” Plut. Pyrr. 14.5.
38 Pyrrhos revait d’un grand empire grec du Couchant, Lévêque (1957) 284.
39 Lefkowitz (1959) 163.
40 Plut. Pyrr. 8.1–2; DH 20.10.1. Such characterizations may go back to Greek sources used by Plutarch, Schettino (2009) 176.
41 Plut. Flam. 21.3–4; Livy 35.14.8.
42 App. Syr. 10.
43 Mossman (1992).
44 ‘ὃς ἂν ὑμῶν ὀξυτέραν ἔχῃ τὴν μάχαιραν.’ Plut. Regum 37. Compare Alexander’s legendary statement, Arr. An. 7.26.3; Curt. 10.5.5. Arrian (An. 7.25; cf. Plut. Alex. 76) says that the royal journals indicated that he had lost his voice before dying, implying that such a statement is fabrication.
45 Lévêque (1957) 22–43.
46 Livy 9.17–19; cf. Plut. Mor. 326A-C. The digression also served to highlight Roman resiliency after their defeat at the Caudine Forks and to praise the virtues of the men of that age as equals to Alexander in their own right, Oakley (1997–2005) 3:196–197.
47 Humm in Caire and Pittia, eds. (2006) 175–196 defends the idea that Alexander was to some degree planning a western campaign aimed at a defense of Hellenism from barbarians, but suggests its target would have mainly been Carthage rather than Rome.
48 Plut. Pyrr. 19; Zon. 8.4; App. Samn. 10.2.
49 une fois Rome maîtresse de tout le bassin de la Méditerranée, on ne pouvait plus imaginer qu’elle eût été menacée de si près et qu’elle eût dû défendre son existence même contre Pyrrhos, Lévêque (1957) 50.
50 Dio fr. 40.3.
51 ἐξελθόντα τῆς ’Ιταλίας, Plut. Pyrr. 19.3.
52 Plb. 1.6.6; cf. 2.20.10; Florus 1.13.1.
53 Λατίνους δὲ καὶ Καμπανοὺς καὶ Σαβίνους καὶ ’Ομβρικοὺς καὶ Οὐολούσκους καὶ Μαρουγκίνους καὶ Πελίγνους καὶ Φερεντανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπηκόους … DH 20.1.4–5.
54 Sil. Pun. 8.356–616.
55 Plb. 2.23–24; Walbank (1957–1971) 1:196–203.
56 Var. Rust. 1.2.1; Roth (2007).
57 contra Humm (2009), who sees the idea of Roman Italy in the late fourth century developing along ethno-linguistic lines rather than geographically.
58 There was no regular process of provincial administration when these areas were conquered. It was only in 198, decades after Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and the Spains were under Roman control, that a more regular system of six praetors was created, Livy 32.27.6; Brennan (2000) 1:163–173; Richardson (1986) 76. Appian (Sic. fr. 2.2) says that praetors were only sent to Sicily as governors in 241. Judicial functions likewise took time to develop as can be seen in Greece, Kallet-Marx (1995) 161–183.
2 Conflict and competition before Pyrrhus
The moment that ancient sources focus on as the beginning of the Pyrrhic War was in 282 BCE when a Roman fleet of about a dozen ships sailed along the southern Italian coast. There, it was spied by the drunken populace of Taras who embarked their own navy and attacked, capturing all but five ships and killing one of the fleet’s two commanders. The Roman crews were mistreated and the captured ships sunk. The Tarentines furthered their folly by mocking the clothes and speech of Roman envoys who arrived to demand redress. One drunken fellow, Philonides, even went so far as to urinate on the Romans’ togas, which elicited more laughter from the assembled Tarentines. Furious, the head of the Roman mission, one L. Postumius Megellus, threatened that the filth on his toga would be washed out with Tarentine blood. Realizing the severity of the threat, the Tarentines resolved to ask Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, to come to their aid. As such, the blame for the war was placed clearly on the collective head of the Tarentines, who, through their own foolishness, orchestrated a conflict between the Romans and Pyrrhus.
The story is quite riveting. Honor, betrayal, drunkenness, and righteous fury; it has it all. The narrative emphasizes the virtuousness of the Romans and the thoughtlessness of the Tarentines, but does not fully convey the wider geopolitical context of what was happening. The attack on the Roman fleet certainly played a large part in the outbreak of war between Rome and Taras, but there were long-standing tensions already between the two cities rooted in the expansion of Roman power on the peninsula over the previous decades. Italy had long been embroiled in endemic warfare that often involved peoples from beyond the peninsula, especially from Sicily in the early third century. In the early third century, the Romans pursued an aggressive diplomatic campaign among the Greeks and Italian peoples of the southern peninsula to capitalize on their divisions even as they deployed armies. The outbreak of the Pyrrhic War, which would in time extend far beyond Italy, was not as straightforward an event as our sources suggest. The Pyrrhic War was an outgrowth of many prior conflicts in both Italy and Sicily.
Affairs in Sicily
While the Pyrrhic War would be waged initially in Italy, affairs in Sicily played a major role in its outbreak. Before (and after) the Pyrrhic War, Sicily was a land divided. The western portion of the isla
nd was under Carthaginian control (epikrateia), while the east was divided into a series of independent Greek poleis. In between were smaller Sicel communities that made alliances or war as circumstances dictated. Adding another element of chaos were Italian mercenaries such as the Mamertines, who had seized control of several cities for themselves. The wars on Sicily rarely resulted in long-lasting changes to the overall political situation. For short periods though, large portions of the island’s communities were unified under one side or the other. Only a couple of decades before the Pyrrhic War, Agathocles led the city of Syracuse to dominate not only much Sicily but also significant portions of southern Italy, serving as a model of the interconnectedness of the two regions.
At the center of Greek affairs in Sicily was the city of Syracuse, which saw success in influencing or dominating its neighbors in the fourth century under the leadership of the tyrannical Dionysii and Timoleon. The Syracusans would rise again under the leadership of the sometimes adventurer, tyrant, and king Agathocles (r. 316–289).1 Agathocles was an embodiment of the complexity of Sicilian affairs. He was born around 361 in Thermae, a Greek city then within the Carthaginian epikrateia. His father was Greek from the Italian city of Rhegium and his mother was Sicel. After the family moved to Syracuse, the young Agathocles served in the army during Timoleon’s rule and worked his way up the ranks. More lofty ambitions would see Agathocles exiled twice. He became a condotierre in Italy and Sicily before seizing power in Syracuse in 316 from the oligarchs that controlled it. He proceeded to unite much of Greek Sicily and made war against the Carthaginians, even briefly invading Africa in 310. After the ignominious end of those efforts, campaigns in Italy followed around 300 in an attempt to bring the Italiote Greeks under his control and subdue the Italian peoples attacking them (Bruttians and Lucanians). Beyond these areas, Agathocles established diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean aimed especially at the Greek/Macedonian leaders of the east, which included marrying his daughter first to Pyrrhus of Epirus and then Demetrius Poliorcetes. He died at the age of 72 of natural causes, having led a spectacular and controversial life. On his deathbed he restored the democracy of Syracuse, ushering in a period of political division and turmoil.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 4