54 Vir. Ill. 36.2.
55 Cavallaro (1976) 271–278.
56 Compare the lex sacrata said to have been used by the Samnites to recruit the Linen Legion in 293, Livy 10.38.2–13; Oakley (1997–2005) 4:392–398.
57 Dionysius (20.1) gives the most detailed account of the deployments, perhaps relying on Pyrrhus’ memoirs or Timaeus, Lévêque (1957) 329, n. 1; Beloch (1922–1927) 4.2:472.
58 Μέρος was a generic term for a group that could also be applied to military units. In his description of Punic Wars-era Roman armies, Polybius (6.26.9) does say that allied troops were divided into two general groups (μέρη), each of which was more precisely called a wing (κἐρας). However, there is no indication of overall organization or commanding Roman officers (praefecti sociorum) at Ausculum. Livy makes no reference to alae in terms of large conglomerations of allied units before the loss of his narrative in 293, although at 10.29.12 he describes a unit of Campanian cavalry as an ala Campanorum. No praefecti sociorum are referenced prior to the Second Punic War, although the loss of Livy’s narrative makes it difficult to say when they first appeared. The groupings at Ausculum may indicate an incremental step towards greater command and control of allied forces in Roman armies, but they lacked any significant overarching organization.
59 Frontinus (Strat. 2.3.21) gives a slightly different deployment of the infantry. He places the Samnites alongside Pyrrhus’ phalanx on the right, which may be a confusion for their cavalry, Salmon (1967) 286, n. 5.
60 Plb. 18.28.10; Walbank (1957–1971) 585–588. Similar deployments of phalanxes interspersed with other troops were later made by Antigonus III Doson at Sellasia in 222 using Illyrians (Plb. 2.66.5), and Antiochus III at Magnesia in 189 using a combination of light infantry and elephants (Livy 37.40; App. Syr. 32). These Greek/Macedonian parallels suggest that Pyrrhus did not get the idea to deploy in such a manner from observing Roman/Italian armies, contra Lévêque (1957) 392–393.
61 Plut. Pyrr. 21.
62 DH 20.1–3; Dio fr. 40.43–46; Zon. 8.5.
63 Lévêque (1957) 384–390.
64 Lévêque (1957) 386; Wuilleumier (1939) 120; Beloch (1922–1927) 4.2:472–473.
65 Plut. Pyrr. 21.
66 Heraclea: Plut. Pyrr. 16; Zon. 8.3; Dio fr. 40.19; Livy Per. 13; Justin 18.1.4–6; Florus 1.13.8; Eutrop. 2.11; Oros. Hist. 4.1.9–11. Ausculum: Plut. Pyrr. 21; Justin 18.1.11; DH 20.1–3; Livy Per. 13; Florus 1.13.10; Zon. 8.5; Front. Strat. 2.3.21; Eutrop. 2.14; Oros. Hist. 4.1.19–22.
67 Oros. Hist. 4.1.9–11.
68 Zon. 8.3.
69 Livy Per. 13; Eutrop. 2.11.
70 Dio fr. 40.19; Zon. 8.3; Eutrop. 2.11.
71 Dio fr. 40.28; Zon. 8.4; App. Samn. 10.3.
72 αὕτη τῶν βαρβάρων οὐ βάρβαρος, Plut. Pyrr. 16.5; cf. Livy 35.14.8. Frontinus (Strat. 4.1.14), on the other hand, says Pyrrhus inspired Roman camp-making.
4 The diplomatic negotiations of 280 and 279 BCE
The military campaigns of the first two years of the Pyrrhic War were limited to south and briefly central Italy. It is the diplomatic exchanges of those same years that reveal the wider impact of the war. The diplomatic exchanges of 280 and 279 are the best attested events of the entire conflict, which proves both boon and bane. While a relatively great deal of material survives, that information is problematic given the sources’ fragmentary or excerpted nature, lack of details, confusion in the timeline, authorial bias, and the significant discrepancies between them. Despite Roman insistence that Pyrrhus desired to conquer Rome itself, his diplomatic efforts were aimed primarily at securing a peace that recognized his control of southern Italy. After the battles of Heraclea and Ausculum, the king made concerted efforts to end his war with Rome. Nevertheless, the scale of the conflict would continue to grow as the Romans rejected a negotiated settlement and the Carthaginians entered the fray.
Before Heraclea (summer 280)
In the events leading up to the battle of Heraclea, we are told that the Romans were not hesitant in declaring war and an aggressive military effort was made. On his way to Heraclea, the consul Laevinius secured control of Lucania and sought to reinforce Rome’s Italiote Greek allies.
The first recorded direct contact between the Romans and Pyrrhus was a supposed offer by the king to arbitrate in the dispute between Rome and Taras. Pyrrhus dispatched a letter to Laevinius making his proposal, which the consul ultimately rejected. The exchange is only briefly sketched out by Plutarch and Zonaras, who emphasize Roman defiance.1 Zonaras portrays Pyrrhus with an unearned air of authority that he has Laevinius label ‘rather crazy’. Laevinius then states that he will not come to Pyrrhus as a suppliant but with an army, preferring a trial in the court of Mars. A much fuller account is given in the excerpts of Dionysius.2 Pyrrhus begins by boasting of his heritage and past exploits, offers to arbitrate with impartiality between Rome and Taras, offers an alliance with the Romans, and then declares that he will ensure peace through arms if necessary. Laevinius replies that Pyrrhus is foolish to threaten people with whom he has had no experience, asserts that the Romans punish their enemies by deeds rather than words, pronounces that the Romans would extract retribution from the Samnites and Tarentines, makes a jab at Tarentine duplicity, and finally tells the king to send a proper embassy to the Senate, which will deal reasonably with him. Dionysius’ letters are rhetorical creations of his own, similar to the speeches that he incorporates throughout his history, but may be built to a small degree upon historical foundations.3
Regardless of their authenticity, the letters fit into the larger Roman conception of the war as a duel between their own virtuous ancestors and the foreign Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus is portrayed as an invader of Roman space, and assumes haughtiness in his offers to adjudicate. The Tarentines are here clearly in the wrong in their previous attack on the Roman fleet and subsequent humiliation of Rome’s envoys. Pyrrhus’ offer to mediate thus starts from an untenable position. Laevinius’ response stresses Roman rightness in seeking redress while displaying the manly desire for action above talking. In addition, the blame for aggression is transferred from the Tarentines to Pyrrhus, reinforcing the role of the Romans as victims seeking just redress.
The letters also hint at the king’s limited goals in his campaign rather than the grandiose plan to conquer the west. He wanted to end the war through diplomacy before any actual fighting occurred. However confident he was in battle, Pyrrhus could not afford many losses in material or time. Settling the Roman–Tarentine dispute would allow him to quickly take full control of the Italiote Greeks, whose resources he could use elsewhere. His offer of an alliance with the Romans may be genuine, as it would potentially give him access to Roman military assistance as allies alongside the Samnites and other Italian peoples. Pyrrhus was attempting to win control of southern Italy with a minimum of spilled blood, but failed to take into consideration the fact that the war that he had entered was a continuation of decades of fighting and was not so easily put to rest. The Romans were accustomed to long drawn-out conflicts and had, up to this point, suffered few setbacks in the lead-up to Pyrrhus’ arrival.
Unable to obtain a peaceful resolution through diplomacy, the armies of Laevinius and Pyrrhus fought the battle of Heraclea. Suffering defeat, Laevinius withdrew north. Pyrrhus, meanwhile, launched his Latium campaign, briefly coming within a short distance of Rome itself. The end of the campaigns of 280 brought with it an intense series of negotiations between Pyrrhus and the Romans.
Negotiating after Heraclea (winter 280/279)
After Heraclea, Pyrrhus held a number of Romans and other Italians prisoners who could be used as diplomatic leverage. The Romans dispatched C. Fabricius Luscinus, who had lifted the siege of Thurii, at the head of a delegation to Pyrrhus in Taras where he was wintering, to discuss ransoming the captured men. The events of this episode are heavily influenced by the Roman tradition, which portrayed Fabricius as the pinnacle of Roman virtue: modest, humble, and honest. Indeed, the other two m
embers of the delegation (Q. Aemilius Papus and P. Cornellius Dolabella) hardly appear despite their impressive individual careers. While Pyrrhus sought a quick peace, the larger implications of the wars of Italy made the Romans reluctant at best.
Sometime late in 280 or early 279, Fabricius and the rest of the delegation headed to Taras to meet with Pyrrhus to negotiate the release of Roman and allied prisoners. Fabricius’ interactions with Pyrrhus, as they are relayed in the sources, are greatly exaggerated and are discussed below. The ransoming of prisoners was normal after battles and is in and of itself not remarkable.4 It is to be expected that the Romans, as the defeated, would be the ones to initiate talks. The Romans offered money or a mutual exchange of prisoners they had captured. However, the discussions quickly took on the much larger question of peace. Determining precisely who brought up the possibility of a negotiated end to the war presents some difficulties. Dionysius and Zonaras insist that it was the king who first raised the topic. They assert that Pyrrhus desired to end the fighting because he had been impressed by Roman strengths on the battlefield and despondent about his own losses. They make Pyrrhus into the suppliant instead of the defeated Romans. Justin says that it was Fabricius who brought up peace, which is more logical.5 Dispatching a delegation of such prominent men spoke to the importance the Senate placed on this mission, and perhaps implies forethought as to the potential larger issues that would come up. The Romans would have been at least partially familiar with Hellenistic diplomatic norms through contact with the Italiote Greeks as well as the Carthaginians.
We are told that Pyrrhus asked his counselors for advice regarding the issue.6 Milo, one of his most important military leaders, rejected the idea and encouraged Pyrrhus to attack while they had the Romans on their heels. Cineas, his chief diplomat, suggested a release of prisoners without ransom and a concerted diplomatic effort to end the fighting. Milo’s advice calls to mind the similar suggestion that would be given to Hannibal after his victory at Cannae, while Cineas becomes the voice of reason. Later Roman writers knew the outcome of the war and, in their view, the futility of it. As such, Pyrrhus and the rest of his council agreed with Cineas, and the king informed the Romans of his desire for peace. Of course, peace would well serve Pyrrhus’ own strategic goals rather than the supposed admiration he was developing for his enemies. However, such an important decision was beyond the power of the envoys, who insisted that Pyrrhus take his proposal to the Senate, which had the authority to negotiate. Dionysius goes so far as to have the Roman delegation preemptively reject the idea, foreshadowing the Senate’s response.7
It was at this point that Pyrrhus decided to release at least a portion of his prisoners, without ransom, before sending his own ambassadors to Rome. The release of prisoners closely parallels Hannibal’s similar release of prisoners in the Second Punic War but also highlights the important differences between the two generals. Hannibal would maliciously release the Italians he had captured, but not the Romans, in order to undermine Rome’s alliance system. Pyrrhus’ release of prisoners, on the other hand, emphasizes his generosity and his admiration for the virtue of the Romans in general (and Fabricius in particular). Both Hannibal and Pyrrhus acted similarly, but with entirely different motivations. Pyrrhus may have been at war with Rome but nevertheless he has qualities that are admirable, especially being smart enough to recognize Roman greatness. Hannibal was irredeemable. For Pyrrhus, this was a shrewd political move meant to sway Roman opinion in his favor. His victory at Heraclea and the Latium campaign had served as the stick, and now his release of prisoners was the carrot to prod the Romans in the direction he desired.
Whether Pyrrhus released these men immediately or not is difficult to say, due to discrepancies in the sources. According to one version, he temporarily released the prisoners to allow them to celebrate the Saturnalia festival in Rome, but dictated that they must return if peace was not made.8 This would place the negotiations in December. It was only after the prisoners had returned that Pyrrhus, impressed by their honor in keeping their word, decided to release them without ransom. Dio, a later and more hostile source, claims that Pyrrhus unsuccessfully attempted to entice the Roman prisoners to join him in his attack on Rome.9 The details of the prisoner release have been greatly exaggerated, especially by Dio. Perhaps the prisoners were released only conditionally, pending successful negotiations or a reciprocal release of prisoners by the Romans. He may also have only released a limited number of them immediately as an act of good faith and means of exerting pressure on the Roman Senate. At least a portion of the prisoners seem to have returned to Rome alongside Pyrrhus’ diplomatic mission led by Cineas during the winter of 280/279. The overarching tradition of this act is an old one, going back to Ennius, and is universally acknowledged in other sources despite differences in detail.10
The negotiations took place on two interrelated but distinct levels, the individual and the institutional. Pyrrhus adroitly operated on both. In their initial meeting, the Roman envoys made their proposals for the release of prisoners while Pyrrhus simultaneously made personal overtures to Fabricius in private.11 Of course Fabricius, as the ideal Roman, refused. Cineas too sought out personal connections among the Roman elite before meeting with the Senate, which Roman writers label as attempted bribery.12 The intention was to build personal relationships with individuals that could then be used to influence the negotiations on an institutional level. The Roman tradition denies that these efforts were successful and that they went against Roman values, but such relationships were common in early Italian diplomacy.
The Romans were certainly not strangers to this strategy. At Neapolis in 327 Roman envoys had reached out to leading Neapolitans on an individual level in an (unsuccessful) attempt to sway the city away from their Samnite alliance.13 They had also acted in a similar fashion in Taras just before Pyrrhus’ arrival, and would continue to do so during the war. Individuals with strong personal relationships with people from other communities could benefit economically, politically, or socially from those inside connections, while their own community gained another avenue of contact. Of course such connections could be exploited by a superior power, as the Romans are said to have feared from Pyrrhus. Nevertheless, Pyrrhus’ diplomatic efforts were dynamic and multi-pronged in a concerted effort to make peace.
Cineas, after making his rounds to individual members, presented Pyrrhus’ peace offer officially to the Roman Senate. Plutarch and Zonaras limit the scope of Pyrrhus’ offer to friendship between himself and the Romans, immunity for the Tarentines, and the release of prisoners.14 Appian and the Ineditum Vaticanum describe a much more detailed, expansive, and harsh proposal.15 Here, Pyrrhus offered an alliance between himself and the Romans that included the Tarentines, a guarantee of freedom for the Italiote Greeks, and restoration of war losses for the Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and Daunians. Both Plutarch and Zonaras can be set aside as incomplete summaries as Plutarch shows little interest in such minutia, and Zonaras was epitomizing the more hostile Dio. They include the most important core of the proposal as later Romans saw it, peace between the two parties, but neglect to give further information that would indicate the strong position of Pyrrhus in the negotiations. The harsher terms of Appian speak to a more realistic proposal from victor to defeated. Pyrrhus was not a suppliant but a victor. Polyaenus says that Pyrrhus often emphasized the negative impact of continued fighting while urging peace.16
Appian’s proposal also reflects the preexisting campaign goals of the king. Freedom and independence for the Greek cities was already something of a catchphrase among the Greek/Macedonian kingdoms of the Hellenistic east. Greek cities may have technically retained their independence, but in reality were under the sway of whichever ruler was most powerful. This arrangement would have left the Italiote Greeks effectively under Pyrrhus’ control. But for the Tarentines their alliance with Pyrrhus was a means to an end: they wanted control of the Italiote Greeks through the historic league.17 Including the Tarentine
s in the treaty would serve to stabilize the political situation on the peninsula and, by not including the other Greeks in the same manner, cement the Tarentines as the de facto leaders of Magna Graecia on Pyrrhus’ behalf. The Tarentines had long coveted that role. Restitution of losses suffered by the peoples of southern Italy from Rome, presumably property, captives, and perhaps territory, would weaken Roman gains in the region, strengthen Pyrrhus’ Italian allies, and create a more effective buffer for the Italiote Greeks. How far back such concessions would extend, which is to say whether territory seized before the Pyrrhic War would be on the table, is not specified. Finally, peace between Pyrrhus and the Romans would allow him to turn his attention elsewhere.
Cineas’ proposal was thus aimed at securing Pyrrhus’ effective control of southern Italy while portraying him as a protector of Greek culture against barbarian aggression. While this proposal weakened the Romans’ position in Italy, it did not demand the direct subordination of the Roman state to Pyrrhus and is unlikely to have pushed Roman hegemony back into Latium alone. Despite attempts by later Romans to assert otherwise, the king had suffered no serious setbacks as yet and was in a position of strength, and as such he put forth a proposal that secured his power in Italy. The fact that he did not demand the subordination of Rome is an indication of his limited intentions in Italy from the start rather than a decrease in ambition due to an unexpectedly strong opponent.
The Roman Senate, we are told, was initially leaning towards accepting Pyrrhus’ offer.18 His military success, the release of prisoners, and Cineas’ unofficial diplomatic efforts in Rome were no doubt all strong factors in the thoughts of the senators. But, as the story goes, a blind old man was carried in by his sons to change their minds. Appius Claudius Caecus was a former dictator, censor, and consul who had been a major figure in Roman politics for decades, and he vehemently opposed making peace in a famous speech on the Senate floor.19 The speech is a testament of Roman exceptionalism. He says that what the Romans were doing (entertaining the idea of peace) was shameful; that their boast about being able to beat Alexander the Great must be an empty claim when they cower to Molossians; that they trembled before Pyrrhus who was merely looking to escape enemies that he could not face at home; and that accepting peace would make people such as the Samnites and Tarentines despise Rome. In response, the Senate took heart and replied that there would be no negotiations with Pyrrhus until he had departed from Italy. They would fight in accordance with their military ethos.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 11