With Pyrrhus taking more direct control, it is hardly surprising that these two prominent men would be involved in the growing Syracusan disaffection. For Pyrrhus, they represented the most powerful individuals who could potentially stand in his way, and their elimination should be seen as in line with his efforts to place his own people in leadership positions. His leadership was made even more precarious by the fact that a majority of his military forces were Sicilian Greeks, with Sosistratos providing nearly a third of those he had led against the Carthaginians. Some men, of course, found new opportunities. Hiero, the future king of Syracuse, earned a number of military awards from the king.63 But whatever support Pyrrhus found among these local leaders, it was insufficient. As he tightened his grip, the political and military situation slipped from his control.
Once again capitalizing on Greek division, and perhaps seeking to avoid a second siege of Lilybaeum, the Carthaginians went on the offensive both militarily and diplomatically.64 Reinforcements arrived from Africa and Italy, supplementing whatever was left of the army that had besieged Syracuse the year before. The army then advanced eastward, rolling back some of Pyrrhus’ gains. The Carthaginians also provided refuge to Greek refugees driven out by Pyrrhus’ consolidation of power, as they had done with those who had opposed Agathocles before. These exiles served as a means of further undermining Pyrrhus and facilitating Carthaginian diplomatic efforts, which saw success among both Greeks and native Sicels. The Mamertines also took the opportunity to launch offenses in alliance with the Carthaginians. This counterattack undermined the chief claim to leadership Pyrrhus had: his military reputation. Now the king was on the defensive with fewer soldiers at his command to stabilize the situation.
Pyrrhus’ position was becoming precarious on every front. According to the sources, it was at this critical moment that Pyrrhus’ Italiote Greek and Samnite allies called for his immediate assistance in the face of Roman aggression.65 The situation in Italy was deteriorating as it was in Sicily, and Pyrrhus must have known that it was impossible for him to attempt to hold both against concerted attacks. No doubt this was why he had tried to push the Romans into a peace after defeating them in battle and precisely why the Carthaginians had worked so hard to prevent it. Of course this situation duplicates the king’s prior quandary about going to Sicily, once again serving as an example of Pyrrhus’ wild attempts to pursue whatever goal seems easiest while failing to follow through on any of them. But Pyrrhus’ position in Sicily was increasingly untenable in the face of Carthaginian military and diplomatic aggression in combination along with the backlash amongst many of his Sicilian Greek allies.
Pyrrhus had failed to grasp the complexities of the situation in Sicily as Greek political division, especially within Syracuse, and Carthaginian counterattacks undermined his efforts. Pyrrhus had deftly managed to establish himself as leader in Syracuse, city, but in that position his control was delicate. When he attempted to remedy the situation following his successful campaign against the Carthaginians, he found what support he had melting away.
While Pyrrhus was losing control in this tumultuous political environment, the Carthaginians took advantage based on decades of experience in diplomatic manipulation. The Carthaginians were not, in fact, passive players against Pyrrhus. They pursued a defensive strategy in 277 in the face of the combined forces of the Sicilian Greeks behind Pyrrhus, holding Lilybaeum in preparation for renewed efforts later. And when cracks began to show in 276 and the Greeks were increasingly unhappy with Pyrrhus’ exactions, the Carthaginians went on the offensive. As Plutarch noted, Pyrrhus was forced to leave the island because “he could not master Sicily which was like a chaotic ship …”66 The Carthaginians understood this chaos, capitalized upon it, and drove the king into retreat.67
For Pyrrhus, strengthening his control in Sicily was conceivable, but promised to be a long and difficult task with no guarantee of success. The more time he spent in Sicily, the less he would be able to pursue his goals in Italy and the Hellenistic east. As he lost influence among the Sicilian Greeks, his military forces were put in greater danger.68 He also risked being stranded in Sicily as the Romans had gained control of Locri, Croton, and Heraclea along the southern coast of Italy, which, in combination with Rhegium, effectively severed Pyrrhus’ allies in Italy and Sicily. With Carthaginian naval forces still patrolling the straits, leaving the island was becoming more and more difficult. In the end, there really was no choice; Pyrrhus decided to abandon Sicily. Before he left he may have defeated a Carthaginian army in one last fight, but it was a parting shot.69 No doubt those communities in the interior of the island that had so readily joined Pyrrhus at the height of his success now switched sides again as his hegemony collapsed. The various peoples of Sicily had resisted Pyrrhus’ attempts to create a more unified state under his control. The king had been unable to assert control over the contested political and military environment of the island.
Notes
1 DS 22.2.
2 DS 21.18; Dio fr. 40.8. The Mamertines (sons of Mamers, the Oscan Mars) were said to have slaughtered the Greek male population of the city, seizing the women for themselves. Similarly, in 404 a group of Campanian mercenaries had seized Entella in Sicily, DS 14.9.9. Concerning Italian mercenaries in Sicily see Tagliamonte (1994).
3 DS 21.18.1, 22.2.1.
4 DS 22.10.1–2; Justin 23.2.13.
5 DS 21.18; Justin 23.2; Lévêque (1957) 452–455.
6 Polyae. 5.37; DS 19.3–5.
7 DS 22.6.2, 7.6.
8 Plut. Pyrr. 22; DS 22.7.3; DH 20.8.1; Justin 18.2.11. It is unlikely that there had been previous diplomatic overtures, despite Diodorus’ statement that Theonon and Sosistratos ‘once more’ (πάλιν) invited Pyrrhus to Sicily, Hamburger (1927) 77.
9 Berger (1991) 140–141.
10 πολλὰ δὴ τὴν τύχην μεμψάμενος ὅτι πράξεων μεγάλων ὑποθέσεις εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν αὐτῷ συνήνεγκε, καὶ νομίζων ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ὑπαρχόντων ἀπολλύναι θάτερον, διηνέχθη τοῖς λογισμοῖς πολὺν χρόνον, Plut. Pyrr. 22.2; cf. Zon. 8.5.
11 Hammond, et al. (1972–88) 3:253, n. 3; contra Lévêque (1957) 558.
12 Plut. Pyrr. 22.3. Cineas likely died during or shortly after this mission in Sicily, as he is never mentioned again, Lévêque (1957) 455, n. 3.
13 Zon. 8.5; Plut. Pyrr 22.3; Justin 18.2.12.
14 Vartsos (1970) 91–92. Diodorus (22.8.1–2) claims the Carthaginian army numbered 50,000, but see below about the unreliability of such numbers.
15 DS 22.7.4.
16 DS 22.7.5, 8.3. The reliability of the given size of Carthage’s fleet and whether they were drawn from the fleet blockading Syracuse is unclear, Lévêque (1957) 458, n. 3; Cross (1932) 77; Garoufalias (1979) 102, n. 36.
17 These ships were probably built by Pyrrhus, DS 22.7.5; Lévêque (1957) 456–457, although Wuilleumier (1939) 131 suggests they were provided by the Tarentines.
18 DS 22.7.4, 8.3.
19 Lévêque (1957) 459.
20 DS 22.8.5; Plut. Pyrr. 22.4.
21 DS 22.8.2.
22 Plb. 7.4.5; Justin 23.3.2.
23 Borba Florenzano in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) 207–223; Stazio (1978); Lévêque (1957) 465–470; Berve (1954); Brauer (1986) 160–163; Garoufalias (1979) 199–214.
24 Vartsos (1970) 94–95; Borba Florenzano in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) 221–223; Hammond (1967) 570.
25 Borba Florenzano in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) 218–219.
26 Alexander, see Borba Florenzano in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) 223, n. 46, contra Lévêque (1957) 471–474. Alexander the Molossian had also struck some coins, possibly in Taras, Burnett in La Magna Grecia da Pirro ad Annibale (2015) 809.
27 De Callatay (2000) 210–211.
28 For Carthaginian armies in general, see Hoyos (2010) 153–163; Koon in Hoyos (2011) 77–94; Ameling (1993); Wise and Hook (1982).
&n
bsp; 29 As occurred on a massive scale after the First Punic War when the Carthaginians claimed an inability to pay the thousands of mercenaries that fought for them, leading to a general revolt called the Truceless War, Hoyos (2007).
30 Herod. 7.165; DS 11.20.2; 13.54.1–6; 14.76.2; 16.77.4; 23.8.1; Plut. Tim. 25.1; Plb. 11.20.2; Livy 28.12.13; App. Ib. 25.100.
31 Murray (1999); Steinby (2007) 23–27; Hoyos (2010) 149–153.
32 DS 22.8.1.
33 App. Samn. 11.2; cf. DS 22.8.2. The passage only mentions elephants and 8,000 cavalry, but is likely defective. Niebuhr (1853) 3:598, corrects the passage to read 8,000 infantry and cavalry. For an analysis of military strength and coin production, see Callatay (2000) 210–211.
34 Plut. Pyr. 21.10; Zon.8.5.
35 DS 22.8.4–5, 10.1.
36 DS 22.10.1; Plut. Pyrr. 22.4; Lévêque (1957) 475–477.
37 DS 22.8.4; Plut. Pyrr. 22.6; Lévêque (1957) 477.
38 Enna: DS 22.10.1. For the western cities, see below.
39 DS 22.8.3; 22.10.1.
40 DS 22.10.1. The exact location of Azones is unknown, but was likely along the coast between Acragas and Selinus, Lévêque (1957) 477, n. 5.
41 DS 22.10.2.
42 Plb. 1.55. Polybius incorrectly claims that Mt. Eryx is the second highest peak on Sicily behind Mt. Etna, Lazenby (1996) 140. The temple was supposedly founded by Aenaeas, Verg. Aen. 5.759–61.
43 Plb. 1.58; DS 24.8–9; Walbank (1957–1971) 1:122; Lazenby (1996) 148–150.
44 DS 22.10.3; Plut. Pyrr. 22.
45 Lévêque (1957) 479.
46 Alexander slept with a copy of the Iliad under his pillow, Plut. Alex. 8.2. Alexander and Achilles: Arr. An. 1.12.1; 7.14.4; Plut. Alex. 15.7–9; Curt. 4.6.29; 8.4.26; DS 17.27. Alexander and Heracles: Arr. An. 1.11.7; 4.10.6; 5.3.2; 5.3.4; 5.26.5; 2.18.1; Plut. Alex. 24.5. As a descendant of Heracles: Arr. An. 3.3.1–2; 4.4.7; 4.11.6. Plut. Alex.2.1. Attack on the city of the Malloi: Arr. An. 6.8–12; Curt. 9.4–5; Plut. Alex. 63; DS 17.98.
47 DS 22.10.4.
48 The summit was flat, large enough to support modest farming, offered pasturage for animals, and was naturally protected by cliffs. Later, in the First Punic War, Hasdrubal Barca occupied the site and from there harassed Roman operations for years, Plb. 1.56–57; cf. DS 24; Walbank (1957–1971) 1:121; Lazenby (1996) 147–148.
49 Meltzer (1879–1913) 2:236; Walter (1947) 118.
50 Plut. Pyrr. 23.2; DS 22.10.5–6; Lévêque (1957) 481–484.
51 Beloch (1922–1927) 4.1:544.
52 There is some variation in the details and timing of the offer, Arr. An. 2.14, 25; Curt. 4.1.7–10; Plut. Alex. 29.7–8; Justin 11.12.1–2; DS 17.39.1.
53 The scope of Pyrrhus’ campaign has led to some debate as to when the siege of Lilybaeum occurred, whether late in 277, Lévêque (1957) 507; Beloch (1922–1927) 4.1:355, or early in 276, Meltzer (1879–1913) 2:239. A significant difficulty with dating the siege to 277 lays in the timing of the campaign against the Mamertines and the Carthaginian peace offer, but these issues are the result of Plutarch’s own confused chronology, see below.
54 DS 22.10.5; Vartsos (1970) 95–96.
55 Plut. Pyrr. 23.1.
56 Plut. Pyrr. 23.3; App. Samn. 12.1; cf. DS 22.10.7. This assertion is accepted by Beloch (1922–1927) 4.1:555 and Lévêque (1957) 485–489.
57 Plb. 1.42–55; DS 24.1–3; Zon. 8.15; Lazenby (1996) 124–132.
58 Plut. Pyrr. 23.3; DS 22.10.7; App. Samn. 12.1.
59 DH 20.8; cf. Dio fr. 40.46.
60 Justin 23.3.3. The author makes a mistake in his epitome, swapping Alexander and Helenus.
61 Borba Florenzano in Hackens, et al., eds. (1992) 219–220.
62 Plut. Pyrr. 23.4–5; DH 20.8.3–4; Dio fr. 40.46; Zon. 8.5; Lévêque (1957) 489–491.
63 Justin 23.4.14.
64 Zon. 8.5; DH 20.8.4; Plut. Pyrr. 23.5. The Italians mentioned by Zonaras were likely Oscan mercenaries along the same lines as previous groups as opposed to being part of any Roman contributions, Meltzer (1879–1913) 2:550; contra Lévêque (1957) 486. The Numidians mentioned by Ennius and sometimes assigned to book six are not likely to have been linked to these reinforcements, Skutsch (1985) 426.
65 Plut. Pyrr. 23.5.
66 τοῦτο δὲ ἦν εὐπρέπεια μὴ φυγὴν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀπόγνωσιν τὸν ἀπόπλουν τῶν αὐτόθι πραγμάτων τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὐ δυνάμενος κρατεῖν Σικελίας ὥσπερ νεὼς ταραχθείσης, ἀλλ᾽ ἔκβασιν ζητῶν, αὖθις ἔρριψεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, Plut. Pyrr. 23.6.
67 App. Samn. 12.1; Zon. 8.5.
68 Vartsos (1970) 92.
69 Justin (23.3.9) says Pyrrhus won a victory before withdrawing, perhaps trying to stabilize the situation in the face of Carthaginian attacks, but it is unclear how reliable this is, Lévêque (1957) 493.
6 A war ends
By 277, the Pyrrhic War was being fought on multiple fronts. As Pyrrhus attempted to bring the Sicilian Greeks under his control and campaigned against the Carthaginians in Sicily, the war in Italy continued. As with the war in Sicily, the surviving sources significantly decline in quality but nevertheless provide a clear picture. The conflict was defined by Roman aggression in southern Italy. Roman efforts continued to rely on a mixture of warfare and diplomacy to expand their influence now aimed at undermining the hegemony of Pyrrhus. By the time Pyrrhus returned to Italy, the situation was breaking down. Efforts to stem his mounting losses in the west culminated in the battle of Beneventum, but the king would not come out ahead in this fight. In the Roman narrative, this decline in Pyrrhus’ fortunes was linked to a decline in his moral character as he slowly devolved into despotism, impiety, and ultimately failure in the face of Roman virtue.
Matters in Rhegium
Rhegium sat at an important strategic point on the Italian side of the straits separating the peninsula from Sicily. On the opposite side was the city of Messana inhabited by the Mamertines, allies of the Carthaginians at this time. The two cities were strategically important as they could regulate movement through the straits. Both were also centers of stories of betrayal. The Mamertines had been Oscan mercenaries employed by Agathocles. Instead of going back to Italy when their contract ended, they instead seized the city of Messana (then Zancle), killing the men and taking the women for themselves. Similar events transpired in Rhegium during the Pyrrhic War. These Oscans were allied with the Romans. Efforts were made by ancient writers to absolve the Romans of any responsibility in the massacre that took place, but even Fabricius, that pinnacle of virtue, is implicated in what transpired.
The first betrayal of the garrison of Rhegium is by far the most commonly related element in surviving materials.1 Although the exact details vary somewhat, the basic story remains largely consistent. The Romans dispatched a garrison made up mostly of Campanians to ensure that the inhabitants of Rhegium would not ally themselves with Pyrrhus and endanger movement through the straits. The Campanian commander, Decius Vibellius, fabricated evidence that the Rhegians were plotting to join Pyrrhus, using the supposed plot as a pretext to massacre the male inhabitants and seize the women for themselves. The garrison used the example of the Mamertines across the strait as inspiration, and allied with them after seizing control. Decius ultimately paid dearly for his treachery. Suffering from an eye condition, he brought in a doctor who gave him a poultice to rub on his eyes that actually burned out his ability to see. (The doctor was actually from Rhegium, unknown to Decius.)
In turn, the now consul Fabricius, appalled by these abuses, avenged the Rhegians and executed the Campanians, reinforcing the idea of Roman fidelity. The Romans were horrified at the actions by the garrison, who are specified not to be Romans, against their allies. Fabricius immediately rectified the situation, or, as some sources say, dealt with it as soon as the war allowed. But either way, the Romans acted virtuously. Fabricius himself, the man who had denied off
ers of wealth and power from Pyrrhus in favor of his own honorable humility, continues as an exemplum of Roman virtue.
The garrison of Rhegium was linked to its geographically important location. Most sources state that the garrison was installed in reaction to Pyrrhus’ arrival, but Dionysius instead says that it was placed there by Fabricius during his consulship in 282 to secure it from attacks by neighboring peoples. This earlier date makes sense within the context of the war before Pyrrhus’ involvement, while the king did not represent so much of an apparent threat to the city in 280. Fabricius’ later involvement in punishing the garrison may also indicate he felt a personal responsibility due to his installation of it. Rhegium’s following importance in the war against Pyrrhus may have resulted in a shift in date to more explicitly link the garrisoning to the king. As such, Rhegium becomes part of Rome’s expansion in southern Italy alongside Thurii and other Greek cities. The garrison itself comprised 800 Campanians and 400 Sidicini allies.2 Decius himself was from a prominent Capuan family. The lack of a Roman officer is not surprising as allied units commanded by their own native officers are to be found elsewhere around this time, such as Oblacus Volsinius at the battle of Heraclea.3
Rhegium was the site of a raid mentioned by Diodorus, who says that 500 Roman soldiers were taken aboard a Carthaginian fleet with the intention of attacking Pyrrhus’ shipbuilding supplies at Rhegium. It is much more likely that this force used the city as a base from which to raid Pyrrhus’ Bruttian allies who were providing timber for ships.4 The king’s alliance with the Bruttians as well as his intention to bring the Greek cities of both Italy and Sicily made Rhegium particularly important. As such, the Romans and Carthaginians combined their forces in a joint operation.5 The Campanian garrison would have acted as a supporting force for this joint operation, and may even have been the source of the ‘500 Romans’. The fragment of Dio may be poorly preserved or an attempt to claim that the garrison was in opposition to the Romans rather than acting on their behalf.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 17