As with earlier battles, the numbers of casualties are unreliable. Pyrrhus’ dead are given as 23,000 or 33,000.52 Roman losses are not mentioned. More spectacularly, the Romans are said to have captured a number of elephants, which Curius then marched through Rome in his triumph. Thus the elephants become not only symbols of Roman fortitude, but also celebrated agents of Pyrrhus’ defeat in their own right.
Despite the claims of many sources, Beneventum was not a great victory for the Romans.53 They had won the day, but Pyrrhus still commanded significant military forces that he withdrew south towards Taras. Lentulus had been similarly successful in Lucania, although against a lesser force.54 Ideologically and strategically though, the battle was vitally important. Both consuls were given triumphs, Curius over King Pyrrhus and the Samnites, and Lentulus over the Samnites and Lucanians.55 For the Roman people, these celebrations were proof that they could in fact beat this man who had defeated Roman armies and marched within sight of the City. Furthermore, the Romans consolidated their control of the Calor River valley, securing the path to southern Italy via Samnium. At the same time, they had preempted any future attempts to invade Campania and Latium within the near future. Pyrrhus was put on the defensive again; he would have to protect his allies against Roman attacks rather than launch his own offensives.
The war without Pyrrhus
By 275, Pyrrhus had been fighting continuously in Italy and Sicily for five years. It was his growing problem in financing the war rather than the battle of Beneventum that saw the conflict wind down. The king had come to Italy with whatever wealth he brought from Epirus as well as resources provided by various Hellenistic kings who were eager to get rid of him for a time. Two years of fighting against the Romans had significantly drained his assets. His Sicilian expedition required monetary exactions from his allies. In Syracuse, he took unpopular actions in seizing property from members of the aristocratic class in order to construct the navy necessary to take Lilybaeum alongside his attempts to consolidate political control. On his return to Italy he famously looted the temple of Persephone in Locri, for which he faced divine retribution, which Diodorus says was to meet the demand for pay from his soldiers.56 Even before the abortive looting, Locri had been the location of one of Pyrrhus’ mints, and tablets survive from the sanctuary of Zeus there that indicate a disbursement of money ‘to the king’.57 Pyrrhus had been maintaining a force of 20,000–30,000 men in the field for years, including significant numbers of mercenaries, as well as garrison forces.
Significant changes can be seen in the coinage from Taras later in the war. Coins minted in the city display images associated with Pyrrhus, such as the head of Zeus, thunderbolts, Athena, and elephants on gold and silver coins. These issues also retained local Tarentine iconography such as references to the cult of the Dioscuri and dolphin imagery that indicates continued local autonomy underneath the king.58 The head of Zeus, Athena, and thunderbolts are reflective of the same iconography Pyrrhus used in Sicily on his silver coins there, suggesting that these coins should be dated to after his return to Italy. While the elephants were not used in any of his Sicilian coins, they would have been particularly relevant in Italy where they had played a significant part in his battles against the Romans and were a symbol of strength. Pyrrhus did not attempt to seize direct control as he had in Syracuse, but he still required substantial financial support from the Tarentines and left little doubt of his own authority.
Taras’ silver coins indicate the negative impact the war was having on the city’s economy, as those associated with Pyrrhus were devalued. Silver didrachms were reduced by about 16.5%.59 Similar weight reductions are found in the coins of Heraclea, Thurii, and Croton. By around 270, only Taras, and Heraclea to a lesser degree, continued to produce silver coins as both Croton and Thurii ceased to do so. It is impossible to date the devaluation of coinage in Magna Graecia precisely, but it was probably the result of the financial burdens supporting Pyrrhus’ war efforts. The silver of the Italiote Greeks was going into the pockets of Pyrrhus’ soldiers, creating a strain on their economies. These factors may have played into the hands of pro-Roman factions in Croton, Locri, and Heraclea, which had switched sides during Pyrrhus’ absence in Sicily. The heavy financial exactions may also have fed into the discontent Pyrrhus experienced in Taras. The resources Pyrrhus had hoped to tap for his goals in the Hellenistic east were being drained in drawn-out wars against the Romans and Carthaginians, slowly bankrupting the Italiote Greek cities.
According to Justin and Polyaenus, Pyrrhus attempted to gain reinforcements from Antigonus II Gonatas who was now king of Macedonia.60 Pyrrhus threatened that if he was not given support, he would be forced to return to mainland Greece instead of remaining in Italy. Antigonus refused. Polyaenus says that Pyrrhus then ordered for the opposite to be announced so that his wavering allies in Italy and Sicily would remain loyal in the belief that they had support from a wealthy new patron. But the situation was now crumbling in Italy as it had in Sicily and Pyrrhus decided to leave for Epirus. He certainly intended to maintain control of Taras itself, leaving a garrison under the command of his son Helenus and his trusted lieutenant Milo who had been in place since the king had gone to Sicily.61 Precisely when he sailed away is not mentioned, but early in 274 seems probable. He returned to Epirus with some 8,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, likely the same core of men he had taken to Sicily. What resources he was able to draw from the western Greeks moving forward could not have been much.
Whatever control Pyrrhus had maintained upon his departure from Sicily quickly disappeared in 275 as the island returned to its status quo. Without his presence, Syracuse fell back into stasis. The Syracusan army was apparently continuing the war against Carthage, operating out of Megane in the mountains of the eastern portions of the island. According to Polybius, the men of the army and the people of the city came into conflict.62 Hiero and Artemidorus were chosen to lead the army. Returning to the city, Hiero was able to use his personal connections to gain admittance and overcame those that opposed him. He then secured his rule by marrying into a powerful family, eliminating disaffected mercenaries in the city (perhaps linked to Pyrrhus’ time there), bringing in his own loyal mercenaries, and defeating the Mamertines in battle. Hiero was then named king of Syracuse and, in time, took the title of King of the Sicilians. In the turmoil, the Carthaginians once again took control of the portions of the island they had lost to Pyrrhus. The Mamertines continued to raid their neighbors. Pyrrhus’ departure first from Sicily and then Italy ensured that his dominion on the island disappeared.
With Pyrrhus gone from Italy, the Romans had the opportunity to go on the offensive in southern Italy again. What the consuls of 274 were doing is unclear as there is no surviving information on their activities.63 However, the next year saw the consul C. Claudius Canina campaign in southern Italy, earning a triumph over the Lucanians, Samnites, and probably Bruttians.64 In 272, both consuls (L. Papirius Cursor and Sp. Carvilius Maximus) earned triumphs over the Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tarentines.65 In the aftermath of Beneventum Roman attention was strongly focused on their southern Italian opponents. Without Pyrrhus’ presence they focused on finishing the war that had begun with the Samnites and Lucanians before even the Tarentines were involved. Their efforts, combined with the establishment of several colonies, put an end to any significant military activity from the southern Italian peoples until the arrival of Hannibal decades later. A Samnite named Lollius attempted to renew the war against the Romans in 269, but his efforts were brought to a swift end.66 In the early 260s, campaigns followed that penetrated Calabria, with several triumphs over the Sallentini and Messappians, and Bruttium.67
Taras, despite its central role in the Pyrrhic War, was left alone for a time. Perhaps the Romans feared an attack on the Epirote garrison there would draw the king back, especially since Helenus was present for a time. But that situation changed in 272. In that year Helenus was with his father during his assault on Argos; when h
e left Italy is not mentioned. But in the time since Pyrrhus’ own departure from Taras, political turmoil had drastically increased between the factions of the city. Zonaras says that a group of Tarentines, led by one Nico, who had been injured by Milo, attempted to oust the garrison commander from the citadel.68 Having failed in their efforts, the hostile faction of Tarentines took control of a nearby fortress and continued to raid the city’s environs. Their efforts were no doubt aided by friendly contacts that had remained, resulting in a difficult situation for Pyrrhus’ men. Perhaps this was Helenus’ motivation to join his father, leaving Milo alone in command.
The narrative of Taras’ fall is as convoluted as its role in the outbreak of the war nearly ten years earlier. L. Papirius Cursor and Sp. Carvilius Maximus, the consuls in 272, were both fighting across the breadth of southern Italy, which would involve the final attack on Taras. Exactly what transpired to elicit the Roman action is unclear. Some among the Tarentine rebels would have been pro-Roman and perhaps had some personal connections, as had Agis in 281/280, who could have reached out to the Romans. Helenus had left the city by this point. In addition, in the summer of 272 Pyrrhus met his end in Argos. Whether the consuls undertook action before or after learning of the king’s death is unclear, but the political infighting in Taras opened the door for Roman intervention. The consuls, with Cursor in the lead, used similar multi-pronged military and diplomatic tactics as their successors nearly ten years prior.
The attack on Taras would also involve the Carthaginians. According to Zonaras, the people of Taras were resentful at Milo as well as the rebels outside the city and, upon hearing of Pyrrhus’ death, called for help from Carthage.69 The Carthaginians sent a fleet that blockaded the garrison in the citadel while the Romans attacked from land. Milo still controlled the citadel of Taras, but he was in an untenable position. He decided to negotiate with Cursor and the Romans. Zonaras says Milo’s motivation was the twin attacks of the Romans and Carthaginians combined with the hostility of the population generally, while Frontinus says that he tricked the Tarentines into sending him as an ambassador and betrayed the city in return for his own safety.70 Frontinus seems to be simplifying the situation as an example of the betrayal of cities, which is reinforced by the complete absence of the Carthaginians. The Romans were taking advantage of internal political strife, the news of Pyrrhus’ death, and the presence of the Carthaginian fleet to drive the garrison out. In exchange for safe passage, Milo surrendered the citadel to the Romans and withdrew back to Epirus with his men. Turning the citadel over to the Romans may be the treachery at the heart of Frontinus’ version of events, as many people in Taras were very much anti-Roman still. Regardless, Taras and the last vestiges of Pyrrhus’ presence in Italy had fallen to the Romans.
With the fall of Taras, whatever cities were not already allied with Rome quickly sent ambassadors. The people of Locri, who had joined Pyrrhus twice and produced coins for his war effort, found it expedient to emphasize their fidelity to Rome. The city issued a new series of coins that showed the goddess Roma crowned with πίστις (‘faith’, cf. Latin fides).71 It would seem that the Romans were willing to accept these assertions of loyalty, no doubt in conjunction with the strengthening of pro-Roman local leadership. The Italiote Greeks were useful allies; they were wealthy, connected with the trade networks of the Mediterranean, and strategically located in relation to Samnium and Lucania. For the Greeks themselves, Roman hegemony was at this point an inevitability. At least until some other potential savior made an appearance.
Notes
1 DH 20.4–5; App. Samn. 9.1–3; Plb. 1.7; Dio fr. 40.7–12; Zon. 8.6; DS 22.1.2; Livy Per. 12; Oros. Hist. 4.3.4–6.
2 DH 20.4. The Sidicini inhabited the northern edge of the Campanian plain. Polybius (1.7.1) gives a number of 4,000, which roughly coincides with the 4,500 men executed after Dionysius’ fictitious second uprising (20.16), see below. The specificity of Dionysius’ description for the size of the initial garrison (20.4), particularly mention of the Sidicini, suggests a basis in historical knowledge, while the numbers of Polybius may be a generalization of a legion-sized group or perhaps the total number was increased over time, contra Beloch (1922–1927) 4.2:484. Livy (Per. 12, cf. 28.28.3; Oros. Hist. 4.3.3) calls the men under Decius a legio Campana implying 4,000–5,000 men, but again is being used in a generic sense, Walbank (1957–1971) 1:53. The legal status of the Campanians as cives sine suffragio is unclear in its military and political nature, Frederiksen (1984) 224; Mouritsen (2007). Decius is described variously as a χιλίαρχος (DH 20.4), φρουράρχος (Plb. 1.7.1), and praefectus (Livy Per. 12).
3 Other examples include Herius Poltilius who led a group of Samnites to serve as rowers in Roman fleets in the First Punic War (Zon. 8.11; cf. Oros. Hist. 4.7.12), and Numerius Decimius who joined the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus with 8,500 Samnites in the Second Punic War (Livy 22.24.11–14). No praefecti sociorum, Roman officers who commanded allied contingents in later armies, are mentioned before the Second Punic Wars.
4 DS 22.7.5; Beloch (1922–1927) 4.2:479–485; Lévêque (1957) 419–20; contra Lefkowitz (1959) 156 who suggest that the target was the rebellious garrison of Campanians in Rhegium.
5 This is the most commonly accepted reading, Beloch (1922–1927) 4.2:479–485; de Sanctis (1956–1964) 2:407; Wuilleumier (1939) 131; Lévêque (1957) 419–20. Hoyos (1984) 432–434, argues that the raid must have been solely a Carthaginian enterprise based on his reading of the Roman-Carthaginian treaty’s Pyrrhus clauses and the apparent origin of the fleet from Sicily as opposed to Italy. However, the Rhegium garrison itself may be the source of the Roman contingents. Huss (1985) 212 suggests that the Romans would not have allowed such an operation on the peninsula without their involvement, but this accepts the anachronistic Roman claims to dominion over all of Italy and discounts the provisions of previous Roman-Carthaginian treaties that allowed such activities.
6 ἔχει δὲ λόγον ἀμφότερα, DH 20.4.6.
7 Livy Per. 15; cf. Oros. Hist. 4.3.5; Dio fr. 40.12; Plb. 1.7.9; Zon. 8.6.
8 Dionysius (20.16) and Orosius (Hist. 4.3.4–6) claim the consul C. Genucius Clepsina took Rhegium, but it is the other consul of 270, Cn. Cornelius Blasio, who is recorded as celebrating a triumph over the city, Degrassi (1954) 99. It is possible that both were involved, as seems suggested by Polybius (1.7.8–13).
9 Zon. 8.6; Paus. 6.3.12; Walbank (1957–1971) 1:53.
10 Zon. 8.5; Justin 18.2.12; App. Samn. 12.1; Wuilleumier (1939) 131.
11 Plut. Pyrr. 22.3; cf. Paus. 1.12.5; Brauer (1986) 166, n. 22, contra Lévêque (1957) 420–422.
12 MRR 1:194. They would also serve together as censors in 275.
13 Frontinus (Str. 1.4.1) says that Aemilius was ambushed by a Tarentine naval squadron while marching along the coast in Lucania. The circumstances suggest this took place on the southern coast of Magna Graecia, which may have happened in this year or in 282.
14 Degrassi (1954) 98; Lévêque (1957) 510; Weuilleumier (1968) 131–132.
15 Cic. Balb. 22; Arch. 6; Brauer (1986) 153; de Sanctis (1956–1964) 2:411. Lévêque (1957) 510 doubts Cicero, who he interprets as being unsure. Dating the treaty to Fabricius’ consulship in 282 is very problematic, Weuilleumier (1968) 132. However, Weuilleumier’s own suggestion of a confusion of Fabricius for Fabius, consul in 273, alongside Beloch’s (1926) 464 that the treaty was formed in 272 in connection to the fall of Taras, contradicts Cicero’s statement that the treaty was made while Pyrrhus was in Italy.
16 MRR 1:194–95.
17 Zon. 8.6. Lévêque (1957) 510–512 and Beloch (1922–1927) 4.1:555 argue that Zonaras’ narrative should be largely rejected as unreliable.
18 For a discussion of these forts in general, see Oakley (1995).
19 Salmon (1967) 285.
20 Degrassi (1954) 98.
21 De Sanctis (1956–1964) 2:391–411; Walbank (1957–1971) 2:332; contra Weuilleumier (1968) 132; Beloch (1926) 465; Lévêque (1957) 511–5
12.
22 Front. Str. 3.6.4.
23 MRR 1:196; see Epilogue.
24 Degrassi (1954) 98; Zon. 8.6.
25 Oros. Hist. 4.2.2; August. De Civ. D. 3.17. The severity of the disease is exaggerated as a means of demonstrating the superiority of the Christian god over those of the pagans.
26 Justin 23.3.5.
27 App. Samn. 12.1.
28 Plut. Pyrr. 24.1; App. Samn. 12.1; DS 27.4.3; Zon. 8.6. Appian exaggerates the scale of this defeat by insisting that Pyrrhus lost all but 12 ships, but it seems to have little to any impact on his campaign as a whole, Lévêque (1957) 514–515.
29 Zon. 8.6; Plut. Pyrr. 24.
30 Zon. 8.6; cf. App. Samn. 12.1.
31 DH 20.9–10; App. Samn. 12; DS 27.4.3; Dio fr. 40.48; Zon. 8.6; DVI 35.9; Lévêque (1957) 499–501.
32 ἐπισκώψας τὴν ἄκαιρον θεσέβειαν εἶναι δεισιδαιμονίαν, τὸ δὲ σθλλέξαι πλοῦτον ἄπονον εὐβοθλίαν, App. Samn. 12.1.
33 The reality of the shipwreck has been doubted as a later invention of divine wrath, Wuilleumier (1939) 135.
34 Diod, 27.4; Livy 29.6–9, 16–22; MRR 1:304. Livy’s account is much more detailed than Diodorus’ and enumerates far more crimes on the part of Pleminius that went unpunished by Scipio, which fits his broad emphasis of the divine, Levene (2010) 344–347.
35 Livy 42.3. The Senate ordered the tiles returned, but Flaccus did not bother to actually put them back in place on the roof.
36 Green (1991) 324–325, 452–453.
37 Zon. 8.6. Zonaras is the only surviving source that gives the man’s name, Nicias.
38 Dio fr. 40.47; Zon. 8.6.
39 A Latin colony was founded on the site in 268. Maleventum had a negative connotation in Latin, eliciting the name change, Plin. Nat. 3.42; Livy 9.27.14; Salmon (1970) 63.
40 Livy Per. 14.
A History of the Pyrrhic War Page 20