by Red Pine
107 Although Mahamati realizes attachment to the existence or nonexistence of something is a delusion, he wonders if “higher reality” is not another delusion and if those not aware of it are thus not deluded. He repeats this view in the lines that follow.
108 Unaware of the existence of something, they are not deluded. Unaware of what transcends existence and nonexistence, they are not not deluded.
109 That is, if projections are inherently false, how do we discriminate what is real?
110 The Sanskrit is vivikta (separation/detachment), which is used here, and in Section LXXVII, as equivalent to nirvana. By the “nonexistence of detachment,” Mahamati wonders whether detachment is equivalent to nothingness.
111 Section LXX. The Buddha continues to develop the point with which he closed the previous section. Talking about what is real burns the mouth. To say anything at all is to ask for trouble. Fortunately, the Buddha has a mouth made of asbestos. In this case, he uses one of his own teachings as an example: “whatever exists does not arise.” Like any teaching of the Buddha, it was not meant as a proposition but as an expedient means to help those attached to existence or nonexistence. Also, it only works if it is applied to everything, including the proposition itself.
112 Without a sufficient reason a proposition cannot be established. Hence, every proposition depends on a reason. Thus to establish the proposition, the reason would have to “arise.”
113 In this case, that “something” is the statement of the proposition.
114 The use of the five-part syllogism, consisting of proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion, was common to a number of schools of logic in ancient India. Buddhist texts list thirty-three errors inherent in the use of such syllogisms.
115 The standard example is water, which fish see as we do air, which hungry ghosts see as fire, and which devas see as aquamarine.
116 Left unsaid here is what to teach to those fearful of the teaching of the illusory nature of imagined reality. The teaching used for the fearful is “the personal realization of buddha knowledge,” which was dealt with in the previous section.
117 Although the translations of Gunabhadra and Shikshananda are in agreement, Bodhiruchi and the Sanskrit have “no repository consciousness” in the second line. This series represents the denials of other paths. But if such claims were true, those making them would have to be nonexistent themselves.
118 The three liberations are emptiness, formlessness, and intentionlessness.
119 All three Chinese translations render this verse in six lines, as does the Sanskrit.
120 Section LXXI. If opening one’s mouth only leads to trouble, what about one’s eyes and ears? How do we obtain knowledge? And what are the obstacles? Mahamati still thinks of knowledge as something we obtain from an external world and still does not grasp that whatever we might know is a perception of our own mind. It turns out no knowledge is knowledge. Who would have guessed?
121 The Sanskrit for “knowable” is jneya, which Gunabhadra transcribes: er-yen.
122 Namely, views that equate the absence of knowledge with no knowledge.
123 Section LXXII. The reason Mahamati is still attached to external existence is because he has not yet experienced the personal realization of the knowledge of a buddha. Hence, the Buddha repeats his earlier mention of the way of attainment (which Suzuki translates “self-realization”) and the way of instruction, which he dealt with earlier in Section LXIII. The way of instruction is for external knowledge, and the way of attainment is for knowledge that is neither external nor internal.
124 The Sanskrit is nrtyat. Normally, the term means “to dance.” But it also means “to turn around,” which is how Gunabhadra translated it (hui-chuan). However, Shikshananda chose huan-huo (to be mystified), which I think comes closer to what is meant here.
125 Again, the fourfold tetralemma: it exists, it does not exist, it exists and does not exist, it neither exists nor does not exist.
126 The past, the present, and the future.
127 Section LXXIII. Mahamati wonders if the way of instruction does not include other philosophies, such as materialism. But not only do materialists confuse ordinary people, they also use their “way of instruction” to confuse the gods. The Buddha redirects Mahamati to the “way of attainment,” which he also calls the “way of personal understanding,” which, ironically, is too empirical for materialists, as it alone is based on one’s own experience.
128 The Sanskrit for “materialist” is lokayata. This term included all those whose approach to knowledge was based on knowledge gained from the five senses.
129 The Sanskrit is amisha (flesh, object of enjoyment). Gunabhadra has simply t’u (desire/lust). In this case, I’ve turned to the Sanskrit.
130 The Sanskrit for this expression is sva-naya, or literally, “one’s own way,” which refers to the “way of attainment” of the previous section.
131 Shakra, also known as Indra, was chief of the gods and himself an expositor of Buddhist doctrine.
132 The Chinese translations all have lung (dragon), but the Sanskrit text has naga (serpent). A multiheaded, multihooded cobra was a standard conception in ancient Indian mythology with the snake, of course, representing the guardian of knowledge.
133 Different sutras outline different time spans for the age in which the Dharma flourishes and in which it can be understood. The most common conception outlines four such periods of five hundred years, after which people will no longer understand the Dharma, or if they do, it will only be with the greatest difficulty and in the most superficial manner.
134 This is a catchall phrase for the underlying duality in the teachings of materialists concerning change.
135 The threefold gate of liberation is marked by emptiness, formlessness, and effortlessness (or intentionlessness). In his commentary, T’ung-jun notes, “The stance of those who understand the way of truth of self-existence is firm. They teach materialism all day, yet it is not materialism. Meanwhile, the stance of those who don’t understand is unstable. They teach what is not materialism all day, yet it turns out to be materialism.”
136 Brahmans are the priests and chief functionaries of the various Hindu traditions. The name comes from Brahma, the creator of the universe. The text here presents this Brahman as arrogant and disdainful, with no respect for the Buddha’s teaching. Although a “materialist Brahman” sounds like a contradiction, there were materialists sects among Hindus.
137 These three were considered asamskrita (uncreated) dharmas in the abhidharma of some sects, though not all included nirvana. If uncreated dharmas are like this, how much more so those that are created.
138 This refers to an existence between one life and the next.
139 These represent the views of the world as functioning either according to causes or not according to causes—in short, according to a deity.
140 This is a comment on the three uncreated dharmas, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. At the end of this paragraph, Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit add: “How much more so teachings about whether they are created or uncreated.”
141 At this point, the Sanskrit text inserts a paragraph about a conversation with the serpent king of Chapter One.
142 These ten vows are listed in a note to Section LXVIII.
143 Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit begin this series with another verse that clearly does not belong and must have come from somewhere else: “Beings are attracted by training (meditation) / morality ends their evil deeds / wisdom their mistaken views / which lead to liberation.”
144 Section LXXIV The previous section talked about the cause of the world according to materialists. This section talks about liberation from the world, or nirvana. Nirvana was seen by Hinayana Buddhists as the final and complete annihilation of both body and mind, while Mahayana Buddhists see it as the final and complete transformation of the bifurcating/bifurcated mind. In addition to Buddhists, other paths had their own
views of this form of ultimate liberation, and in this section the Buddha lists more than twenty of them.
145 This paragraph lists different versions of the view of nirvana held by most Hinayana Buddhists; namely, it is the end of something.
146 Bodhiruchi and Shikshananda add pu (not) here (“For some, not seeing permanence and impermanence is nirvana”), and this is supported by the Sanskrit. However, in support of Gunabhadra’s version, T’ung-jen notes that this was, in fact, the view of followers of the Rudra-Shiva sect.
147 Again, Gunabhadra omits pu (non-destruction), but it is present in Bodhiruchi and Shikshananda, who simply repeat their rendering of the previous view.
148 Purusha is viewed by many early Hindu sects as creating the world out of his body.
149 According to this view, which is interpreted differently by the different commentators, the tendencies (gunas) are permanent and combine to form objects of sensation, which are impermanent.
150 The last part of this sentence is also handled differently by Bodhiruchi: “the end of affliction is due to wisdom” and Shikshananda: “the end of affliction is not due to wisdom.”
151 Brahma and Shiva are the standard examples of such a power.
152 As noted earlier, the three tendencies (gunas) of creation, stasis, and destruction were considered the forces or building blocks of reality by the Samkhyas.
153 According to the Samkhyas, the primordial darkness gives rise to awareness, which gives rise to the sense of self, which gives rise to the five subtle elements, which give rise to the five gross elements, which give rise to the eleven bases of sensation, which altogether is twenty-five realities.
154 According to the Vaisheshikas, the six included substance (dravya), tendency (guna), action (karma), sameness (samanya), difference (vishesha), and combination (samavaya).
155 For the last few lines, Bodhiruchi has: “There are followers of still other paths who say distinguishing something that exists, or something that doesn’t exist, or something that exists and does not exist is nirvana.” Shikshananda has: “Some imagine something that exists or does not exist is nirvana, while others imagine nirvana as no difference between nirvana or anything else.” The Sanskrit agrees with Shikshananda.
156 These pairs include no self among beings or things, the afflictions of the senses and what arises from them, the obstructions of passion and knowledge, and karmic and transformation death.
157 Pain resulting from direct causes, from deprivation and from impermanence. Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit all have “words give rise to the three realms.”
158 In this metaphor, the world is likened to the image and the mind to the mirror. To know which is which is to know the mind and the world. For the first line, Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit have variations of “who doesn’t know what they perceive is only mind.” Likewise, for the third line, they all have “who knows it is only mind.” The readings of lines two and four are the same in all versions.
159 Section LXXV. In the previous section, the Buddha moves away from the traditional view of nirvana as the end of something to the later view that it is marked by the presence of something, namely enlightenment. Hence, Mahamati asks about enlightenment. But in defining enlightenment, the Buddha avoids any of the major dualities: it is neither different nor not different from the skandhas, from liberation, or from wisdom.
160 In place of yu (want), Bodhiruchi and Shikshananda have variations of “accept.” The reason for such a reaction by buddhas is that if any result were tantamount to buddhahood, this would sever the relationship between practice and attainment.
161 In the Samyuktagama, the Buddha asks the ascetic Shrenika Vatsagotra if the Tathagata is the same as the skandhas, and Shrenika says, “No, Bhagavan.” Again the Buddha asks if the Tathagata is separate from the skandhas, and again Shrenika answers, “No, Bhagavan.” The Buddha then asks if the Tathagata is inside the skandhas. Again Shrenika answers, “No, Bhagavan.” The Buddha then asks if the skandhas are inside the Tathagata. Once more Shrenika says, “No, Bhagavan.” Finally the Buddha asks if the Tathagata is not the skandhas, to which Shrenika answers, “No, Bhagavan.” (105) Likewise, in the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines, the Buddha says that enlightenment is neither inside the skandhas nor outside them, nor both inside and outside them, nor other than the skandhas. (1/9) Two horns one bull.
162 This repetition of the initial pair is only present in Gunabhadra.
163 In this and the following sentence, Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit all have “like space” instead of “essentially nirvana.”
164 In this series of verses, as in the foregoing text, the third person singular refers to enlightenment, the subject about which Mahamati asked.
165 This refers to the twelve nidanas, or links, that make up the chain of dependent origination that begins with ignorance and memory and ends with old age and death.
166 For this line, Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit have variations of “it isn’t the skandhas and not not the skandhas.”
167 Section LXXVI. Mahamati inquires further into the nature of a tathagata. Previously he was told to let go of appearances. Now it is names. Here, he focuses on one particular name used to describe and refer to a tathagata but misunderstands it, thinking “what neither arises nor ceases” must necessarily refer to nothing (meaning) or something (words). The Buddha reminds him not to focus on words but on meaning and that meaning is neither a nothing nor a something.
168 The Sanskrit is anirodha-anutpada.
169 Implicit in Mahamati’s question is the suspicion that the Buddha’s statements are contradictory. If “what neither arises nor ceases” refers to nothing, this is tantamount to nihilism; if it refers to something, such as a name, it is tantamount to eternalism.
170 Gunabhadra’s is the only translation that includes this statement. It is because nothing arises that there is no “something,” and it is because nothing ceases, there is no “nothing.”
171 The projection bodies of a buddha are also mentioned in sections XXX, LII, and LVII. Of the three types of projection bodies mentioned, this is the third type, which is able to teach the Dharma.
172 Indra is chief of the gods and is also known as Shakra and Purandara.
173 The water represents the minds of all beings, and the moon is the body of the Tathagata.
174 This is a difficult sentence and is variously interpreted by Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and Suzuki. I’ve followed Gunabhadra who understands this as confronting the problem of a meaning that transcends words.
175 The reasoning here is that such beings are still dependent on the way of instruction and not yet ready for the way of attainment. Language is for those in need of instruction, no language is for those ready to see for themselves.
176 There are different lists of these powers, but the most typical is the one that includes a knowledge or mastery of right and wrong, karma, meditation, the senses, desires, natures, directions, past lives, divine sight, and passionlessness.
177 Gunabhadra has “foolish person,” but in this case I’ve followed Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit.
178 Gunabhadra and Shikshananda have the infant going mad. Certainly feeding a child uncooked rice would not make it happy, but mad, as in crazy? I’ve turned to Bodhiruchi in this case.
179 Only Gunabhadra has this sentence.
180 Section LXXVII. Mahamati continues his inquiry and wonders if the Buddha’s teaching of what neither arises nor ceases differs from that of other schools. The Buddha tells him that despite their usage of similar expressions, there is always something behind the words of other schools, while he uses this term because everything is illusory and neither arises nor ceases. What seems to arise or cease are nothing but the perceptions of one’s own mind.
181 At the beginning of Chapter One and Chapter Two, Mahamati also rises by the Buddha’s power to ask his questions. It’s been awhile, but the sutra reminds us that
it is really a dialogue engineered by the Buddha to question himself. Then, too, Mahamati asks questions he might not normally ask and represents the views of others who might have such doubts in the future.
182 The causes are listed at the end of the next paragraph.
183 The Sanskrit is apratisamkhya-nirodha. This is one of the two types of cessation recognized by the Sarvastivadins and one of the six uncreated dharmas of the Yogacarins. This refers to the cessation of whatever gives rise to suffering not as the result of analysis and understanding, but simply as the result of fortuitous circumstances. Hence, it is temporary.
184 Not mentioned here are: time, direction, space and Brahma.
185 This probably refers to a creator god, such as Brahma, who does not arise or change. Or it could refer to death. All three Chinese translations have bien (changing) here, instead of the usual mieh (ceasing).
186 That is, they seem not to be false.
187 The Sanskrit is avivikta-darshana, which is similar to avivikta-drishti, both of which mean “to not see clearly/distinctly.”
188 Section LXXVIII. This section denies doctrines of arising, establishes the truth of non-arising, and treats doctrines of other paths claiming non-arising and non-cessation as projections and as just more versions of arising. There is considerable variation among the translations for this section. As elsewhere, I’ve followed Gunabhadra, unless otherwise noted.
189 For this line, Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit have “I teach the truth of ‘no cause’ (abetu-vada).”
190 I’ve followed Bodhiruchi, Shikshananda, and the Sanskrit for this line, which is not clear in Gunabhadra.
191 This verse is rendered in six lines by all versions.
192 Another verse rendered by all versions in six lines. Only Gunabhadra has chih-jan (bright light).
193 Bodhiruchi omits most of this. Shikshananda has this verse in four lines. Gunabhadra renders it in six lines, which I’ve summarized in four.