Yet it was in fact Hitler himself who had caused the ‘unification’ of the Protestant Church to escalate to the point where strong opposition forced him publicly to admit the failure of his policy, to abandon the Müller/Jäger partnership that he had supported, and in effect to apologize to the bishops opposing his policy. This was caused by his inadequate understanding of the actual power relationships in the Protestant Church, by his indecisive attitude towards Müller and Jäger, and finally by his indecision about whether he should create a strong Reich Church by intervening in Church policy or whether he should not rather be guided by his radical anti-Christian views and aim to weaken the Churches. That would have fitted in with the slogan he produced in August 1933: ‘We shall become a Church.’
A crisis of confidence and a show of loyalty
The conflicts over the ‘Reich Church’ had damaged Hitler’s reputation, showing him to be anything but an omnipotent ‘Führer’, including in circles that were not directly affected by the constitution of the Protestant Church. For these people had taken precise note of his ultimately fruitless dithering between his supposed neutrality in these matters and his radical impulses. Although the concerns discussed above about economic developments became less acute towards the end of the year (fears of what the winter might bring proved in the event illusory), they were replaced by other sources of discontent. Thus the ‘purge’ that had taken place on 30 June had not removed from public consciousness the problems caused by the arrogant bearing of Party functionaries and their over-zealous methods. On the contrary, criticism of individual functionaries as ‘bigwigs’ was now increasingly being applied to the whole ‘movement’. Moreover, during the final months of 1934 tensions between the armed forces and the Party were growing. The establishment in the autumn of 1934 of an armed SS unit, which was Hitler’s way of recognizing the key role played by the SS on 30 June 1934, was inevitably regarded by the military as a breach of Hitler’s assurance that the army was ‘the nation’s sole bearer of arms’. In the end they had to put up with the SS’s plans to set up an SS division equipped for military combat, but they attempted through tough negotiating to delay it. At the same time, criticism of the military was being voiced in Party circles, because it was unwilling to submit to the Party’s claim to total power. From the standpoint of the Party machine, the regime’s plan to introduce conscription was a reason to fear a further increase in the armed forces’ influence, and since the autumn of 1934 this conflict of interests had led to frequent clashes between forces’ personnel and members of Nazi organizations. Rumours circulated of plans for a military putsch or of a ‘major move’ by the SS and appeared in the foreign press.49 Adding to the confusion was the fact that between the end of November and the middle of December Hitler reduced the frequency of his public appearances, causing speculation about an assassination attempt.50 An official statement issued on 27 November, contradicting rumours spread by foreign newspapers about Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief Werner von Fritsch, and Walter von Reichenau (effectively the Chief of the General Staff ), and also denying reports of tensions between Goebbels and the army, inevitably seemed to any newspaper reader who had learned to read between the lines to be a positive confirmation of those assertions.51
On 1 December in a speech in Rheinhausen Göring felt obliged to warn about ‘traitors’ who were trying ‘to undermine the nation’s confidence in the Führer’. The announcement two days later of the dismissal of the Gauleiter of Silesia, Helmuth Brückner, for ‘behaviour damaging to the Party’ and the following day of Gottfried Feder, state secretary in the Ministry of Economics (the ‘economic theorist’ of the Party since its earliest days was totally unacceptable to Schacht, the new Minister for Economics), did nothing to calm the situation, in particular because in both cases no details about the reasons for the dismissals were given.52 Well-informed readers of the Völkischer Beobachter might well ask themselves why Defence Minister Blomberg thought it necessary to use an interview printed on 27 December in the main Party organ to declare once again his ‘complete agreement’ with Lutze, chief of staff of the SA, about the armed forces’ role as ‘the nation’s bearer of arms’.53
It was evident that the regime was facing a situation in which it was losing control of public opinion. Local incidents, actual and manufactured conflicts, planned intrigues, general discontents, cryptic news reports about the dismissal of functionaries, fears and rumours, vague and yet significant denials, and defiant posturing all went into the pot to produce a negative mood. Added to the general nervousness was the widespread fear among the population that, as on 30 June 1934, the regime might be working up to a shock move that would solve the accumulated problems by violent means.
This situation of diverse and conflicting interests was precarious not least because at the end of 1934 a further major event, the consequences of which were impossible to discern, cast a long shadow. On 13 January 1935 in the Saar region a referendum was due to take place on whether in future the disputed territory, which under the Versailles treaty was subject to the League of Nations, should be part of Germany or France or should finally be given its independence. After the failure of the Austrian putsch, the Reich’s international situation was in any case extremely tense. For many people the imminent referendum raised the spectre of an armed conflict with France and there were signs of a developing ‘war psychosis’.54 The regime intervened massively in the referendum campaign, and with Reich support the Nazi ‘German Front’ succeeded in taking almost complete control of the campaign in the region, with its population of 800,000, and in largely neutralizing the Unity Front (consisting for the most part of SPD, KPD, and parts of the Centre), which was advocating independence for the Saar region. At the same time mass demonstrations in support of the annexation of the Saar region took place in south-west Germany. The initial climax was a mass rally at Ehrenbreitstein in Koblenz; on 26 August 1934 Hitler spoke there to a crowd of 200,000, more than half of whom had been transported specially for the occasion from the Saar.55
The uncertain situation prompted the regime to hold a surprise ‘rally of German leaders’ at the Berlin State Opera House ten days before the vote.56 Cabinet ministers, Gauleiters and Reichsleiters,* along with other top Party functionaries and military leaders took part. Speaking about the coming vote in his address, Hitler went ‘into detail about the flood of lies’ that had again been ‘unleashed of late against the Reich’ and appealed to the unity of the nation in its ‘indissoluble solidarity in sharing one destiny’. Demonstrations of loyalty from Göring and Hess rounded off the noteworthy occasion.57 All the same, Hitler was still worried, as he confided to Goebbels: ‘After the Saar Paris will keep trying to blackmail us. 1935 will be a difficult year. We shall have to keep our nerve.’58
By any sober assessment, two years after the ‘seizure of power’ the regime was at a low ebb. Hitler’s plan to reset the domestic political agenda in line with his own thinking by means of the shock tactic of 30 June 1934 had failed. Foreign policy developments in the following months were, however, to push the deep-rooted domestic problems into the background.
* Translators’ note: The title ‘Reichsleiter’, lit. Reich Head was rather arbitrarily given to a number of top Party functionaries in charge of various departments.
18
Initial Foreign Policy Successes
On 13 January 1935 Hitler could chalk up one important success on the way to revising the post-war order, for on that day almost 91 per cent of those eligible to vote voted for the Saar territory to be annexed to the German Reich.1 On the Tuesday after the referendum, when the results of the voting were known, Goebbels organized extravagant celebrations all over the Reich at which the population had to gather in ‘large and spontaneous [sic!] demonstrations on the occasion of the Saar election victory’.2 This victory was not, however, a sign of confidence in the regime, as the propaganda chief wished to persuade everyone, but rather reflected above all the population’s own sense of which nation they
belonged to and their desire to put the Treaty of Versailles behind them. For most natives of the Saar region it was unthinkable to be annexed to France, even for the Catholics and members of left-wing parties, and any future as an independent entity promised to be politically unstable and economically uncertain. Blatant National Socialist election propaganda during the campaign had played its part in convincing people in the end that reintegration with Germany was the only viable option. As he had already assured the French in talks in the run-up to the vote, Hitler also stated in a radio broadcast to the German people in the evening on 13 January that ‘the German Reich will make no further territorial demands on France’. In the days following he was to repeat this declaration emphatically in press interviews with foreign journalists.3
Hitler attached great expectations to the victory in the Saar. On 20 January he discussed foreign policy with Goebbels, who noted: ‘Far-reaching project regarding England. Protection of Empire, in return alliance for 30 years. Still developing. He’s very taken up with it. . . . Poland is firmly on our side. France and England are getting ready to blackmail us. But we’ll not give way.’ As Goebbels noted the day after the previous lunchtime conversation, ‘Foreign policy and armaments are still the main problems today. We must get more power. Everything else will fall into place.’4
Because of the Saar referendum the Geneva disarmament talks had been suspended in November 1934. Now France and Britain made new efforts to get negotiations moving again. On 3 February 1935 both governments put forward a proposal to replace the disarmament terms of the Treaty of Versailles with an international arms agreement and to initiate a defence pact to counter air attacks. The Reich government’s response was broadly positive and it suggested talks with representatives of the British government.5 The Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon and Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden were invited to Berlin for 7 March. When, however, at the beginning of March the British government published a White Paper naming German rearmament as the reason for increasing British military expenditure, Hitler cancelled the talks at short notice, giving as an excuse that he was recovering from a throat infection.6
According to official reports, Hitler had caught a cold on 1 March at the extensive ‘liberation celebrations’ that had taken place to mark the official return of the Saar to the Reich by the League of Nations. On a day of persistent rain in Saarbrücken he had attended a march-past of Party formations, police units, and his personal bodyguard and made a speech in the town hall square in which he again called on the French to maintain peace.7 Hitler then went to Berchtesgaden for a week to recover, after which he spent a few days taking a cure in Wiesbaden. Hitler’s persistent cold was in fact more than just a diplomatically motivated indisposition. On 23 May he had to undergo an operation. The real cause of the hoarseness he had suffered from in recent months was a polyp, which was removed from his right vocal cord. The postponement of the British politicians’ visit was, however, due above all to the fact that Hitler had been planning two ‘surprises’ ahead of it: the official announcement of the existence of a German air force and the introduction of conscription, both decisions that he wanted finally settled before beginning talks with the high-ranking British delegation.8
Since February there had been agreement between Hitler and the military leadership to stop concealing the expansion of the air force. They now judged that the new arm could be used to strengthen the Reich’s hand in foreign policy. On 26 February the cabinet approved a secret Führer decree prepared by Göring about Reich aviation and justifying an air force as a third branch of the Wehrmacht;9 on 10 March in an interview for the Daily Mail Göring officially announced the existence of a new German air force.10 Only a few days later, on 14 March, Hitler surprised his army adjutant Friedrich Hossbach by telling him he intended to introduce conscription very soon. The timing seemed right, he said, for the next day the French National Assembly would increase military service from one year to two and this would serve as the perfect pretext for German ‘counter-measures’. When Hitler asked how large the leaders of the military were aiming to make the army, Hossbach gave the figure of thirty-six divisions, although in fact, according to their internal discussions, they were not aiming to achieve this for several years. Hitler, however, seized on Hossbach’s figure without further consultation with military leaders and officially established thirty-six as the number of divisions the German army should be aiming to create.11
At first Blomberg, the Minister of Defence, and Werner von Fritsch, the head of the army high command, were doubtful about the wisdom of this rapid expansion, and Blomberg is reported to have made this clear on the evening of 15 March at a meeting chaired by Hitler of a number of cabinet colleagues. Yet the very next day both Blomberg and Fritsch withdrew their objections after personal interviews with Hitler,12 for in the final analysis the introduction of conscription was a prerequisite for the generals’ plans to enlarge the army.13 The official decision was made at a cabinet meeting on 16 March, at which Blomberg got so carried away that he called for three ‘Heil Hitlers’.14 The next day at the ceremonies to mark ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’, as the National Day of Mourning had been officially renamed the previous year,15 Blomberg took the opportunity of his speech in the Berlin State Opera House to assure his audience that Germany would now once more be able to ‘take its rightful place among the nations’. Still prevented by hoarseness from speaking in public, Hitler observed proceedings from the royal box, after which he took the salute at a military parade in Unter den Linden.16
On 18 March, a Saturday afternoon, Hitler received the ambassadors of France, Britain, Italy, and Poland and told them of the Reich government’s decision.17 The British ambassador asked whether the Germans were still willing to attend the talks agreed in the communiqué of 3 February, and, when Neurath said they were, gave an assurance that the British ministers’ visit would go ahead. This response gave a clear indication to the Germans that they need fear no political backlash from Britain. The same day Hitler announced his decision to the German nation in a lengthy declaration.18 At the talks that Simon and Eden held as planned with Hitler on 25 and 26 March they realized that he could not be persuaded to commit to anything binding regarding Germany’s possible participation in international agreements or arms limitations.19 During the two days of negotiations Eden found Hitler’s manner ‘decidedly more authoritative’ than at their first meeting more than a year previously; boosted by German rearmament he had constantly, and longwindedly, ratcheted up his conditions for a return to the League of Nations or binding armament restrictions, while offering nothing worthwhile in return.20
At a conference convened in Stresa in the middle of April, the heads of government of Italy, France, and Britain issued a joint declaration, stating that ‘any unilateral termination of treaties’ would be dealt with by ‘all appropriate means’.21 On 17 April the Council of the League of Nations confirmed this declaration with the statement that Germany had contravened the Treaty of Versailles and was endangering the security of Europe.22 On 2 May 1935 France and the Soviet Union concluded a military pact. Yet none of these, on the whole moderate, responses to German remilitarization made Hitler change his rearmament policy in any fundamental way. On the contrary: as Goebbels, with whom Hitler discussed the foreign policy situation on various occasions following the British visit, records in his notes, the Chancellor was instead looking for opportunities to divide his opponents.
Hitler took Mussolini to be only bluffing when, according to Ulrich von Hassell, the German ambassador in Rome, the Italian leader claimed that war between the western powers and Hitler was inevitable. Even so, Hitler’s response was, ‘We’re not ready. We need peace for a long time yet.’23 He did not discount the possibility that Mussolini might ‘suddenly do something stupid and set things off’. According to Goebbels’s diary entries, Hitler was concerned that the French might intervene. They could be prompted to do so if Mussolini ‘did something rash’: ‘So we must be careful and not allow
ourselves to be provoked.’24 Mussolini’s own unmistakable preparations for war against the Ethiopian Empire were, however, also liable to create an international crisis from which the German Reich could profit, if it offered Mussolini support.25 The Propaganda Ministry had been repeatedly warning the German press since February 1935 not to criticize Italy’s policy towards Abyssinia.26 On 15 May Goebbels recorded the following from a discussion with Hitler: ‘Mussolini seems to have got himself entangled in Abyssinia. . . . He’s seeking our friendship again.’27
The aim of removing Italy from the Stresa front was a vital motive for Hitler’s speech, again styled a ‘peace speech’ by German propaganda, to the Reichstag on 21 May.28 On this occasion Hitler made the declaration Italy had long been hoping for, that he respected Austria’s borders. Mussolini responded immediately to this signal, referring in a meeting with the German ambassador to the possibility of German–Italian rapprochement.29 On 25 May the German press received an instruction ‘in future to avoid any friction with Italy on any subject’.30 Hitler’s speech on 21 May also contained an important concession to Britain; among other things he declared that Germany was prepared to limit its naval tonnage to 35 per cent of Britain’s. On the other hand, he attacked France by asserting that Germany’s western neighbour was threatening the Locarno Treaties by making a treaty with the Soviet Union (which Hitler called a ‘military alliance’). In addition, he called into question the demilitarization of the Rhineland by referring to the continuing ‘expansion of troop numbers’ on the French side. He rejected the resolution of the League of Nations of 17 April on the reintroduction of conscription. He also expressed his support for détente in Europe in countless different formulations and produced a dazzling array of confidence-inspiring proposals: non-aggression pacts with other neighbours, an aviation treaty, agreements on arms limitation and a total ban on particular weapons systems, a limit on gun calibres and shipbuilding, an international non-intervention treaty, to name but a few. In reality, however, this speech, ostensibly about peace, was an attempt to divert the Stresa powers from Germany’s policy of massive rearmament and to divide it as a ‘front’.
Hitler Page 55