Tiso arrived in Berlin on 13 March, where Hitler offered him ‘assistance’ in establishing an independent state. Tiso had a matter of ‘hours’ to make up his mind; if he did not accept, Hitler indicated that he would no longer oppose Hungary’s ambition to occupy Slovakia. However, Tiso refused to commit himself.126 Ribbentrop then worked on Tiso during a session lasting nearly six hours, finally presenting him with an ultimatum to declare his country’s independence the following day and, for his return journey to Pressburg, gave him the text of a telegram, appealing for help from the German government.127 Impressed by Tiso’s report on his Berlin meetings, on 14 March, the parliament in Pressburg declared the independence of Slovakia and elected Tiso prime minister; however, the telegram requesting help was only released on 15 March128 under German pressure.129 On 17 March, the new state formally recognized its dependence on the German Reich in a ‘treaty of protection’.130
The Czech president, Emil Hácha, and his foreign minister, Chvalkovský, arrived in Berlin on the evening of 14 March. Hitler forced them to wait for hours and then, during the night, and in the presence of, among others, Keitel, Göring, and Ribbentrop, subjected them to massive pressure, finally compelling them to capitulate.131 They had to sign a declaration, committing themselves to placing ‘the fate of the Czech people and country trustingly in the hands of the Führer of the German people’, who in turn promised ‘that he would place the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich and guarantee the autonomous development of its ethnic life in accordance with its particular character’.132 The German invasion of Czech territory began in the early morning. Hitler followed his troops, arriving that evening at Prague Castle in a convoy of vehicles.133 The following day he signed a decree establishing a ‘Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia’,134 placing the territories occupied by his troops under the Reich’s ‘protection’. The ‘autonomy’ granted to the Protectorate was to be supervised by a ‘Reich Protector’ residing in Prague, who was also responsible for confirming the members of the Protectorate’s government. Hitler appointed the former Foreign Minister, Neurath, as Reich Protector.
Hitler left Prague on the afternoon of 16 March, in order to return to Berlin via Brünn, Vienna, and Linz.135 On 19 March, the Party organized ‘spontaneous demonstrations’, as they were described in the Berlin press conference, throughout the Reich.136 In the capital Goebbels prepared another triumphal entry for Hitler. According to the Völkischer Beobachter, ‘never in the history of the world was a head of state paid such homage’. The boulevard, Unter den Linden, was transformed into a ‘canopy of light’ by means of anti-aircraft searchlights, above which there was a firework display.137
In fact, the new coup does not appear to have produced overwhelming enthusiasm among the German population. While, on the one hand, there was certainly admiration for the renewed proof of Hitler’s abilities as a statesman, there was, on the other, also surprise, criticism, and the fear of war.138 Even Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant, Below, wondered: ‘Was it necessary?’ In doing so, he hit the nail on the head,139 for, unlike their ‘Führer’, the majority of Germans did not consider the occupation of Prague, Bohemia, and Moravia as the fulfilment of longstanding plans for the future of a Greater Germany.
Hitler’s decision to tear up the Munich Agreement and occupy the ‘remainder of Czechoslovakia’ prompted the British and French governments to undertake a fundamental revision of their attitude to Hitler’s dictatorship. For, with the incorporation of non-German territories, it had become apparent that Hitler’s justification for his previous policies, namely that, acting on the principle of national self-determination, he was only bringing all Germans together in a single Reich, was simply a pretext for a brutal policy of expansion, while unscrupulously ignoring the rights of other nations. London and Paris now realized that the line followed hitherto of trying to appease Hitler by making more and more concessions had been a miscalculation. Dealing with Hitler clearly required another language.140 He, however, did not take seriously the warning voices and the formal protests from Paris and London; both countries recalled their ambassadors for consultations.141 Instead, he declared himself convinced that the British prime minister was simply pretending to ‘take action’.142
The fact that Hitler only informed Mussolini subsequently about the occupation of Prague was also not conducive to strengthening the relationship of trust between the ‘Axis power’, Italy, and its ally north of the Alps, and very probably contributed to Mussolini’s decision not to coordinate with Hitler the next steps in his policy of expansion.
The annexation of Memel
Completely unimpressed by these protests, after his return from Prague Hitler immediately embarked on his next diplomatic ‘coup’, the incorporation of Memel into the Reich.143 This territory, whose approximately 140,000 inhabitants were largely of German extraction, had been separated from Germany by the Versailles Treaty and had initially been under French administration; in 1923 it was occupied by Lithuania and, from 1924 onwards, had been administered by Lithuania as an autonomous territory on the basis of an international convention. In his directive of 21 October 1938 Hitler had already demanded the ‘capture of Memelland’, when the ‘political situation’ allowed it.144
On 1 November, under German pressure, the Lithuanian government had lifted martial law, which had been operating since 1926. A Memel German electoral list, dominated by Nazis, was then drawn up and, in an election on 11 December, was able to establish itself as the dominant political force, effectively coordinating the country with Nazi Germany and demanding its return to the Reich.145 In December, Hitler, accompanied by Ribbentrop, received Ernst Neumann, a leading representative of the Memel Germans and told him that Memel would be incorporated into Germany in March or April the following year; until then, he must maintain discipline among the Memel Germans.146
On 20 March 1939, Ribbentrop gave the Lithuanian foreign minister, Joseph Urbsys, who was visiting Berlin, an ultimatum to give up the territory. Under pressure, Urbsys secured the agreement of the Lithuanian cabinet in Kovno and, on 22 March, signed the transfer agreement in Berlin.147 The following morning, German troops moved into the territory without meeting resistance. Hitler, who had boarded the cruiser ‘Deutschland’ in Swinemünde the previous evening, sailed up the Lithuanian coast with an impressive fleet. Around noon he then switched to a torpedo boat, landing in Memel harbour, which had previously been secured by a unit of marines. In Memel he greeted the Memel Germans with a brief speech as new members of the ‘Greater German Reich’ and then signed the transfer treaty aboard the ‘Deutschland’.148
On the evening of 24 March, now back in Berlin, and during a joint visit to the Wintergarten variety show, Hitler gave Goebbels an insight into his thinking on foreign policy: ‘The Führer is contemplating a solution to the Danzig question. He will try again with Poland, using a certain amount of pressure, and is hoping it will respond. But we shall have to bite the bullet and guarantee Poland’s borders.’149
* Translators’ note: Göring used the Yiddish term ‘Muschpoke’.
28
Into War
Following the occupation of Prague and Memel, Hitler now focused once more on Poland.1 On 21 March, its ambassador, Lipski, told Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that the Polish government was disconcerted about the German ‘treaty of protection’ with Slovakia, and that ‘the announcement that the relationship was based on protection was clearly directed against Poland’. Ribbentrop played this down, proposing Beck should make an early visit to Berlin, in order to discuss with him ideas for a common policy. However, for Germany the return of Danzig was non-negotiable. It would recognize the Corridor, provided Poland agreed to an extra-territorial transport link between the Reich and East Prussia.2 Germany would also agree ‘to concur entirely with the Polish view of the Ukrainian question’. Two days later, Ribbentrop returned to the issue, instructing his ambassador in Warsaw to inform Beck that Germany was prepared not only to recognize the Corr
idor, but to guarantee the whole of the western border for a period of twenty-five years. Within the context of a common ‘eastern policy’, it would be prepared ‘to allow Poland to take the lead in dealing with the problem of the Ukraine as a whole’. Thus Ribbentrop was trying once more to play the ‘Ukrainian card’ with Poland, despite the fact that, during his visit to Warsaw in January, Beck had made it clear to him that Poland had no intention of engaging in common action against the Soviet Union. In view of Poland’s irritation about Slovakia, this was hardly the appropriate moment to renew an offer that had already been rejected. Hitler, for whom Ribbentrop’s offers had already gone too far, then intervened, and Ribbentrop, to his embarrassment, was forced to withdraw his instructions to Hans-Adolf von Moltke, the ambassador in Warsaw, who then had to cancel his appointment with Foreign Minister Beck.3
In fact, Beck did not come to Berlin, and the German proposals were unambiguously rejected by the Polish government; on 26 March, Lipski informed Ribbentrop, and on 28 March Beck informed the German ambassador in Warsaw. Instead, the Polish government demonstratively moved troop reinforcements to the Corridor. It then turned to Britain with a request for support, to which Chamberlain responded positively in a declaration to the House of Commons on 31 March. At the end of the month, the Polish Foreign Minister told the German ambassador in unambiguous terms that if Germany used force to resolve the Danzig question it would mean war. A quickly arranged visit to London by Beck led to the announcement at the beginning of April of a mutual assistance pact,4 which France joined shortly afterwards.5
Meanwhile, even before Poland’s rejection of the German government’s proposals had become known in Berlin, Hitler had informed the commanders-in-chief that, while he did not intend to resolve the ‘Polish question’ for the time being, the military should ‘work on it’. ‘Dealing with it in the near future would need particularly favourable political preconditions. Poland would then have to be crushed so that, for the next few decades, it no longer needs to be considered as a political factor.’6 War against Poland had now become a clearly defined political option for Hitler.
The document also noted that ‘the Führer doesn’t want to get involved’ in the Ukraine. They might at some point establish a Ukrainian state, but it was still an open question. Thus, Hitler had still not completely abandoned his speculative plans for the Ukraine; the Ukraine option was to reappear on a number of occasions during the following months.
Hitler’s decision to attack Poland
Hitler’s next move was to use the opportunity offered by the launch of the battleship, ‘Tirpitz’, the sister ship of the ‘Bismarck’, on 1 April in Wilhelmshaven, to deliver a tirade in the Rathausplatz attacking above all British ‘encirclement policy’. This attack was preceded and followed up by a vigorous anti-British press campaign.7 The slogan ‘encirclement’, which was increasingly used by German propaganda, was an overt reference to the situation at the beginning of the war in 1914, which, according to the dominant view in Germany, had been caused by an anti-German coalition led by Britain. In his speech Hitler referred to several alleged parallels with the situation in the summer of 1914, culminating in the threat to abrogate the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.
In his Wilhelmshaven speech Hitler justified his actions vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia with the argument ‘that for a thousand years this territory has been part of the German people’s living space’; he had merely ‘united what, on the basis of history and geography and, in accordance with all rational principles, ought to be united’. This obviously meant that the annexation of a large number of other European states could be justified by similar ‘historical’ and ‘spatial-political’ arguments.8 Hitler then spent a few days on board the ‘Strength through Joy’ ship, the ‘Robert Ley’, which was in the North Sea on its maiden cruise.9 Prior to embarkation, however, he authorized Keitel to issue in his name the ‘directive for the Wehrmacht to prepare for war’, which Keitel duly did on 3 April.
This directive provides documentary evidence that, under the impression of the Polish government’s rejection of Germany’s proposals at the end of March, and, in view of growing British–Polish cooperation, Hitler had radicalized his attitude towards Poland. Within a few days, the possibility of armed conflict, which he had sketched out at the end of March, had become a war plan.
In the directive of 3 April Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare for three scenarios, namely ‘to secure the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks’, ‘Case White’, in other words war against Poland, and the ‘seizure of Danzig’. In relation to Poland, Hitler stated that basically Germany’s attitude was determined by the desire ‘to avoid upsets’. However, were Poland to adopt an ‘aggressive attitude’ then a ‘final reckoning [could] become necessary’. According to Hitler, in the event of a war with their eastern neighbour, Germany’s leaders saw it as their task to ‘limit the war to Poland’. This eventuality might occur in the not too distant future as the result of a ‘growing crisis in France’ and, ‘in consequence, a growing reserve on the part of Britain’. This statement clearly shows that Hitler was not making his decision on whether or not to go to war dependent on ‘Poland’s threatening attitude’, but, first and foremost, on the next available opportunity that would allow him to crush Poland, while simultaneously avoiding having to fight a war in the West. Equally, he pointed out that Russian intervention would be of no use to Poland ‘because it would involve its destruction by Bolshevism’. The directive had already been printed when he also instructed Keitel that preparations would have to be made for ‘Case White’ such that ‘it would be possible to implement it at any time after 1 September 1939’.10
Thus, Hitler’s decision to fight a war with Poland at the first favourable opportunity after 1 September was made after Poland’s rejection of his ‘generous’ offer at the end of March and its move towards dependence on Britain, in other words between 26 March and 1 April, the day on which he embarked on his short pleasure trip on the North Sea. During this week, it became clear to him that the destruction of Czechoslovakia, in other words his breach of the Munich Agreement, had led the western powers to adopt a hostile attitude towards his policy of aggression. It had also caused the loss of, and change of sides by, his hitherto most important partner, Poland, which was not prepared to submit to his revisionist demands. Hitler’s response to this setback is comparable to his reaction to the Weekend Crisis nearly a year earlier. He determined to destroy the Polish state just as, in May 1938, he had determined to crush Czechoslovakia. As far as he was concerned, by rejecting his revisionist demands both countries had caused him a serious loss of face, for which they would have to pay with their elimination.11 As in the previous year, he believed he could ignore the risk of intervention by the western powers. If this proved unavoidable the Reich was far better prepared militarily than it had been a year earlier. His decision was irrevocable, which is clear, among other things, from the fact that diplomatic relations with Poland were now frozen. It was told that there was nothing more to negotiate; Ribbentrop’s offer had been ‘unique’.12
In contrast to the generals’ attitude to a premature war the previous year, the Wehrmacht now rapidly got to grips with its new task without raising any objections. War with Poland was studied by the general staff for the first time during a war game at the beginning of May; the assumption was that it would lead to a confrontation with the Soviet armed forces, which once again raised the question of a conquest of the Ukraine. Moreover, numerous agents from military intelligence, the Gestapo, and the SD were involved in stirring up the German minority in Poland, to get them to provoke incidents, thereby causing the Polish authorities to intervene, along the lines of the Sudeten crisis.13
Sabre-rattling and fear of war
The elaborate festivities to mark Hitler’s birthday on 20 April were designed to demonstrate his power and authority. However, it was striking that the only official representatives from foreign countries who came to
Berlin to congratulate the ‘Führer’ were delegations from Italy, Japan, Spain, Scandinavia, and the Balkans. Since the ambassadors from Britain, France, and the United States were also absent – they had been recalled after the invasion of Czechoslovakia – it was only too clear that Hitler’s birthday celebrations were taking place in the midst of a growing international crisis.14
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